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L a b o u r  U n i t y  i n  U n i o n  D i v e r s i t y
iDie Spaltung zwischen den Beiden Internationalen entsprang 
unvereinbaren Gegensätzen, aBer sie war nicht überaß deutlich zu 
ernennen und verschob sich beständig. (...) (Diese neuen, hier offenen, 
dort heimlichen Spaltungen und die alten blutgetränkten Qräben der 
nationalen Gegensätze Hefen nebeneinander, widereinander, kreuz und 
quer durch ganz ‘Europa und befanden sich in 'Bewegung wie Spalten 
eines dauernd von 'Erdbeben geschüttelten 9(pntinents. /MEINRAD 
INCUN, Schweizerspiegel, Roman, 1931-38, Gesammelte Werke 
V2, Zürich: Amman Verlag 1987)
L a b o u r  U n i t y  i n  u n i o n  d i v e r s i t y
A la mémoire des mes grands-parents passionnés, 
Für das liebevolle Verständnis meiner Eltern, 
And for Lee's enduring patience.
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P r e f a c e
Ich Betrachte meint ‘Karten als eine Maschinerie zur (Produktion von 
¡Hypothesen... (STEIN ROKKAN1980:128)
"Where does union diversity come from? " was the Leitmotif that hummed through many years 
of collective research on THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE UNIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE (DUES), 
a VW-Stiftung research project initiated by Peter Flora at the MZES, University of 
Mannheim. I am indebted to Jelle Visser for seven years of intellectual dialogue and 
exchange of ideas that kept us going on the comparative endeavour. While in the midst of 
painstakingly assembling data for collective use, it was a challenge and relief to reflect from 
afar about the sources of union diversity. The fascination for comparative sociology had 
been stimulated already many years earlier by my teachers Peter Flora and Charles Tilly, 
both admireres of Stein Rokkan's encompassing oeuvre.
A year in Geneva, the last three years in Florence, and many trips to Amsterdam and 
Mannheim in-between, have given me the chance to broaden my comparative and 
European perspective. The EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE sopra Florence (not far from a 
change-inducing Italian union school) was surely an appropriate place to undertake such a 
thesis project. Thanks to the DAAD/EUI grants, I profited from the institute's dedication to 
interdisciplinary research and its truely European character. My supervisors, Gösta Esping- 
Andersen and Hans-Peter Blossfeld, both gave me thankfully the freedom to draw a 
European map of union diversity wit large from a bird’s-eye-view.
For the opportunity to sketch my preliminary outline in various seminars, my gratitude 
goes to Wemer Abelshauser, Jean Blondel, Hans-Peter Blossfeld, Gösta Esping-Andereen 
(at the EUI), Charles Tilly (CSSC, New School, New York) and Peter Flora (MZES, 
University of Mannheim). Moreover, for having been invited to present some preliminary 
sketches, I am thankful to Jelle Visser (ISA Congress, Madrid, July 1990), Justin Greenwood 
(EC conference, Teeside, July 1991), and Willy Bürklin and Hansjörg Nielsen (ECPR 
workshop, Limerick, May 1992), and the EUI for travel grants.
For challenging discussions, comments and encouragement along the itinerary I am 
thankful to Axel Körner, David Purdy, Jens Bastian, Johan De Deken, Jürgen Grote, Katrin 
Behaghel, Lee R. Whelchel, Leopoldo Moscoso, Magaret Herden, Mary Daly, Maurice 
Glas man, Paul Thumer, Peter A. Kraus, and Steve Hopkins (a special merci to Jens, Katrin, 
Mary and Peter for having time while labouring on their own first 'academic child’). They 
all have pin-pointed at some remaining blank areas on my European map of union 
diversity. My hope is that it will provide a useful guide for further explorations.
B.E. Mannheim, February 1993
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In t r o d u c t io n :
Labour  U nity  a n d  U nity  D iversity
'just •what questions is a theory of (a6or organization supposed to 
answer? Only after this tasHihas Seen ejqpUcitly recognized can there be 
criticai discussion c f the development of the labor movement (...) 1.
9iotu is one to account for the origin or emergence of lahor 
organizations? ‘Hfait conditions are necessary and u/hat circumstances 
stimulate the precipitation of lahor organization? rHfcy have some 
workers organized and others not? 2. ‘What explains the pattern of 
growth and development of labor organizations? What factors are 
responsible for the sequence and form in which organizations have 
emerged in various countries, industries, crafts, and companies? Since 
there is great diversity in the patterns of development, any theory of the 
labor movement must account for these differences' (DUNLOP 1948:
164.)
Union diversity, not labour unity, prevails in Europe today. This contention may be 
astonishing in a decade when the dividing wall between the East and West crumbled, when 
European integration tears down century-long barriers, when World Markets become 
increasingly intertwined. Adherents to bygone modernization theories of convergence may 
rejoice in the light of these changes the final victory of the logic of industrialism. 
Modernization theorists of the 1950’s expected developed capitalist countries to converge in 
their economic, social and political development along one path set by the United States of 
America. Yet, today, we remain puzzled over persisting social differences across countries 
despite the global trends and similar challenges. Indeed, century-long man-built social 
institutions have resisted the convergence logic of industrialism. One of the social 
institutions that shows the most important institutional divergence across countries are 
organizations, practices and regulations in industrial relations (cf. KAELBLE 1987: 82). In 
fact, "diversity rather than uniformity characterizes the industrial relations experience of 
nations (POOLE 1986: 3)". Ironically, it is in one of the main areas of convergence theory 
(Ross & Hartman 1960, KERR et al. I960) that modernization theorists had to acknowledge
- though belatedly - an "exception to the rule" (cf. KERR 1983: 73). In particular, trade union 
movements with their century-long history vary across Western Europe in the degree of 
unity, centralization, and strength (cf. VISSER 1990). We may even expect union diversity to 
increase in the future (cf. POOLE 1986: 34-6) as heterogeneity of interests proliferates (cf. 
STREECK1987) and institutional differences amplify in periods of crisis.
Theories of labour movements, according to DUNLOP (1948, see cit. above), should 
explain both the origins of unions and their growth. How can we account for the differences in
1
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the emergence of labour interest organizations? And further: what where the consequences of these 
differences for their development? It is the origins and patterns of national diversity in the 
social organization of labour interests that are at the centre of this study. Hence, the 
Leitmotif of my investigation can be transcribed into a question: "Where does trade union 
diversity come from? (EBBINGHAUS & VlSSER 1990)". In order to advance a theory of labour 
movements I will try to import insights from political sociology, sociology of organizations 
and comparative-historical sociology (see Chapter 2). This study attempts to overcome the 
tendency to fall into ahistorical, ethnocentric, and atheoretical statements (cf. SHALEV 1980), 
as some observers of industrial relations seemed too enthralled by current involvement, 
national debates and political convictions to reflect from a distance on long-term 
developments.
C o n tem po ra ry  C h allen ges  t o  Eu r o pea n  U n io n s
Nevertheless, a historical, cross-cultural, and analytical study on union diversity cannot 
disregard but has to acknowledge the contemporary context, if not derive its rationale from 
today's pressing problems. Three major recent changes have provided a challenge to trade 
unions and stimulate current debate on the future role of unions and their role in politics 
and society. First, since the oil-crisis, economic and political changes led in many Western 
countries to a crisis of union movements that questions the future role of unions. However, 
union movements were differently affected by global pressures towards increased 
flexibilization, the intensifying international economic interdependence, and the limits to 
growth of Welfare States (cf. BOYER 1986, BaGUONI & CROUCH 1990, FLORA 1986). In fact, 
the level of union organization has diverged in recent decades as a result of differences in 
labour market institutions and different responses to the economic crisis (cf. VlSSER 1991). 
Second, the challenge of European political integration and international economic 
interdependence call for new forms of cooperation of labour across national boundaries 
and overcoming differences within national union movements, if labour still wants to be 
reckoned with in the future (cf. VlSSER & EBBINGHAUS 1992). Third, after the recent break­
down of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, these countries look to the Western world 
for models how to shape their own economic and political institutions, including the role 
and relationship of unions.
All these challenges pose two immediate questions: Can we learn from the past experience, 
those countries or union movements that fared best, how to adapt for the future? And related: Can 
one translocate, implant or harmonize political and economic contexts from one country to another 
despite their differences in social fabric, political and economic structures? Although an answer to 
these questions is beyond the scope of this study, it should be evident that an analysis of 
union diversity can provide insights about enduring institutional arrangements and long­
term processes that have a bearing not only on yesterday’s, but also on today’s and even 
tomorrow's problems. It is my conviction that in times of crisis we should not merely 
lament over the current symptoms of crisis, dispute its likely causes, or be polemic about 
apologetic future scenarios, but have some more distant, long-term perspective of the
2
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different contexts, various trajectories, and varying responses of union movements facing 
these challenges. A comparisons of union diversity across Europe indicates how much long 
enduring social cleavages have been an obstacle to labour unity. The conclusion that will be 
forwarded is that these divisions are relative persistent to change. Moreover, given the 
institutionalization of cleavages in union structures, similar or global challenges to unions 
will have different results and ask for different solutions in each country. With this study I 
would like to contribute to an understanding of the long-lasting differences in union 
diversity and the obstacle to European labour unity.
L abour  U nity  a n d  U n io n  D iversity
Labour unity is not a value in itself but a requirement that arises from the particular position 
of labour in society vis-à-vis capital (employers and their associations) and the state (cf. 
OFFE & WIESENTHAL 1980, KORPI 1983). Even if all potential workers are strongly organized 
and well represented, divisions of interests that cut across labour will weaken the 
bargaining power and influence of unions vis-à-vis these two main contenders. Thus the 
degree of unity in the organization of labour interests is of crucial value. Unity is then 
endangered when differences in the social structure give rise to cleavages (or enduring 
conflicts of interests) that became entrenched into separate organizations through the 
process of institutionalization (see Chapter 2).
But why is it so difficult to achieve labour unity? The best avenue to an understanding of 
the problem of labour unity is, in my view, to study the reverse problem: what are the 
origins of union diversity and why does it persist? Hence, the analysis will concentrate on 
the origin and pattern of the social organization of labour interests. I will adapt the cleavage 
analysis of party systems (LlPSET & ROKKAN 1967) to explain the origins and development 
of union diversity. The aim is to explain variations in union diversity across countries and 
time by examining the transformation of cleavages into organizations. There are many 
parallels between party systems and union systems, that make an adaptation (and 
comparison) of the cleavage analysis of party systems worthwhile for a study of union 
systems.
As will be shown, working-class party and allied unions as institutions, their relations, 
their embeddedness in the social structure, and their interlinkages were moulded in a 
similar way at about the same time before and around the First World War. As a 
consequence, cleavages in society at the time had an impact on the party systems as well as 
on the union systems. However, one of the problems in applying a thesis on party systems 
to union systems is related to the more complex organizational structure of unions: a union 
movement is an ’action-set' (ALDRICH & WHETTEN 1981) that is composed not only of one 
organization, like a political party with an internal structure, but of a loosely coupled 
network of relatively autonomous unions, that are only incompletely coordinated by a
3
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higher order peak association: the union centre1. One of the pitfalls of political science has 
been to compare too naively union centres and the allied party, disregarding the large 
heterogeneity within each union movement (cf. critique by MARKS 1989). Moreover, one 
further difference is that union systems reflect not only general political divisions in society 
but also sectional differences of interests that arise from the particular position of 
occupational groups in the labour market and in society. Therefore, I will extend Rokkan's 
cleavage analysis to develop a systematic view of functional intra-labour cleavages that 
cross-cut political cleavages.
The approach taken here assumes that the particular forms of labour interest 
organization became institutionalized at an early time, at the time of founding and early 
consolidation of these organizations. As a consequence, individuals face a limited, 
historically derived, set of interest organizations, parties and unions, from which they can 
choose. Although this freezing hypothesis, as originally developed for party systems (LlPSET 
& ROKKAN 1967), remains to be empirically tested for union systems, it serves here as a 
theoretical proposition. I vise the freezing hypothesis as a heuristic tool to explore the 
origins of institutions: how far have the unions been marked by the context of their emergence? 
And second, how much are the alternatives for subsequent adaptation to change limited by the 
previously institutionalized organizational decisions?
A number of organizational theories, however, support this heuristic assumption. They 
stress the importance of the institutionalization of the organizational structure at the time of 
founding and early consolidation. The organization's internal structure (degree of 
centralization, hierarchical authority) and its relationship with the environment (social 
structure, supporting organizations) which were dominant at the time of foundation were 
then socially imprinted (cf. STINCHCOMBE 1965) and are thereafter difficult to be dislocated. 
For various reasons, organizations once institutionalized tend to structural inertia (HANNAN 
& FREEMAN 1984), resisting radical changes in their internal or external structure. It will be 
argued that the specific form of organizational formation and consolidation (PANEBLANCO 
1988) constrains the possibilities of reaching consent and, more importantly, implement 
decisions to adapt the organization to a changing environment.
Even though organizations may adapt to changing environments by strategic decisions 
at critical junctures, the claim developed in this study is that "developments or decisions at 
one step set conditions or constraints for the next" (ROKKAN 1977: 564). Hence, even after 
social, political and economic changes have altered the context in which an organization 
emerged, the initial structure once institutionalized remains an obstacle to profound and 
immediate change. Although there may be new cleavages challenging an established party 
or union, these organizations may be able to secure their survival through adaptation and 
exploitation of institutionalized links.
1 I use the term "union centre” to denote various national and historical forms of union peak 
associations, such as union commissions, congresses, central organizations, or confederations (or 
federations, in American usage), with varying degrees of centralization and power.
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U n io n s  as C ollective A sso ciatio ns a n d  C o rpo rate  A ctors
However, unions have a dual function in modem society and economy that bring them 
under tension to adapt to changes in the social and political environment. According to the 
famous definition of the WEBBS (1894/1920), a trade union is "a continuous association of 
wage-eamers for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their working 
lives (employment) (WEBB & WEBB 1894/1920: 1)". Unions are collective associations, 
organizing and representing the interests of wage-eamers. On the other hand, unions are 
corporate actors, that is, organizations that represent these interests to the outside. Unions 
are in their internal relations collective associations and in their external relations corporate 
actors. Unions aggregate the interests of labour and then represent these interests vis-à-vis 
their contenders, the state and the employers. Hence, unions take the function of 
intermedian/ organizations (cf. MÜLLER-JENTSCH 1983, STREECK 1987). They are as collective 
associations embedded in the social structure and as corporate actors interweaved into the 
web of industrial relations. This dual institutionalization in the social structure and within 
the social system is the main reason why union systems reflect (or are subject to) cleavage 
structures in society.
Unions as collective associations of interests are largely based on voluntary membership - 
though group pressure and other forms of coercion may limit in some cases the freedom to 
join a union or not. Am important consequence is the particular relationship between the 
union and its membership base is the 'sodai embeddedness' (GRANOVETTER 1985) of 
unions. Yet the question arises: what interests are actually organized through collective 
associations? Not all potential interest groups are equally represented by unions, some 
groups may be prevented from organization by missing initiative, external force, high 
organizational costs, or lack of solidarity. Moreover, unions must as collective associations 
recruit and mobilize enough members to finance their task, have enough broad support 
from the public, and enough legitimation to be considered a representative. As Olson 
observed, unions face a collective action problem, how can they prevent individuals from free­
riding by consuming public goods but not contributing to their production (cf. OLSON 1965)? In 
short, unions as collective associations have to deal with the consequences of the logic of 
membership (cf. SCHMTITER & STREECK 1981, STREECK 1987).
Unions as corporate actors have to recruit a leadership, build up an administrative 
structure and internal processes of decision making that allow them to represent their 
members’ interests vis-à-xris their contenders. There is a general drive in modem society to 
organize, and unions arise in the labour market out of the need to check the concentration 
of economic power (MARTINGALE 1966). Though due to the collective action problem not all 
interests become equally well represented. The larger the organization, the more it is a part 
of an exchange relationship with other organizations and the more the leadership may 
depart from its membership base. The problem of 'oligarchy' has become a common 
critique of modem, bureaucratic, big unionism since its emergence (see MICHELS 1911). A 
further consequence of the role of unions as corporate actors is the increasing importance of 
organizational interdependence from its environment. How much is unity and
5
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centralization of labour interests achieved vis-à-vis the state and employers? In short, 
unions as corporate actors have to face the consequences of the logic of representation (cf. 
SCHMITTER & STREECK 1981, STREECK 1987).
U nions as Intermediary O rganizations and Instttutions
This study of trade unions aims to fill a "missing link" in comparative sociology between 
macro-sociological analysis at the system level (cross-national) and micro-comparisons of 
individual behaviour and attitudes. It is my conviction that organizations at the meso-level 
are an important intermediary structure between both macro-level and micro-level (cf. 
COLLINS 1988), between structure and agency (cf. ÀHRNE 1990). Thus there is a need to 
elaborate on this "missing link", the intermediary structures linking individuals to the social 
structure and organizations to the social system.
As intermediary structures unions provide the dual function of social integration and 
system integration (LOCKWOOD 1964, cf. STREECK 1987), they bring people with similar 
interests together and also represent their interests within the political and economic 
system. In order to perform these functions, deavage-organizations, whether parties or 
unions, use the strategies of sodai and organizational closure to mobilize and represent 
interests. I will discuss the process of social closure (cf. WEBER 1922), or segmentation, and 
the process of organizational closure, or pillarization, in more detail in the following chapter 
(see Chapter 2). Yet, unions are themselves also subjed to social and system integration, 
they are affeded by the sodai integration of their members into society and by the 
integration of the organization into the political and economic system. This in turn, so the 
claim of this study, will lead to the processes of desegmentation and depillarization, that 
undercut the bases of social cleavages of these organizations (see Chapter 10).
The missing link in the explanation of union diversity is not only a problem of the level 
of analysis but also the need to combine micro-level and macro-level processes. There is 
also a gap in many accounts as to the process by which institutions last. It is not sufficient 
to explain differences between countries in union diversity by mere reference to differences 
in the environment. Though today's organizational structure reflects the outcome of 
processes that were at work in the past. An explanation that links today's diversity to past 
differences is not sufficient. We need to demonstrate how these differences became 
institutionalized within a sodety and how past practices became frozen into institutions 
that last beyond changes in the factors that were initially responsible for their formation.
Recently, Coleman has stressed that "social theory must concern itself with the problem 
of constructed social organization" (COLEMAN 1991: 8). This study will focus at the meso- 
level of organizations, examining their relations to the macro level environment and their 
social embedded ing. In so far, I will depart from the long tradition in theories of labour 
movements to consider countries as cases of invariant national charaderistics that are often 
conceived as a result of national differences in value systems (a tradition from PERLMAN
6
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1928 to LlPSET 1983).2 For example, French exceptionalism will be discussed not as a 
particularism of the French nation-state or her people, but as a particular failure of 
institutionalizing modem differentiated labour organizations due to adverse circumstances. 
Cross-national union diversity will be explained by reference to the differences in the 
process of institutionalization of labour organizations. The selection of the unit of analysis 
is a "decisive first choice" (GaLTUNC 1969), and leads to a particular avenue of explanation.
I base my focus on the meso-level on the contention that intermediary structures are the 
locus of institutionalization processes that structure organizational alternatives.
For A Comparative-H istorical Sociology of Unions
In searching for the forms and causes of union diversity, I adapt a particular research 
philosophy. To study the origins and development of union diversity across countries and 
time is to compare the dynamic long-term development of an institution namely the 
organization of labour interests. The focus of the study lies on the particular configurations 
under which differences in labour organization arose as well as their long-term 
consequences. This study aims to be both comparative and historical, examining different 
configurations and trajectories of union diversity across Western Europe during the last one 
hundred years. There are two dimensions along which both the object of the study as well 
as the explanatory factors may vary: across space and time. At any particular point in time, 
the outcome (union diversity) and the social context changes from setting to setting, while 
the timing and trajectory may also vary. In order to account for union diversity in Western 
Europe one has to pursue a comparative and historical sociology.
Comparison will not only allow us to highlight the differences across countries in the 
different forms of organization of labour interests but will also permit us to compare the 
varying or similar contexts under which union diversity exists. Since my assumption in this 
study is that the organization of labour interests is thoroughly embedded in the social 
structure and contingent upon the socio-economic and political environment, a cross­
national comparison becomes pertinent to look systematically at the impact of variation in 
the context on the organization of labour interests. The comparative method allows us to go 
beyond the ethno-centric perspective of a country case study, it has been an important 
research strategy in institutionalist approaches to industrial relations (SHALEV 1980, POOLE
1986).
However, synchronical comparison alone will be misleading, as, for example, today's 
union system is not necessarily strongly related to the contemporary social structure, it 
does not highly correlate. Instead, today's union system reflects - in its aged tectonic 
structure - encrusted practices derived from past social structures that were successful in 
surviving in spite of ongoing social change (cf. SnNCHCOMBE 1968). Hence, for an 
explanation of diversity we have to search for its origins. My claim is that differences in the
2 The comparative study of Marks (1989) on the variation of political activity of selected 
national unions is a step in this direction.
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organization of labour interests between countries have been long lasting and date back to 
past divergent steps taken at critical junctures under varying configurations. Therefore, I 
will combine the comparative method and a historical perspective, partly in a diachronical, 
partly in dynamic comparative approach. The former view looks at critical conjunctures in 
the development of trade unions, while the later will analyze the social process across time.
A historical perspective, particularly in industrial relations, is "more helpful if we wish to 
understand both the variety in the typ>e of organizations and the reasons of their existence 
(FLANDERS 1968: 27)". However, there is the pitfall of "hindsight", if we were to interpret 
history backwards, when in retrospective analysis we attribute inevitability to earlier 
actions that were only a precondition to later developments (EUAS 1970: 178-179). We 
project teleological necessity into the development from its origins, though the outcome 
was in fact undecided at the time. In industrial relations theory, the gap between an 
account of the different origins and varying patterns of diversity has often lacked an 
explicit treatment of the process by which past structural differences have an impact on 
later decisions. I will return to this "linking" process of the social organization of interests, 
that is the transformation, social embedding and institutionalization of cleavage structures 
into organizations, in the following chapter in more detail.
The Selection of Cases and the Time Frame
A crucial choice is the selection of cases and time. This is based on the very pur prose of 
comparison: do we ivant to highlight differences or similarities? In principle, comparisons are 
based on one or both of Mill's classic methods of agreement and of difference (MILL [1881], 
SKOCPOL 1984: 378-9). According to the method of agreement, one searches for crucial 
similarities in the outcome as well as the one variable that may not vary with the others. 
The contrary is the case with the method of difference, crucial differences exist in the 
outcome and one searches for one variable that correlates, while the other crucial variables 
remain constant. The research design of this study with its interest in explaining union 
diversity surely stresses the method of difference. However, since social reality is more 
complicated then simple logic allows, we face situations where more than one crucial 
variable correlates with the outcome making the causal relationship spurious. I have used 
two possible strategies to deliberately limit the large diversity: comparison of numerous 
units that have enough similarity and comparison over time of the same unit allows us to 
keep some variables constant.
Related to the question of the method of comparison is the question of the number of 
units being compared. The question of the number of units (often noted as: "N") has 
important practical consequences but also theoretical implications as to how much 
variation or similarity one encounters. Adherents to a "large-N" method tend to be variable- 
oriented, amassing large numbers of mainly quantitative indicators that are statistically 
correlated, while those with a "small-N” design are case-oriented, stressing the particular 
configuration of an individual case and use mainly qualitative material (RAGIN 1987). The 
dilemma is that the "small-N" researcher stressing differences in the outcome faces too
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much variation between too few cases to systematically discard them. The "large-N" 
researcher on the other hand is confronted with the reverse problem, he can keep some 
differences statistically constant and stress the similarities in outcome under s im ila r  
conditions but cannot account for the process at work in each case.
The selection of countries with a similar setting helps to reduce some of the spurious 
variations ("most similar country design", cf. PR2EWORSKI & TEUNE 1970, UJPHART 1971). 
The twelve countries chosen are all part of one world region (Western Europe). They share 
enough commonalities to make a comparison fruitful and not arbitrary.3 These countries 
have all been exposed to the same social processes, albeit with varying speed and intensity, 
the Industrial and National Revolutions, the transition towards a capitalist industrial 
economy and a democratic nation-state (cf. CROUCH 1986, ROKKAN1975). Trade unions as a 
specific institution to represent the interest of the dependent work force vis-à-vis employers 
and the state can be seen as a European innovation that spread across Europe and from 
there elsewhere. As in the case of Nation-State building, European development represents 
a unique configuration compared to other world regions (cf. ROKKAN 1975). Since this 
analysis limits itself to one world region, regarding only the more comparable twelve 
country cases, it limits consciously the range of diversity. As has been pointed out, 
generalizations based on "limited diversity" such as in the works of ROKKAN (1970, 1975) 
make simplifying assumptions about the non investigated cases by ruling them out as non 
instances or disregarding cases outside the realm of study (RagIN 1987). This may be a 
reasonable price to be paid for being able to come to regionally bound hypothesis or 
"middle-ranged theories" (MERTON 1957) that can be challenged thereafter by more general 
applications.
If the selection of cases has to be defended, so has the choice of the time frame. I have 
chosen the year 1989 as the point to end my analysis, not just for the reason that I started 
writing in that year but that the situation after demise of Communist regimes remain still 
unclear. As in event history analysis, right-censoring, the cut-off point of a study may be 
less problematic than left-censoring (TUMA & HANNAN 1984: 47), that is, where do we start? 
Given the interest in long-term processes of the social organization of labour interests, I had 
necessarily to go far back in history. For the magic of numbers I have tried to collect 
information more systematically for one hundred years if possible from 1890 to 1989. 
Although I will consider some events before the 1890s, it is a good starting point to 
compare differences in development of trade unions. The 1890s were the period in which 
new unionism came to its breakthrough in England, and spread from there, in Germany 
with the lifting of the political restrictions the Free labour movement started to become a
3 These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, (West) Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. Finland, Iceland and Luxembourg 
have been excluded due to lack of documentation and data. Greece, Portugal, and Spain, now 
members of the European community, have been excluded since they had more than thirty years of 
non-democratic regimes and again documentation and data are difficult to obtain.
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coordinated centre, and in France, regional labour exchanges became organized parallel to 
the dispersed local and national unions, to indicate only some major countries.
The Comparative Design: Encompassing Variations
Let me stress in concluding that the purpose of this exercise in comparative historical 
sociology is to develop relative general macro-sociological hypotheses that are grounded on 
a particular organizational perspective. The aim of this study is to account for union 
diversity in two ways: first, to analyze the causes for the differences in the way in which 
labour interests became organized across Europe, and second to relate the major differences 
of labour organization across Europe to variations along the major constitutive features (or 
master variables). The former may fall - using Tilly’s schema of four comparative designs - 
into the category of variation-finding, while the second, as Tilly warns a "more risky" 
venture, can be called encompassing comparison (TILLY 1984).
First, variation-finding comparison will be conducted in each of the six main chapters 
(Chapters 3-8), explaining the differences in the pattern of union organization as the 
outcome of different organizational choices at critical junctures under particular 
configurations. My aim is to explain the variation in the "structuring of alternatives" 
(ROKKAN 1977). The sequence of these choices are path dependent (NORTH 1990) where 
previous decisions lead to a reduced set of alternatives (or a "nested game" situation, cf. 
TSEBEUS 1990). Thus differences are not only found in the form of organizations but also in 
the process at stake, there are ramifications in the developmental paths, or - in a more 
belligerent picture - these "trajectories” differ. Hence, union diversity should be accounted 
by differences in the particular configurations and organizational decisions taken at critical 
conjunctures and the consequentially different sequential paths. For example, I will later 
claim (in Part ED that the particular form of the division of labour between working class 
political parties and unions as it was established at an earlier time had different 
consequences for the consecutive relationship and development of the two interest 
organizations.
Second, encompassing comparison is a synthetic approach that draws attention to the 
configuration of factors that led to the diversity across countries (cf. TILLY 1984, RacIN
1987). In the last concluding chapters, a Rokkanean conceptual map (ROKKAN 1975) will be 
sketched for an encompassing view on union diversity. A conceptual map is a diachronical- 
comparative typology placing each case along the major cross-cutting axes that represent 
the variation of the master variables (cf. FLORA 1981, TILLY 1984). These maps are not only a 
summary representation of the variation-finding explanation but an encompassing view of 
the interrelations of particular outcomes within the larger system. One of the important, 
often overlooked features of these conceptual maps is that they can serve as a guide in our 
understanding of the processes of trans-national integration. From these conceptual maps 
of union diversity we can read the commonality and its diversity across l'espace social 
européen (an European social space, J. Delors). Over the last hundred years we find many 
cross-national influences on the community of discourse (WUTHNOW 1989) and increasing
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pressures towards economic and political integration of Western Europe. This will lead to 
further "conectedness" within the conceptual map, not so much for reasons of similarities in 
configurational contexts, but due to trans-national influences and supra-national 
integration. These transnational interdependences are more evident in the case of nation­
state systems (cf. ROKKAN 1975) than in the case of trade unions. However, it will gain more 
visibility and attention in the future. In so far, these conceptual maps of union diversity 
may be a guide to search for clusters of dominant forms and tensions within a more 
integrated, future European industrial relations system.
Figure 1.1
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Finally, I should give a rationale for the scheme of cleavages that I take to be the major 
sources for variations in labour unity and union diversity in Europe. Certainly, following 
Marx' class analysis the dominant cleavage that gave rise to the labour movement is the 
labour-caprital cleavage. Both political parties and trade unions are relatively universal 
organizational responses to the labour-capital cleavage (cf. LIPSET & ROKKAN 1967) as will 
be described later (see Chapter 3). However, union diversity points at internal 
fragmentation of labour interests. The class cleavage is in many societies cross-cut by other
- older and newer - social cleavages. As WEBER (1922) and many of his followers pointed 
out MARX erred in assuming that the class conflict - arising from the opposing interests 
between owner of the means of production and those with labour power only - would 
become the dominant cleavage in society. What are the cross-cutting class cleavages?
WEBER (1922: 177) has proposed two additional bases of class interests besides the 
Marxian view of Besitzklasse (property class): Erwerbsklasse (employment class) and soziale 
Klasse (social class). In my view, the two main cleavage axes that can intersect the labour- 
capital cleavage (the property question) are conflicts based on subdivisions in the labour 
market (Weber’s employment class) and social divisions in the society (Weber's social
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class). I will subsume the two cleavages under the concepts of functional cleavage and 
political (or segmentational) cleavage, following partly LORWIN (1971). Thus, a trade union 
organized solely on lines of skill or industry or employer unit is a functional organization, 
while a Catholic or Protestant or Socialist trade union is a segmented organization" 
(LORWIN 1971:141).
Political (or segmentational) cleavages based on Weltanschauung (LORWIN 1971) have the 
potential for cross-cutting the labour-capital cleavage, since "who one associates with is not 
completely predictable from one's occupation" (COLLINS 1975: 82). Ethnicity and religious 
community, but also political orientation, have given rise to the formation of different 
interest groupings within labour. Weltanschauung becomes the base of identity and social 
relations for a famille spirituelle (a community of believers). However, these cleavages cross­
cut the labour-capital cleavage (cf. UPSET & ROKKAN 1967) differently across Europe, 
depending on the particular salience of these cleavages in a society. When labour 
movements emerged and consolidated around the First World war, each national labour 
movement found a varying number of political cleavages that had already been mobilized 
and divided the society. European labour is, in my view, most importantly divided, by 
three political cleavages: the labour-capital, State-Church and reform-revolution cleavages 
(cf. LlPSET & ROKKAN 1967, ROKKAN 1968). The cleavages became transformed into Social- 
Democratic, Christian and Communist labour movements, with some significant variations, 
such as syndicalism. Each line of conflict arises as a consequence of the interaction of the 
National and Industrial Revolution (cf. ROKKAN 1968): the claim of the working-class for 
democratization of the polity, the Church reaction to secularization and secular expansion of 
the Nation-State, the reaction of the Left to the International communist revolution. In the 
following chapters on political cleavages (Part Two), I shall examine the impact of the 
labour-capital cleavage, the Church-State cleavage and the revolution-reform cleavage.
In addition to political cleavages, differences in the labour process and labour market 
give rise to different Interessenlagen (interest bases) of section in the workforce. This is the 
second major axes of union cleavages: conflicts that arise from the segmentation of the 
labour markets (MACKENZIE 1982). "Segmented Work, Divided Workers" (GORDON, EDWARDS
& REICH 1982) may be dubbed the punchline of functional union diversity. This is not to fall 
into technical contingency arguments over the interest base. Although these cleavages 
became mass phenomena in the course of modem capitalism, they have their sources in 
pre-industrial social divisions in society, such as craft tradition, status distinctions and state 
authority structures. Functional cleavages derive from the social division of labour (cf. 
DURKHE1M 1893), they reflect social divisions and the distribution of power in a society (cf. 
RUESCHMEYER 1986).
The processes that gave rise to the cross-cutting functional class cleavages are relatively 
universal but their mitigation varied from society to society. The rise of mass production, 
the advance of white-collar work, the growth of public employment were all common 
phenomena to modem advanced capitalist societies. Yet, as will be shown later their 
timing, scope and pattern varied across Europe (see Part Three). Following the Industrial
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and National Revolution, three changes led to segmentations in the labour market (Cf. 
Figure 1.1): the Taylorist Revolution and the rise of mass production, the tertiarization and 
expansion of service work, and the growth of the welfare state and public employment. 
Each of these processes had the potential for further cleavages: the craft-industry, white- 
blue collarline, and the public-private cleavages. These cleavages were differently 
transformed into organizations, some were encompassed in inclusive unions, in others 
cases sectionalist unions emerged in competition to existing ones. Moreover, labour 
organizations were not only shaped by the functional cleavages, they further reinforced 
through their interest politics the social divisions upon which they were based. Hence, 
segmentational cleavages originate from closed social mobility and ingroup social 
association within the Weltanschauung community, while functional cleavages derive from 
closed mobility patterns in the labour market. Segmentational cleavages arise primarily 
from divisions in society, functional cleavages from the social divisions of labour. The 
former tends to arise in general from conflicts with the State, the later from conflicts with 
the employers.
An Outline of the Thesis
Let me provide a short overview of what will be presented in the following chapters. First, I 
shall lay out the methodological and theoretical bases of the study and the main argument 
(Chapter 2). I propose a sociological approach to the study of unions as intermediary 
organizations. How are interests formed, organized, mobilized and represented? The chapter 
exposes the argument on institutionalization of major lines of conflict of interests (or 
cleavage structures) into union diversity. It also sketches an evolutionary model of the 
organization of labour, the differentiation between unions and party, and between unions 
and union centre.
The main empirical sections of the study will be dealing with political cleavages (Part II) 
and functional cleavages (Part III) that gave rise to important differences in the organization 
of labour across Western Europe. Part II discusses the three political cleavages that gave rise 
to the Socialist labour movement (Chapter 3), the Christian labour movement (Chapter 4) 
and the Communist labour movement (Chapter 5). In each of these three chapters, the 
formation of the cleavage, the creation of political parties and the emergence of allied union 
centres will be sketched. Thereafter, follows a dynamic analysis of the tension of party- 
union relations as unions and party move on diverging paths caused by incongruous logics 
of membership and of representation, that is between extending their social base and 
representing the more heterogeneous interests. By analyzing each line of cleavage the part 
on political cleavages reveals how each line of conflict became differently transformed, 
leading to variations in political union diversity across Europe.
The second part on cleavages discusses cross-cutting functional cleavages that found 
expression in different forms of union organizations: the craft vs. industry union principles 
(Chapter 6), the white-collar vs. blue-collar cleavage (Chapter 7), and the private vs. public 
sector cleavage (Chapter 8). In each of these three chapters, the formation of the cleavage,
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the emergence of national unions and the creation of (or integration into) a union centre are 
discussed. Again, a dynamic analysis of the logic of membership and representation 
follows, highlighting the tensions between unity and strength of particular forms of interest 
organization. In the part on functional cleavages, each line of conflict is analyzed as to its 
impact on functional diversity across Europe.
Adopting Rokkan's perspective my aim is to draw as a conclusion a Conceptual Map of 
union diversity in Western Europe (Chapter 9) that encompasses the major factors that 
have led to diversity in the organization of labour interests. The major challenge to 
European labour is to overcome union diversity. The conceptual map of union diversity 
developed before should provide us with a framework for the discussion of possible future 
points of adaptation. The last, concluding chapter (Chapter 10) takes a again the issue 
raised at the beginning: can roe detect a convergence towards labour unity, or is union diversity 
persisting in Europe?
Finally I would like to stress that given the scope of the comparison the attempt to 
develop a general scheme for one hundred years and twelve European labour movements 
is a rather "risky" venture. Any single case may be challenged by more detailed national or 
historical studies. New evidence may bring about new interpretations of facts requiring 
revisions of the model which can only be welcomed. This study should be seen as part of a 
collective enterprise initiated by studies like STURMTHAL'S Unity and Diversity in European 
Labor (1953). As ROKKAN (1980) pointed out the conceptual maps should be used as a 
"machine to produce hypotheses" that are certainly tentative but try to encompass the 
diversity across Western Europe in our explanation and naturally provoke further 
elaboration. It is for the reader to judge at the end whether "the dwarf who stands on the 
shoulder of giants sees further than the giants themselves" (MERTON 1965).
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2
7 catted for a detailed analysis of the parallels and the interactions 
between two sets of organization-building efforts: the structuring of 
alternatives in what 1 catted the 'numerical democracy' channel and the 
building of effective units of action in the corporate bargaining chan­
nel. (...) Si full-fledged model would have to generate hypotheses not 
only about the emergence of alternatives in the electoral channel but 
also about the structuring of mass organizations in the corporate chan­
nels and about types of interlinkages between the units in the two 
arenas. (...) 9{pne of this can be sorted out systematically without de­
tailed analyses of the actual cleavage bases of the movements: we have 
to (oo(i at the sequences of cleavage crystallization and we must find  
how far the first mobilizing agencies were téle to exploit the electoral 
and the membership markets before the ne%t set of agencies emerged 
PRpkkpn 1977:563, 568, italics removed).
Union diversity originates from the fragmentation of labour interests. However, from 
labour interests to union organization we cannot draw a direct, linear line. The social orga­
nization of interests is a transformation process. Not all potential conflicts of interests will 
find their expression. Moreover, not all collective interests are organizable, some pose 
formidable problems of getting people together to act in their interests, others are difficult 
to be represented. Ironically, where such a transformation from interests to organization is
successful, the very success makes later further change difficult. Organizations tend to
inertia and thus cleavages become frozen. The more successful an organization consoli­
dates, bolsters group solidarity, and orchestrates its external relations, the more it becomes 
lured into organizational languor. My assumption is that organizations reflect the conflict 
of interest of the time of their emergence, that these cleavages become institutionalized in 
organizations. Moreover, social cleavages become frozen in the organizational structure 
and the organization is relative resistant against immediate adaptation to social change.
In this chapter I shall provide the general concepts and models of the transformation of 
cleavages into organizations. First, I shall follow each phase of the process of formation, 
organization, mobilization and intermediation of interests. From political sociology I will 
borrow the concept of cleavages to delineate important lines of conflict that gave rise to the 
formation of interests vis-à-ms contenders. Cleavages provide the base on which collective 
organizations are formed, they delineate the boundaries of an interest community 
internally and externally. Cleavages help creating and maintaining unity. However, even 
an organization based on group solidarity and common interests faces two problems: the 
problem of mobilization and intermediation. Potential members have to be mobilized for 
collective action and interests have to be represented effectively. Moreover, there is a ten­
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sion between the two logics in the face of ongoing social and political change, a challenge 
that requires adaptation of the organization. If an organization fails to adapt it will be en­
dangered to dissolve or disintegrate.
Second, I shall develop the thesis that organizations once established tend to structural 
inertia, that cleavages become frozen in the organizational structure. The process of institu­
tionalization operates at all level and phases of the transformation of cleavages into organi­
zations. The process of institutionalization consolidates the organizational structure, deep­
ens the embedding of the organization in the social structure, and strengthens its links to 
other organizations. My contention is that there is an institutional path: organizational 
decisions at an earlier time structure and delimit the alternatives for future adaptation.
Finally, I shall introduce an evolutionary model of the differentiation of labour organi­
zations. Political party and trade unions emerged and differentiated as separate institu­
tions, one in the political "electoral channel", the other in the economic "bargaining chan­
nel". Within the action set of unions, two levels of organizations became differentiated at 
the level of the individual unions and at the level of peak associations (or alliances of these 
unions). This will be followed by a listing of possible explanatory factors for political and 
functional cleavages that contributed to union diversity. A discussion of the processes of 
social closure and pillarization provides two concepts for understanding the rise and 
decline of cleavage organizations, that will be discussed in the following chapters on each 
political and functional cleavage.
I
Th e  T r a n sfo r m a t io n  o f  
C leav a ges in t o  O r g a n iz a t io n s
Cleavages are at the root of union diversity. For a better understanding of the differences in 
the organization of labour interests across Europe we must examine how interests become 
organized. However, there is no linear relationship from interests to organization. Not all 
potential conflicts of labour interest find their expression in union organization. For build­
ing a strong interest organization a formal organization structure has to be build, resources 
must be mobilized and its relations to the outside should be structured. Hence, it will be 
argued that cleavages become transformed into collective organizations by an intricated 
process of formation, organizational foundation, mobilization, representation and possible 
future adaptation. Before I shall discuss each of these processes, let me first clarify the con­
cept of cleavage since the concept takes here a central position, though it is relatively 
vaguely defined in political sociology (cf. ZUCKERMAN1975).
First of all, cleamges should be distinguished from social conflict as such: "A cleavage is a 
division on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups or organizations among whom 
conflict may arise. The concept of cleavage is thus not identical with the concept of conflict; 
cleavages may lead to conflict, but a cleavage need not always be attended by conflict. A 
division of individuals, groups or organizations constitutes a cleavage if there is some
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probability of a conflict. (...) Cleavages operate in the social structure dividing it into 
various collectivities; sometimes such structural cleavages become the target of conscious 
orientation and a variety of interests are defined " (L a n e  & ERSSON 1991: 53). Cleavages are 
thus potential lines of conflict that result from differences in the social structure. Yet they 
are also partly shaped by the mobilization of these conflicts through collective actors. Not 
all cleavages are necessarily politicised and find their organizational representation. Fol­
lowing the sociologist MERTON (1948), one could distinguish between latent and manifest 
conflicts of interests (cf. also DAHRENDORF1959:178). Nevertheless, in order to compare the 
"bewildering variety" (ABRAMS 1982:163-177) in cleavage structures I will use an a posteriori 
classification of cleavages based on the evolution of social conflict and the organizational 
responses to general social processes (e.g. Industrial Revolution). The question of whether, 
when and how these potential lines of cleavages became crystallized and mobilized by 
organizations remains the subject of empirical analysis in the subsequent chapters.
One should be careful not to fall into the trap SaRTORI (1969) once called sociological 
determinism by extrapolating political cleavages from social stratification. In sociology and 
political sciences, "the concept of cleavage is often either reduced 'down' to that of ’social 
cleavage’ or raised 'up' to that of 'political cleavage' (BARTOLINI & MAIR1990: 215)". Instead, 
cleavage structuration should be analyzed as a two-step transformation process of latent 
conflicts in the social structure and their crystallization into manifest political conflicts. 
Social cleavages are transformed into organizations but are also shaped by collective actors.
In the following I shall discuss five aspects of the transformation of cleavages into organiza­
tion. Following a similar scheme by ROKKAN (1 9 7 7 )1,1  distinguish five processes: (1) forma­
tion, (2) organization, (3) mobilization, (4) representation, and (5) adaptation. First, in the 
formation phase new social groupings emerge and new lines of conflict crystallize. Second, 
the organization phase the social cleavages of the time of foundation become 
institutionalized within the organization. Third, the organization faces a mobilization 
problem once it cannot control its boundaries but has to organize beyond the small bases of 
group solidarity. Fourth, at the same time, if faces a representation problem of how to 
intermediate the common interests. It will often seek broader alliances with other 
organizations. Finally, as social and political change continues, the organization faces the 
problem of adaptation. However, there is a trade-off between opening up for new groups 
and alienating the old followers, between seeking new alliances and rebuffing the old allies. 
Let us discuss now each aspect in its own right.
1 Rokkan distinguished six steps in the translation process: (1) the generation of cleavage lines,
(2) the crystallization of cleavage lines, (3) alliances of political entrepreneurs, (4) choices of mobi­
lization strategies made by such entrepreneurs, (5) the choice of arenas for the confrontation of 
mobilized resources, and (6) actual pay-offs of such concerted efforts (cf. ROKKAN 1977: 564). My 
scheme collapses the first two into one category (formation), and stresses more the adaptation con­
siderations than the post ante pay-offs of adopted strategies.
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The Formation of Interests
Collective interests are often taken for granted or projected from overt group acting (cf. 
TILLY 1978: 59). Instead, the formation of group interests should be conceptually separated 
from the problem of collective action and formal organization. From an individualist per­
spective, one often assumes that interests represent the wants of individuals and that group 
behaviour imply congruent wants of a group of individuals. For WEBER (1922:15) collective 
action was then "interest based" when individuals assumed the same rational aims for their 
action, when their behaviour was based on the same Interessenlage (interest base). Yet inter­
est formation implies more than a common interest base. Before engaging into collective 
action, a quasi-group evaluates the expected gains and losses of the potential course of 
action. Hence, "to be aware of one's interests, therefore, is more than to be aware of a want 
or wants; it is to know how one can set about trying to realise them" (cf. GlDDENS 1979: 
189).
Social or political change can lead to the generation of cleavage lines. Economic and po­
litical development can lead to the formation of a new quasi-group with potentially com­
mon interest. In the course of the Industrial Revolution, for instance, a dependent industrial 
workforce emerged with similar life chances. Other processes lead to further social divi­
sions on the basis of which people tend to group. However, the existence of social cleavages 
as such leads not necessarily to the crystallization of a cleavage.
Indeed, not so much the fact that a quasi-group has objectively the same common inter­
ests is crucial for an understanding of cleavage structuration but that actual conflicts of 
interests arise herefrom. Given a quasi-group that has a common identity and that forms a 
close social network, it is likely to form an interest group when in the interaction with other 
groups it comes into conflict of interests (cf. TILLY 1978,1985). Cleavages have their "origin 
in the authority structure of associations" (DaHRENDORF 1959: 181), they are an outflow of 
the distribution of power in a society. For Marx class interests arose in opposition, a class 
was forming as the result of the common struggle against another class. In analogy, we can 
see cleavages as conflict of interests between two groups in society, one contending the 
other in the polity (cf. also TILLY 1978). In this case one can speak of the formation of a 
political cleavage that derives from politicised social cleavages.
The Organization of Interests
A quasi-group that conceives its interests as in conflict with other groups is not yet an 
interest group. In addition to the formation of interests a degree of collective organization is 
necessary for an interest group proper to emanate. This is the fundamental problem of 
cleavage transformation: collective interests have not only to be formed through the process 
of cleavage crystallization, but an enduring organization has to be built. The transition from 
interest formation to collective organization is a process. 'It is a matter of no small interests 
to determine at what point these looser configurations crystallize into associations" 
(GINSBERG 1953: 41). In fact, it is not always easy to decide when collective action has
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achieved a degree of collectiveness and continuity that one can speak of a formal organiza­
tion as "a set of stable social relations deliberately created, with the explicit intention of 
continuously accomplishing some specific goals or purpose" (STTNCHCOMBE 1965:142). The 
transition from a quasi-group to an organization entails a deliberate choice for more stable 
social relations in order to achieve a particular goal. Once established, the organization 
takes on its own life, its own mechanism for reproduction. 1 will consider trade unions as 
forma/ organizations "that have been deliberately established for a certain purpose" (cf. 
BLAU & SCOTT 1962: 5), as opposed to social and informal organizations (e.g. a strike 
movement). Certainly, unions include also informal social organizations and are the 
descendant of a social movement. Nevertheless, I consider the act of setting up a formal 
organization as the starting point, although informal collective action has often preceded 
and the building of a consolidated organization may require a longer time period thereafter 
(cf. HANNAN & FREEMAN 1989: 147-9). When a group of workers goes on strike one can 
speak of some form of social organization, though this will be ad hoc and informal unless 
they attempt to build a continuing formal organization.2
Historically, unions were "deviant” organizations (NEDELMANN 1975, DAHRENDORF 
1959:190) that had to gain legitimation. Initially, "political inventors" or "entrepreneurs" (cf. 
STINCHCOMBE 1965, ROKKAN 1977) play a crucial role in founding organizations and 
defining their scope. People will form an organization when they perceive that the organi­
zation is a more effective and successful alternative in providing some previously unob­
tained benefits (cf. STINCHCOMBE 1965: 146). This implies that the political entrepreneurs 
has access to the necessary social organizational technology and the political opportunity 
structure is favourable to organization, though at an early stage the formation of "deviant” 
organizations was highly taxed. But still today, the costs to found a new organization tend 
to be considerable, particularly since already existing organizations can "price out" new 
ones or raise high "tolls on entry" through institutional arrangements.3
The formation of new interests may not lead necessarily to new formal organizations 
when already existing organizations attempt to include them. When there is no appropriate 
representation and other groups seem to gain from organization, new social groups are 
compelled to organize themselves. This drive to organize collectivelly in a society leads to 
the consecutive organizations of various social groups (cf. KORPI1978 for Sweden). Crucial 
for the cleavage transformation is the question whether interests will be organized within 
or outside existing organizations. The question of integration or separation of interests will 
be of central importance in the following empirical cleavage chapters. Individuals that 
perceive a lack of interest representation have three alternatives to respond: exit, voice or
2 For instance, the Italian autonomous movement (COBAS) developed from an ad hoc strike 
movement to an infant organization requiring public recognition as a bargaining partner like the 
three "big" established union confederations.
3 For instance, representativeness conditions for the recognition as collective bargaining partner 
(e.g. the NLRB majority certification procedure in the USA), or a threshold for representation into 
parliament (like the 5% mark in Germany) rise "tolls on entry" for a union and a political party 
respectively.
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loyalty (HlRSCHMAN 1970). Accordingly, individuals may twice their interests within 
existing organizations demanding them to represent their interests. Secondly, they may exit 
from existing forms of interest representation and found a new, more appropriate interest 
organization. Or thirdly, they may find that their voice and exit options are precluded and 
consequentially their loyalty towards the system will abate. The alternatives are relatively 
constrained: an individual's alternatives for collective action are contingent on the decisions 
of others to join in and promote the same interests.
The Mobilization of Interests
Trade unions are mutual-benefit associations "in which the membership is expected to be the 
prime beneficiary" (BLAU & SCOTT 1962: 45), different from other types of organizations 
were prime beneficiary are owners, clients, or the public-at-large. Mutuality with its give- 
and-take can only provide collective benefits when the burdens are jointly shared. Member­
ship is the prime resource both in terms of the contribution members pay (financial dues, 
participation, strike proneness, recruiting others, honorary functions) and as the source for 
legitimation or representativeness vis-à-vis its contenders. Moreover, membership via 
internal democracy plays an important role in the aggregation of collective interests. Par­
ticularly in the absence of surveys union leaders have to rely on membership expression to 
know more about the interests of those that they claim to represent.
There are two principal problems for unions as membership organizations once a group 
of founders has set up such an organization. The two problems derive from the question of 
mutuality: what is the principle of group solidarity (HECHTER 1987)1 The first problem is the 
selection of the potential membership base, or social base, that is, the definition of the 
organizational domain. Organizations may choose to specialize for a particular niche in the 
membership market, they may tend to stress social closure (cf. WEBER 1922, MURPHY 1988), 
while others pertain a more generalist, open strategy. The second problem is the 
mobilization of potential members, the colledive action problem (OLSON 1965), that applies 
particularly to large scale organizations that provide mainly public goods. It is interesting 
to note that the latter problem has gained more interest in the literature than the first, while 
the important link between the two has been largely ignored.4
A "dosed" union, for instance, a local miners' union in a mining community with an ex­
clusive membership principle (closed shop) can more easily mobilize on the base of 
stronger social bonds, group homogeneity and exclusive mutual benefits. However, given 
its exclusiveness, a closed union limits deliberately its potential membership base. Occupa­
tional communities, particularly when an "isolated mass" separated from the outside world 
(KERR & SIEGEL 1954), have often been considered to be prime examples of group solidarity
4 O lson  (1965) discusses "inclusive” and "exclusive" groups briefly and it is implicit in the dis­
cussion of large vs. small groups in his seminal The Logic of Collective Action, that set the tune for later 
debate on the collective action problem. His more recent work, however, focuses more on the pro­
duction of inclusive or exclusive goods of encompassing vs. selective interest organizations (cf. also 
O lso n  1982).
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and collective action. Yet, as the rise and fall of local miners' unions indicate, solidarity 
based on exclusiveness may be an initially successful but - on a long-term base - a self- 
defeating principle due to changes in the environment that endanger communities with 
closed boundaries. With increasing market integration even previously closed local 
communities will face the competitive forces of world markets and increasing 
interdependence.
The external contingency of dosed unions, their long-term inability to control the influx 
of workers and changes in the work organizations that are detrimental to its own group 
solidarity, forces many closed unions to adopt an open strategy (cf. OLSON 1965: 66-8). In 
order to prevent competition between organized and non-organized groups an open union 
(or indusive union) attempts to organize all potential members in an economic sector. 
However, an open union cannot so easily rely on strong social bonds but has to convince its 
potential followers that membership is worthwhile. The possibility to use informal group 
pressures are limited and formal arrangements (e.g. closed shop) are more visible and thus 
may provoke repression by employers or the state. Large, open unions face the free-rider 
problem of collective action, they have in the absence of coercion to use selective incentives to 
motivate tin individual to contribute to the production of a collective good (OLSON 1965). 
Yet despite these problems large "open" unions exist nearly everywhere with more or less 
success. Certainly, inclusive unions provide in some instances selective benefits (e.g. insur­
ance benefits) and use some form of coerdon (e.g. closed shop), however, these measures 
are rarely enough to mobilize on a large scale. In order to tackle the collective action 
problem we need to change the perspective: from a short-term individual choice to a long­
term view of institutional path dependence.
Large, open unions have hardly ever been build de novo. They were in most instances the 
result of long-term organization building efforts. Sometimes these endeavours were 
boosted by sudden radical social mobilizations after wars or in general strikes when the 
non-unionized faced insecurity over their future (a situation adverse to rational choice as­
sumptions). Advocates of open unionism made appeals to broad sodal groups to combine, 
but the actual consolidation of inclusive unions was a long-term process. Unorganized 
workplaces, occupations, sodal groups, regions had to be mobilized one-by-one. Histori­
cally, unionists were aware of the problem of collective action and therefore tended to start 
organizing where group solidarity was strongest. Moreover, the building of a union en­
tailed long-term investments, thus requiring a shifting of expectations from short to 
medium-term returns (CROUCH 1982: 45). Hence, it was less the most deprived but the 
better paid workers that were the first to organize (BLAU1964:214-5).
T h e  R epresentation  o f  I nterests
Mutual-benefit organizations perform a dual function of intermediation: they aggregate 
interests internally and represent them externally. Trade unions as intermediary structures 
(cf. MULLER-JENTSCH 1983) are one of the most important sodal institutions in contempo­
rary society. Unions perform the two dual functions of internal social integration and
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external system integration (cf. LOCKWOOD 1964, STREECK 1987). Not only have unions to 
face the mobilization problem with its logic of membership, unions have also to decide 
collectively over the content, target and channel for collective action. This intermediation 
problem has its own rules: the logic of intermediation (cf. SCHMlilKR & STREECK 1981). An 
important insight from neo-corporatist theory on interest intermediation is that 
"organisation is both constrained by and shapes the nature of interests concerned (CAWSON 
1986:11)". Collective interests do not speak for themselves but have to be filtered and for­
warded through an organization. Moreover, interest organizations do not just derive goals 
from an aggregation of interests but shape the very base of the goal formation, the 
collective identity and value-system (cf. STREECK & SCHMTITER 1985:19).
Internally, intermediary organizations perform the important function to link the social 
structure to the social system, that is, to aggregate and shape interest formation. In order to 
press for the interests of its members an interest organization needs internally a degree of 
hierarchical ordering (cf. SCHMTITER 1974). Interests are aggregated through processes of 
internal democracy. Moreover, in order to bargain with other organizations a union has to 
rely on a degree of compliance by its members. If necessary is must be able to discipline its 
members for non-compliance (CROUCH 1979:39-40). This may be particularly the case when 
the organization's leadership stresses the primacy of medium-term procedural goals (to 
achieve power for future negotiations), while members prefer short-term returns.
As for the logic of membership, the logic of representation (or intermediation) varies as a 
function of the size (or degree of differentiation) of the membership. Small unions that cater 
only a particular craft or occupation can form special interest organizations with a high 
degree of internal cohesion. Special interest organizations have the advantage of amplified 
solidarity but also tend to group homogeneity and social closure. Large inclusive unions, 
on the other hand, organize a larger segment of the population with larger interest 
heterogeneity. Moreover, small special interest groups are less likely to be affected by the 
externalities of their pressure group politics than large encompassing interest organizations 
(OLSON 1982). Thus encompassing organizations have also to take into account the external 
effects of their action. They have to explain to their members the constricting logic of 
Sachzxvange (factual requirements).
Externally, interest groups represent the mediated interests towards the outside. In 
order to enhance representation possibilities and overcome unnecessary competition with 
like-minded organizations, unions seek alliances within the union movement and with the 
outside. Cooptation and coalition are two "bridging strategies" (SCOTT 1987) for 
organizations to build alliances in order to increase the representational strength and 
overcome resource dependency (cf. PFEFFER & S a la n c ik  1978). These strategies are 
substitutes if not a functional equivalence for encompassiveness under conditions where 
this cannot be achieved by one single organization (cf. STREECK 1987), that is by "one big 
union".
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Adaptation of Interest Organizations
Finally, the question arises to what degree are organizations able to adapt their institutional 
set-up, their mobilization strategy and alliances to changing external conditions. In the 
strategic considerations of organizations different prospective pay-offs of alternative strate­
gies are considered. However, there is an inbuilt tension between the two integrative func­
tions of intermediary organizations, the logic of membership and the logic of representa­
tion. Depending on the forms of intermediation, its interorganizational links, the organiza­
tion - according to the logic of representation - becomes dependent in its decisions from the 
environment. On the other hand, the link between the organization and its social base 
makes the organization also dependent from the social structure. Social change can affect 
the social support structure of an organization, while changes in the inter-organizational 
network and power relations also require adaptation. Strategic adaptation of an or­
ganization may pose a dilemma when the logic of representation requires an opposite ad­
justment to that imposed by the logic of mobilization.
Each of the two logics creates different trade-offs once an organization attempts to alter 
its membership base or its organizational interdependencies. One of these interaction 
effects can be illustrated by the example of a working-class party transforming itself into a 
catch-all Volkspartei (KIRCHHEIMER 1966). By changing its social appeal it may come into 
conflict with its traditional close union relations. Trade-off considerations (PRZEWORSKI & 
SPRAGUE 1986) operate at two levels for the party (or for a union). First, the party (or union) 
by moving away from its traditional base may loose old supporters (or members), while 
partly gaining through appeal to new ones. Second, the party (or union) risks to strain its 
relations with the traditional ally (union and party respectively), while it may gain some 
more room for manoeuvre to cooperate with other organizations.
The ability to adaptation, however, varies as to the degree of the institutionalization of 
the organization into the social structure and organizational network. My argument will be 
that the initially successful transformation of interests into organizations becomes a some­
what self-defeating cause, it increases organizational inertia. Organizations that are well in­
stitutionalized face formidable problems of change: flexible adaptation is difficult when the 
organization is relative strongly locked into the social structure and tied into an interorga­
nizational network.
II
In st itu tio n a liza tio n  o f  
C leavages  in  O r g a n iza tio n s
We have followed the transformation process of cleavages into organizations, the process 
by which interests become formed, organized, mobilized and represented. Cleavages are 
not only an impetus for the initial formation of an organization, but they are the very base 
of the two main functions: the mobilization and representation of interests. The enduring 
impact of cleavages on collective organizations derives from the particular way in which
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cleavage-organizations are embedded into the social structure and are linked with the 
social system. As pointed out in the introduction, unions have a dual function as collective 
and corporate organizations (see Chapter 1). As collective organizations they have to rely 
on the mobilization of the social base (membership or supporters). As corporate actors they 
have to rely on alliance building with other organizations in order to achieve effective 
representation.
I shall now develop the thesis that cleavages become through the process of institution­
alization enshrined into the organization. First, in the formation and consolidating phase, 
the cleavages that gave rise to the organization as well as the way in which the organization 
is set-up have a long-term impact on the "infusion with value”. Thereafter, I will develop 
along the two logics of membership and representation, the strategies by which cleavage- 
organizations institutionalize themselves. I will develop two crucial concepts for the study 
of the institutionalization of mobilization and representation processes: social closure and 
pillarization. In each case, I shall state the mechanism and the limits of these processes. In 
fact, some cleavage-organizations are compelled to adapt a more open mobilization strategy 
and broader alliance building. Indeed, the two concepts allow us not only to analyze the 
social and organizational closure but also the reverse processes of desegmentation and 
depillarization on cleavage-organizations. Yet, my contention is again that there is an 
institutional path: organizational decisions at an earlier time structure and delimit the 
alternatives for future adaptation.
O rganizational Institutionalization
Once an organization has been founded, the problem of the "maintenance of the system" 
(SELZNICK 1948) arises. In order that an organization lasts longer than an ad hoc collective 
action movement it must structure its internal and external relations. The founders must 
build and consolidate an organizational structure that differentiates leadership, adminis­
trative and membership roles. The leaders, staff and members will have to be committed to 
the aims of the organization, that is, "infuse with value" (SELZNICK 1957:17). The assump­
tion taken here is that the initial phase of foundation and consolidation has an impact on 
the long-term organization development. Organizations will carry with them "traces of 
their time of origin" (STINCHCOMBE 1965:159) over their subsequent development. Whether 
the organization was externally or internally founded and whether all parts of the organi­
zation become committed to one set or a diffuse set of values will have an impact on the 
organizations resistance to change.
In his seminal study of parties DUVERGER (1951) distinguishes two genuine structural 
organization models: the leadership party {parti de cadre) and the mass party (parti de masse), 
or between internal and external founding. While the leadership party was initially formed 
by an electoral alliance or parliamentary grouping, the mass party has been formed by 
support or intervention from existing external organizations (DUVERGER 1951: 2-13). The 
difference between internal and external support has important consequences to the inter­
nal structure - what is summed up by the images of leadership vs. mass party. Externally
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founded organizations tend to be more centralized, they are formed from the top-down, 
with more hierarchical discipline, and the centre assumes primary authority. In contrast, 
the loose electoral alliances and parliamentary groupings tend to be more decentralized, 
they have been formed from the bottom-up, and the local structures maintain largely their 
autonomy (DUVERGER 1951: 13). The more the organization is externally legitimated, the 
more it is interdependent and innerorganizational change is difficult to be undertaken uni­
laterally.
One should also separate the process of organizational consolidation from the dimen­
sion of support. There are two ideal-type forms of territorial expansion: a strong, centre-led 
strategy of penetration, and a weak, periphery-led form of diffusion (cf. PANEBLANCO 1988; 
ELIASSEN & SVAASAND 1975). Yet one can apply the same principle also to non-territorial 
aspects of organizational consolidation. Does an organization grow through differentiation 
of functional units or through combining relative independent units? Institutionalization is 
a more uniform process in the case of centre-led penetration, when local organizational 
structures but also functional sub-structures become modelled after the centre, while in the 
case of periphery-led growth by bringing together diverse units and will ne only 
incompletely integrated.
Organizational institutionalization leads to the consolidating of an organization, 
however, it "is a two-edged sword" (HANNAN & FREEMAN 1989: 75), the other edge of the 
sword is structural inertia (see also HANNAN & FREEMAN 1984). For a number of reasons 
structural inertia persists in well institutionalized organizations ( H a n n a n  & FREEMAN 
1977: 957). Internally, it is rational to continue existing routines given the past investments 
that become sunk costs, limited information over alternatives, vested interests opposed to 
change, high risks and costs of reorganization, and shared organizational norms (cf. 
STINCHCOMBE 1965, 1968). Externally, structural inertia is fostered by external barriers to 
entry or exit from organizational fields, constraints on access to informations, and isomor­
phic legitimation. Thus for an organization it is less costly to continue existing routines than 
indulge in unknown areas, thus organizations follow a learning curve (NELSON & WINTER 
1982: 99-107). Institutionalization is not merely limited to the consolidation of the organiza­
tional structure but also derives from the mobilization of interests through social 
embedding and the representation of interests through interlocking with other 
organizations. I shall examine now the process of institutionalization through sodal 
embedding (social closure) and interlocking (pillarization), that contribute to the "freezing" of 
cleavage structures in union systems.
Social Closure
In order to create group solidarity and mobilize resources for the representation of inter­
ests, a cleavage-organization can use an exclusive strategy. Social closure is a 
monopolization strategy which maintains internal solidarity and external closure (WEBER
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1922: 23-24X5 Through social closure an organization locks into the social structure. Social 
closure binds members of a social group or community to an organization.
Historically, social closure was often a partly deliberate, partly affective reaction to the 
destablization of traditional social networks through modernization, in particular, through 
spatial and social mobility (cf. ROKKAN1977, ELLEMERS1984). A social group that is endan­
gered through the 'ills of modernization' builds a web of social relations that replaces tradi­
tional community by assodational belonging. Important is the creation of an ideological 
community, whether WeltaTtschauung or professional status, that creates solidarity and 
group identity xris-a-vis other groups. Social ghettos, like Socialist, Catholic or Communist 
working class communities in the interwar period are an example for political cleavage 
organizations based on social closure. But also status groups with Standesdünkel (particular 
social esteem), labour aristocracy, white-collar salariat, Beamtenstand (civil servants) mobi­
lized in defense of their privileges.
Cleavage organizations play an important role in the process of social closure through 
creating a network of assodational life. Social closure is based on a deliberate attempt to 
create inclusive concentric circles. The inner circle is the political or spiritual life sphere, 
enclosed by the sodalization sphere, further encircled by the professional life and finally by 
the private, social life. Multiple membership in organizations of these spheres is the mech­
anism that creates internal cohesion, paralleled by the process of interlocking at the level of 
organizations. For Socialist workers in interwar Germany, for instance, their life turned 
around concentric circles: the political party, working class family and neighbourhood 
community, trade union and workplace organization, sports or cultural associations, or 
holiday camps. For Catholic workers, only the inner circle was replaced by the Church and 
Catholic Action groups, the other life spheres were matching those in the Socialist "camp".
However, as will be shown in examining cleavage- organizations, social closure is a 
precarious, even self-defeating mechanism. Sodal integration, the increased national inte­
gration of the previous subcultures into society, led to a loosing of the grip of group iden­
tity. Desegmentation increased after the Second World War with increasing sodal mobility, 
deepened political and economic integration, enhanced individualization, spreading leisure 
culture, general secularisation, and the diffusion of modem values through mass media. 
Modernization eventually cut the base of social closure processes, it finally succeeded over 
the counter-reactive process, albeit not completely. The concentric social drdes that had 
been artificially created (different to the mechanical solidarity of the Middle Ages), through 
continued social integration became increasingly cross-cut (cf. SlMMEL 1890/1908), leading 
to multiple contradicting group memberships. Pressures toward opening cleavage 
organizations at the level of interest intermediation have reinforced the breaking down of 
the formerly tied social network.
5 Following WEBER (1922), social dosure theoiy became further developed by conflict therorists 
and neo-marxists (COLLINS 1975, MURPHY 1988). I use social dosure here in a more narrow sense as 
the process of segmentation of a sodal network in order to foster solidarity and to shut off a group 
from external influences.
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Exclusive and Inclusive Mobilization Strategies
Hence, unions have in principle two basic strategies for mobilization: an exclusive strategy 
that is based on social closure and an inclusive strategy based on assodational advantages. 
As pointed out before, small, closed unions profit from exclusive mobilization strategies, 
while large, open unions face collective action problems (cf. OLSON 1965). In general, there 
are six means to mobilize members: (1) group solidarity, (2) group monopoly, (3) group 
coercion, (4) individual selective incentives, (5) individual risk avoidance, (6) individual 
costs of non-membership. The first three mechanism remain mainly strategies of small, ex­
clusive closed unions, the latter three of large, inclusive open unions.
(1) Group solidarity. Individuals may be strongly committed to the group in which they 
work or live and thus join for reasons of group solidarity. Moreover, a motivation to join a 
union can be social needs of individuals for group identity and solidarity. The social club 
character was prevalent among the many small union locals in the early days of union his­
tory. Until after the war, the organizational life was a major pillar of working class forma­
tion and the crystallization of group identity. Although the growth of unions to large scale 
organizations was largely detrimental to the social function, union movements with a well- 
developed workplace oriented "club system" have been more successful than others 
(KJELLBERC 1983).
(2) Group monopoly. According to PERLMAN (1928) American workers were afraid of job 
scarcity and therefore American unions attempted to achieve 'job control' in order to 
monopolize job opportunities for their members. Membership may be rational when a 
closed communal union can monopolize control over entry into a profession or craft, and 
thus reduce competition through outsiders by exclusion (WEBER 1922: 23-25, 201-203). 
Based on historical accounts, however, Olson suggests "that unions have sought 'job con­
trol', not so much to protect a stagnant or dwindling supply of job opportunities, as to 
strength, expand, and stabilize unions as organizations (OLSON 1965: 82)". In any case, job 
control and monopolization are limited to small groups (work places) or professions with 
particular skills and control over the labour process.
(3) Group pressure. The already organized have an interest to maintain group solidarity - 
quite in contrast to the principle of voluntary association. "A group's survival depends upon 
the adoption of effective techniques to control its members" (HECHTER 1987: 51). Monitor­
ing compliance is seen as legitimate in a mutual-benefits society, the organization can 
enforce compliance and may even hire professionals as agents to maintain membership. 
Furthermore, external support may be achieved through political exchange, alliance build­
ing or bargaining with other allied organizations (labour party, other labour associations), 
the employers or the state. These institutionalized arrangements are a form of coercion,
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though often covered, leaving de jure freedom, while de facto forcing individuals to become 
member.6
(4) Individual benefits. In the absence of coercion, unions may provide selective incentives 
or club goods to overcome the collective action problem. Originally, a number of unions 
had been formed as mutual benefit associations with the main aim to provide welfare bene­
fits, though these benefits have later been provided on a larger scale by the welfare state. 
Moreover, "outside inducements" (OLSON 1965) that are not related to the prime aims of the 
organization, such as family insurance, holiday camps, social activities, provide "club 
goods" that are additional, but hardly sufficient enough incentives to combine. In fact, these 
selective benefits have often fallen short of the costs of membership. Moreover, they 
became less important over time as they were often dysfunctional to the unions' main goals 
of economic interest representation (cf. STREECK1981: Chap. 10).
(5) Individual risk avoidance. Membership may be rational under circumstances of uncer­
tainty when the organization provides a mutual insurance. In fact, unemployment insur­
ance, strike benefits, grievance handling, legal advise are «ill mutual insurance benefits of 
unions against uncertainty deriving from the structural weakness of individual employees 
vis-à-vis their employers. Risk avoidance through mutual-benefit thus seems to be a rational 
strategy, particularly for those that would be most affected by external risks (strike, work 
dispute, arbitrary dismissal, firm closure) due to a weak position in the labour market. 
Cost-benefit calculations on membership costs compared to the future need and value of 
these insurance benefits can be positive. Moreover, risks are difficult to determine for an 
individual under uncertainty, incomplete information and external contingency when (the 
risks cannot be individually controlled).
(6) Individual costs of non-membership. On the other hand, one can also turn the free-rider 
problem up- side down (cf. BRIEFS 1980: 706). A union claims to be the representative of a 
particular section in the workforce, expecting each one that profits from it also to contribute 
to its costs, although non-members ("free-riders" as seen for the union) have no say over the 
goals. This leads to the paradoxical situation that the costs of being a non-member may ex­
ceed the costs of membership (MARSH 1976, WILLIAMSON 1989: 78). In fact, some under­
represented, non-unionized groups may be disadvantaged compared to others and there­
fore driven to combine (within or outside the existing unions). Wage contracting in so far is 
not always a public good, but can be a targeted, exclusive collective good (cf. OLSON 1965). 
Those not represented may not receive their "fair shares" (SWENSON 1989), non-membership 
becomes thus a costly option, the non-organized groups are facing solitarily the collective 
solidarity of the organized.
6 Thus membership in an union-led unemployment insurance scheme in Sweden does not re­
quire de jure being a member of the union as well, but de facto this discretion is not as obvious to the 
potential member.
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PlLLARIZATION
Geavage-organizations not only monopolize through social closure but also use organiza­
tional closure to enhance their power. Organizations enter alliances with others to maintain 
unity and augment their power resources vis-a-vis contenders. Cleavage based 
organizations form interlinkages and become organizationally segmented, they become 
integrated into an organizational pillar. Pillarization is the macro-process by which an 
interorganizational network is created with the aid of interlocking and other bridging 
devices on the base of a social cleavage.7 The process of pillarization is the tandem to the 
process of social closure, both processes are mutually reinforcing each other. Social closure 
enhances group cohesion, collective solidarity and resource mobilization, while 
pillarization fosters social closure through the organizatational segmentation of social life 
spheres.
Similarly to the process of social closure, the process of pillarization was a counter-reac- 
tion of political elites and dissidents to modernization. In order to mobilize against the 
threats of modernization, a strong organization was needed. Internal cohesion and external 
pressures were to provide the base of organizational power to these elites (Rokkan 1977). 
An interorganizational network was created or became differentiated from the cleavage 
fostering centres (the party or Church). Interlocking of leadership and alliance building be­
came the most important bridging strategy that maintained the coherence of an organiza­
tional pillar.
Again the idea of concentric circles is the organizing principle not only of the social life 
spheres but also of the organizational life. The party or Church is the inner circle the 
Weltanschauung disseminating institution, encircled by the media for that dissemination 
(propaganda press, own schools), and followed by the professional organizations, and 
finally the social and cultural organizations (cf. POST 1989). Interlocking is the functional 
equivalent to the process of mutual membership in the case of social closure, organizations 
form alliances or co-opt leadership positions. Moreover, overlapping social bases, mutual 
membership, and multiple leadership increases interdependence between these or­
ganizations.
However, as in the case of desegmentation, depillarization eventually sets in, mainly as a 
result of a pillar's own organizational success. Increased interdependence with cross­
cleavage organizations through accommodation, concertation and corporation decreases 
the impact of intra-cleavage interlocking. Moreover, each organization will eventually have 
to face the externalities of its sectional politics. Thus with the advancement of system 
integration the initially formation of a system opposing interest coalition becomes
7 The concept of pillarization (verzuiling) was first introduced by Dutch sociologists (cf. KRUIJT
& GODIJN 1962). Besides the Netherlands, the concept has been applied to segmemented countries, 
like Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria. In political science, the impact of pillarization on the 
accommodation of interests in consociational societies has triggered off an extensive debate 
(LlJPHART 1968). However, I use the concept of pillarization here in a more limited organizational 
usage.
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decomposed as its parts become drawn into political exchange with institutions outside the 
own pillar. Furthermore, the problem of desegmentation destabilizes the social base and 
forces adaptation in the social boundaries. The organization will be forced to open up to 
new social groups by demphasizing the traditional cleavage base. However, by becoming 
more encompassing these organizations move into different directions, reducing their 
interorganizational overlap in the social base, thus at least gradually the pillars start 
crumbling.
Alliance Building
Following THOMPSON & McEWEN (1958) we can distinguish four forms of interorganiza­
tional relations (besides competition): (1) bargaining, (2) co-optation, (3) coalition, and (4) 
merger. The constraints of the environment and the degree of inter-organizational control 
over organizational goal-setting decisions increases in the above order since the "potential 
power of an outsider increases the earlier he enters into the decision process (THOMPSON & 
M cE w en  1958: 25)". Coalition and bargaining are strategies of alliance building where or­
ganizations remain completely autonomous, while cooptation and merger are alliance 
building in which organizations give up a part (or all) of their control.
(1) Bargaining. Bargaining is a structured exchange relationship between potentially 
competing organizations that agree to recognize each other as contract agents. As a recur­
rent exchange relationship both parties have an interest in creating trust by implementing 
and enforcing compliance to the terms of the agreement. "The need for periodic adjustment 
of relationships is demonstrated most dramatically in collective bargaining between labor 
and industrial management, in which the bases for continued support by organization 
members are reviewed (THOMPSON & MCEWEN 1958: 27)". Bargaining increases environ­
mental control over decision making through the direct interaction with the other bargain­
ing party. An organization becomes bound in the choice of alternatives by the degree to 
which the other party precludes alternatives from negotiation. Although inter-class bar­
gaining between unions and employers or the state are the common, recurring form, inter­
union bargaining is important where unions are split but have to come to terms in order to 
represent their interests effectively vis-a-vis the employers or the state (multi-union bar­
gaining).
(2) Co-optation. "Cooptation is the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or 
policy-determing structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability 
or existence (SELZN1CK 1948: 34)". Co-optation or interlocking of organizations is a strategy 
between complementary, non-rival organizations in order to better coordinate common ac­
tion and increase external support and legitimacy. Cooptation may be formal or informal, 
through interlocking directorates or through overlapping multiple membership. It brings 
external considerations into the decision making process thus further limiting the choice of 
alternatives and the possibility for unilateral decisions (externalities of action to secondary 
parties become organizationally recognized). Complicated interdependencies develop be­
tween formal authority and power relations, commitment and responsibility become
Til
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shared between organizations. In the case of trade unions, co-optation is an important de­
vice in the relationship between party and union centre (see section 23 below), both orga­
nizations are not competitors but gain from the legitimation, resource and support of the 
allied organization operating in the other channel of representation.
(3) Coalition. Coalition is the most far reaching continuing form of interorganizational 
cooperation. The most primitive form of coalition is an action-set (ALDRICH & WHETTEN 
1981: 387), a group of organizations "that have formed a temporary alliance for a limited 
purpose", the early trade union congress, the Triple Alliance in Britain, or Aktionsgemein- 
schaften (action committees) come to mind as examples of action-sets. On the other hand, a 
peak association is a long-term, general purpose, integrated association of organizations that 
are similarly affected by external forces and have thus a common purpose to gain strength 
from collective action. Peak associations involve a degree of transfer of resources and deci­
sion making power to a higher level that serves the common interests. Organizations that 
build an alliance attempt to reduce the competitive pressures at the level of single organi­
zations by shifting it up to a higher level (HANNAN 1988:104-5). The most integrated coali­
tion is the neo-corporatists model of a monopolistic, state-licensed peak association consti­
tuted by a limited number of non-competitive, singular, compulsory membership organi­
zations (cf. SCHMITTER 1974). Not only theoretically do forms of coalition building vary in 
their intensity, union centres vary between loose, volatile action-sets and strong, enduring 
peak associations.8 Across Western Europe, union centres vary over time and between 
union movements as to the degree of vertical integration (cf. VISSER 1990: Chap. 8), in how 
far power (e.g. organizational reform, bargaining rights) and resources (e.g. strike funds, 
own staff) have been transferred to the higher (peak) level.
(4) Merger. Merger is the ultimate, discontinuing form of bridging strategies. An organi­
zation joins with an other organization to foster their common interests and will thereby 
give up most of its autonomy. After a merger it is no longer subject to inter-organizational 
constraints (THOMPSON & MCEWEN 1958: 28, fn. 14), though internally former divisions 
may continue. Merger can be a rational strategy for an organization in order to overcome 
resource dependency (PFEFFER 1972, PFEFFER & SALANCIK 1978), to reduce domain compe­
tition (Freeman & Brittain 1977:176), to decrease transaction costs (WILLIAMSON 1981), or 
to gain from economies of scale (CHITAYAT 1979: 5). From an ecological view point, there 
are two forms of combining organizations in order to rise their power of action: the 
"symbiotic (on the basis of their complementary differences) and the commensal (on the 
basis of their supplementary similarities). (HAWLEY 1968: 331)". There are furthermore two 
different forms of merger: (i) amalgamation of organizations that agree to dissolve in order 
to build a new combined organization and (ii) absorption of an organization by an other or­
ganization that will continue in its existence, while the other submerges its structure. Note 
that whatever its rationality a merger may face resistance by members that fear to loose the
8 1 use the term "union centre” as a generic term for all forms of coalition building among
unions, thus including confederation, union congress, coordination committee. Note that American 
usage is federation instead of confederation (cf. Kassa lo w  1969).
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base of group solidarity. Moreover, "the president of a small union which is considering a 
merger with a larger union or with other smaller unions, is very conscious that leadership 
control as well as economic resources must be relinquished (CHIT AY AT 1979: 7)". The 
merger strategy is furthermore constrained through legal and institutional requirements 
(e.g. merger laws)9, while external pressures (e.g. from union centre) and ideology (e.g. 
solidarity principle, cf. FULCHER 1988) foster concentration.
Institutional Path
The assumption of this study on cleavage structuration is that institutionalization enhances 
path dependence (NORTH 1990). Past decisions become institutionalized and limit the set of 
alternatives for the future course of action (ROKKAN 1977). At a crucial juncture of an orga­
nization's development, when crisis symptoms signal to leaders the need for substantial re­
form, the alternatives are largely bound by past institutionalization processes. Different to 
the assumptions of rational choice theory, these strategic decisions are not taking place in a 
void, there is no tabula rasa. Although organizations may adapt to changing environments 
by strategic decisions at critical junctures, “developments at one step set conditions or con­
straints for the next" (ROKKAN 1977:564).
Institutional change is normally gradual and incremental, the most important possibili­
ties for sudden, substantive change are given at critical junctures in the life span of an 
organization. Critical junctures are important potential turning points in the development 
of an organization. These conjunctures are points in time when symptoms of organizational 
crisis are signaled to the leadership, when disfunctional routines of the organizational 
behaviour have accumulated to a threshold of intervention, when problems of resource 
mobilization and internal disintegration have gained a critical mass, when changes in the 
network of organizations jeopardize established exchange patterns. Thus external social 
change and system restructuration, combined with mounting internal organizational 
tension, pose a formidable pressure to change. This coincides often with a situation when 
resources become freed (like after a war) and uncertainty over the future course is 
paramount.
Any decision taken, including no decision, can be considered to be a strategic decision in a 
situation of a critical juncture. We can speak of a strategic decision when the actors have 
some discretion and there are several alternatives to choose from, and when the taken deci­
sion has long-term consequences and will be crucial for the future position within the 
organizational network. The most important characteristic of strategic choice at critical 
junctures is that there are multiple solutions and only imperfect information (cf. NORTH 
1990). There is no golden way to achieve the most efficient solution, at least for the actors 
involved at the time. Therefore, institutionalized structures can play an important role in
9 For instance the British Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act of 1917 required 20 percent of con­
senting votes from at least half of each organizations membership, while the reform of 1964 required 
only a simple majority vote (cf. SIMPSON 1972:387-9).
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limiting the range of alternatives. At least there are three alternatives to an organization 
under pressure to change: selection, adaptation, or disintegration. An organization may 
either fail to adapt, while other organizations that were better adapted succeed over it 
(selection), or adapt successfully to the new situation, or the organization sees part of its 
leadership, membership or structure dissect.
When there are multiple solutions without a rational optimal strategy, the decision will 
be more determined by power relations than by rational choice. Institutions, in particular 
ideology, will shape the definition of the situation as well as the perception of possible 
alternatives. The decision making is likely to become a power game of vested interests 
within the organization. Furthermore, when the organization is linked with others, the 
organization may be further dependent and limited in its choice. Instead of a one shot 
rational choice game, it becomes an iterated nested game (TSEBELIS 1989, cf. KOELBLE 1992), 
where the outcome of one game, redistributes the power of groups within and between 
organizations, limiting the future choice or Spielraum (room for manoeuvre) in the next 
game.
The sequence of incremental and strategic choices thus follows a ramified process, 
where early small decisions and chance events have long-term consequences. Through the 
process of institutionalization the range of alternatives is limited and prestructured. An 
organization can change its course, but it cannot completely change its internal structure, 
external relations, or social base without risking complete upheaval. Any change is thus 
bound by past institutionalization. In order to adapt a radical change an organization has 
not only to design and implement a new structure but dismantle the old one without 
loosing its force. This is not to say that the development is deterministic or teleological, one 
cannot foresee the future choice but only analyze the conditions that limit the process of 
adaptation. There remains enough liberty for individuals to choose rationally or affectively 
from the set of alternatives and enough space for chance. But the subject of this study is to 
examine the conditions and configurations under which interests became organized, and 
how the once taken organizational decisions have been structuring the alternatives 
thereafter.
Ill
T h e  D ifferen tia tio n  o f  
Labour  Interest O r g a n iza tio n s
Finally, we will now turn to the evolution of cleavage-organizations of labour interests. I 
shall develop two models that systematize the differentiation of the organization of labour 
interests into political and economic oriented organizations. The first model accounts for 
differentiation of party and unions, and the other for the division of labour between union 
centre and national unions. They are not meant to describe any particular national union 
development but an ideal-type model. Yet they can serve as yardsticks to compare the ideal 
paths of evolution with the national development. They allow us to point at divergence in
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the development of these organizations and reflect on the impact on union diversity. The 
model is both an interpretative view and an explanatory device that will be the baseline 
model for the following chapters and detailed analysis of each labour cleavage. Further­
more, I shall provide some indications as to the clusters of factors that may account for the 
salience of political and functional cleavages in labour organization. Again these are only 
sketches of general universal processes and are not compared with the historical develop­
ment in this chapter.
D ifferentiation of Party and U nions
Working-class party and unions comprise two different forms of labour interest represen­
tation. Historically, party and unions emerged as the two main "wings" of the same social 
movement that became differentiated into two types of institutions sited in the political 
arena and the economic arena respectively. Party and unions, emerged in response to, and 
were shaped by, the gradual opening up of the "electoral channel" and the "corporate 
channel" (ROKKAN 1977). Yet, as UPSET (1983) observes, differences across Europe were 
substantial as to the path by which "the working classes were accepted into the fabric of 
societies as political and economic citizens. The first involves their right to vote and to 
organize a political party that could play a constructive role in the polity; the second refers 
to the way working-class economic combinations, in the form of labour unions, were 
accepted as formally legitimate by the state and substantively legitimate by employers 
(LlPSET 1983: 6)". In the model forwarded here, it is assumed that deviations from an ideal- 
type integration process moulded the differentiation of the two organizations. The 
proposition is that the timing and structuring of these two channels had important 
consequences for the integration of labour into the political and economic systems (cf. 
ROKKAN 1977, LAFFERTY1971, ELIASSEN 1974, LlPSET 1983).
Following ROKKAN (1970: 79) one can postulate four institutional thresholds that struc­
tured the political integration of the working class into the polity. (1) The threshold of 
legitimation: When were formerly excluded social groups granted the rights to assemble, to 
become organized and to express themselves in public? (2) The threshold of incorporation: 
When were these groups allowed to participate in political representative bodies? (3) The 
threshold of representation: When was a proportionality between electoral power and deci­
sion making power established? (4) The threshold of executive power. When did these 
groups get the chance to participate in the execution of government? These intervening 
constraints on the political opportunity structure moulded the "political alternatives'' for 
collective action available to the labour movement in the political arena.
Similarly, in the economic arena, the corporate opportunity structure moulded the 
opportunities for collective action of labour movements. The structuring of the "bargaining 
channel" shaped the development of union as an institution, and its differentiation form the 
party. In analogy to Rokkan's model, a set of four thresholds can be proposed with respect 
to the transition towards a modem system of industrial relations (Cf. EBBINGHAUS & VISSER 
1990): (1) The threshold of association: When was the right to form a coalition of labour
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Figure 2.1
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granted and no longer impeded? (2) The threshold of collective action: When was the right to 
strike granted to all workers? (3) The threshold of bargaining: When were unions recognized 
as collective bargaining partners by the State and by employers? (4) The threshold of 
participation: When did unions become intermediary organizations involved in the forma­
tion and execution of social policy and economic management? These thresholds constrain 
the "alternatives" of union organization and the form and degree to which unions become 
integrated within the capitalist economic system.10
Both threshold models are ideal-type representations of major steps in the transition 
toward political and economic integration of the working class - comparable to T.H. 
Marshall's sequence of the extension of citizenship rights (MARSHALL 1950). The evolution­
ary ideal-type model as proposed here (see Figure 2.1) is to be taken as encompassing the 
main course of European development towards political and industrial democracy. Its main 
purpose is to compare variations and deviations from the ideal-type path, not to assume its 
universality. We can study variations along two dimensions: (i) the degree of differentiation 
of the two channels and (ii) the sequencing in the opening of the two channels. The more 
equally, and the earlier, the two paths were separated the more we would expect party and 
unions to be differentiated and being less interdependent. However, if the processes are not 
synchronized we can expect a spill-over effect: when the political channel remains longer 
closed, one can expect a politicization of the organizations in the "bargaining" channel, 
while in the reverse case, unions will seek political alliance and support.
The structuring of the two channels will be taken as given, since an examination of the 
reasons, timing and character of the integration process would require a study in its own 
right (cf. BENDIX 1964, DaaLDER 1966, ROKKAN 1968, MANN 1987). Certainly, this integra­
tion process was not merely an elite decision, but more an interaction between power 
holders and contenders. Nevertheless, for pragmatic reasons I take it as exogenous, for the
10 Few studies have systematically analyzed the variations in institutional arrangements, see as 
an exception Sorce 1976 for an account of the transition to industrial democracy.
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interest here is to analyze the impact of variations in the context of interest organizations on 
the way in which interests become formed.
Explaining Political Cleavace-Orcanizations
The party-union model allows us to account for the differentiation of political and eco­
nomic interest representation. The model holds best for the Socialist labour movement (see 
Chapter 3), which is indeed the paradigmatic case of the ideal-type model. However, as will 
be shown, the cross-cutting class cleavage organizations, the Christian and Communist 
labour movement, were also reactions to the party-union interdependence of the Socialist 
labour movement.
For an explanation of the transformation of political cleavages, I would like to suggest 
four clusters of intervening contextual factors: (1) the social structure, (2) state intervention,
(3) employers’ intervention, and (4) cultural agencies and ideology. All four factors have 
been put forward in explanations for the character of labour movements, their radical or re­
formist orientation (cf. ELJASSEN 1974, UPSET 1983). However, our interest here is to account 
for the different impact of cleavage structures on labour movements, not primarily their 
orientation. Nevertheless, one would expect the same independent variables to have also an 
impact on the transformation of political cleavages into organization.
(1) Social structure. The salience of the labour-capital cleavage depends partly on the de­
gree to which the pre-industrial social fabric was eradicated by industrialization. Particu­
larly on the continent, pre-industrial, semi-feudal social relations persisted and reinforced 
the status system (cf. STURMTHAL 1953:17-32). It was there that the social integration of the 
rising proletariat was less successful and the process of social closure could erect social 
ghettos based on existing social ties and traditional status differentiation. Although secu­
larization affected the growing urban working-class first, it did not lead in all working-class 
communities to a decline in religious affiliation. Migration form rural areas and regional 
periphery with a different ethnic, linguistic or religious population further added to the 
fragmentation of the working-class. The social status divisions, moreover, led to further 
working-class fragmentation and political heterogeneity.
(2) State intervention. The timing and scope of the integration of the working-class into 
the polity had also a direct impact on the institutionalization of cleavages. The state as­
sumed in several countries a role in codification of union structures (e.g. legal union recog­
nition, criteria for representativeness as bargaining partner). In respect to the State-Church 
cleavage, the conflict between a national-liberal Nation-State and the Church, particularly 
the Catholic church intensified segmentation. An important role played the school conflict 
over whether the state or the Church was to obtain authority over mass education, par­
ticularly, for the middle and lower classes (UPSET & ROKKAN 1967). At a more general level, 
the political environment, for example, the degree of centralization and strength of the 
Nation-State affected the formation of labour organizations. For instance, the stronger 
French central state hampered trade union development more effectively, while the weaker 
German federal state had eventually to rely on incorporation of intermediary organizations,
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such as unions for the execution of social policy (cf. CAROLL, DELACROIX & GOODSTEIN 
1988: 386-9).
(3) Employers strategy. Recognition of unions by employers at the workplace or by 
employer associations at the national level played an important role in the institutionaliza­
tion of union structure. In some cases, this was used as deliberate employer strategy to 
fragment the labour movement. On the other hand, in some countries, employers them­
selves were organized into religiously segmented employers’ associations that preferred to 
deal with unions of their own creed (if at all), thus religiously divided labour movements 
had the possibility of cross-class accommodation within their own religious pillar (cf. 
LlJPHART 1968). On the other hand, employers intransigence and lacking willingness to 
centrally bargain perpetuated existing fragmentation of the labour movement into a radical 
political and reformist economist movement.
(4) Ideology. Both Left working-class party and Church claimed primary authority over 
ideology, the national or international party in the case of Socialist and Communist labour 
movements, the Church in the case of the Christian labour movements. The strategy of 
these political and cultural agencies were crucial, particularly, in the formation phase of 
labour movements. Since these actors pursued strategies not primarily aimed at economic 
interest representation, they often imposed on the union movement their own political and 
cultural goals. Tutelage and intransigence of the party or Church hindered for long the de­
velopment of a fully differentiated, independent union structure, often blocking across 
cleavages labour unity vis-à-vis capital and the state.
Hence, for a better understanding of cross-cutting cleavage organizations we have to 
add further "players" to the figuration shaping the organization of labour interests. Figura­
tion is a useful image to depict the interdependence of major collective actors in a social 
field, it takes a prominent place in Elias' figuration sociology (ELIAS 1970, cf. SWAAN 1988 
for an application). Besides the employers and the state, there are two further collective 
actors that intervened in the formation of labour movements - both claiming a particular 
ideological primacy over Weltanschauung. The Church had an important role in the emer­
gence of Christian trade union movements, though the Rome-led Catholic church was more 
trans-national and centralized than Protestant denominations. The Moscow—led 
Communist International assumed a particular role in the Communist trade union move­
ment, while in the Socialist movement there remained only a diverse international commu­
nity of discourse (cf. WUTHNOW 1989), after the shortlived First International.
D ivision of labour between U nion Centre and Unions
A second differentiation in the organization of labour interests took place within the 'action 
set' of unions: the. di vision of labour between a union centre and its constituting affiliated 
unions. Like party and unions, the differentiation between union centre and national 
unions followed a general differentiation into a more political function and a more eco­
nomic function of interest representation. Historically, union centres were build in most 
countries through the initiative of already existing national unions, and often with the help
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Figure 2.2
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of the party or other actors in the figuration. The need to combine in a peak organization 
became pressing as the want rose for independence from party tutelage, effective national 
pressure politics vis-à-vis the state, and solidaristic cooperation against increasing 
employers centralization. However, it still remains disputed which of these forces was the 
driving one, if actually only one was dominant (cf. FULCHER 1988). The functions of the 
union centre are threefold: (1) coordination of the affiliated national unions (also vis-à-vis 
the party), (2) the representation of the general interests vis-à-vis the state (pressure group 
politics), and (3) the concertation with the national employers associations (bargaining 
function).
The union centre is commonly a peak association, that is, an organization of organiza­
tions, quite in contrast to the political party. With few significant exceptions, labour organi­
zations in the economic sphere are less centralized than in the political arena. The more 
diverse composition of union movement (cf. MARKS 1989) is often overlooked by studies 
that concentrate on peak level organization only. For single unions, to build an alliance 
with others is a rational strategy to overcome uncertainty and pool resources to increase the 
power potential vis-à-xns contenders. The degree of integration in such an alliance, however, 
varies substantially over time and across countries. Union centres often started as a statisti­
cal information office, a periodiceli congress of union delegates, or an alliance of union 
leaders became in some cases differentiated well-staffed confederations with considerable 
power over their affiliates.
An ideal-type model (see Figure 2.2) can summarize the transition from an undifferen­
tiated union movement to a well-organized national union movement. Such a union 
movement is signified by the following internal organizational characteristics: (1) nationally 
integrated, (2) functionally differentiated, (3) hierarchically ordered, and (4) centralized. 
Note that this ideal-type union movement is close to the model of neo-corparist interest or­
ganizations (cf. SCHMITTER 1974). However, as has been pointed out in neo-corporatist 
studies, trade union movements vary substantially across space and time in matching the 
model (cf. CROUCH 1986,1991, VlSSER 1990).
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Like the previous model, we would expect variations in the sequence of these processes 
to affect the degree of differentiation of union centre and national unions. Different to the 
party-union model before, these processes are internal organizational consolidation pro­
cesses, not the structuring of thresholds in political opportunity structure. Nevertheless, 
these processes have been triggered of by structural changes such as national integration of 
politics and economy, as well as the degree of centralization of state and capital. '
(1 ) National integration. National integration of labour interests became crucial in the face 
of the national integration of labour markets, concentration of national economy, and 
increasing regulatory power of the central state (cf. ULMAN 1955). The formation of national 
unions, the integration of independent locals and the territorial expansion of a network of 
locals became one of the major achievements of prewar labour movements. Independent 
local unions and other regional representative structures - often strongholds of politicized 
syndicalist localism - became increasingly barred from direct representation within the na­
tional union centres. Dual structures of representation with territorial and functional units 
having a say within decision making in a union confederation were mostly settled in favour 
of the latter. This in turn lead to further depoliticization of the union centre and enhanced 
the differentiation from the political party which is commonly based on territorial repre­
sentation. National integration of regional and local labour organizations was also a 
response to the "nationalization" of the electoral and bargaining channels. After the First 
International, the labour movements developed into more solid national union centres (e.g. 
the Swedish "Landsorganisation") that brought together the centralized national unions (e.g. 
the German "Zentralverband").
(2) Functional differentiation. A second crucial development was functional differentiation 
(cf. SCHMITTER 1974). Rationalization of the trade union structure became an imperative in 
the face of increased economic interdependence and concentration. At the level of national 
unions, the drive towards a reorganization and concentration of trade unions through 
mergers was crucial for a rationalization of the representative structure. Through mergers, 
unions with overlapping or adjacent domains can reduce direct competition, profit from 
economies of scale, and amplify political power. Union centres, in order to enhance internal 
coherence, fostered the drive towards a more rational, concentrated union structure 
through merger inducements and affiliation policies. Moreover, union centres often 
fostered the set-up of unions in weakly non-organized domains, thus enhancing overall 
representation. Concentration is a prerequisite for better, less time consuming and costly, 
decision making coordination. Yet, imbalances in the power structure of affiliates, the 
existence of a few "big" unions vis-à-vis many smaller unions, are usually an obstacles 
towards a shift of authority to the supra-functional peak level.
(3) Hierarchical ordering. "Hierarchical ordering" (cf. SCHMITTER 1974) involved the shift 
of decision making competences and resources to a higher level: from local to national, 
from single union to peak level. However, internal power distribution of union movements 
vary considerable over time and space, they follow diverging historical paths. Three func­
tions seem to be crucial indicators for the degree of integration: power over resources, bar­
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gaining competence and organizational disciplinary capacity. Power over resources at a 
higher level allows higher order, "organic" solidarity, it maintains overall strength through 
balancing resources between weaker and stronger units. Bargaining competence at a higher 
order balances again differences in power to the advantage of the weaker units. Organiza­
tional disciplinary capacity at a higher order maintains the unity of actions and limits juris­
dictional competition. In practice, these three capacities are normally diminishing from the 
first to the last, not to speak of the differences between union centres as to the overall 
degree of integration (see VlSSER 1990).
(4) Centralization. The building of an administrative structure is further an outcome of 
the forces that lead to centre building. In order to promote the afore mentioned processes, 
union movements enlarged, centralized and professionalized their administrative struc­
tures. With the growth of unions, unions could no more rely on voluntary activity only. 
Moreover, bureaucratic rationalization is partly an isomorphic process (DIMAGGIO & 
POWELL 1983), adapting to the bureaucratic environment for reasons of efficiency and 
legitimation. As the state, employers associations, and large corporations increase their 
administrative systems, the organization of labour is forced to follow suite.
Explaining Functional Cleavage-organizations
The division of labour between union centre and unions raises the important problem of 
functional interest representation. What are the organization principles of the union 
movement, the distribution of power and task between national unions and the union 
centre. As was pointed out before, functional cleavages gave rise to different forms of 
organization strategies. Functional cleavages can lead to splits in a union movement: 
interorganizational conflicts over jurisdiction or external conflicts with other rival union 
centres. To explain the differences in the way in which interests of various sections of the 
dependent labour force became organized, a number of macro-social factors can be associ­
ated: (1) the economic development, (2) state intervention, (3) employer strategies, and (4) 
labour ideology. Both structure and agency are important variables for each of these fac­
tors, be it the structure of the economy, the state, the employers, the labour movement, or 
the action of these actors.
(1) Economic development. The economic development is the underlying force for the po­
tential labour market segmentation and the formation of different sectional interests. The 
character and development of the economic structure has an impact on the labour process, 
for instance, on the level of skill requirements, industrial concentration and bureaucratiza­
tion. These factors in turn influence the way in which labour interests are segmented, how 
different groups can combine and act collectively, and what resources they have. At the 
level of the workplace, technological development can restrain or facilitate the power of 
workers, as much as, at a industry level, it can hamper or serve the power of union organi­
zation. The timing and pace of the industrialization process not only affected the formation 
of the working class (cf. GALENSON 1952a, LORWIN 1958) but also the organizational devel­
opment. Late-comers could apply new organization "technologies", while facing less rigidi-
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ties of established, traditional structures. Moreover, slow and gradual development nor­
mally lead to peacemeal adaptation without large restructurations, whereas periods of 
sudden, rapid growth freed resources and allowed radical organizational changes (cf. 
SlTNCHCOMBE 1965). Yet, contingency theories have long claimed a technology-structure 
linkage, the interdependence of organizations and their technological environments (cf. 
SCOTT 1990), which cannot be maintained. Deterministic 'logic of industrialism' explana­
tions fail to account why countries with similar economic level of development have so 
varying organizational structures.
(2) State intervention. The state may intervene at least at two levels by shaping interest 
formation or by licensing organizations. The state has been active in reshaping social divi­
sions, particularly by intensifying the segmentation of the working class. Social and labour 
policy may well turn into class dividing politics (ESPING-ANDERSEN & KORPI 1984) when 
state regulation privileges some social groups, for instance, by granting special provisions 
for senior workers, white-collar employees, or civil servants. Moreover, the state regulated 
the organizational structure by erecting entry barriers or codifying its structure, for 
instance, by banning public sector strikes. The differential granting of coalition and strike 
rights (see above) to particular groups is one way of state regulations of collective organi­
zation. Of more subtle impact have been other regulations, such as association or merger 
laws, or statutory registration of unions. Moreover, the state can institutionalize unions 
through incorporation of unions into welfare state functions, for instance, participation in 
social security administration, labour courts, or employment exchanges. Finally, it should 
be noted that the state has been crucial in union recognition (BAIN 1970), either as employer 
in the public sector or by public licensing unions as social partners (cf. OFFE 1981), in both 
respects an existing union structure becomes codified and institutionalized at the discretion 
of the state.
(3) Employers strategies. The third actor in industrial relations, the employers, have a 
similar crucial role in shaping the context in which union organizations emerge. The level 
to which employers are collectively organized, the degree of centralization of employer 
associations, and the extent of their resources poses a challenge to the organization of 
labour interests, being pressed to follow suit. Moreover, in order to conduct collective bar­
gaining unions are under pressure to adapt their structure accordingly, they may be 
inclined to coordinate their action (in a bargaining cartel), or even merge with each other to 
form a encompassing union as to limit the centrifugal effects of multi-union bargaining. 
Moreover, resistance of employers to union activities at any level poses a formidable chal­
lenge to unions to adapt. Historically, massive lock-outs by employers have made more co­
ordinate and centralized action (national federation) and resources (strike funds) a prime 
necessity (cf. FULCHER 1991). On the other hand, recognition of unions will have an impact 
on the consolidation of unions (see 6ADM 1970) and on institutionalization of the existing 
union structure. Beyond these structural aspects, employers strategies at the workplace 
level often fostered labour segmentation in their own interests.
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(4) Labour ideology. Finally, the structure of the labour movement and its ideological 
orientation have an impact on the functional differentiation of union movements. More­
over, cross-cutting class cleavages multiply the number of rival unions, thus the average 
union would be smaller than otherwise, leading to diseconomies of scale, fiercer competi­
tion and pressures to concentrate within one movement. The strategies of union centres, 
whether following ideological or pragmatic considerations, for instance, conceptions of 
class solidarity (cf. FULCHER 1991), are also a catalyst. However, as was already noted, the 
authority of union centres over their affiliates vary across Europe, in countries where the 
need for a rationalization of the union structure would be greatest, fragmentation prevails 
within the union centre blocking the transfer of power to reorganize. On the other hand, 
success in bringing about a more rational structure at one time, may well lead to problems 
of integrating new sections of the labour force at a later time. These unorganized groups 
may in turn organize separately in response to the lack of representation and the success of 
the existing unions, following a general drive to organize (cf. for Sweden: KORPI 1978). 
Having developed a framework for analysis, we will now turn to each line of conflict, first 
political cleavages and later functional cleavages, and investigate in the following chapters 
the historical transformation of these cleavages in organizations.
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Th e  Labour-C a pital  C leavage
3
'Zhe worfcjng class movement with purely trade union organization 
cannot reach its goal, ft working class movement with purely politkai 
organization cannot reach its goal. Hit two forms of organization are 
indispensaBU to each other ... /WILHELM LlEBKNECHT, 1893, cit. in 
KASSALOW 1969:29)
Labour unity, was and is the primary goal and means of the labour movement. With the 
Industrial Revolution, the conflict between labour and capital gave universally rise to the 
formation of political and economic interest organizations that claimed to represent the in­
terest of the working-class (cf. LlPSET & ROKKAN 1967). Socialist mass party and allied 
unions as modem forms of interest representation originated from the labour-capital cleav­
age.1 Labour unity was crucial in labour's struggle for civil, political and social citizenship 
rights. In its century old history, the socialist labour movement has had a profound impact 
on the development of labour organization in Europe. No other labour movement has 
made a larger historical claim and commitment to labour unity, while struggling to over­
come union diversity. Union diversity along the labour-capital cleavage derived from the 
different political and economic integration of the working-class, in addition to the persis­
tence of pre-capitalist and new social cleavages that divided labour.
This chapter decils with the transformation of the universal labour-capital cleavage into 
socialist party and unions, revealing the variations in the transformation of the cleavage 
into labour organization. The claim is that these variations are largely the result of the dis­
similar formation and diverse differentiation of party and unions following the opening up 
of the two channels of interest representation: the electoral channel and corporate channel 
(see Chapter 2). This chapter analyzes the transformation of the cleavage into party and 
unions, the parallel mobilization, the representation, and party-union linkages.
First, the transformation of the labour-capital cleavage into working-class party and 
unions will be compared. Following the model developed in the preceding chapter, the dif­
ferentiation of party and unions, the relations between the two, will be related to the timing 
and sequence in their formation. Although we expect the cleavage organizations to emerge 
universally, the variations in the integration into polity and economy led to differences in 
the consolidation and interdependence of the two organizations.
1 In the following the term Socialist party and Socialist union movement is used as a general 
term for non-Communist working-class parties and union movements, though in some cases the 
terms Sodal-Democratic party. Labour party or Free union movement is more appropriate. It is not 
to claim that all these working-class parties (or unions) are ideologically or sociologically the same: 
quite in contrast.
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Second, the logic of mobilization for party and unions will be discussed looking at the 
electoral and unionization records. During the initial phase of mobilization, party and 
unions gained from a parallel organization. However, working-class party and unions meet 
limits to their growth, they are faced with a strategic decisions to open to new social groups 
or to fall short of the majority or encompassing all dependent employed. We expect that 
these pressures will lead to tensions in the initial party-union relations.
Third, the representation of labour interests adds further tension between party and 
unions and the initial linkage. Whereas during the early phase both organizations gained 
from mutual struggle for political and social rights, with the integration into polity and 
economy, there will be more potential for differences. In order to make broader political al­
liances or strike settlements with employers, party and unions will have to alter their tra­
ditional policies. In particular, conflicts between a party in government and allied unions 
can increase the tension. Again we expect given the differences in the institutionalization of 
party and unions and their relations, strongly institutionalized labour movements to be 
slower in adaptation.
I
Fo r m a t io n  a n d  In ter d epen d en c e  
o f  th e  "Siam ese T w in s"
In the course of the Industrial Revolution, the conflict between workers and employers - the 
labour-capital cleavage - led more or less uniformly to the formation of a working-class party 
and unions in the decades before the introduction of universal (or male) suffrage around 
the First World War (UPSET & ROKKAN 1967: 35). One finds in all Western European coun­
tries the emergence of a party and unions that claim to represent the political and economic 
interests of the working-class. Even though still a class-in-its-making, the working class rep­
resented a substantial minority, one-fourth to one-third of the adult prewar population, 
with the "Great Expectation" that it would become the dominant, ruling majority in the near 
future (PRZEWORSKI & SPRAGUE 1986: 25-8). Moreover, socialist ideas that proclaimed the 
ultimate goal of a class-less society were disseminating internationally, thanks to the exile 
of dissidents, the improved communication patterns and trans-national party and union 
contacts. Yet, the Industrial Revolution spread unequally and with varying pace from its 
berth in Britain across the European continent. The Arbeiterfrage, the social problems con­
nected with the rise of industrial capitalism, became a pressing question on the political 
agenda. While mending the most dangerous social wounds, the ruling elites utilised vary­
ing manoeuvres to exclude the working-class from gaining full political participation and
♦ _
to hamper its collective organization (cf. MANN 1987). The differences in political and eco­
nomic development, however, had a divergent impact on the transformation of the labour- 
capital cleavage into labour organization.
Certainly, working-class party and unions, like Siamese twins (V. ADLER), were bom to­
gether out of the same nascent social movement and are inextricably linked. The labour-
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capital cleavage led universally to a differentiation of political and economic organizations 
into the two channels of interest representation, while the relations between party and 
unions remained interdependent (see Chapter 2). Even though a working-class party and 
unions emerged everywhere in Europe as a consequences of the universal labour-capital 
cleavage, there are important variations that have somewhat been neglected in cleavage 
analysis. Party and unions emerged partly synchronically, partly diachronically, thereby 
leading to different forms of party-union relations with important consequences for union 
diversity. The timing and sequence of the development towards mass democracy and plu­
ralist industrial relations has shaped the cleavage transformation process into labour orga­
nization. Moreover, it will be argued in this Chapter that the initial party-union relations 
became entrenched in the organizational structures with long-term consequences. Socialist 
party and unions are later challenged by old and new social cleavages that cross-cut the 
labour-capital cleavage. However, following the theoretical propositions developed earlier 
(see Chapter 2), we expect the decisions taken at the time of founding to limit the set of 
'alternatives' for change. Moreover, the institutionalization during the consolidation leads 
to structural inertia that reduces the capacity for swift adaptation.
Th e  F o rm atio n  o f  Socialist  P arties
The thesis of the universal labour-capital cleavage is supported by the ubiquitous emergence 
of socialist parties between 1863, when the first German socialist party emerged, and 1893 
when the British Independent Labour Party was formed (for abbreviations, names and year 
of foundation, see Appendix). Nevertheless, the timing of the working-class party, its form 
of organization and electoral success, varied considerably across Europe with important 
consequences for the labour movement. Although there are several 'environmental' factors 
that set the conditions under which party formation occurred such as the class or status 
structure (cf. LlPSET 1983) and the pace and character of industrialization (cf. LORWIN 1958), 
the emphasise will be here on consequences of differences in the political opportunity 
structure, in particular, the structuring of the electoral channel (see Chapter 2). European 
states varied in the politics of integration or exclusion of dissident, lower-class interests (cf. 
Da ALDER 1966, LlPSET 1983, MANN 1987). The contention is that the differentiation between 
economic and political interest representation that emerged in response to the degree of 
integration into the political system moulded to a considerable degree the character of the 
labour movement (cf. ROKKAN 1968, LAFFERTY 1971, EUASSEN 1974, LlPSET 1983). Yet, the 
analysis here will be taking the structuring of the "electoral channel” as exogenous and ex­
amine solely the distinct consequences in the transformation of the labour-capital cleavage.
The leading questions to be posed are: When, by whom, and how successful toere working- 
class political parties founded? An analysis of timing and sequence of the organizational for­
mation and consolidation - though largely synoptical - reveals how the labour-capital 
cleavage became differently transformed into political organizations across Western 
Europe. The contention is that - given organizational inertia the structuring of the political
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Table 3.1
Founding and Political Entry of Socialist Parties, Western Europe
Country: AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
Party: SPÖ POB SD SFIO SPD IrLP PSI SDAP DNA SAP SPS Lab.
Predecessor 1874 1877 1871 1880 1863 1912 1882 1880 1893
Year of founding 1889 1885 1878 1905 1875 1922 1892 1894 1887 1889 1888 1906
Entry in parliament 1897 1894 1884 1893 1871 1922 1895 1897 1903 1896 1893 1900
Entry in government 1919 1916 1915 1924 1918 1948 1944 1939 1927 1917 1943 1915
Association right 1870 1830 1857 1884 1869 1824 1890 1855 1839 1864 1848 1824
Suffrage (>50% male) 1907 1893 1849 1848 1871 1912 1896 1898 1909 1848 1885
Prop. Representation 1919 1899 1918 (1919) 1919 1921 1919 1918 1921 1909 1919 -
Parliamentarism 1919 1830 1901 1917 1919 1922 1919 1868 1884 1917 1872 1909
So u r c e : compiled tram Alber 1982; Elvander 1980; Flora 1983; Jacobs  1989; Lane & Errson  
1991; M ackie & Rose  1990; Rokkan 1970; W ende  1981. No t e : for names see Appendix
alternatives at an early period became institutionalized in the organizational structure with 
long-term ramifications, even after universal suffrage was later granted.
The first socialist party emerged not in the most liberal or open political environment, 
quite the contrary (see Table 3.1). "Political entrepreneurs" initiated socialist political parties 
first in Germany (1863/75)2, Denmark (1871/78) and Belgium (1877/85), not without 
meeting state repression. From there the impetus spread to the neighbouring countries, that 
were still not completely industrialized: France (1880), Switzerland (1880/88), the 
Netherlands (1881). Late industrial development or weak inter-regional integration delayed 
the forming of a national socialist party in Norway (1887) and Sweden (1889), but also in 
Austria (1889) and Italy (1892). On the British Isles (including Ireland), formal rights of as­
sociation were granted early, yet only after the suffrage reform of 1885 did socialist parties 
emerge (ILP, 1895), though these sectarian clubs remained largely detached from the 
working class.
The importance of institutional sequencing and timing of party foundation should not 
be misunderstood. The former does not determine the latter, but it provides the context 
within which the party emerges.3 In many countries, suffrage reform became the main mo­
bilizing issue on the way to Electoral Socialism. In this struggle, the socialist party had
2 In the following the year of foundation (or other events) is given in brackets after the organi­
zations abbreviation or the country name.
3 The French and Swiss Socialist parties took a long time to become consolidated, not because of 
the lack of a substantial suffrage but paradoxically due to its long existence. The foundation of the 
German socialist party coincided with the granting of universal male suffrage for the newly unified 
Germany.
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often to rely on parliamentary alliances (with reformist, Liberal parties) and extra-parlia­
mentarian support from the labour movement (unions, labour press, cooperatives). The re­
formist character of the socialist parties of Belgium or Scandinavia can be partly explained 
by their successful mobilization for suffrage reform and broader alliance building. These 
parties were also early in accepting the logic of electoral socialism and even the participa­
tion in government (Denmark 1914, Belgium 1916, Sweden 1917). Ever since the 1880s, the 
question of Millerandism, that is, government participation in a coalition with bourgeois 
forces, divided the pro-participation reformists and the "revolutionary" left wing. Most 
prominently, the German SPD's entry into the last war government (1918) furthered the 
split with the party left (USPD), and the British National Labour Party broke away over the 
participation in government during the 1930s.
Using the organization concepts developed earlier (see Chapter 2) there are four ideal- 
type forms (cf. PANEBIANCO 1988) in the founding and consolidation process of socialist 
parties. One dimension is whether the organization was founded by internal or external 
forces, that is, on the initiative of "political entrepreneurs" or by other organizations, in par­
ticular, trade unions. The second dimension is the process by which the organization be­
came consolidated, whether by centre-led institutionalization (penetration), or whether it re­
mained weakly institutionalized (diffusion) with ample space for local autonomy. The classi­
fication is based on a comprehensive reading - though necessarily compressed interpreta­
tion of - party histories that brings some order to historical diversity of party formation 
across time and space (Table 3.2).4
First, the German SPD, formed by a merger in 1875, is a prime example of the internally 
legitimated and strongly institutionalized party. The party survived the Anti-socialist laws 
(1879-1890), and continued on the parliamentary road to socialism. The prewar SPD was "a 
powerful bureaucracy, self-financed, centralized, with a bureaucratic structure extending 
from the centre to the periphery and ensuring the dominant coalition's tight control over 
the party (according to those well described by Michels and by many others after him)" 
(PANEBIANCO 1988: 75-6). Similarly, the Danish SDF (1878) reemerged from an early volatile 
phase under the moderate Copenhagen leadership (supporting government in 1913, enter­
ing in 1916) that maintained interlocking relations with the strong craft union movement. A 
less successful example is the Dutch SDAP (1894), a late reformist break-away from the 
anti-parliamentarian SDB (1881), that imposed the German party model, but had less elec­
toral success in a segmented late-industrializing society.
Second, a good example of an externally legitimated, yet centralizing party is the Swedish 
SAP (1889). Popular movements had already mobilized a part of the lower-classes 
(THERBORN 1989), when the party was founded on the initiative of local unions. Four-fifth 
of party membership were collectively affiliated (ELVANDER 1980: 44), binding resources 
and fate of party and unions together. SAP mobilized for suffrage reform, even calling for a
4 On Socialist party history see: besides national country studies: the following comparative 
studies: ELVANDER 1980; GEARY 1989; KENDALL 1975; PANEBIANCO 1988; LINDEN & ROJAHN 1990; 
Pa d c e t & Pa terso n  1991; P atterson  & Th o m a s  1977,1986
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Table 3.2
Founding Origins and Organization Strategy of Socialist Party
Penetration Diffusion
Internal German SPD French SFIO
legitimation Danish SDF Italian PSI
(founding) Dutch SDAP Irish Labour Party
External Belgian POB British Labour Party
legitimation Swedish SAP Norwegian DNA
(founding) Austrian SPO Swiss SP
general strike (1902) that provoked employer centralization and state intervention. 
Committed to the electoral road, SAP entered the Liberal government (1917), even taking 
the risk of a left-wing break-away. Similarly, the Belgian POB (1879), was set-up as a exter­
nally legitimate party of local unions, workers’ associations, co-operatives and socialist 
groups. The party became the centre from which the organizational network was turned 
into a well-organized ztril (pillar) that could rally for suffrage reform (LORWIN1971). In late- 
industrializing Austria, the SPO (1889) was formed belatedly by a plethora of various 
workers' associations, political clubs and co-operatives. Only after years of struggle for 
franchise reform did the party enter parliament though the nationality question blocked 
prewar politics. SPO grew slowly into a mass party, relying on collective union affiliation 
and a cooperative movement, all three were to form the interwar socialist Lager (camp) 
centred around "Red" Vienna.
Third, the British Labour Party (1900/06) is the well-known example of the third type - 
an incompletely integrated, externally legitimated party. Early industrialized Britain was the 
country in which there was no socialist mass party, instead, some union leaders were 
elected to parliament on a Lib-Lab ticket. Socialist parties and trade unions, though 
mutually suspicious, were forced to accordance. "The formation of the Labour 
Representation Committee (LRC) in 1900 with its limited aim of sponsoring labour mem­
bers of Parliament was a reflection of this tentative alliance. The LRC was a federation of 
independent organizations in which trade union money and muscle combined with social­
ist intellectual leadership. The forlorn hope was the socialist tail could wag the trade union 
dog (PRICE 1990:19)." The LRC, later the Labour Party (1906), was weakly institutionalized, 
depending on external support (see PANEB1ANCO 1988: 90-2). Individual membership was 
not introduced before 1918, but union block vote (over 80%) dominates - until today - the 
party's decision making. In Norway, the DNA (1887) emerged belatedly. It was a federation 
of local unions and socialist groups, that spread slowly from Oslo into the periphery, the 
strongholds of popular liberalism, entering parliament relatively late (1903). Similarly, the 
Swiss SPS (1888) was a weak federation of local parties, trade unions and welfare societies, 
that adopted a socialist programme belatedly (1904). Although part of the state-sponsored 
Arbeiterbund and given the possibility of national referenda (since 1871) socialist reform 
proposals were soon frustrated by labour's weakness in a Liberalist society.
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Fourth, internally legitimated, weakly institutionalized socialist parties developed some­
what in an organizational void. Belatedly, SFIO (1905) grouped in an uneasy coalition the 
fragmented, sectionalist French socialist parties5. The Guesdists (POF, 1880), put their 
stamp on SFIO and the 1906-Charter that remained unaltered until Mitterand's party 
reform (PS, 1969/70). SFIO inherited a decentralized organization with incompletely inte­
grated regional and intermediary structures (PANEBIANCO 1988: 95-6). Moreover, SFIO was 
less a working-class than a "voters party", with strongholds in regions of rural militantism. 
"The party was predisposed to such a development by its birth though the federation of 
groups with autonomous organizational power resources (which thus impeded the growth 
of a central bureaucratic apparatus), but also by the workers’ unions’ political indepen­
dence. This independence prevented the SFIO from controlling a resource which was (...) 
essential to the construction of a solid party sub-culture" (PANEBIANCO 1988:98). The Italian 
PSI (1892) emerged belatedly due to state hostility and incomplete national integration. It 
was a weak federation of regional associations, trade federations and mutual aid societies 
from which it remained dependent since it remained long excluded from parliament until 
1913. Extra-parliamentary opposition and centrifugal "municipal socialism", undercut fur­
thermore the authority of the party leadership (PANEBIANCO 1988: 104). Given the late na­
tional independence, the Irish Labour Party (1912/22) emerged also belatedly and ab­
stained in the first decisive Irish elections on the national question, reflecting its contra­
dicting support from British-based and Irish-based unions.
T he  F o rm atio n  o f  Socialist  A llied U n ions
While the socialist party had to integrate both the parliamentary grouping and territorial 
party structures, the union movement faced a double integration problem. National unions 
had to achieve authority over local unions in order to face the national integration of labour 
and producer markets. And national union centres had to integrate both functional and ter­
ritorial forms of interest representation in order to press - with one voice - vis-à-vis the state 
and employers. In both struggles, the socialist party played a crucial role - in a practical as 
well as an ideological sense by stressing class solidarity over sectionalism (cf. FULCHER
1988). In this chapter we will concentrate on the latter integration problem the formation of 
union centres6 (see Appendix), while the integration of locals into national unions will be 
described later (Chapter 6). Certainly, some national unions and many local unions existed 
before the formation of socialist parties, yet the formation of a union centre is a crucial step 
in labour unity, creating a national coordination amongst diverse, sometimes parochial, 
interests. Only thereafter was the union movement on a par with the national party in 
claiming labour representation vis-à-vis the state and employers.
5 SFIO was a "broad church, holding together an uneasy alliance of reformists (A. Thomas), 
Republican-Marxists (Jaurès), Mandst-Republicans (Vaillant), Guesdists, quasi-syndicalists 
(Lagardelle), and anti-militarists (Hervé)" (M a g r a w  1989:73).
6 In the following I will use the term union centre (instead of peak associations) to denote any 
form of cooperation between mainly national unions, such as annual congresses or confederations.
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Table 3.3 
Foundation of Socialist Union Centres
AU BE DE FR GE IR rr NE NO SW SZ UK
Union Centre BFG CGSB DSF CGT ADGB rruc CGI NW NAFL LO SGB TUC
predecessor 1886 1885 1875 1893 1863
founded 1693 1898 1898 1903 1891 1894 1906 1905 1899 1898 1880 1895
delay after party 4 13 20 15 16 (•28) 12 11 12 9 -8 -5
coalition right 1870 1898 1857 1864 1869 1824 1890 1855 1839 1864 1848 1824
So u r c e : see Appendix A.
Like in the case of political parties, the labour-capital cleavage lead not everywhere im­
mediately to the formation of Socialist unions. Before the setting-up of national Socialist 
union centres, preexisting unions, particularly the early 'labour aristocracy' - like printers' 
craft unions (cf. MARKS 1989) - were largely particularistic and moderately oriented. Like 
the early Lib-Lab workers' candidates, these unions held liberal-reformist ideas before en­
tering a socialist movement. Moreover, the earliest union centres, the British TUC (1867), 
the German Hirsch-Duncker Gewerkvereine (1868), and the Swiss SGB (1880) were mainly 
liberal-reformist union movements that shunned Marxist socialist orientations. Yet in 
Germany, the repression of political and social emancipation by the state, as the 
Bismarckian Federal and Prussian state during the Anti-Socialist laws (1878-1890) uninten­
tionally further politicized and united the labour movement against the regime. Where 
political and economic integration of the working-class, at least more skilled sections, was 
initiated earlier, Ub-Lab craft reformist unions led to a tradition of a moderate labour 
movement, whereas repression fostered a politicisation of the labour movement.
Hence, the formation of national Socialist union centres and their relative timing com­
pared to the socialist party are important in understanding the forces that shaped the 
labour movement (see Table 3.3). The crucial question is: which came first, the party or the 
unions? Was the party sufficiently able and strong to shape the development of the union 
movement, or was the reverse or neither of the two the case? Thus, four different ideal-type 
patterns of sequencing, representing different combinations of legitimation and institution­
alization (see Table 3.4), can be derived from a bird's-eye view of labour history.7
First, the party preceded the union centre, giving the union movement support in foster­
ing national coordination and ideological equipment (German type). In these countries, a 
well-organized socialist party (German SPD, Swedish SAP and Belgian POB) coordinated 
initially the local and national activities of the unions. The party later initiated the founding 
of an allied union "secretariat", from which a fully fledged centralized union confederation 
emerged over time. Thus, a centralized, preceding party moulded the centralization of the 
union movement and the integration into national unions. The German Free union centre
7 On Socialist union confederations see GALENSON 1952a; G eary 1989; KENDALL 1975; L aunay 
1990; Linden & R ojahn 1990; Visser 1990.
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Table 3.4
Formation and Organization Strategy of Socialist Union Centre
Penetration Diffusion
External German AOGB Norwegian NALF
legitimation Swedish LO Austrian BFG
(Party-led) Belgian CS Dutch N W
Internal British TUC French CGT
legitimation Swiss SGB Italian CGL
(Union-led) Danish DSF Irish ITUC
was set up with the help of the party (1891), it grew gradually in strength and self-assur­
ance vis-à-vis the party. Yet the party still claimed its primacy over such contentious matters 
as the general strike until the 1906 settlement. In Sweden, the party coordinated union 
activities until a union centre was set-up (LO, 1898), and collective party affiliation 
remained in practice for most local unions. In Belgium, the party coordinated union activi­
ties via a union committee (CS, 1898) within its structure, only in 1937 became the union 
centre independent of the party (CGTB).
Second, the process was reversed: the union movement became entrenched before a 
socialist party could exert a centralizing influence (British type). Thus the organization of 
economic interest had been already advanced by the time socialist ideas spread, in fact, 
moderate unions set up a union-led political party. This was the case in countries with 
strong apolitical, localist, and sectionalist craft unionism that achieved in some trades col­
lective bargaining (Britain, Switzerland, and Denmark). In Britain, the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC, 1863) met long before the socialist parties of the 1890s, but remained a 
weak forum of autonomous unions and local councils (at least not before the 1895-reform). 
In Switzerland, local craft unions founded a union centre (SGB, 1880) that remained 
marginal until its 1905-reform when it came close to the socialist party. In Denmark, a union 
centre was formed first in Copenhagen (DSF, 1886), later nationally (1898), but remained 
long dominated by fragmented craft unions. In these countries, the prewar votes for the 
socialists did not match the size of the unionized workforce despite - or paradoxically be­
cause of - a relatively large enfranchised population, thus indicating the continuation of 
liberal worker alignments.
Third, the party preceded the unions, but was not sufficiently centralized to push the 
union movement towards centralization (¡ate-comer type). This third pattern represents 
somewhat incomplete forms of party-led union centralization due to organization problems 
under late-industrialization and incomplete national integration (Norway, Austria, 
Netherlands). In Norway, the party coordinated local union activities before a union centre 
was formed (NAFL, 1899) that became only slowly a national organization, yet local coop­
tation and collective party-affiliation remained. In Austria, a union centre was formed, 
when the party was still in its infancy (1893), and centralization succeeded, as in Norway, 
only in the interwar period. The Dutch union centre (NW, 1905) was set-up by the re-
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fonnist socialist party as a rival to the syndicalist unions after a disastrous railway strike 
(1903). Only shortly before the First World War did party and unions start to centralize and 
integrate the local structures, facing localist, syndicalist (Norway and Netherlands) or na­
tional-ethical (Austria) counter-movements.
Fourth, both party and unions developed independently, therefore often overlapping in 
activities and competing over working class alliances (French type). These countries failed 
in a double sense: neither was the union movement strong enough to built up a political 
force, nor was there a political force that induced a strong union centre (France, Italy, 
Ireland). The French union centre (CGT, 1895) maintained a double structure of territorial 
and functional representation (Bourses and fédérations), thus both politicized locals and 
moderate unions had equal voice. CGT enshrined its syndicalist strategy, disapproving 
party-union relations in 1906, just when a united socialist party finally emerged (SFIO, 
1905). In Italy, national unions and the Chambers of Labour coexisted, preceding the union 
centre (CGL, 1906). Moreover, CGL's close links with the socialists led to internal political 
feuds and a syndicalist split-away (USI, 1912). In Ireland, late industrialization, the national 
problem, and incomplete disengagement from the British TUC were major obstacles to 
party-union links and radical syndicalism soared in the 1910s. We will later see how union 
movements with a dual structure and strong local autonomy became affected by, or turned 
into, revolutionary syndicalism (see Chapter 5).
T h e  L inkages Betw een  th e  Two S iamese T w in s
The figurations under which party and unions emerged had a profound impact on the 
character of the labour movement: the radical-politidsation of the union through the party, 
or the reformist-moderation of the party through the unions. But the party-union figuration 
shaped also the linkages between the two Siamese twins. The remnant of party-union link­
ages today reflect with the due adaptations the initial figuration of party-union formation, 
though in Germany and Austria a major change occurred after the Second World War. 
Although the historic linkage between the Siamese twins are redrawn all over Europe as a 
result of general political, social and economic development and global pressures (e.g. 
M a rk o v i ts  1992), such changes took different forms. As will be pointed out later, both the 
logic of membership and representation, pressed party and unions to reevaluate their link­
ages, yet again this happened under different configurations and with a different capacity 
to change.
Party-union linkages can operate at various level of an organization: at the leadership 
(or administrative) level or at the level of basis organizations, between party and national 
union centres (or national unions and even locals). In principle, there are two linkages: or­
ganizational interlocking and membership overlap. With organizational interlocking party 
and unions attempt to manage their interdependency through mutual coordinatation in de­
cision making. Interlocking is part of the pillarizatUm (see Chapter 2), by which party and 
unions build an inter-organizational network in order to maintain labour unity versus con­
tenders. When the supporters and membership of party and unions overlap, they can profit
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Table 3.5 
Socialist Party-Union Linkages
Formal links Coordination Informal links
Collective
AFFILIATION 
OF UNIONS
British Lab.
Irish IrLP 
(Belgian POB) 
(Austrian SDAP)
Swedish SAP 
Norwegian DNA
Membership
overlap
Danish DSF Belgian PS/SP 
Swiss SP
German SPD 
Dutch PvdA
"Vo ter" party 
(spurious)
French PS 
Italian PSI
No te : historical cases in brackets.
from mutual parallel mobilization. Party and unions fostered the creation of working-class 
cultures (social ghettos) through organizational and social closure. Social closure (see 
Chapter 2) helped party and unions to maintain collective class identity, cohesion and soli­
darity, but necessarily limited its growth to the sections of the workforce that could be 
reached by such a strategy. Yet, both forms of party-union linkage show a bewildering 
variety across European labour movements8 , though a general trend toward distancing 
can be observed (see Table 3.5).
First, inter-organizational linkages have been initially maintained in most socialist parties, 
however, they vary in the degree of formalization and importance. In Belgium, the union 
centre was initially a part of the party structure, but with the 1902-reform interlocking 
directorates were established until the union centre became finally an independent organi­
zation (1937). Conversely, the Irish trade unions controlled the Irish labour party activities 
until the separation of the party from the union (1931) but two union leaders are still for­
mally represented on the party board. Ex-officio interlocking directorates existed also in 
Denmark, where two party and two union leaders where represented on allied organiza­
tion's executive committee (although since the 1960s there is also the rival, leftist VS with 
some union support). In Scandinavia, Britain and postwar Belgium, formal coordination 
committees or customs of informal meetings provide further coordination functions with­
out direct interference. In postwar Britain and Belgium, these forms of coordination were 
mainly targeted around political elections, for instance the Liaison committee (1972), or the 
Belgian action commune. In Austria, after the move towards Einheitsgewerkschaft, there exists 
partisan factions within the union, in fact, the socialist faction FSG functions as the 
Schamierstelle (PEUNKA 1980) (hinge) between party and union. In the German, Dutch and 
Swiss parties the links are relative informal, the socialist party leadership includes unionists
8 On party-union linkeage see BEYME 1977: 215-243, KENDALL 1975, LINDEN & RojAHN 1990, 
T a y lo r 1989: Ch. 3, G rebinc & Meyer 1992.
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among its ranks but the union remains officially "non-partisan" despite the fact that most of 
its leaders are socialist party members.
Secondly, collective affiliation of unions to the party have been the most explicit form of 
support but also means of influence. Collective affiliation in the British and Irish labour 
parties were a consequence of the union-led foundation. Britain is unique as TUC affiliated 
unions (not the TUC or individual locals) decide to affiliate collectively (see TAYLOR 1989: 
53), in fact, some larger unions (in particular the miners) joined in only some years later. By 
the eve of the First World War, 83% of all TUC members were collectively affiliated to the 
party, albeit paying only a small political levy (only after 1918 was individual membership 
introduced). Collective affiliation has declined over time, partly as a result of legal changes, 
the introduction of opting-in rules from 1927 until 1946, and the expansion of non-partisan 
white-collar or public sector unions. However, TUC unions with their 'bloc-vote' at party 
congresses could still claim 94% the 1980s, yet this represented only 55% of all TUC mem­
bers.
Outside Britain, collective affiliation was common before the First World War by local 
unions in Sweden (80% of party members, 45% of union members) and Norway (66% of 
party members), and Austria (40% of party members), while it was outlawed in prewar 
Germany, or voted down by the unions in Switzerland (1902) and France (1905). The local 
affiliation of the two Scandinavian union movements, not to speak of the relatively higher 
political levy, is compared to Britain a greater indication of membership alignment due to 
the larger discretion left to the membership base. Collective membership within the party 
declined with worker dealignment, more rapidly in Norway (1989: 24% of DNA members, 
ca. 4% of LO members) than in Sweden (1980s: 75% of SAP members, ca. 40% of LO mem­
bers). While it has become de facto unimportant in Norway, the Swedish SAP decided in 
1990 to discontinue de jure collective membership in order to rejuvenate the party. Given 
the affiliation of the largest general union (ITGWU) to the Irish Labour Party, collective 
membership dominates the party (ca. 95%) but remains more a financial political levy.
II
T h e  Tw in  Lo g ic  o f  Electo ra l  
a n d  C o rpo ra te  So c ia lism
Socialist party and allied unions mutually mobilized for the extension of the civil, political 
and social citizenship rights to the lower classes. In mobilizing for change, party and unions 
became drawn into the two channels of interest representation as they climbed up the 
thresholds in the electoral and corporate channels (see Chapter 2). Party and unions, some­
times grudgingly, sometimes enthusiastically, in mobilizing for political or corporate power 
had to face the logic of membership. Initially the roads to Electoral and Corporate Socialism 
run parallel: party and union gained from party-union linkages and coordinated mobiliza­
tion in the political and economic arena. Both as "outsiders" became increasingly integrated 
into the polity and economy, however, tensions between the two emerged. In fact, party-
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union relations had been challenged ever since the First World War, the period marking the 
decisive moment for labour's national integration. The more the party and unions gained 
responsibility in political or economic participation, the more their relations faced potential 
conflicts of interests. Moreover, with the suffrage reforms around the First World War, in a 
number of countries Socialist labour movement faced competition, and limits to growth, by 
other deavage-organizations. For analyzing the twin logic of Electoral and Corporate 
Socialism, we will now be looking into the long-term electoral and membership records of 
party and unions respectively.
T h e  T w in  P rocess o f  Socialist M obilization
The logic of membership underlying the twin processes of socialist mobilization sets the pace 
but also the limits of Electoral and Corporate Socialism. When the Situnese twins fought 
side-by-side against exclusion - labour unity was labour's strength. As long as party and 
unions had limited resources and faced exclusion, both had to rely on the other for support 
in mobilization. Formal party-union links provided coordination of action, corporate union 
membership or party levies added to political funding, party clubs and union meetings 
knitted group solidarity, party journals and union press disseminated common ideology, 
ancillary organizations maintained further class identity. Socialist party and allied unions 
through pillarization created a net of political, economic and social organizations (see 
Chapter 2) in response to the hostile political and social environment. Building on preex­
isting group solidarity in working-class communities, socialist pillarization maintained 
social closure creating Socialist sub-cultures within modernizing societies. Particularly where 
regional and urban working-class communities existed but national political integration 
remained retarded, Socialist labour movements build social ghettos on the bases of pillariza­
tion and social closure, like Red Vienna or Red Berlin.
Looking at the record of socialist voting and unionization over one century, there is a 
secular trend in most countries from rise to stagnation, though notwithstanding cases with 
weakly institutionalized party-union relations (France, Italy and Ireland). With the excep­
tion of short fluctuations after the two wars, socialist voter turnout and unionization trends 
are strikingly parallel. Mobilization by party and unions rose in tandem and both reached 
their saturation ceiling, albeit with different zeniths of electoral and corporate mobilization 
depending on the salience of cross-cutting class cleavages. Initially, socialist party and 
union activities were deviant political causes (NEDELMANN 1975), promoted by few politi­
cal entrepreneurs (STDMCHCOMBE 1965). Only with increasing, legal, political and social 
acceptance (and receding resistance), did the new forms of interest representation become 
legitimated. In fact, we can observe a diffusion like curve with an initially slow but then
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increasing growth rate until the momentum slows down up to a saturation point (the 
carrying capacity).9
The extension of the suffrage and the recognition of unions by employers and the state 
changed stepwise the opportunity structure of party and unions respectively (see Chapter 
2). Yet, both party and unions needed time to build up national representative structures 
and mobilize constituency by constituency, company by company, the potential voters and 
union members. This was the phase when voting and union alignment became ingrained 
into the working class, reinforced by social ties and community solidarity. However, with 
increasing legitimation, competition with other forms of representation became more pro­
nounced ( H a n n a n  & FREEMAN 1989), particularly over groups that are outside the initial 
core support group. Moreover, with ongoing modernization, the core support group 
stopped growing, the social community ties degenerated, and inter-generational mobility 
cut working-class alignments. The "trade-off between keeping the core support group and 
opening-up for other groups was a ambiguous choice for party and union leaders (cf. 
PRZEWORSKI 1985). On the one hand, political parties are forced to seek extension of their 
electoral support beyond the limits of a too narrow working-class base but cannot be cer­
tain about how much their core support will defect once the party changed course. 
Similarly, socialist union movements faced the problem of whether and how to integrate 
the rising politically heterogeneous white-collar workforce that challenged traditional or­
ganizing principles based on working-class solidarity (see Chapter 7).
Party and union strategists had to take into account that there was a trade-off between 
holding on to the old constituency, while opening up to new social groups (PRZEWORSKI & 
SPRAGUE 1986) - especially where workers could defect to other parties or unions. Yet a 
move away from the traditional social base could meet internal resistance by vested 
interests that were able to bloc any party or union reform. In fact, party and union strate­
gists had only limited discretion to choose and implement organizational reforms. They 
faced a "nested game” (TSEBEUS 1990) in which internal power relations reflect past organi­
zational decisions (cf. KOELBLE 1992), the old traditional groups have to decide whether to 
include the new social groups. The postwar move towards a catch-all party (KlRCHHEIMER
1966) or unity labour movements of the Austrian and German union movement, implied a 
deemphasization of party-union relations in order to attract middle class voters or white- 
collar union members respectively.
Cross-cutting political cleavages (reform-revolution, Church-State) could also further 
limit the growth of Socialist labour movements. In France and Germany, the relative suc­
cessful interwar Communist parties limited the electoral success of the Socialist party and 
strained party-union relations, this applies even more for postwar France and Italy (see 
Chapter 5). In countries with religiously mixed or Catholic population, Christian- 
Democratic parties profited also from suffrage reform and from proportional representa-
9 The parallel 5-shaped curves of political and corporate mobilization are similar to typical dif­
fusion curves (cf. ROGERS 1983), suggesting mutual mobilization processess, instead of just unilateral 
influences from unions to party or from party to unions.
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tion. With the help of a network of Christian unions and associations, these parties com­
peted over workers alignment with the Socialist party (see Chapter 4). Yet, whatever the 
level of mobilization, the march towards Electoral or Corporate Socialism came with few 
significant exceptions to a standstill after the Second World War.
T h e  "N u m erical" Strength  o f  E lectoral a n d  C orporate  Socialism
Before the First World War, socialist parties mobilized earlier or faster than their allied 
unions in Belgium, Austria (since 1907), Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. This 
was partly due to the relative extensive suffrage, and employer resistance and legal obsta­
cles to unionization. In Scandinavia and Great Britain, votes for labour parties gained mo­
mentum only after Lib-Lab electoral alliances had been largely replaced. In France and Italy, 
the share of national votes for socialist parties exceeded by far the degree of unionization, 
the latter lagging behind due to employers intransigence and in some regions retarded in­
dustrialization. At the eve of the First World War, three labour movements were the best 
organized: the Danish DSF (17.5% union density), the German Generalkommission (13.7%), 
and the British TUC (12.2%, 80% affiliated to Labour), underlying their importance vis-à-vis 
the party. The German Free unions, became increasingly self-assured and achieved a his­
toric compromise of party-union relations (1906), that enshrined mutual party-union 
autonomy and cooperation. All other socialist labour movements clustered below 10% in 
unionization and 10% to 20% in electoral turnout. The high share of agricultural labour 
force in these countries lowered the chances for both party and unions. If we take into 
account only the extractive, productive and transport sectors before 1914 Italian, French, 
Belgian and Dutch union centres organized not even every tenth "proletarian". Austria and 
Switzerland organized only few more, while the Swedish and Norwegian are at pars with 
the British and German union centre that organized about one-quarter, not to speak of the 
Danish movement where about every second "industrial" worker is a DSF member. Yet, 
depending on the landholding structures, and the strategies of labour toward small holding 
peasants, some Socialist parties (like the Swedish SAP) attempted to mobilize also the rural 
population, or attempted to organize agricultural labourers (as Italian unions).
With the news of the termination of the War and the Russian revolution, a wave of social 
mobilization boosted membership records of trade unions and working class parties. 
Where Communist parties remained weak (see Chapter 5), the extension of suffrage 
boosted socialist parties, though none of them came close to a majority position. Union 
membership in 1919-22 surged between 2 and 5 times compared with the prewar period. 
While the initial sudden political mobilization and radicalization made many unionists 
hold believed in a great universal break-through, the following period became a turmoil of 
European labour, when dispersion into various trajectories set in again. The sudden up­
surge in support had overrun both party and unions, their leaders faced now the expecta­
tions and demands of a mass constituency and membership base. The sudden growth 
showed the limits of integration of new members through party and union structures. Party 
and unions differed across Europe as to their capacity to hold on to the new members or
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Table 3.6
Votes and Seats of Socialist Parties (%), Western Europe 1890-1989
Country: AU BE DE FR GE IR rr NE NO SW SZ UK
Party: SPÖ PS/SP SD PS SPD IrLP PSI PSDI PvdA DNA SAP SPS Lab.
Average votes (%)
1890-1917 23.7 13.1 19.3 12.2 28.1 - 15.6 - 10.0 132 18.8 13.2 5 2
1918-1944 38.8 33.6 38.8 21.1 223 9.8 24.4 - 21.9 32.0 41.3 26.6 31.7
1945-1967 42.9 34 2 40.1 15.6 29.6 10.8 13.0 5.6 28.6 45.4 465 26.7 46.2
1968-1989 48.1 27.1 33.4 25.3 42 2 11.9 115 4.0 29.3 405 44.8 23 2 37.3
Average seats (%)
1890-1917 19.2 16.6 14.7 11-3 16.1 - 6.6 - 6.4 6.6 13.1 45 4.0
1918-1944 39.9 36.3 385 19.8 23 2 7.8 21.0 - 22.4 30.3 45.0 23.8 21.4
1945-1967 44.9 36.9 405 155 315 10.2 13.1 4.4 29.7 51.3 48.5 26.2 48.8
1968-1989 49.0 29.1 34.3 29.8 42.4 11.1 115 35 30.6 45.0 46.1 24.5 43.7
No t e : incl. predecessors; So u r c e : own calculations, updated series based on Mackie & Rose 1990, 
see Appendix B.
supporters, the union movements lost most of the new union members within five to ten 
years.10 In Austria, Germany and Britain, the initial mutual recognition of employers and 
unions eroded correspondingly. In Scandinavia, Britain and Switzerland, the socialist 
unions recovered and later gradually gained in unionization during the years of increasing 
unemployment.
In the postwar period, socialist parties and allied unions reached their saturation when 
the core social support base was reached. In the first postwar elections, Communist parties 
had successfully mobilized in some national elections, yet voters returned back to socialist 
parties thereafter with the exception of France and Italy (see Chapter 5). The peak in social­
ist turnout was already achieved by the 1950s in Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, thereafter the party never exceed by more 
than 5% points its previous best result, with the exception of Sweden. Only in Austria and 
Germany, but also in France and Ireland, did the party achieve its saturation later, during 
the 1970s (in France in the 1980s). In both Austria and Germany, the two socialist parties 
pursued a catch-all strategy and turned to broader electoral support once the early elections 
in the 1950s deprived the hope of party leaders to eventually achieve the majority mark as a 
working-class party. In some countries, leftist parties and since the 1980s ecologist parties 
emerged in addition, competing with the long established socialist parties for the votes of 
wage earners and salaried employees.
A somewhat different pattern can be derived from the allied union movements. 
Saturation in unionization was also achieved in the 1950s in Austria and Germany, besides 
Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and - if we consider party affiliated TUC unions only -
10 Decline in percent, comparing membership low to peak in 1920's: Austrian BFG (-46%), 
German ADGB (-50%), and British TUC (-49%), but also to a lesser degree: Belgian CGTB (-27%), 
Danish DSF (-24% exd. SiD), French CGT (-35%) and Swiss SGB (-33%)
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Table 3.7
Socialist Union Membership and Density (%)
Country: AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
Union Centre: ÔGB-FSG FGTB LO FO DGB ICTU UIL FNV LO LO SGB TUC
Membership share (%)
1913 91.8 55.4 75.4 94.8 64.9 60.4 32.1 100.0 66.8 73.0 54.0
1918-1944 85.0 71.2 82.3 54.9 70.6 80.0 54.2 37.7 100.0 77.9 63.6 77.0
1945-1967 [45.5] 30.0 79.9 14.0 85.1 57.3 10.9 36.1 78.0 74.2 58.1 86.0
1966-1989 (41.6] 41.7 71.8 19.6 82.0 92.4 14.3 53.0 69.8 62.1 515 87.7
Gross density (%)
1913 5.9 5 2 175 22 13.7 . 3 2 3.9 9.4 3.1 6.4 12.2
1918-1944 36.3 22.6 33.1 25.9 . 6.9 11.3 20.4 30.4 15.2 24.0
1945-1967 62.7 19.3 48.4 0.8 31.8 26.3 14.6 46.3 51.2 21.8 37.1
1968-1989 58.8 26.2 52.6 3.0 31.9 495 7.1 16.3 44.4 51.7 16.9 42.8
Source: own calculations, DUES database, see Appendix C.
United Kingdom.11 However, in Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden, all countries with con­
siderable increase in overall unionization, the allied union membership grew again above 
the previous peak in the 1970s. This was mainly due to the positive effects of union-led 
(Ghent system) unemployment insurance schemes (cf. NEUMANN et al. 1991, ROTHSTEIN 
1990) in years of increasing unemployment - a unique incentive to join a union (although 
legally the two institutions are separated).
This empirical stability, if not deadlock, for most countries may be an astonishing find­
ing, supporting the freezing hypothesis of the postwar party and union systems (see 
Chapter 10). The chances for the labour movement to break-out of the limits set by social 
mobilization were qualified. Only three out of twelve socialist parties and three out of nine 
allied union movements had success in broadening their support. Yet, even to achieve sta­
bility parties and unions had to alter incrementally. As the social structure changed, party 
and unions faced the rise and challenge of new social groups. In a number of countries, the 
socialist-oriented union movements faced decline in the unionization rate, in Norway and 
Switzerland already in the 1950s, but most pronounced in the United Kingdom in the 
1980s. The question of political alignment between party and unions and its consequences 
for a break-out of the limited working-class support base became crucial for the electoral 
and corporate trade-off.
Stability and Change in Unions and Workers Party A lignment
Party and unions had traditionally gained their strength from the broad support in the 
working-class, but were they able to hold on to their base? Worker alignment to socialist 
parties varied across countries - with important consequences to the political distinctive
11 France and Italy due to the weak party-union ties cannot be considered here.
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ness (cf. ESPING-ANDERSEN 1985:122-6). Although the party alignment of blue-collar work­
ers declined somewhat over time, the relative differences between socialist parties can best 
be compared at the end of the mobilization drive (the early 1970s). Parties with high blue- 
collar workers' alignment (70-90%) can be presumed in Austria and Sweden, followed by 
medium-high (50-70%) alignment in Denmark and Norway, in Germany and Great Britain, 
medium-low alignment (30-50%) in consodational Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland, and low alignment (10-30%) in Catholic semi-agrarian France, Italy and 
Ireland.12 As a result of the cleavage structures workers alignment are divided due to leftist 
parties in Scandinavia, particularly in Denmark, and as a result of religious cross-cutting 
cleavages in Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland (see Chapter 4). In France and Italy, 
the low alignment is due to the stronger working-class appeal of the Communist party 
(around 40% of blue-collar workers voted Communist in both countries in the 1960/70s). In 
Ireland, the Labour party foiled to have an important support base within the small indus­
trial working-class, it lost much of its small support (28% in 1969), particularly among the 
skilled working class in the 1970s.13 In Germany and Great Britain, more than one-third of 
blue-collar workers voted for a conservative party (in Germany, the Christian-Democratic 
party attracts also Catholic workers), while one-sixth in Austria only.
A decline in worker alignment to union-linked socialist parties can be identified for the 
Danish DS and Norwegian DNA, while the Swedish SAP held its support (cf. ESP1NG- 
ANDERSEN 1985). In Britain, alignment of the manual working class plunged from over 65% 
in the 1960s and short below 60% in the early 1970s to around 43% in the 1980s (CREWE, 
D a y  & Fox 1992:19), albeit an increasing share of the non-labour vote went to the Liberals 
(SDP/Alliance). Working-class voting behaviour reflects the intensity of "class alignment", 
the importance of working-class community cultures for political mobilization. In this 
respect, party-union relations in combination with the strength of the union movement as 
such can have an impact on maintaining worker alignment.14 Moreover, workers’ party 
alignment seems to be proportional to the intensity and formality of party-union ties, since 
party and unions cannot completely overrule diverging party preferences of their core sup­
port group.
Historically, however, these ties have been crucial in maintaining socialist working-class 
milieus through the process of social closure. Austria, Sweden and Norway have close 
party-union ties, whereas in Denmark and Germany party and union have progressed 
more independently. In Great Britain, while the TUC unions have a strong impact on the 
party, not all unions are affiliated to the Labour party, nor is collective affiliation a guaran­
12 Information on voting behaviour of blue-collar workers or union members based on surveys 
are very scattered. The data used here is derived from cf. Ra SCHKE 1977: 257, NE: UjPHART 1968: 
Tab. 4, IR: MAIR 1987: 70. See also PRZEWORSKI & SPRAGUE 1986, ESPINC-ANDERSEN 1985, DORINC 
1990.
13 Less dun 12% of skilled workers, less than 16% of unskilled vote Labour in 1970/80s (cf. 
MAIR 1987:70, Tab. 3-4)
14 Worker alignment to left parties amongst self-indentifier correlates with the level of overall 
unionization (DORINC 1990:78)
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tee for worker alignment in elections. The Belgian and Dutch socialist parties and unions, in 
an effort to construct broader movements beyond the historical pillars deemphasized the 
historical party-union ties (and swapped names) - though without much hope of a break­
through. In France and Italy, party-union ties were already weak due to syndicalist heritage 
and as a result of the stronger working-class alignment with the working-class Communist 
party. In Ireland, worker alignment remains limited since populist, nationalist parties re­
ceive also a large share of working-class votes despite the collective union affiliation to the 
Labour party, which has only become substantial when the dominant IGTWU joined in 
1968.15 In fact, the Irish and British collective union affiliation decided upon by union 
leaders (or delegates), despite the larger share in party membership or union membership, 
is a weaker form of party-union ties than it appears prima fade. In countries, where the af­
filiation decisions and other party matters were taken locally - by a majority of members - 
local party and union structures are more closely interwoven, thus reinforcing the commu­
nal social milieus and worker alignment.
Ill
T h e  C h a n c e  Fo r  C h a n g e  a n d  
th e  U nity  o f  Labour  Represen ta tio n
Socialist party and allied unions both formed parts of a social movement for change in 
polity and economy in favour of the excluded lower classes. Since only in few cases socialist 
parties could achieve a parliamentary majority on their own, they had to subjugate to the 
logic of representation and look for possible allies to form a coalition government. On the 
other hand, the allied unions in order to represent the interest of their members had to 
achieve organizational power through extended unionization, centralization and unity. 
Both party and unions, while being still "outsiders", gained more form mutual mobilization 
by combining each others demands without much clash of interests. However, once they 
assumed responsibility and participated in government or in collective bargaining, conflicts 
of interests occurred and tensions in party-union relations mounted. According to the logic 
of representation the party had to make concessions to allies for the sake of coalition gov­
ernment. But also union centres that wanted to bargain had to make settlements with em­
ployers or the state that were not in the short-term or immediate interests of their members. 
As will be shown the chances for government, the stability and the internal compositions 
varied across Europe with consequences for the unions' impact on the incumbent union-al- 
lied party. Moreover union centres varied in unity, strength and representation monopoly, 
making them a more or less forceful and united voice of labour vis-à-vis the government 
and party.
15 Each union decides on its own contribution to the Irish Labour Party (or other political 
financing, cf. Ka t z  & M a ir  1992:401-2, fn. b).
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Table 3.8
Government Participation of Socialist Parties, Western Europe 1918-1989
Country: AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
Party: SPÔ PS/SP SD PS SPD IrLP PSI PSDI PvdA DNA SAP SPS Lab.
Government years
1918-1944 2.3 8.5 15.7 5.0 7.0 0.9 0.0 - 0.0 52 18.0 12 3.0
1945-1967 21.3 14.3 17.7 9.0 1.1 6.1 6.7 14.8 15.1 20.3 23.0 19.0 95
1968-1989 19.7 10.3 9.9 6.4 14.8 9 2 18.6 185 5.6 13.0 16.0 22.0 7.6
Cabinet share (%)
1918-1944 4.0 13.8 40.9 115 0.3 0.0 - 0.1 15.0 48.7 1.4 8.4
1945-1967 42.6 38.7 66.7 9.9 2.1 6.0 6.6 4.8 24.6 85.6 91.6 24.8 41.1
1968-1989 80.7 20.0 38.8 25.3 53.7 92 16.1 42 105 60.1 67.0 29.6 34.7
So u r c e : own calculations, updated series based on MACKIE & ROSE 1990 and FLORA 1983, see 
Appendix B. N otes: incl. predecessors; cabinet share: relative share of seats in coalition, weighted by 
years
Socialist Government Participation and A lliances
Once universal suffrage and parliamentary control had been introduced, socialist parties 
were commonly the largest party, due to the large share of working-class votes and the 
fragmentation of "bourgeois” parties. However, only in few historical moments, or thanks 
to preferential majority systems, socialist parties gained a parliamentary majority. 
Otherwise, the socialist parties had to rely on alliance building to maintain a durable coali­
tion government. Before the First World War, most socialist parties were not even in theory 
prepared to enter into government, fearing the turbulence caused by Millerandism. 
Although Scandinavian parties considered participation somewhat earlier, the changes 
around the First World War brought the first important opportunity for socialist participa­
tion in government. Moreover, the frequency, duration and importance of socialist 
government incumbency took very different forms over the last 70 years across Western 
Europe (see Table 3.8).
Of those socialist parties that formed a government in the 1920s, none was able to 
maintain its position for long. The few socialist governments were either interim minority or 
unstable majority governments that lasted only a few months, in no case longer than two 
years. Although at the first wave of mobilization, incumbent socialist parties enacted 
favourable labour laws and some nominated unionists as heads of Labour Ministries, the 
power relations soon swung back to the bourgeois p>arties and employers' side during the 
1920s. Given the general downswing in unionization, increased electoral volatility and 
government instability, party-union relations were strained by uncertainty. A way out of 
the tide of labour unrest, high unemployment and World economic crises, was op>en only to 
few labour movements. The Scandinavian socialist parties were able to come and stay (with 
a few months interruption) in power in Denmark (1929), Sweden (1932), and Norway 
(1935), with the help of agrarian parties bound in the Red-Green compromises of 1933/35
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(see KARVONEN 1991). The Belgian socialists shared again power in a Grand Coalition 
(1935) until the eve of the Second World War. It is in these countries that unionization in­
creases despite unemployment in the 1930s - with positive long term consequences. The 
'historic compromise’ of these years based on consolidating power, government incum­
bency, and consensus arrangements in industrial relations formed the base for the particu­
lar Scandinavian Sodal-Democmtic model (see KORPI1978,1983), while at the same time the 
Fascist (or authoritarian) regimes came into power, forbidding socialist parties and unions 
in Italy (1924), Germany (1933), Austria (1934), and after the German occupation in France 
(1940).
This interwar experience underlines how important for the party-unions relations is the 
"stability of socialist control over the government" (KORPI 1983:41). With hindsight, we can 
compare the duration of socialist government participation (see Table 3.8) over the postwar 
period. During the 45 years of democratic postwar governments from 1945 until 1989 (41 
years in Germany from 1949), socialist parties were in power for over 40 years in Austria 
and Switzerland, over 30 years in Norway and Sweden, for more than 20 years in Belgium, 
Denmark, and Italy (the small PSDI participated even over 30 years). In France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Ireland and the Netherlands socialist ruled only less than half of the postwar 
period. One would expect unions to develop positive party relations where union leaders 
can expect socialist government supp>ort to last more than a few years. The earlier such a 
pattern becomes the rule the more important for the re-consolidation of party-union rela­
tions and a positive impact on labour's p>ower in industrial relations. Scandinavia, but also 
Austria and Belgium, develop>ed reinforcing party-union relations. Interruptions in socialist 
government in the later, second postwar p>eriod do not immediately alter long established 
party-union relations, although the rise of competitive left parties as in Denmark may force 
party-union relations to eventually cool-off. The 1970s Left-Liberal coalition governments 
in Germany and the single socialist party rule in Austria had brought party and unions 
closer, despite the unitary union credo of the 1970s. However, in the context of the contin­
uing post-OPEC economic crisis in the 1980s, socialist governments failed, or if they came 
to power as in France (and Spain), over long did not deliver, what unions expected 
(SCHARPF1987). Moreover, as the British experience shows, unions could not count on long 
p>eriods of socialist rule, in fact, their overburdening exp>ectations on Labour in government 
contributed to its instability. An electoral swing to the Right brought the risk of invalidat­
ing the pro-Labour achievements, the pendulum swings contributed to Britain's back-and- 
forth partisan industrial relations legislation.
In Scandinavia, socialist parties were not only able to govern for more than half of the 
period since the end of the First World War, but also have governed as the largest party 
within government coalitions, particularly in the early postwar period (see Table 3.9). In 
these countries, the allied trade union movement (the Scandinavian LOs) have profited 
since the 1930s from favourable Labour governments and the relative weakness of a bour­
geois opposition. Yet even there, party-union relations became eventually more strained as 
the socialists lost in electoral support and socialist-dominated governments became less the
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rule. In a number of other countries with strong union movements, socialist parties have 
ruled for a limited period as the senior coalition partner (Austria and Germany in the 
1970s). In countries with strong segmented pluralism - and split workers alignment - so­
cialists had to rely on forming coalitions with Christian-Democratic or Liberal parties 
(Austria until 1970s, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland). Given the majority voting 
system in the French Fifth Republic and in Britain, the socialist party had a much greater 
hurdle to overcome and ruled though even with no majority of votes for a limited number 
of years only.
Unions interest in maintaining party-union relations are not only a function of the tim­
ing, duration, and stability of socialist government participation, but also the composition 
or power relations within the government supporting parliamentary group. In majority 
electoral systems, as in Britain and France, socialist parties have the chance to win a parlia­
mentary majority, even when it lacks a majority of votes at the national level. In Britain, this 
increases the pendulum tendency of sweeping parliamentary successes and thorough gov­
ernment changes, while in France, since the Fifth Republic, the right bloc was able to ex­
clude the socialist party from power until 1981. In other countries coalitions were most of 
the time necessary (Laver & SCHOFIELD 1990: 114-117): in unipolar systems (Norway, 
Sweden, -1971: Denmark), the socialist party had a hegemonic position; in multipolar sys­
tems (Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, 1971-: Denmark), either a parity party 
coalition or several smaller centre parties. Germany and Austria, both had been largely 
bipolar two-and-a-half party systems, in which governments were either a Grand Coalition 
or a dominant coalition with a junior partner. In a number of other countries and instances, 
particularly in Scandinavia, socialist parties ruled as minority governments, as the largest 
but not majoritarian party. If socialists were forced to look for coalition partners, the choice 
of potential allies was largely given by the party system as it reflected the cleavage struc­
turation (ROKKAN 1968, LlPSET & Rokkan 1967). Thus largely beyond the reach of Socialist 
party leaders was the prevalence of potential and willing coalition partner.
As in most countries the rural population was still considerable, at least in the interwar 
period, it was potentially an important strategic section between working-class and urban 
middle-class. Socialist working-class parties looking for alliances could not neglect the 
"agrarian question" (cf. ESPINC-ANDERSEN 1985). The feasibility of a "Red-Green" alliance 
between urban working-class and the rural classes dependent on the landholding struc­
tures and whether other, mainly agrarian, prarties had already mobilized the rural vote 
(LUEBBERT 1991, STEPHENS 1989). Scandinavian socialist parties, if they were not in a posi­
tion to rule safely alone, found in the "old green" parties an ally (cf. ESP1NG-ANDERSEN
1985), though the Danish SD had to rely mainly on the Radical Liberals (RV). Although the 
Scandinavian parties did not form long standing coalitions, they profited from the splits in 
the bourgeois bloc and lacking a majority in parliament, ruled several times as a minority 
government or with the support of Communist or Leftist parties (see Table 3.9). The 
Austrian SPO was able to govern alone in the 1970s for over 13 years but was nearly twice 
as long forming a coalition government mainly a Grand Coalition with the Christian-
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Table 3.9
Coalition Patterns of Socialist Parties (years), Western Europe 1945-89
Country/Party Coalition No partner Communist (New)Left Agrarian Ch.-Dem. Liberals/Cons.
AU SPÓ 41.0 13.1 (KPÒ0.6) _ — ÔVP 24.4 FPÔ 3.5
SZSPS 41.0 - - SVP41.0 CVP41.0 FDP41.0
SWSAP 38.0 7.7 - (VPK25.2) CP 6.1 . -
NODNA 33.6 29.6 • (SV 4.0) - . -
OESD 27.3 9.8 - (SF 5.1) V 2.1 - RV 14.0)
IT PSI 24.8 (PCI 4.9) PSDI 20.7 - DC 24.8 PRI, PLI 20.4
BE PS/SP 24.6 PCB 1.0 - - PSC/CVP 17.0 PULP 15.4
NEPvdA 20.7 - - — CDA 20.7 D’66 5.3
GB Lab. 17.1 17.1 - - - . .
GE SPD 15.9 - - - CDU/CSU 2.9 FDP 13.0
IR ILP 15.3 - NLP 3.3 - FG 15.3 CnT 6.1
FR SFIO 8.9 PCF 2.5) - MRP 8.9 var. 8.9
PS 6.4 PCF 4.7 MRG 4.8 - - -
SOURCE: own calcualtions. NOTE: ranked by length of government (years); NE: CDA (incl. ARP, KVP, 
CHU), 1973-77; also PPR; IT: PSI only; FR: IVth and Vth Republic separately.
Democratic party (OVP). The other, less powerful, socialist parties in the consociational 
countries (Belgium, Switzerland, Netherlands), had hardly any alternative but to accept a 
coalition with the Christian Democrats and sometimes also with the Liberals. The smaller 
its strategic position within the coalition (dependent on its weight and the alternative coali­
tion possibilities), the socialist party as it had to bargain with bourgeois parties was not able 
to promote union matters the same way as in Scandinavia or Austria (during the 1970s). 
Moreover, in the case where the Liberals were a strong partner, opposing socialist state-in- 
terventionist and Liberal market-economic principles narrowed the room for manoeuvre 
even further. Given the workers' or union wing of Christian parties pro-union strategies 
(see Chapter 4) had a better chance for compromise, particularly in Austria and Belgium, 
while less so in the Netherlands and in Switzerland. The same holds to some degree for the 
German SPD coalitions, that were with the exception of the late 1960s, a coalition with a 
Liberal, though at the time social-reform oriented and middle-class promoting party. The 
weaker French SFIO, Italian socialist parties (PSI, PDSI) and Irish Labour party were co­
opted into coalition by the Christian parties (Italian DC, French MRG, Irish FG), often with 
other progressive parties. The reformed French socialist party under Mitterand was able to 
break the government monopoly of the bourgeois bloc in the Fifth Republic, though only 
with the help of the Communist and the support by left independents.
Labour Unity in Socialist Union Monopoly
If the unity of the political left adds to the power relations of labour (cf. KORPI1978), labour 
unity is an important factor for unionism, too. Besides a high degree of unionization, 
SCHM11TEK (1974) has pointed at assodational monopoly as an important variable of labour 
unity and union power (cf. KORPI 1983, VlSSER 1990, CROUCH 1990a: 74), measured as
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Table 3.10
Associational Monopoly in Socialist Union Centres (%), Western Europe 1918-1989
Country: AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
Union Centre: ÖGB-FSG FGTB LOCGT-FO DGB ICTU UIL FNV LO LO SGB TUC Lab.
1913 91.8 55.4 75.4 *40.0 64.9 18.8 32.1 66.8 73.0 54.0 (44.9)
1920 89.7 81.4 772 542 73.8 *80.0 21.8 33.3 63.9 72.3 76.9 (51.8)
1930 802 70.6 755 58.6 67.4 40.0 82.1 60.7 76.8 (41.5)
1950 (64.4) 49.0 845 9.1 91.8 38.8 2.6 33.4 802 602 84.3 (53.5)
1970 (68.0) 43.9 75.0 17.4 815 95.3 14.1 385 76.0 66.3 54.9 89.4 (56.0)
1889 (59.8) 38.6 695 21.6 82.4 90.9 14.0 59.1 65.0 58.9 47.9 84.0 (*46.0)
NOTE: incl. predecessors see Table 3.(?); AU 1950-89:100%, Chamber of Labour votes of FSG fac­
tion in brackets; FR: -1920: syndicalist CGT, 1950-: socialist FEN and secularized CFOT not included 
(see Text); NE: FNV 1980 norvCatholics only; 1989: incl. Catholics; UK: (Lab.) Labour party affiliated 
TUC unions only. SOURCE: 1913: own data collection; 1920-1980: V isser  1989,1990 (tab. 19); BE - 
1940: Neuville 1959, AU, BE. IR, 1950-, others 1989: DUES database, see Appendix C.
membership share of a given union centre in overall unionization. It indicates to what de­
gree a union centres is able to claim in realiter universal representation, or faces competi­
tion by other organizations. The associational monopoly provides us with an indication of 
the salience of cross-cutting class cleavages as they are transformed into rival union move­
ments (see Table 3.10), without entering here into the origins of these (see the following 
chapters).
While by 1920, most socialist union centres were able to absorb most of the independent 
manual labour unions, they faced some competition from political rival unionism or 
incipient white-collar federations. The Scandinavian and Anglo-Irish movements, particu­
larly the Norwegian and Swedish LO had a near monopoly among the dominantly blue- 
collar workers, while the Danish, British and Irish movements faced more independent lo­
cal and autonomous unionism until the unemployment and economic crisis forced many of 
them to join or risk to perish. In countries were Christian or white-collar union movements 
competed as in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland, socialist union centres gained 
from the sudden membership mobilization in the early 1920s but faced increased member­
ship losses and competition by rival movements. The Dutch N W  after losing members 
during the 1920s gained from the decline of the splinter movements. In France and Italy, 
where socialist were organized within syndicalist movements (CGT and CGL), these 
movements faced strong competition from communist union currents (see Chapter 5).
After the Second World War, again political cleavage structures accounted for variations 
in associational monopoly since efforts to labour unity had failed in most European coun­
tries with the exception of Austria and partly Germany. The French and Italian, the Belgian 
and Dutch socialist, communist and (in some countries also) Christian unionists had pro­
posed plans to overcome the dooming interwar labour fragmentation and founded a uni­
tary non-partisan union movement. However, these efforts failed in all four countries 
within few years, as the Marshall plan, the Cold-War and fierce internal political battles
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mounted. Thus only in Austria and Germany where the tragedy of fragmented labour had 
been most a calamitously newly reformed Einhdtsgewerkschaft (unitary union) gained near 
monopoly in representation: Austrian ÓGB (100%) and the German DGB (above 80%). 
Moreover, with the shifts in employment structure the differences in union strategies to­
wards the functional cleavages gained in salience. Besides the Austrian and German union 
centres the Anglo-Irish movements were able to integrate a large degree of non-manual 
unionism - the British TUC (85-90%) and Irish ICTU (95-90%), in the latter case after the na­
tional quarrels that led to a split into two rival movements (ITUC, CIU) was settled with the 
merger of ICTU in 1959. All four union movements were open to white-collar and public 
service employees, and allowed via depoliticisation, factionalism or opting out non-socialist 
party supporters to be a member of a dominantly socialist labour movement without too 
much self-denial.
The Scandinavian union centres rank second in associational monopoly. They acquired a 
high degree of representation amongst manual workers but were only partly successful in 
organizing non-manual workers (cf. VlSSER 1990: 114-119). The Danish LO has been more 
successful (85-70%) than the Norwegian LO (80-65%) which in turn ranks before the 
Swedish LO (80-60%). The ranking of the Scandinavian union movements reflects the in­
verse strength of rival white-collar unionism. This in turn reflects the strategy of inclusion: 
the purity or flexibility of the adopted industrial union principles within the LO's (see 
Chapter 6). The Danish LO with a mixed structure is more open to white-collar or public 
sector sectionalism, while the Norwegian and particularly the Swedish LO enforced a 
mainly manual industrial unionism principle.
In the third group we find again consociational countries, Belgium (50-40%), the 
Netherlands (35-40%, later 60% ind. Catholics) and Switzerland (60-50%). The ranking of 
these countries reflects to some degree the mixture of political and functional cleavage 
structures: in Switzerland and partly the Netherlands, it is the loss due to the functional 
cleavage, in Belgium and partly the Netherlands, it is due to the competition by the 
Christian (and other political) movements. The Dutch merger of the socialist and Catholic 
unions, although it led to the split-away of some white-collar unions, consolidated its posi­
tion (around 60%)16. It should be noted that in Austria, there are quasi-pillars within the 
union centre, the political factions. The socialist faction FSG has also lost in strength from 
70% of the votes at Chamber of Labour elections to 60% today, while the Christian and 
Nationalist party factions increased accordingly.
Finally, in polarized pluralist countries (see Chapter 5), in France and Italy, the two split- 
away anti-Communist union centres CGT-FO (ca. 10-20%) and UIL (ca. 5-15%) have a clear 
minority position amongst the five or three union centres. This is partly due to the fact that 
socialist supporters are also organized by other union centres, as a minority in the 
Communist-led union centres (CGT and CGIL), and by the secularized, former Christian
16 The three Socialist, Catholic, and Protestant pillars together, lost in overall share - and consid­
erably in unionization - from a peak 83% in mid-1950s to 77% in 1989, though not if Catholic/white- 
collar split-away MHP is included with 8%.
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union movements (CFDT and CISL) or the French teachers union FEN. In fact, CFDT is 
today the union centres with the closest party-union links to the PS and a majority of its 
leadership and members are pro-socialist. Whereas the PS pursued a strategy of searching 
informal contacts with the unions, the PSI has failed to do so, although the party aimed at 
copying Mitterand's success under Craxi (JUNGAR1991:259-260).
However, associational monopoly is only one, albeit important, aspect of labour unity as 
a prerequisite of effective union representation (see VlSSER 1990). The aggregation, differ­
entiation, and hierarchical ordering of interests, as well as the distribution of power and 
autonomy within the union centre vary considerable over time and across countries. An 
important aspect of unity within a union centre was internal coordination and aggregation 
of interests via the concentration into few large union organizations. A trend toward con­
centration in all union movements (see Table 3.11), reflecting the integration of local or 
small sectionalist unions into national broad unions, the merging of smaller unions into 
new ones, the absorption of smaller by larger unions, and the faster growth of larger, multi­
sector unions. The countries with traditional mixed, if not territorially and functionally 
fragmented, structures have made considerable progress in the interwar and postwar 
period (in particular Denmark, Ireland, Great Britain), while the Swedish and Norwegian 
LO’s started to rationalize their structure earlier (see Chapter 6). On the continent, the 
postwar socialist union centres had rationalized their union structure already by the 1950s 
thanks to interwar concentration movements and postwar organization reforms (Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland). However, the French and Italian 
minority union centres were less successful to integrate local and sectional unions which 
further dispersed resources and led to further fragmentation.
Not only the number of affiliates but the division of power within union centres is an 
important factor in union representation. Looking, for instance, at the membership share of 
the three largest affiliates (see Table 3.11) provides an indication of the concentration of 
power within few dominant national unions, that can play a key role within the union cen­
tres policy making and can perform leadership role in collective bargaining and pressure 
group politics (cf. CROUCH 1990a, VlSSER 1990). Here again concentration is higher within 
the Continental European union centres, while the Anglo-saxon, and less the Scandinavian, 
but definitively the French and Italian lack a degree of leadership. However, predominant 
general unions (Danish SiD or Irish IGTWU) can also play an important role within a more 
fragmented union system, they commonly challenge the transfer of power to the confeder­
ation level and bloc further organizational reforms. Large multi-sector unions (e.g. German 
IG Metall) have also provided a primus inter pares leadership role often to the detriment of 
the union centres authority (see Chapter 6). The power of the confederation may in fact be a 
function of both the concentration of unions and the possibly equal distribution of power 
amongst them, with a minimum of overlap and jurisdictional conflicts.
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Table 3.11
Concentration in Socialist Union Centres (%), Western Europe 1918-1989
Country: AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
Union Centre: ÔGB FGTB LOCGT-FO DGB ICTU UIL FNV LO LO SGB TUC
Number of Affiliates
1900 298 52 . 58 . 21 30 191
1920 65 31 55 . 52 . 31 19 213
1950 16 16 70 . 16 44+24 37 28 41 44 15 186
1970 16 14 52 42 16 75 36 20 40 29 15 142
1989 15 12 30 16 58 28 17 29 23 15 78
Three Largest Affiliates (%)
1950 40.8 59.0 525 49.3 a355 425 31.1 32.8 59.4
1970 48.8 65.0 55.1 56.6 552 552 36.6 46.4 64.9 37.6
1985 49.3 64.0 54.6 56.8 48.6 292 66.1 42.3 57.5 65.7 36.2
No t e : for predecessors see Table 3.(?); IR 1950: ITUC+CIU; IR: 1987; UK: 1988; (a) 1955: ITUC only. 
So u r c e : 1900-20: own collection; 1950-89: DUES database 1992; see also Visser 1990:143-4, Tab. 
18
Unions and Socialist Government Intervention
Although party and unions may have a common objective in achieving government rule, 
"union-linked parties in government, while receptive to certain union demands, have nu­
merous other administrative and economic pressures to respond to. Tensions between 
union-linked parties and unions has regularly coincided with the party's assumption of 
government responsibilities (JOSEPH 1979: 75)". Socialist governments, like any other gov­
ernment, are object to various multidirectional pressures from coalition partners, internal 
party factions, the semi-autonomous parliamentary group, forceful employers and business 
interests, augmenting financial constraints, long-term international obligations, and - alas - 
an impatient public opinion.
Unions commonly expect from supporting governments state favourable regulation and 
intervention in two policy areas of immediate relevance to unions: first, industrial relations 
regulation, and second, economic and income policy. In the first policy area, unions hope 
that Socialist governments intervene in favour of the role of unions and its power relations 
(cf. KORPI 1983). However, unions not always aim first at direct socialist government inter­
vention, but were able to profit from a general increase in political power (cf. KORPI & 
SHALEV 1980, KORPI 1983). The Basic Agreements struck between unions and employers in 
Norway (1935), Denmark (1936) and Sweden (1938), attempted to achieve "industrial peace" 
in order to preempt unilateral state intervention. Moreover, the Scandinavian voluntary 
agreements between capital and labour gained quasi-official character, often complemented 
by legislation (ELVANDER1974: 373). Similarly the German employers singed the November 
Agreement (1918) in anticipation of probable Socialist government intervention and the 
threat of revolutionary upheaval. However, when the power relations changed during the
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Weimar Republic, even several codified agreements could not prevent the deterioration of 
industrial relations institutions and practices (cf. FELDMAN & STEIN1SCH 1985, Abraham
1986). Similarly, the Matignon Agreement pressed for by the new Popular Front govern­
ment (1936) remained volatile. A similar agreement in Belgium (1936) initiated by a grand 
coalition enshrined the first step towards corporatist partnership. With the exception of the 
Danish Basic Agreement (1899) and Swiss "peace” agreement (1937), the major agreements 
had been struck when socialists came new into government or in national crisis situations 
that demanded inter-class consensus (cf. ARMINGEON1992:139-140).
Although early coalition rights were granted at the time when socialist parties were only 
incipient, later extensions of coalition and strike rights were introduced by socialist coali­
tion governments17. In Britain, new Labour governments abolished instantly conservative 
trade union acts that curtailed party-union relations and union securities (1927 Trade 
Dispute and Trade Union Act, abolished in 1945; 1971 Industrial Relations Act, abolished in 
1974, cf. HEPPLE 1986) and were expected to abolish Conservative Trades Union Acts 1982-6 
after regaining power. The impact of socialist incumbency has been particularly important 
in the introduction of worker participation. The first works' councils in Germany (1920), 
and works' council and chamber of labour in Austria (1919,1920), the délégués du personnel 
in France (1936) were legislated by Left coalition governments in particular reform situa­
tions in which also employers gave their consent in fear of otherwise even more radical 
demands. The adoption and scope of reforms in workers' participation in the early 1970s 
were found to be related to socialist incumbency at the time and less generally to postwar 
power relations of labour (STEPHENS & STEPHENS 1982), albeit the institutional forms varied 
considerable, reflecting important long-term differences between countries (SORGE 1976). 
Legislation on workers' participation and representation has been attributed to be crucial to 
the power relations in industrial relations as it regulates union access to - and control of - 
workplace activities (cf. KJELLBERG 1981, STREECK 1981).
Secondly, in respect to economic and income policy, unions expected during the post­
war years Keynesian demand management measures to maintain full employment, thereby 
strengthening the base for unions labour market power. However, the interest perspective 
and preference structure of unions differ from that of Social-Democratic governments, as 
unions aim at maintaining full employment (or reduction of unemployment) and the rise in 
real income (SCHARPF 1987: 212-218). Social-Democratic governments that maintain a full 
employment policy cannot be secure of cooperation by unions, as they can "free-ride" with 
expansive wage demands (SCHARPF 1987: 215). Party-union relations are crucial to socialist 
governments for maintaining cooperation and wage discipline by unions. Especially unions 
in Scandinavia and consociational countries, in which Social-Democratic parties were rul­
ing or formed coalitions, unions profited from lower postwar records of unemployment 
and inflation with somewhat more gradual growth pattern, although much of it is at-
17 In reform of coalition rights in Austria: 1918-20; Belgium: 1921, 1936; France: 1936, 1982; 
Germany 1920; for white-collar workers: Denmark 1938, Sweden 1936, cf. ARMINGEON 1992: 348-353 
(Tab. A-4.1)
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tributable to the particular consensual style of these small states in world markets 
(KATZENSTEIN 1985). In larger economies, Keynesianism adopted by socialist government 
in Great Britain and Germany in the late 1960s and early 1970s, or belatedly by French 
socialist in 1981, proved since the OPEC crisis in 1973 and the collapse of the U.S.-led inter­
national economic system "impotent, even serving counter-productively to exacerbate the 
conditions they were designed to cure (PADGETT & PATERSON 1991:155). Consequently, re­
lations cooled-off between socialist-led governments changing their course to monetary and 
fiscal measures and unions facing loosing power through high unemployment. In Britain 
and Germany, conservative governments came into power and ended socialist rule, while 
the austerity measures of the new French socialist government or Craxi's dismantlements of 
the Italian wage-price indexation strained even further party-unions relations and pro­
voked rising popular unrest (PaDCETT & PATERSON 1991:154-167).
C o n c lu sio n
The thesis according to which the labour-capital cleavage is universal (LlPSET & ROKKAN 
1967), holds for the formation of Socialist party and union centres in each country before 
the First World War, but fails to account for the large variations in the actual cleavage 
transformation. Applying the hypothesis developed by ROKKAN (1968) and LlPSET (1983) 
about the political and economic integration of the working-class into polity and economy, 
the variations in the formation of party and unions, as well as the consequences for party- 
union relations can be accounted. The labour movement emerged under varying conditions 
of political and economic integration, leading to differences in the differentiation between 
party and unions, division of functions and party-union linkages. It was found the more 
gradual and early the economic and political integration, the more an entrenched Liberalist 
union movement preceded and shaped the party formation. In the reverse case were party 
and unions faced state and employers resistance, the party normally preceded and coordi­
nated the unions, reinforcing mass mobilization for suffrage reform and a class strategy for 
unions.
With the exceptions of polarized movements, the socialist party and unions, like Siamese 
twins, had a symbiotic mobilization relationship - they both gained from the advances of the 
other, yet they also faced similar limits. As long as the constituency largely overlapped and 
was recruited from the mainly manual working-class social background, party and unions 
jointly mobilized and maintained collective identity and solidarity through social closure. 
However, socialist party and unions, particularly where they had build a social ghetto, met 
two social limits to growth. First, in societies with cross-cutting class cleavages, socialist 
party and unions faced competition from Christian and Communist labour movements. 
Second, the traditional manual working-class support base never became a majority as in 
the Great Expectation, moreover, it stagnated after the Second World War. Both party and 
unions faced a strategic choice of opening up or remaining locked into a ghetto, but there 
was also a trade-off involved. The trade-off varied according to the party-union relation-
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Table 3.12
Labour-Capital Cleavage and Union Movements
Early/Gradual Integration Late/Sudden Integration
Labour u n ity UNION-LED PARTY-LED
labour-capital Labourist Solidaristic
cleavage dominant UK, IR, (DE) SW, NO. GE. AU
PLURALISM PILLARIZED WEAK LINKAGE
cross-cutting Segmented Polarized
class cleavages NE. BE, SZ FR.IT
ship and the possible exit options and organizational costs for dissident movements. 
Moreover, party and unions were slow in adapting to social change, as was shown, they 
suffer from structural inertia, particularly where they had become locked into the social 
structure and where the party-union linkage remained inflexible.
The sequence in formation of party and unions, had important consequences for the ex­
ternal or internal legitimation and organizational consolidation of union movements. Four 
clusters of transformation of the capital-labour cleavage, as laid out in detail in this chapter, 
can be summarized (see Table 3.12): (1) labourist unionism, where an early union movement 
emerged and had decisive role in bringing about the Labour party, (2) a solidaristic union 
movement that was shaped by party leadership and joint struggle for Electoral Socialism,
(3) a segmented reformist labour movement that remained partly confined to a non-religious 
segment due to cross-cutting cleavage, (4) a polarized and fragmented Left movement with 
initially weak party-union ties and later partisan splits. This summary table provides a 
typology of the main configurations, the major differences in the transformation of the 
labour-capital cleavage into organizations. The typology takes the contextual factors, the 
degree of integration and the existence of cross-cutting class cleavages, as external, societal 
and political environment that in turn could be further elaborated.
When socialist party and unions were still "outsiders", both fought for the same general 
aim, yet once they became integrated into polity and economy, both were forced to accept 
the logic of representation. However, the opportunities to alliance building and government 
participation varied with the cleavage structures across Europe. Similarly, the main union 
centres varied considerably in unity, centralization and authority, but also the degree of 
competition and rival unionism, as a consequence of the cleavage structure, and state and 
employers strategies. Moreover, the chances for Socialist government participation, its 
strength and stability, varied, providing different political environments for Socialist union 
movements, the possibility to count on neo-corporatist policies and universal welfare state 
policies, as for instance in Scandinavia. But Socialist union movements could also find their 
niche within segmented societies, profit from corporatist arrangements and hope for an 
eventual coming-together with secularisation of Christian and Socialist union movements. 
Yet, the Church-State cleavage remained more persistent as a cross-cutting class cleavage 
than many had expected hundred years ago, as will be described in the following chapter.
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Th e  C h u r c h -State C leavage
4
The decisive Battle came to stand Between the aspirants of the moBi- 
lizing nation-state and the corporate claims of the churches. (...) The 
parties of religious defense generated through this process grew into 
Broad mass movements after the introduction of manhood suffrage and 
were able to claim the loyalties of remarfcciBly high proportions of the 
church-goers in the working class. These proportions increased even 
more, of course, as the franchise was attended to women on a par with 
men. Through a process very similar to the one to Be described for the 
Socialist parties, these church movements tended to isolate their sup­
porters form outside influence through the development of a wide 
variety of parallel organizations and agencies: they not only Built up 
schools and youth movements of their own, But also developed confes- 
sioiudly distinct trade unions, sports cluBs, leisure associations, pub­
lishing houses, magazines, newspapers, in one or two cases even radio 
and television stations /LlPSET & ROKKAN 1967: 15; italics 
removed).
Religion matters for labour unity, too. In some European countries, religious conflicts cut 
across the labour-capital cleavage, thereby splitting worker alignments (LlPSET & ROKKAN
1967). In terms of social cohesion of political parties, it has been claimed that "religious di­
visions, not class, are the main social basis of parties in the Western world" (ROSE & URWIN 
1969:12). Religion, leads not only to particular forms of group association but has the po­
tential for inter-religious conflict, its function of "providing an alternative set of values creates 
a potential for conflict between religion and secular society" (COLEMAN 1956: 56). In some 
countries, the political Church-State conflict split not only the polity and gave rise to a reli­
gious party, it also provoked a split in working class political alignment and labour unity. 
Historically, Christian unions were built as a reaction to the threat of secular modernization 
and socialist mobilization. The Church-State cleavage, although less universal than the 
labour-capital cleavage, cross-cut labour unity and led to union diversity in continental 
Europe. Moreover, it is an instructive, prime example of the processes of pillarization and 
segmentation, the formation of a network of linked organizations and the promotion of so­
cial closure based on Weltanschauung.1
1 The concept of "verzuiling" (pillarization) was first introduced into analysis of Dutch organi­
zational life by KRUIJT it G o d d ijn  1962; it was extended as a mode of political accomodation by 
LJJPHART 1968 and LORWIN 1971, see also POST 1989 on a review of the extensive Belgian and Dutch 
literature. I use pillarization as a more "generalized" concept (cf. ROKKAN 1977) to describe the 
process and state of organizational interlocking, and segmentation as the process and state of social 
closure (see Chapter 2).
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This chapter analyzes the conditions, development and limits of religiously based cross­
cutting class cleavages. As in the previous chapter, the transformation of the cleavage into 
party and unions, the parallel mobilization, the representation aspect and party-union link­
ages will be examined.
Firstly, the formation of the Church-State cleavage and its transformation into Christian 
party and unions will be analyzed and compared to the Socialist labour movement. The 
Church-State cleavage has given rise only in some countries to the formation of Christian 
party and unions, that compete with Socialist party and unions for worker alignment. The 
historical overview explores the role of the Church and the religious parties in the forma­
tion of the Christian union movement In the early phases, it was the position of the 
Church, her intransigence or tutelage that shaped the formation pattern of Christian party 
and unions. Later, however, the Christian-Democratic party had a more important role in 
the figuration that promoted separate Christian union organization or integration.
Secondly, mobilization of working-class aligance was an important factor for both 
Christian party and unions in securing its position. Although the Christian-Democratic 
party appealed beyond the working-class, the mobilization potential and path of party and 
unions were connected. Both contributed and gained from the process of segmentation, the 
promotion of social closure through pillarization. However, once desegmentation and de- 
pillarization started, Christian-Democratic movements varied in their responses and capac­
ity to adapt across Europe.
Thirdly, the substantial impact of Christian-Democracy and the institutionalization of 
democratic pluralism in industrial relations for the presence of Christian unionism will be 
discussed. Christian unionism has to operate under the pressures of plural unionism, that is 
fragmented union diversity, the leaders have to balance internal cohesion with cooperation 
with other movements. Christian unionists based on their Christian-social conception - 
Catholic 'subsidarity' or Calvinist ’sovereignty in its own sphere' - opt for pluralist union 
diversity but strive for labour unity within their own circle. Christian unionists have ac­
cepted union diversity even when they are only a minority with a fragmented labour 
movement. However, in order to limit destabilizing effects and ineffectivity, and given their 
preference for consensus, Christian union leaders wished to come to terms within its con­
tenders within the labour movement as well as outside.
I
T h e  T r a n sfo r m a t io n  o f  Th e  C h u r c h -Sta te  
C leav a ge  in t o  t h e  C h r ist ia n  P illar
The religious map of Europe has been relatively stable since the end of the Religious Wars 
(1648), even though the process of Nation-State building was not yet completed (cf. LlPSET 
& Rokkan 1967). Therefore, not only denominations and states do not neatly overlap, the 
religious factor - the impact of Church-State relations, religious heterogeneity, and the de­
gree of toleration of dissident religious groups - is spread unevenly across Western Europe
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(MaDELEY 1986,1991).2 In Catholic countries, the Church remained an independent (trans­
national) structure of authority in conflict with the secular Nation-State. In Protestant 
Europe, the Church was part of the Nation-building process, though in Scandinavia dissi­
dents mobilized in short-lived religious revival movements, whereas in Britain new de­
nominations (Chapels) were tolerated early.3 In religiously heterogeneous countries, the 
coexistence of two denominations remained a problem for national integration - requiring 
amicable accommodation in society and polity (LlJPHART 1968; LEHMBRUCH 1967). Hence, 
the religious map of Europe clusters around three (and a half) groups: countries with 
Catholic monopoly, countries with Protestant dominance (either Northern Lutheran 
monopoly or Anglo-Saxon pluralism), and a "mixed pattern" (cf. MARTIN 1978: Ch. 2, 
MADELEY 1986, 1991). What remains of importance for labour unity is less the religious 
composition or fragmentation as such but the different reactions to ongoing modernization 
that broke up religious bonds in working-class communities, often leaving Socialism as the 
sole Ersatz religion. However, where secularizing modernization and religious defence col­
lided, Christian party and unions emerged, splitting worker alignment and labour unity.
The Church, in particular the Catholic Church (but also orthodox Calvinists), remained 
one of the major contenders to the centralizing Nation-State and the liberal-materialist 
market economy in both Catholic countries and religiously "mixed" Nation-States. Since the 
French Revolution, the Nation-State has attempted to limit the power of the Church, to cut 
its trans-national ties (with the Vatican), to intervene in internal Church hierarchy, to curb 
her income and privileges, to regulate civil marriage and to take over welfare provisions. 
However, the dominant mass-mobilizing conflict has been over secular control or ecclesi­
astical domination on elementary education (cf. LlPSET & ROKKAN 1967: 15, Swaan 1989: 
83-7). The schoolstrijd (school dispute) mobilized religious communities against the secular 
Nation-State and gave rise to the formation of parties of religious defense, out of which 
Christian-Democratic parties grew (LlPSET & ROKKAN 1967:15). However, only in the Low 
Countries the Church(es) secured an important role in education, the historical Church- 
State school-pacts (Belgium: 1895, 1958; the Netherlands: 1917) entrenched the system of 
verzuiling (pillarization) with its segmented party and union systems (LORWIN 1971). In the 
other countries, private denominational schools remained the exception (cf. NEAVE 1985), 
though Church influence on religious teaching existed particularly where control remained 
at the sub-national level.4
2 Besides the overview in the tradition of LlPSET & ROKKAN 1967 by M a DELEY 1986, 1991, on 
Protestant Europe: see MADELEY 1977,1982, on Catholic Europe see: MARTIN 1978, WHYTE 1981; for
country profiles see MOL 1972.
3 The Church has served on the British Isles as carrier of territorial identities (or even nation­
hood), for instance, the Church of Scotland for the Scots, the Catholic Church for the Irish (cf. 
M a r t in  1978:102.)
4 In 1900, the share of private (denominational) schools in primary education figured at 40% in 
Belgium, 31% in the Netherlands, 27% in France (though mainly female middle-class, cut by the 
State in 1907), 7% in Italy, 4% in Austria, and less than 1% in Germany and Switzerland; cf. FLORA 
1983: Ch. 10.
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Table 4.1
Founding and Political Participation of Christian Parties
AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
Religion: Cath. Cath. Prot. Cath. Cath. Cath. Cath. Cath. Prot Prot Prot. Prot Cath. Prot Prot.
Party CVP PSC KRF PDP Z. PPI KVP ARP CHU KrF KDS CVP EVP
Founded 1895 1884 1970 1924 1870 1919 1904 1879 1897 1933 1964 1912 1917
delay to Lett * 6 -1 72 19 1 27 10 -15 3 45 66 24 11
Entry
in Parliament 1890 1847 1973 1924 1870 1919 1888 1888 1897 1933 1985 1848 1919
in Government 1907 1884 1982 1944 1919 1920 1901 1901 1908 1945 • 1891 -
Source: founding and entry years: Lane & Ersson 1991; Jacobs 1989; Mackie & Rose 1990. Notes: 
Cath.: Catholic, Prot.: Protestant; (*) in years to Left party. BE: CVP/PSC regional split 1936-45,1968- 
; reformed: GE: 1945: CDU/CSU (both); IT: 1943 CD; NE: 1976/80: CDA (3 party merger).
The Formation of Christian-Democratic P arties
For an understanding of the Christian trade union movement, it is worthwhile to analyze 
first the formation of religious parties and the conditions under which Christian- 
Democracy emerged.5 In contrast to the Socialist labour movement (see Chapter 3) 
Christian party and unions emerged less as result of the differentiation of political and eco­
nomic functions of one social movement. Instead, nascent Christian unions had to seek po­
litical support in their struggle for the right of existence - within their own zuil (pillar) - 
against Church interference and - outside - against the larger, more contentious Socialist 
labour movement. Hence, Christian unionism profited from (but also shaped the character 
of) the Christian-Democratic party. Both party and unions were based on similar Christian, 
anti-Socialist Weltanschauung and appealed to all social classes, in particular, after the ex­
tension of suffrage and collective bargaining, they made an appeal on Church-going 
workers. It was the Christian unionists that tried to turn the religious parties into a 
"Christian-Democratic" party, while the religious (inter-class) party was not directly 
involved in building a Christian union movement.
However, was Christian-Democracy a counter-reaction to the "Socialist threat"? In three 
countries, important Christian-Democratic parties emerged around the time of Socialist 
party founding: in Germany, Belgium and Austria (see Table 4.1). However, the parallelism 
may be no more than coincidental: following changes in the political system and given the 
infancy of the labour movement the Socialist actual "threat effect" was still small. Instead, 
the formation of religious parties should be seen more as a "tandem” response to both the 
penetrating modernization process (cf. ELLEMERS1984) and the rise of anti-clerical Socialist 
movements (cf. STUURMAN1983), thus to both social and political mobilization.
5 On religious or Christian-Democratic parties in Europe see FOGARTY 1957, Ir v in g  1979, 
M a DELEY 1977,1986,1991, also WENDE 1981 and JACOBS 1989.
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In early democratic parliamentary systems such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland, loose parliamentary groupings existed long before well-organized national 
party structures were built up. As long as decentralized federalism prevailed, or national 
centralization lagged behind, there was not much need for Catholic mass organization, thus 
the more centralized Netherlands or Austria became more pillarized than the more feder­
alist, "sectionalist" Switzerland (cf. KRIESI1990, LEHMBRUCH 1967). Hence, it was first in the 
more secularized or "mixed religious" diaspora that the Catholic Church and lay leaders 
turned the extensive network of parishes, welfare institutions, and Christian Action groups 
to political use and built a well-organized pillar (cf. RlGHART 1986). It was also there that 
the Catholic party overcame its conservatism and opened itself to the Christian-Social 
labour wing.
The schoolstrijd provoked the early foundation of the first well-organized religious party 
in Europe - the Dutch Calvinist party (ARP, 1879), though it later suffered from a split- 
away of the moderates (CHU, 1897). In contrast, Protestant parties in Germany and 
Switzerland emerged with much more difficulty and remained temporary and minuscule 
parties (Germany 1890s, mid-1920s) or a minor and regional phenomena (Swiss Zurich- 
based EVP 1919). Although there existed a prewar Scandinavian tradition of "popular 
movements" (folkrorelser), the religious movements remained split, scattered and transitory 
(THERBORN 1989: 197-201). Only belatedly did religious rival parties emerge: most impor­
tantly, the earliest Norwegian KrF (regionally: 1933, nationally: 1945), the small - from par­
liament excluded - Swedish KDS (1964) and the late minority Danish KRF (1970) - all based 
on moral-ethical sectarian defense against increasingly "permissive" Nation-States (cf. 
MADELEY 1977). The "Anglo-Saxon type" of Christian-Democracy (FOGARTY 1957) was 
party-less since political alignment of dissident Protestants remained an individual choice - 
"each acting for himself' (FOGARTY 1957:10). For Irish Catholics after the emancipation of 
the 1820s the National question became overriding; they voted on both British Isles either 
for the Irish National party or (even with the consent of bishops) the Labour party where 
the majority system did not guarantee the success of an Irish MP candidate.6
Compared to the paradigmatic Michelsian German SPD (see Chapter 3), the Catholic 
party was initially a weakly centralized party, mainly serving as an electoral machinery in 
mobilizing mass support in those constituencies were Church-goers could tip the majority. 
However, with universal suffrage and proportional representation, working-class voters 
and their organizations gained in importance for Christian-Democratic parties (cf. LlPSET & 
ROKKAN 1967: 15, 32-3). In France and Italy, due to the intransigent, ultramontane Catholic 
Church, small Christian-Democratic parties emerged relatively late, only after the First 
World War, after the union movement had already emerged. The Christian-Democratic 
parties in Italy (PPI, 1919) and France (PDP, 1926) relied more on support form the
6 Political parties in the Catholic-dominated Irish Free State and later Irish Republic could not 
claim Christian tradition as a means of social cohesion. Fine Gael, today affiliated with the European 
People’s Party, cannot be seen as a Christian-Democratic party proper (as in LANE & Er sso n  1991), it 
lacks in fact the particular association with the religious cleavage (cf. M a ir  1987).
77
ü / P o l i t i c a l  C l e a v a g e s
Table 4.2
Founding Origins and Organization Strategy of Christian Parties
Penetration Diffusion
Internal German Zentrum French PDP
legit mation Dutch ARP Italian PPI
(lay-led) Dutch CHU Norwegian KrF
External Austrian CP Swiss KK
legitmation Belgian PC Dutch RKSP
(Church-led)
Christian unions than on the Church hierarchy or Catholic action. The Italian Church hier­
archy was long opposed to a mass political party, since as PPI's founder Sturzo observed 
"the Church unites, politics divide", but changed its position after the disastrous alliance 
with the Fascist state.
The process of Christian-Democratic party formation is more complicated and unsteady 
than in the case of Socialist parties, partly due to the lack of a coherent trans-national ideo­
logy and party model. Nevertheless, one can distinguish four forms of political formation 
(see Table 4.2): first, internally legitimated political parties with individual membership and 
centralized structures (German Catholics, Dutch Calvinists); second, internally legitimated 
parliamentary groupings that relied on a diffuse network of local alliances (French and 
Italian Catholics, Norwegian Protestants); third, political alliances with external, corporate 
social organizations (Austrian and Belgian Catholics); fourth, electoral alliances of a diffuse 
network of regional federations and social organizations (Swiss and Dutch Catholics). The 
first two forms developed more independently from the Church hierarchy, the latter tended 
to be led by the clergy. This classification reflects the early phase of party consolidation, 
though a number of parties have gone through several phases in the transition from loose, 
decentralized, volatile political alliances to centralized mass parties.
With the shift from political elite alliances to national mass mobilization, the Church lost 
its monopoly, and Christian lay organizations gained in importance. On the Continent, a 
plethora of functional organizations within the Christian pillar were formed, in particular, 
for worker associations and unions, associations of business (or middle class) interests, and 
farmer leagues. Together with the Church hierarchy, these three socio-economic groups are 
the four major actors in the figuration that supported Christian-Democratic parties, though 
the institutionalization of the relations between party and supporting groups and the de­
gree of interdependence varied over time and between countries.
The Formation of Christian U nion Movements
The formation of Christian unions remained a tardy and equivocal process compared to the 
Socialist labour movement. While the Socialist party and unions differentiated from each 
other, the Christian labour movement emerged more in a process of differentiation of the
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economic from the social-cultural function and as an emancipation from Church tutelage.7 
The figuration that gave rise to the Christian workers movement was - in contrast to the 
Socialists - the more intricate interaction between Church hierarchy, emancipated lay 
workers and Christian-Democratic party leaders. The early religious organization of 
workers had been initiated by benevolent priests or bourgeois honoraries to safeguard the 
spiritual community, and the teaching of the gospel, and to provide social welfare to the 
needy, first the "poor", and later with the recognition of the Arbeiterfrage: the workers. These 
clergy-led organizations remained mainly of local scope, non-political and less directed to 
economic problems. These 'intermediary structures' of local self-help and benevolence fol­
lowed the principle of subsidarité summoned in Christian-social theology.
After the encyclica Rerum Novarum (1891), the Pope gradually recognized the economic 
base to social misery and also allowed functional interest representation. Until then the 
Catholic Church had long been opposed to union organization, but continued to foster 
Fachvereine (craft associations) linked to clergy-led cultural workers leagues, while looking 
with sucpicion at separate lay-controlled unions that accepted the strike weapon. In all 
countries clergy-led Christian workers leagues preceded the formation of Christian union 
centres (see Table 4. 3): national leagues of the spreading network of parish and diocese 
workers' associations preceded on average about fifteen years the formation of incipient 
national union centres. In some countries the two principles clashed, further weakening 
overall labour unity. Most notably, the Gewerkschaftsfrage (union question) provoked 
Church-intervention in Germany (Berlin vs. Cologne movement) and the Netherlands 
(Limbourg vs. Leiden school), while in others the conflict was less manifest but neverthe­
less inherent. However, Christian unionists had to seek help to guarantee their cultural and 
political independence vis-à-vis the rival Socialist union movements. Lacking in force and 
being reluctant to use the strike weapon, at least in its early days, Christian unions had to 
rely on Church support, State intervention, and employers good-will to secure their right to 
collective representation.
The German local and national unions that had emerged since the encyclica Rerum 
Novarum (1891) formed the first Christian union centre in Europe (GCGD, 1899), that was 
against the will of the Church hierarchy interdenominational, though only few Protestants 
actually joined these unions. Similar attempts toward interdenominational unionism were 
curtailed by the Dutch Bishops' ban (1906) leading to a Protestant (CNV, 1905) and a 
Christian union centre (NKV, 1909) that lasted seventy years. In Austria, Belgium, 
Netherlands and Switzerland, the pro-union Christian-Social movement came in opposition 
to the Church-led conservative leaders of the Christian workers' leagues. In these three 
countries, trade union centres were established in the decade before the war, though scat­
tered national and local unions had emerged since Rerum Novarum (see Table 4.3). Where 
the Church had been most intransigent towards Christian political and union activities, a 
union centre that coordinated the scattered local and national unions was achieved only
7 On Christian union movement see FOGARTY 1957, LAUBIER1985: Ch. 2, Launay 1990, RJGHART 
1986, SCHOLSL1961, VlSSER 1990.
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Table 4.3
Founding of Christian Workers' Leagues and Union Centres
AU BE FR GE IT NE SZ
Religion: Catti. Catti. Cath. both Cath. Cath. Prot. Cath. Prot
Workers' League: RV ACW Siton VKD Unione RKV CAS SKW VESA
Founded 1902 al89i 1900 1880 1906 1888 1900 b1904 1900
delay to Labour -7 -3 -10 0 •17 -1 -1 20
delay to party * -6 1 -5 10 -13 -16 25 -6 -23
Union Centre: ZCG CSC CFTC GCGO CIL NKV CNV CNG SVEA
Founded 1909 1912 1919 1699 1918 1909 1905 1907 1920
delay to Labour +8 6 14 9 12 4 4 2 40
delay to party * 1 20 -5 29 -1 5 30 -5 3
delay to League 7 21 19 19 12 21 5 3 20
No t e : (+) delay to Socialist trade union confederation (SZ: 1905 change to socialist orientation); (*) 
delay in years to founding of Christian Democratic party; (a) predecessor (1867,1870; 1920s: reform); 
(b) merger of SKV (1857/99) and VMAV (1888).
after the First World War. The Italian CIL (1918) and French CFTC (1919) were hardly rep­
resentative, the first was concentrated mainly in Lombardia, Veneto and agricultural areas, 
the latter was founded by a pious association of clerks and Catholic unions from the newly 
incorporated Alsace.
Christian unionism, however, was not limited to Catholic workers only, though 
Protestant and inter-confessional unionism remained a more exceptional case within 
Europe. The Dutch Calvinist union movement dates back to an ARP-led split-away from 
the Liberal union federation over the schoolstrijd, but it long remained a paternalistic orga­
nization (Patrimonium) until after the Socialist unions refounded a union centre (1905). Only 
in Switzerland, another Protestant union centre emerged, though only after the First World 
War (SVEA, 1920). In Protestant Europe, in Scandinavia and the British Isles, Church-going 
workers remained integrated within the same union movement as the other workers. In 
Britain some dissident denominations participated actively within the labour movement, 
while the Scandinavian Socialist union movements were, like on the continent, largely 
atheist. Attempts to organize unions along religious lines, like the minuscule Danish 
Christian workers' union (1899) remained minor exceptions in countries where dissident 
religious movements were confined to rural, peripheral areas.
A recapitulation of the founding origins and organization strategies should map the 
major differences among Christian union centres (see Table 4.4). The degree of internal or 
external legitimation in the case of Christian unions is classified as to the degree of Church 
tutelage and influence of the clergy vis-à-vis the lay leaders at the phase of early consolida­
tion. This influence may have two forms depending on the second axes of the organization 
strategy, whether the organization was centralized and thus mainly open to top-down in-
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Table 4.4
Founding Origins and Organization Strategy of Christian Unions
Penetration Diffusion
Internal German GCGD Swiss CSG
iegitmation Belgian CSC Dutch CNV
(lay-led)
External Austrian ZCG French CFTC
Iegitmation Dutch KAB Italian CIL
(Church-led)
tervention of the Church hierarchy (or union leaders), or whether it was a more loosely knit 
network of union activities relying on the local initiative of priests (or union leaders). In the 
Dutch and German Catholic union movement the Catholic bishops intervened in attempt­
ing to limit its "unionateness" and interdenominational character, though the Dutch intran­
sigence was more successful. Quite in contrast to the more dogmatic, intransigent position 
of the diaspora Catholic hierarchy in the two "mixed" countries, the Austrian and Belgian 
Church showed more pragmatism (on Belgium cf. PASTURE 1991). While the French and 
Italian movement suffered from the general intransigence of the Church hierarchy, local 
priests had an impact on the disconnected local activities. The Swiss Catholic and 
Protestant unionization efforts, lacking a strong centralized Church hierarchy, remained a 
loose coordination of multifarious activities in regional pockets.
Certainly, Christian union movements were building in response to Socialist labour 
movements (about four to ten years afterwards), except where an intransigent Church 
hampered national union organization as in France and Italy (see Table 4.3). However, this 
process was less a national than a more regional process of competition in response to 
modernization. More lay-oriented unions emerged where diaspora Catholics (and 
Protestants) faced the double "dangers" of Socialist agitation and secularizing moderniza­
tion, while in more homogeneous or backward rural areas activities were mainly clergy-led 
counter-mobilization efforts against the "ills of modernization". Although the roots of the 
Church-State cleavage predate the labour-capital cleavage (cf. LlPSET & ROKKAN 1967), it is 
only in response to the latter that the Church-State cleavage became crystalized and mobi­
lized into a cross-cutting class cleavage splitting worker alignment and labour unity.
Besides Church intervention, there is also a relationship between Christian party and 
union formation, reflecting the joint contribution of both organizations to cleavage crystal­
lization. There exists a parallelism in party and union development: in countries where no 
Christian-Democratic party emerged, there was also no schism of the labour movement 
along religious lines - or vice versa. Christian-Democratic parties did not emerge in all of the 
twelve countries considered here: there is no Christian-Democratic party on the British 
Isles, there are only small Christian parties in Protestant Scandinavia, while in the "mixed" 
and continental Catholic countries Christian-Democratic parties though of different scope 
and strength emerged. Only in the group of countries with Catholic or mixed religious
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composition did there occur a split in the labour movement, too. Yet the claim "that it was 
not pillarization that created the political parties, but the political parties gave rise to the 
process of pillarization" (STEIN1GER 1977: 252) seems only partly confirmed. It was less the 
party that created the unions, but the party became the crystallizing point and alliance 
partner against Church tutelage and Socialist rivalry: Christian unions sought legitimation 
and support from the party. The more distant relationship between religious party and 
unions, in comparison to the Socialist party-union relations, had also its impact on the mo­
bilization pattern of Christian labour movments to which we turn now.
II
Fr o m  M o b ilizin g  Seg m en ta tio n  
t o  D em o bilizin g  Sec u la r iza tio n
Christian party and unions mobilized much more independently than the Socialist labour 
movement, yet the party leader' appreciation of Christian unionism changed once the suf­
frage was extended to the working-class. Both party and unions had an interest in main­
taining social closure against hostile environments, in particular the secularizing Nation- 
State and the desecrating industrialization. Yet the political and social mobilization found 
its limits through party and union competition in the political and industrial relations sys­
tem. Both party and union leaders had to contend against two challengers - inside and out­
side its own pillar. Christian unionists faced not only competition by other rival union 
movements but also by employers, even those that were close to their allied Christian- 
Democratic party or were linked via a Christian employers organization within their own 
pillar. Moreover, the ongoing social change, the secularization of life spheres and the in­
creased cross-milieu interactions, the outcomes of the very success of national integration, 
eroded the very base of Christian party and union mobilization: it qualified the possibilities 
for social closure through pillarization. However, Christian party and unions adapted dif­
ferently to the new challenge and consequently followed different paths of electoral and 
corporate mobilization.
Mobilization Through P illarized Segmentation
Christian labour, in party and unions, had to mobilize against the dominance of rival 
labour movements but also against opposed forces within its own pillar. Only through 
strength could it claim a right towards representation of labour interests within the inter­
class party and vis-a-xris the state and employers in the sphere of industrial relations. Party 
leaders in mainly Catholic countries, like the Austrian K. Lueger, quite similar to the 
Socialists, expected to gain the majority of votes once suffrage would be extended (cf. 
STEINIGER1975). In fact, already before the First World War, the Christian parties mobilized 
about one-half of the enfranchised population in Austria (1907 after the suffrage reform), 
Belgium, and the Netherlands (all three major Christian parties combined). In Germany 
and Switzerland - under male universal suffrage - the Catholic minority (ca. 35% and 40%
82
4 / C h u r c h  - S t a t e  C l e a v a g e
Table 4.5
Election Results of Christian-Democratic and Religious Parties, Western Europe 1890-1989
AU BE DE FR GE IT NE NO SW SZ
Party: ÓVP CVP KRF MRP Z. CDU DC CDA KVP ARP CHU KrF KDS CVP EVP
Religion (*): Cath. Cath. Prot. Cath. Cath. 130th Calh. both Cath. Prot Prot. Prot. Prot. Cath. Prot.
Votes (%)
1890-1917 48.1 50.3 - - 18.5 - 3.5 - 17.6 22.8 9.5 . 21.4 -
1918-1944 40.9 36.6 - 3 2 10.6 - 20.4 - 28.9 13.3 9.1 1.1 20.0 0.8
1945-1967 45.5 42.6 - 14.7 - 36.0 41.4 - 30.7 10.8 8.6 9.1 1.8 22.5 1.1
1968-1989 43.3 31.0 3.0 7.4 - 45.4 37.1 31.9 21.4 9.9 6.2 9.2 1.7 21.0 2.0
Seats (%) 
1890-1917 48.9 59.1 . 25.0 3.1 245 17.8 7.7 21.0
1918-1944 44.5 40.0 - . 11.3 - 19.9 - 29.9 13.9 9.7 1.0 - 22.5 0.4
1945-1967 48.6 45.9 - 16.2 - 38.8 45.5 - 31.9 105 8.6 7.8 0 23.6 0.7
1968-1989 44.3 32.9 2.8 5.1 - 47.4 40.3 32.9 22.4 9.4 6.2 11.0 0 21.9 1.5
Source: own calculations, updated from Mackie & Rose 1990, see Appendix B. No te s : (*) Religion: 
Catholic, Protestant, both denominations; (%) Cabinet share: relative share of seats in coalition, 
weighted by years. BE: incl. PSC; GE: -1933: incl. Zentrum, BVP; 1948-: incl. CSU; NE: 1980 CDA 
merger (KVP, ARP, CHU).
respectively) voted faithfully for its party (probably more than 60% of enfranchised 
Catholics), mobilizing about one-fifth of the votes. However, no prewar Christian- 
Democratic party emerged in Catholic France and Italy due to the intransigence of the 
Catholic Church to the republican or liberal Nation-State. In France, Christian workers 
faced the choice between conservative and anti-clerical (republican) left parties, whereas 
Italian workers were hardly enfranchised and thus were less committed to other parties 
and were easier mobilizable by the interwar Christian-Democratic party after the suffrage 
reform.
After the First World War, Christian party leaders expected to profit from an extension 
of the suffrage (and proportional representation) to include the more religious agrarian 
propertyless, small middle-classes and some sections of the working-class. However, 
Christian parties actually mobilized somewhat less votes (particularly: Belgian KP, German 
Zentrum, and Dutch ARP) and lost much of the favourable prewar seat allocations, with the 
exception of the Dutch Catholic party. The Italian Catholic party (PPI, 1919) mobilized a 
turnout of about one-fifth of the voters, certainly less than in other Catholic countries but 
an achievement nonetheless for a new party. This was largely due to the symbiotic relation­
ship with the Christian union and cooperative movement (cf. SCHOL 1966). Indeed, the 
Christian labour movement with its cooperative movement and Chambers of Labour as­
sumed an important role for the party leadership, not only to reach the Christian workers 
but the agrarian population as well. Although the Christian unions represented a minority 
and had less members than the Socialist unions, they had an important role within their 
own pillar. Comparing union membership to party votes, Belgian, German, Dutch and 
Swiss Catholic unions organized around 20% of party turnout, while merely 6% in Austria
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but around 90% in Italy.8 Of course, as within the Socialist camp, not every union member 
was a ’’faithful" (or loyal) voter to the party (or for that matter eligible to vote), yet union 
leaders had an important mobilizing role as communication channels for the party.
T h e  D ilemma  o f  Secu larizin g  M o biliza tion  or  D em obilizing
Secu lariza tion
After the Second World War, Christian unionists faced the question of whether Christian 
unionism was still a feasible option in an increasingly materialist and secularized postwar 
world. The dilemma for a Christian union (and similarly for the Christian-Democratic 
party) was how to adapt to the secular challenge and yet maintain its cohesion. How to re­
tain the Church-goers and yet also appeal to those that hold more instrumental orienta­
tions? With hindsight, we found that Christian union movements diverged in their adap­
tation strategy and mobilization path in every possible manner. Notwithstanding the inte­
gration of Christian unionists within the Austrian and German unitary union movements, 
we find since the mid 1950s all possible mobilization patterns: from long-term growth-to- 
limits to growth-and-decline and relative stagnation or recent downward trends.
Firstly, the most outstanding development is certainly the Belgian Christian union centre 
(CSC/ACV). It is the strongest "truly" Christum union movement in Europe (cf. PASTURE 
1992), outnumbering the rival Socialist union centre (FGTB/ABW) since the late 1950s. 
This exception to the rule is an important case for understanding the impact of pillarization. 
In the early 1950s, the Belgian Socialist and Christian union movements had nearly the 
same strength; both were willing to acknowledge each other as equals. Both were part of 
extensively well-formed organizational pillars centred around the party (or the Church), a 
network of mutualities, cooperatives, media, sport and social clubs and other organizations 
(cf. LOR WIN 1975). What was true for the Christian union movement, particularly in 
Flanders, holds also - across the border - for the Dutch Catholic union movement, and yet 
the latter movement declined after its peak in the late 1950s. Three factors have contributed 
to the success of the Belgian as opposed to the Dutch Catholic unions: a pragmatic ideologi­
cal adaptation, a favourable territorial shift in economic and political power, and institu­
tional arrangements that maintained pillarization.
In Belgium, the postwar Catholic unions had shaken loose the Church tutelage and 
adopted a more pragmatic orientation, this was even easier after the Church retreated from 
politics after the School pact (1958). Contrary to the Dutch Catholic bishop« who found 
themselves in a diaspora within a Protestant-secular society, the Belgian bishops abstained 
from direct intervention in union matters. Union leaders in turn could be more pragmatic, 
attracting even those that were neither pious, nor Church-goers (cf. PASTURE 1991).9 The
8 The membership-votes ratio was calculated as union membership divided by party turnout 
Since non-enfranchised women (in France, Belgium, Italy) or young members are included among 
union members the ratio is overestimated.
9 The CSC, in fact, was more able to attract younger members and activists, and provided more 
services in a more modem organization than the Socialists (Lorwin 1975:252-3).
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Table 4.6
Christian Union Membership Share and Union Density (%), Western Europe 1890-1989
AU BE FR GE IT NE SZ
Union Centre: ZCG ACV CFTC CFDT CGB CISL NKV CNV CNG SVEA
Religion: Cath. Cath. Cath. Secul. both Secul. Cath. (both) (both) Prot.
Membership Share (%) 
1890-1917 73 405 3.8 11.6 27.4 11.2 3.6 3.4
1918-1944 9.1 25.7 7.9 - 17.1 (45.0) 21.1 12.1 85 22
1945-1967 [17.6] 47.7 2.4 13.0 12 34.9 27.9 15.2 9.6 2.1
1968-1989 [29.8] 51.4 3.1 19.6 2.7 35.2 22.1 17.0 11.2 1.5
Gross density (%)
1890-1917 0.5 2.0 0.0 - 1.4 1.0 2.0 05 02
1916-1944 3.9 8.7 0.9 - 5.9 8.6 6.4 3.7 2 2 0.6
1945-1967 J11.0] 20.6 05 3.0 05 10.8 11.4 6.2 3.7 0.8
1968-1989 117.6] 32.5 0.5 3 5 1.0 165 8.6 5.9 3.8 0.5
Net density (%)
1945-1967 20.1 0.5 3.0 0.4 9.7 10.9 6.0 .
1968-1989 • 26.6 0.5 3.5 0.9 14.0 7.6 5.1 3.3 •
SOURCE: own calculations, DUES database, see Appendix C.
NOTE: NE CNV: until 1977 Prot., SZ: until SVEA merger: Cath.; AU [.]: ÒAAB Share in votes in 
Chamber of Labour Elections 1949-89
Christian union centre maintained close ties with the party that became more distant as 
union membership increased while party support declined over the 1960s. In fact, the CSC 
did not suffer from the radical plunge in electoral turnout and was less affected from cen­
trifugal tendencies in the Christian-Democratic party over language and regional conflicts. 
Traditionally, Catholic unions had their strongholds in the more rural Flemish-speaking ar­
eas, thus the shift of population and employment to the North had given it a further 
boost.10 Compared to the Dutch unions, the Belgian unions maintained the Ghent-system 
of union-led unemployment insurances after the war (cf. VANTHEMSCHE 1990), with the 
consent of both pillars. The local unions paid out the subsidized benefits to the recipients 
thus providing a highly attractive incentive.
Secondly, more common pattern of growth and decline can best be exemplified by the 
case of Dutch Catholic pillarization and de-pillarization. Catholic unionization increased in 
the early 1950s but came then to a standstill as was the case with overall unionization. The 
strength of the Catholic pillar proved to be its weakness: the tightly knit network of organi­
zations, largely under the control of the Catholic Church. This had sustained its social ghetto 
cohesion but led in the long-run to intransigent inflexibility. The Church that had been 
known as "being more Roman-Catholic than Rome", forced the unions in a Catholic
10 Although CSC gained more rapidly outside their traditional area, 745% of CSC (47.4% of 
Socialist FGTB) membership was concentrated in Flanders (1964/5), that is about 70% more than 
FGTB in that region. In 1985, 683% of CSC members resided in Flanders, compared to 42.9% in the 
Socialist FGTB. (cf. CSC reports, SPITAELS 1967).
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workers’ league (KAB) and intervened into union affairs, most notably in 1956 when the 
bishops condemned membership of Catholics in Socialist unions. Only at the peak was a 
new, truely unionate confederation established (NKV, 1964) that shed Church tutelage and 
deemphasized its religious character (by no longer discriminating against non-Catholics). 
At its peak around 1960, the Catholic union centre organized nearly as many blue-collar in­
dustrial workers as the Socialist centre, yet far fewer in the private tertiary (two-thirds) and 
in the public sector (one-half, calculated from VISSER 1989:157). While the Socialists gained 
in the latter sector even further, the Catholic union centre stagnated, and became the 
weakest of the three pillarized organizations in the white-collar, private tertiary and public 
sector, not to speak of its weak support amongst the belatedly growing female labour force. 
That NKV was locked into a past social structure was a remnant of the Dutch Catholic epis­
copacy’s interpretation of Christian social doctrine (cf. PASTURE 1991), that opposed the 
organization of blue-collar workers and white-collar employees within the same movement. 
Compared to the slow de-pillarization in the union sector, the Catholic party lost dramati­
cally in the 1967 and 1971/72 elections from over 30% to below 20% of votes when it joined 
the two other religious parties to found a Christian-Democratic party (CDA). Similarly, 
running into a membership and financial crisis, the Catholic unions were forced to accept 
the merger proposals, while the Protestants withdrew in the last moment. The Protestant 
unions were also stagnating, though they were less regionally concentrated and more cable 
of shifting to new sectors, particular after some independent Catholic white-collar unions 
joined. By joining the Socialist unions, the Catholic unionists did not escape the threat of 
decline; the newly merged FNV lost considerably in active membership in the 1980s.
Thirdly, most other Christian union movements have faced similar problems, yet on a 
much lower level and were able to maintain their membership, albeit losing - like unions 
overall - in recent years. An interesting comparison of the French and Italian Christian 
union movements may further reveal the problematic dilemma of religiously pillarized or­
ganizations. Both the French and Italian union centres changed from a religious to a secular 
orientation during the first two postwar decades. The change of name and constitution in 
the case of the CFDT in 1964 is only the final success of the secular minorité that turned from 
minority to a majority within the CFTC. The change found large support amongst the 
members, only one-fifth joined the traditionalist CFTC-maintenu split-away. Differences in 
the character of Christian labour movements and in its subsequent adaptation, resulted not 
only from different mobilization paths but also from variations in the impact of Christian- 
Democracy on politics and on industrial relation institutions.
Ill
Fr o m  P ill a r iza tio n  t o  D em o cra tic  P lu ra lism
Christian-Democratic party and Christian unions were both part of the same 
Weltanschauung pillar as a result of the Church-State cleavage. Yet the party was a cross- 
class Volkspartei even avant la lettre, while the union movement was a class organization that
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cautiously developed into a deconfessionalized, secular movement. For the party, accord­
ing to the logic of representation, the unions were an important ally within their own pillar to 
mobilize larger sections of the working population, while the latter voiced its interests 
against other factions within the party. Through the party, the Christian unions were able to 
meet Christian employers or Christian-Democratic business leaders. The inter-class party 
played a crucial role in mediating class conflicts within its own pillar and thus fasciliating 
political accomodation in society (cf. LIJPHART 1968). Moreover, Christian-Democratic 
parties had an important role in institutionalizing democratic pluralism within industrial 
relations. Although Christian unionism added to union diversity, its strength in labour 
unity within its pillar and its cross-class relations gave it more importance than mere 
numbers showed. However, much of overall labour unity was dependent on the willing­
ness of union leaders to cooperate across pillars and to adapt their movement to the 
changing world.
T h e  Im print  o f  C hristian-D emocracy
The Christian party had already made its imprint in many consodational countries, before 
Christian-Democracy proper emerged with the suffrage reforms around the First World 
War. In countries with early parliamentarism, in Belgium (1830), Switzerland (1872) and the 
Netherlands (1878), Catholic parties entered government early. After its landslide victory in 
1884, the Belgian Catholic party ruled for 28 year until the end of war.11 The Dutch Catholic 
party entered the Calvinist-Catholic coalition in 1901 (individual Catholic politicians had 
been included before) which alternated with Liberal governments until the suffrage reform 
of 1920. The Swiss Catholics were asked to join the Radical-Liberal party in 1891, and have 
remained in office ever since, albeit with a second Federal Council seat since proportional 
representation (1919). In Austria since the 1907 suffrage reform and in the German Reich, 
parliamentary majority (though not the cabinet) depended on the consent of the Christian- 
Social party and Zentrum respectively.
After the suffrage reform and proportional representation, Christian-Democratic parties 
continued to rule for nearly the entire interbellum in the above mentioned countries, though 
in varying coalitions (see Table 4.7). They profited from their pivotal position and the 
failure of the left to achieve a majority or strike a compromise with the Liberals or the 
Right. The Belgian Christian-Democracts and particularly the German Zentrum ruled par­
ticularly during the critical years in a Grand Coaltion with the Socialists, while in Austria 
and the Netherlands such centre-left coalitions broke apart after a short time. On the other 
hand, the Swiss war cabinet asked the Socialists to join only in 1943.
After the Second World War, Christian-Democratic parties ruled in all countries for 
more than half of the postwar period, though varying in strength, regularity and coalition 
partners - mirroring the Social-Democratic party position (see Chapter 3), though none -
11 The "Christian-Democrats", the progressive party splinter, obtained 3 out of 10 Minister posts 
from 1907 onwards, cf. K o s sm a n n  1978: Apendix.
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Table 4.7
Government Participation of Christian Patties, Western Europe 1890-1989
AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ
Party: ÔVP CVP KRF MRP CDU FG DC CDA KVP ARP CHU KrF KDS CVP EVP
Religion (*): Cath. Cath. Prot. Cath. both Cath. Cath. both Cath. Prot Prot. Prot. Prot. Cath. Prot.
Government years
1916-1944 14.0 20.1 - . 12.7 - . - 20.9 21.7 21.7 - 27.0 -
1945-1967 22.0 14.2 - 21.4 18.3 6.1 21.4 - 22.5 15.3 17.4 2.3 23.0 -
1968-1989 5.4 22.0 
Coalition with Socialists (years)
5.7 10.2 9.0 9.2 22.0 12.4 9.9 95 5.4 7.3 22.0 -
1918-1944 2.3 8.5 - - 7.0 - - - - 0.0 0.0 - 12 -
1945-1967 21.3 5.7 - 8.9 1.1 6.1 6.7 15.1 15.1 13.0 10.4 - 24.8 -
1968-1989 3.1 11.3 * - 1.8 9.2 18.6 1.0 4.6 4.6 - - 29.6 -
Cabinet share (%)
1918-1944 42.0 44.8 - 15.1 - . - 41.8 20.8 14.2 - 37.1 *
1945-1967 53.2 46.9 * 21.7 61.2 26.4 74.8 - 47.9 10.7 10.3 1.6 29.3 -
1968-1989 17.4 53.9 1.6 4.3 32.6 41.8 69.1 34.0 20.5 8.5 4.2 6.2 265 »
Source: own calculations, updated series based on Flora 1981, Mackie & Rose 1990, see Appendix 
B. Notes: (*) Religion: Catholic, Protestant, both denominations; Cabinet share: relative share of seats 
in coalition, weighted by years. BE: incl. PSC; GE: -1933: incl. Zentrum, BVP; 1948-: incl. CSU; NE: 
1980 CDA merger (KVP, ARP. CHU).
maybe with the exception of the Austrian OVP (1966-70) - ever obtained hegemony. 
Neither was Christian-Democracy to become important were Socialists achieved sustained 
or sporadic hegemony (Scandinavia, Britain, France). The Italian Christian-Democrats 
though divided by fractions had until the strongest and longest government role (see Table 
4.7) as it successfully kept the Communists out of government and restricted their alliance 
alternatives. Similarly during the two postwar decades the German, Austrian, Belgian and 
Dutch Christian-Democratic parties played an important role as major coalition partner, 
though sometimes joined by the Socialists. These governments were more inclined to all in­
clusive corporatist concertation making. Indeed, these arrangements were a vital element to 
"stable, consodationalist democracies" (SCHOLTEN 1987). The impact of Christian unions 
seemed to have been largest where coalition governments included the Socialist parties, 
since any pro-union policy had to be done on a par with the other union movement, while 
in centre-right coalitions union interests remained underrepresented.
In the second half of the postwar era, however, centre-left coalitions became less the 
rule, though they remained in power in Italy, Belgium and Switzerland. Following the de- 
pillarization, regional disparities, and increasing tensions between factions or party wings, 
Christian-Democratic parties face a critical situation in Belgium and Italy, with some 
warning signs in other countries. Although trade unions have not come as much under at­
tack or suffered severe austerity measures in these countries as in Britain or France, yet the 
social wing within Christian-Democratic parties has become a even more discounted voice.
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Institu tion aliza tion  o f  D em ocratic  P luralism
As Fogarty observed, the history of Christian Democracy is the growth of the seeds sawn 
by the early twenties (cf. FOGARTY 1957: 298). In the consodational countries, where 
Christian-Democratic parties participated in interwar governments, democratic pluralism be­
came institutionalized in industrial relations. Union recognition entailed not only the le­
gitimate representation of labour interests in collective bargaining, but guranteed also rep­
resentation rights to the minoritarian Christian unions. Moreover, in Belgium, Austria, 
Germany and the Netherlands, corporatist institutions were introduced such as works’ 
councils, Chamber (or Council) of Labour during the interwar period. These statutory in­
stitutions - partly unintended - were soon a forum for democratic pluralism in industrial 
relations. Representation on these institutionalized channels of labour representation neces­
sarily became a political issue: how were seats to be allocated between the partisan union 
movements (by social elections, mutual agreement, or government decision)? Even of ear­
lier origin were social welfare institutions that promoted union pluralism, through apply­
ing subsidarity and corporatist principles. After the Second World War, the Christian and 
Socialist pillars agreed to continue and reform these industrial relations institutions of in­
terclass and intraclass consensus in order to stabilize postwar industrial relations (but also 
to limit the impact of Communists).
In Belgium, where the Ghent-system originated, union-led unemployment insurances 
received early on support (1907) and were subsequentially subsidized by the central gov­
ernment (1920). Christian-Democrats and Socialists together struck early on a compromise 
on free choice of welfare funds but with state regulation and financial support 
(Verzekeringswet, 1903, SCHOLL 1964). The continuation of the Ghent-system in unemploy­
ment insurance had the unintended consequence that the Belgian labour movement grew 
during high unemployment, from which also the Christian unions benefited 
(VaNTHEMSCHE 1990). Besides the increasing number of sectoral bipartite committees, there 
existed a long tradition of a national bipartite forum, the National Council of Labour.12 For 
the representation on these committees, the major confederations agreed on principles of 
division of seats with the employers and state. Mutual recognition was further underlined 
by the wartime secrete "Social pact” (1940) and the status of représentativité granted by the 
state (1948). The three established union centres were able to keep individual exit costs and 
organization costs high, thus, for instance, the independent unions of cadres were not offi­
cially recognized as representative until 1985.
In the Netherlands, at the time of the historic comprise (1917) it was also decided by the 
Christian parties that state and communes should subsidize voluntary unemployment in­
surance schemes, which was controlled later by a social security council that became the 
forum for pluralist union representation (cf. KUIPER 1925). Similarly, pluralist unionism 
derived its legitimation from, but also reinforced, high-level corporatist representation and
12 It was first a tripartite (1892), then reformed bipartite (1935) institution, it continued infor­
mally since 1945, and was restructured to its current form in 1952 (cf. "Belgium" in Blanpain 1977).
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cross-class (and interdenominational) consensus seeking between and within the pillars.13 
System integration (see Chapter 2), not social integration, became the overriding concern of 
Christian union leaders, in particular Catholic unionists. While clinging on top-level elite 
corporatist arrangements, social disintegration at the pillars bottom remained largely un­
noticed and unaltered.
Austria has also a long tradition of integrating unions into legislative consultation, in 
particular via the Chamber of Labour.14 While representation on the Chamber was a matter 
of rivalry between the Lager in the interwar period, the postwar unitary ÔGB allowed its 
partisan factions to campaign in the Chamber elections, thus allowing the minority repre­
sentation to the Christian-Democratic wing. The ÓGB was successful in monopolizing its 
representative status and being accepted as the sole social partner on the side of labour, 
notably in the parity price and wage commission (statutory since 1957, predecessor since 
1947 price agreement).
In Germany, some corporatist arrangements have existed that are similar to those in 
Austria but did not survive as much into the postwar period. Although the Christian 
unionists had been proponents of corporatist relations, the legacy of Bismarckian social and 
labour policy (union representation in self-administration) fuelled more status divisions 
(due to the collarline divisions) than pluralist unionism, to the advantage of the anti-semitic 
Protestant clerical union DHV (cf. E b b in g h a u s  1988). The November agreement (1918) 
signed by the employers and all major union confederations, including the Christian 
unions, recognized unions and thereby institutionalized indirectly union pluralism. After 
the Second World War, the unitary DGB claimed a monopoly of representation and was 
able to de facto exclude the minuscule Christian unions (for instance, in the 1970s 
"Konzertierte Aktion”, although much less the status-oriented federations of white-collar 
and civil servants (DAG and DBB)).
In Switzerland, although Christian unions together with Socialists unions had early con­
sultative functions vis-à-vis the national parliament, social and labour policy remained 
largely a matter of cantonal regulation. This was more to the advantage of Catholic unions 
within the Catholic cantons, but hardly to the diaspora organizations. Moreover, they suf­
fered from employers intransigence as much as the Socialist unions until the more cooper­
ative years (1937 peace agreement in metal industry). In France, the regionally dispersed 
Catholic unions of the interwar period met similarly employers resistance, while favourable 
State intervention was lacking until the Popular Front government forced employers to the 
Matignon agreement (1936), from which the Left unions were more to profit. After the 
Liberation, Christian unions were able to claim the same moral right for représentativité as
13 The High Council of Labour (1919) provided social policy proposals, after a short phase of 
corporatist experiments during the German occupation, the Social Economic Council (SER) was es­
tablished in 1950.
14 The first consultative council was formed in 1898, the Chamber of Labour was codified in 
1920, later abolished (1938) after the G e rm a n  Anschlufi, but refounded in 1945, and finally reformed 
in 1954 (cf. ARM INGE ON 1992: Appendix).
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the Left-wing unions (the State granted this right to the four partisan unions and one cadre 
organization). In Italy, after interwar Fascist corporatist regime, democratic, voluntary 
unionism was reestablished, though since 1950s the state assumed a role in recognizing 
"representative" unions, distribute positions in the large state sector by partisan principles, 
and intervene into collective bargaining matters. In reaction to the strike wave, the state 
strengthened the position of the representative unions at the work place (1972) and on ar­
bitration boards (1973) (cf. ARMINGEON1992: 290).
C hristian  L abour U nity  in  U n io n  P luralism
If Socialist unionists strove for labour unity through overcoming union diversity, Christian 
unionists sustained the view that labour unity rests on pluralism. Within each famille 
spirituelle, unity amongst the "faithful" was more easily to maintain and defend against ex­
ternal disturbances. Christian workers were to be organized within their own organiza­
tions, or they would either abstain or loose their faith. Inscribed into the very existence of 
Christian unionism and Christian-Social teaching was a conception of democratic pluralism 
(cf. IRVING 1979: 40-56) that operated at two levels: horizontal pluralism (or political 
pluralism - the coexistence of different political union movements) and vertical pluralism 
(or subsidarite - the devolution to the lowest possible level). Yet two practical consequences 
for labour unity followed. First, Christian union movements were only a minority move­
ment, at least outside the confines of its stronghold regions. This was particularly problem­
atic as labour market became increasingly nationally integrated and an industrial relations 
were centralized. Second, the Christian labour movement, though being commonly with 
fewer resources, was spread into a net of local, regional, occupational, status group organi­
zations, often with mixed economical, cultural and social functions. Hence, while the 
strength of Christian unionism was its cohesion through relying on the small faithful com­
munity, this strategy caused major obstacles for an effective interest representation. 
Although a possitive effect of democratic pluralism was the freedom to vote by feet, to 
choose the most attractive union within the same sector, this "strength of rival unionism" 
(cf. GALENSON 1961:17-41) was only limited as long as alignments remained based on non­
materialist ideology, however, once instrumental orientation became more important, there 
were less reasons to continue rival unionism.
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Table 4.8
Assodational Monopoly of Christian Unions (% ), W estern Europe 1913-1989
AU BE FR GE IT NE SZ
Union Centre ZCG ACV CFTC CFDT CGB CISl NKV CNV CNG SVEA
Religion: Cath. Cath. Cam. Secul. both Secul. Cath. (both) (both) Prot.
Associational Monopoly (%)
1913 8.6 48.8 3.7 - 6.8 3.5 10.7 12.8 45 15
1920* 6.4 17.9 5.1 - 14.7 40.0 21.6 10.9 4.7 1.1
1935** 15.0 35.3 11.7 - 19.6 - 23.7 14.8 10.3 3.4
1950 [14-2] 50.3 8.7 - 0.1 22.8 25.6 13.7 7.7 2.6
1970 123.5] 51.8 2.3 17.2 2.3 34.6 25.3 15.0 11.1 1.6
1969 129.1] 54.0 5.1 23.3 3 2 35.3 • 18.3 11.7 *
NOTE: O  IT: est. 1919-21, (**) 1932: AU, 1931: GE. 
Source: Monopoly: own calculatations, Appendix C.
Before the First World War, when the belated efforts to organize Christian unions began 
to become coordinated, Christian unions attracted only a small minority of all unionized 
workers (see Table 4.8). However, the two Dutch Christian unions organized already one 
fourth and the Belgian unions came close to 80% of the Socialist membership (though 
figures for the independent unions are unknown). In some strongly Catholic regions such 
as Flanders, Southern Netherlands, and Rhineland, the Catholic unions competed success­
fully against the Socialists. The mobilization wave in the early 1920s boosted more the Left 
labour movements than the Christian unions, but they profited from unionization of white- 
collar employees and civil servants who tended to organize in non-Left unions. Although 
all unions, including the Christian union movements, suffered from a membership crisis 
during the 1920s, the Christian unions were less affected than the Socialists. In fact, their as- 
sociational monopoly increased (see Table 4.8), giving them a larger claim for representa­
tion. However, in Germany the Christian unions (particularly among Protestants) became 
increasingly pervaded by the German-National and later Nazi movement, while in Austria 
the German-Nationals formed a separate movement to the Christian unionists.
Postwar development of Christian unionism diverged. In some countries, Christian 
unionists were integrated within a unitary movement, while in others the movement be­
came secularized, and in some cases they adapted the chracter of the movement. Most 
notably, the Belgian Christian union movement was able to outnumber the Socialist and 
Liberal union movement. In the Netherlands, the Catholic union centre extend its share up 
to 30% until the mid-1950s (short above 30% of the population was then Catholic) but lost 
compared to the Socialist and independent unions thereafter, finally joining the Socialists in 
1977/81, while the Protestants stagnated until they could also claim representation of some 
previously non-integrated Catholic unions. The two Christian unions until the 1970s not 
only represented at its peak nearly half of all organized but had besides the Socialist an 
undisputed place (until the formation of the white-collar federation MHP). With less
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numerical and more regional importance, the Swiss Catholic union centre stagnated argi^id 
its prewar high and partly escaped further decline by integrating the small Protestyftt unpn -L 
SVEA in the 1980s. £  \
The two secularized Christian union centres (CFDT and CISL) that comMlmjEjroi #  
mainly Communist-led unions (CGT and CISL) were able to advance their shanpj^re 
sentation. In both countries in the first two decades the two secularizing Christian uruon 
movements gained moderately from the weakening of Communist unionism (see Chapter 
5), while unionization rates lessened somewhat until the mobilization wave of the late 
1960s. The three Italian union movements gained considerable in unionization in the 1970s, 
but lost again in the last years. At the time of the short-lived CGIL-CISL-UIL federation the 
Christian unionists organized one-third of all members, compared to one-half by the 
Communist-led CGIL. The recent decline in Italian unionization, however, is less 
attributable to secularization as in the case of the Dutch movement. In France, a general 
decline - affected all three politically divided labour pillars, in particular the Communist- 
led unions (see Chapter 5).
An important differences between countries in term of their growth prospect but also 
their representational claim was the class character. Motor of the secularization of the 
French and Italian movement were the public sector unions, that would grow in employ­
ment and have particular interest in representation vis-à-vis the government over the 
growth of the welfare-state. Similarly, the Belgian CSC (and to a lesser degree the Dutch 
CNV) were open to public sector unionism, while the Dutch Catholic KNV, the Swiss CNG, 
and the German CGB remained bastions of blue-collar industrial unionism. In Austria, the 
Christian-Democratic faction was particularly strong in the central government and private 
white-collar sector, as a result of the larger political heterogeneity in these sectors. This 
allowed Christian union leaders access to the government if not even a post as Labour 
minister. Thorough the party, contacts could be established with Catholic or Protestant em­
ployers organizations or party-members. Christian-Democratic social policy built on prin­
ciples of subsidarity had a long-term influence in reinforcing the class-dividing, religious 
cleavage (ESPING-ANDERSEN & KORPI 1984). Moreover, it was in these countries with 
Centre-Left governments that major industrial relations reforms reinforced and institution­
alized a pluralist union system with a right (and means of existence) for the Christian union 
movement (see below).
T he  C h a n g in g  P arty-U n io n  L inkage
Compared to Socialist unions, Christian unions have less close ties to (and a less important 
voice within) their political ally. While Socialist party and allied unions are primarily class 
organizations, Christian party and allied unions result from cross-cutting class cleavages. 
Certainly, the Christian unions had an important impact via the workers' wing in trans­
forming the pre-suffrage party of religious defense into a Christian-Democratic Volkspartei 
(peoples party) but it was only one of several forces. Christian union leaders had long diffi­
culties to win party support, though after the introduction of universal suffrage (and pro-
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Table 4.9 
Christian Party-Union Linkages
Church-led Party-led Secular
corporate
(standen)
Belgium -1944 
Austria -1934
social
wing
Belgian CSC 
German GCGD 
Dutch KAB/NKV
German CGB 
Austrian ÖÄAB
German DGB
personal
links
French CFTC
(Italian ACLI)
French CFDT 
Italian CISL 1960s-
portional representation) Catholic working-class votes in Flanders, Southern Netherlands, 
Rhineland, or small-town Austria counted in party headquarters. The Christian-Democratic 
parties, that as catch-all Volkspartei claimed to represent the working class as well, had to 
maintain friendly relations with Christian unionists.
The Christian party and unions have a different positions and role within the Christian 
pillar, that is composed of a plethora of social, cultural and economic organizations that 
stretch from the sacred to the profane life spheres. In countries with strong pillarization, 
particularly in Belgium and the Netherlands, intermediary structures are organized in con­
centric circles (cf. POST 1989:188) around the religious core, the Church, one finds a circle of 
religion disseminating institutions (e.g. Church lay organizations and media), then the 
party, and thereafter a circle of professional organizations (Christian unions, employers’ as­
sociations, farmer leagues, cooperatives), and finally a circle of social and cultural organi­
zations (e.g. Christian leisure and sports clubs). In the Dutch-speaking parts of the Low 
Countries, there exist besides unions also Christian employers associations.16
The Belgian and Austrian parties formalized external support by corporatist integration 
(standen or Stände) of organizations for farmers, employers and workers besides other social 
groups, though the Belgians discontinued the corporatist membership first in Wallonia in 
the 1930s and nationally after 1945. In the Dutch and German interdenominational 
Christian-Democratic parties (CDU/CSU and CDA), no formal links exist but party wings 
(Sozialausschüße) represents the minority labour interests against the well organized 
interests of employers and farmers. In Italy, the links to corporate organizations have
^  The support for the Dutch Catholic party at its peak, for instance, nearly mirrored the overall 
electorate (survey of 1964), while the Calivinist parties (ARP, CHU) had more support amongst 
white-collar employees and the Socialist labour party was overrepresented amongst blue-collar 
workers (cf. LlJPHART 1968: Table 4, p. 29).
16 In Flanders: VKW (1935/1966), in the Netherlands: NCW, 1967), previously split in Protestant 
and Catholic associations, while small-and-medium business associations (middestands) had been 
formed even earlier.
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declined in importance, while political factions ('correntf) around party leaders and based 
on patronage systems prevailed to the advantage of business interests (Confindustria). 
Again, one can detect the impact of sequential founding: where corporate organizations 
(unions) came first and were crucial in setting up party structures, as in Austria and 
Belgium, a corporatist structure was constituted. In other countries, where the party pre­
ceded functional organizations, relations were based more on cooptation or even left to be 
informal. However, there are pressures over time that differentiate, if not distance, party 
and unions, particularly after the Second World War. In countries, Christian-Democracy 
emerged belately and remained marginal, as in Scandinavia (cf. MADELEY 1977), a Christian 
workers' (or union) wing never realy developed.
After the Second World War it was more the Christian-Democratic party that deter­
mined the fate of Christian unionism than the Church that eventually retreated from poli­
tics and unionism altogether (albeit the Dutch bishops only in the 1960s). Party leaders de­
cided in 1944 in Italy or in 1945 in Austria to build a unitary union movement - though with 
political factions, and were the leading forces behind the split of the Italian CGIL in 1947 
and the concessional solution in Austria. But as the Italian case indicates, the party-led 
unions distanced themselves from the party in the course of the 1960s (cf. FARNETI1978). In 
Austria and Germany it was attempted to overcome previous fragmentation by the postwar 
integration of Christian trade unionists within a unitary labour movement. This was 
achieved by either allowing overt but highly institutionalized political factionalism as in 
Austria, or through symbolic balanced leadership and more informal political ties as in 
Germany. In Austria, Christian faction (FCG) within the OGB and the workers league 
(OAAB) within the Christian-Democratic party (OVP) have gained in importance within 
the unions and the Chamber of Labour respectively.17 On the other hand, the German uni­
tary DGB (1949) explicitly rules out the possibility of organized factions. However, it does 
allocate informal representation rights in union and federal executive councils to Christian 
unionists who are organized in a labour league within the CDU. Nevertheless, the DGB 
remained - though informally - associated with the SPD, and some of its union leaders have 
a seat in party councils or in parliament. In the late 1950s a rival Christian union centre 
(CGB) but remained small (see Table 4.6), since it received not much support from the 
CDU, the German employers or the government (it remains excluded from tripartite con­
sultation).
In the two main examples of segmented pluralism, Belgium and the Netherlands, at­
tempts in 1945 to create a unitary movement failed due to the refusal of the Christian 
labour movements which were reconstituted. Between 1945 and 1972 Christian unions at­
tracted more members than Socialist and all other unions together. The Belgian Christian 
union centre ACV, with its strong basis in the now economically prospering Flanders area 
and thanks to its growing white-collar sections, outnumbers the Socialist FGTB. Differences
17 In the Chamber of Labour elections, Christian OAAB increased its votes from 14.9% (1949) to 
365% (1984), but lost recently some 5-8% to the National-Liberal wing. Support among white-collar 
employees grew from 285% (1949) to 48.7% (1984), but fell to 385% (1989) (cf. SOMMER 1989)
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Table 4.10
Church-State Cleavage and Religious Split in Union Movement, Western Europe 1918-1989
Union movement Catholic monopoly Mixed pattern Protestant
No/marginal 
split (<10%)
Ireland
postwar Austria 
France 1964-
Northern Ireland (*) 
postwar Germany
Sweden, Norway 
Great Britain (*) 
Denmark
Medium split 
(10-30%)
Fra nee-1964 
Italy n  
interwar Austria
Switzerland 
interwar Germany 
Netherlands 1977-
Dominant split 
(>30)
Belgium Nethertands -1977
Source: revised from Ebbinghaus & Visser 1990: Table 5. Note: (*) quasi-religious split through af­
filiation to Irish vs. British based unions; (**) CISL became secularized in 1970s although it reached 
more than 30% (excl. autonomous unions).
decreased as the two become more independent from party and Church tutelage. In the 
Netherlands this has led to a merger (FNV, 1980/1976) between Socialist N W  and Catholic 
NKV, while Protestant CNV remained separate, thereby attracting some Catholic unions, 
now becoming, as initially, interdenominational.
The French Catholic union centre (CFTC) with the 1964-reform (CFDT) became a secular 
movement that seeks alignment with the Socialist party (Christian-Democrats had become 
politically squeezed between the right and left bloc). This secularization provoked, how­
ever, a split of a minority who continued the old organization and tradition (CFTC). In 
Italy, the Catholic confederation (CISL, 1950) that had emerged from the failed unitary 
union centre (CGIL) distanced itself from the Church and Catholic Action from the mid- 
1960s.
C o n c l u sio n
The Church-State cleavage was found to lead to segmented pluralism and rival unionism in 
countries where Catholic or Calvinist communities came in opposition to the secularizing 
Nation-State, liberal-materialist capitalism and anti-clerical Socialist movement. The 
Church with her opposition towards political and union activities and control over cultural 
identity was an important actor in the figuration that gave rise to Christian-Democratic par­
ties and Christian unionism. The major State-Church conflict over mass education not only 
gave rise to parties of religious defense, but its outcome determined her influence on local 
working class communities, as in Beligum and the Netherlands. In these countries, and to a 
lesser degree in parts of Switzerland, Austria, and Germany, a pillarized network of 
Christian organizations led to segmented pluralism. The Church intransigence in Catholic 
France and Italy led to a belated (and in France later aborted) formation of a Christian- 
Democratic movement. Although Christian-Democratic party and Christian unions devel-
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Table 4.11
The Church-State Cleavage and Christian Union Movements
Christian unions Unified movement
SEPERATION INTEGRATION
Church-led pillarized merger
segmentation Dutch CNV (NKV) Dutch FNV (1977-)
Belgian CSC
Swiss CNG (SVEA)
Party-led secularizing internal
segmentation French CFDT (CFTC) Austrian 6GB [FSG]
(polarization) Italian CISL German DGB
oped more independently than in the Socialist movement, they later became interdepen­
dent allies for mutual mobilization, representational legitimation, and distance from 
Church tuelage.
In this chapter, we have discussed the configurations under which the State-Church 
cleavage gave rise to Christian union organizations. Yet, the leading question was how 
could a union movement that was based on a pre-industrial cleavage emerge and persist, 
while industrialization would increase secularization. In fact, there have been major 
changes and adaptations to Christian union movements in the postwar period. Of particu­
lar postwar importance have been the following four clusters in adaptation of postwar 
Christian unionism (see Table 4.11): (1) the traditional pillarized Christian union movement 
in segmented pluralist societies that became more distant to Church intervention, (2) secu­
larizing Christian union movements that reemerged with party-led split from Communist- 
led union movements, (3) the merger of the crisis-struck Christian and Socialist unions, and
(4) the postwar integration into tin all-partisan unified union movement (with leadership or 
faction representation). Following the theoretical propositions (see Chapter 2), those 
movements that established worker alignment at an early time and became institutional­
ized showed the most resistance to change, yet if it remained inert it risked to steer into a 
cushoned deadlock.
Christian-Democracy and Christian unionism initially organized and mobilized on the 
basis of religious alignments, they used a strategy of social closure. With the help of a net­
work of organizations the movement could maintain the segmentation into a 
Weltanschauung community that was to isolate its followers from external influences. 
Although the ideological difference between Socialists and Christians, the actual competi­
tion between these movements is limited as long as politico-religious alignments are stable. 
However, the religious cleavage organization came under pressure through continuing 
secularization and social integration. If it continued a closed mobilization pattern it would 
risk to decline, while it could lose its identity and cohesion when it adapted to seculariza­
tion. Some Christian union movements have sucessfully become more pragmatic (Belgian 
CSC) or secularized (French CFDT and Italian CISL), while the Dutch NKV shows the dan­
gers of closure strategy.
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As secularization and desegmentation thinned out the social base for the cleavage orga­
nizations, competition between labour organizations increased while the web of organiza­
tional linkages entangled some pillarized organizations and made adaptation difficult. 
Initially, pillarization had helped to make up for the weakness of rival unionism by provid­
ing political linkages and cross-class contacts for Christian unionists within their own pil­
lar. However, pillarization, democratic pluralism, and elite accommodation brought also 
two dangers. First, the leadership became disconnected from the social base and concen­
trated on compromise seeking with those forces from which the members were supposed to 
be shield. Second, the more Christian unions became institutionalized and the welfare state 
expanded, social integration advanced and consequently, the insistence on separate organi­
zations became increasingly paradoxical. The Church-State cleavage has lost much of its 
mobilizing salience, although it remains entrenched in organizational structures and insti­
tutional arrangements that tends to persist. We will turn now to the last political cleavage: 
the reform-revolution cleavage.
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Th e  Rev o lu tio n -Reform  C leavage
5
'(...) the Industrial Revolution produced Unver-class parties of one sort 
or another throughout the 'West But these differed conspicuously in 
strength, in organizational unity, in ideological orientation and in the 
extent of their integration into, or alienation from, each historically 
given polity. (...) ‘To aid in the mapping c f these variations in the char­
acter of working-class politics our model posits a fourth 'critical junc­
ture', an International Revolution. Hite conflict between proletarian in­
ternationalism and nation-accepting' socialism emerged early in the his­
tory of the working-class movement. The dramatic events of the Jirst 
'World 'War and the Russian Revolution deepened the split in the 
movement and produced not only militant factions But distinct and 
competing working-class parties (ROKKAN 1968: 207, italics re­
moved)’.
Quarrels over revolutionary or reformist strategy divided labour further. Since the first 
days, labour was split whether to follow the path toward Electoral and Corporate Socialism 
or await the final ’Kladderatasch' (crash-bang-wallop), the breakdown of capitalism. The 
prewar Socialist intellectuals, like Kautsky and Bernstein, debated fiercely over revolution­
ary ideology or revisionist pragmatism, and the International union movement over syndi­
calist "action directe" or reformist trade unionism. Yet the Russian Revolution in 1917 be­
came the signal to the revolting workers hoping for a radical change in society and econ­
omy. Dissatisfaction with the national, reformist path of the Socialists led many to become 
committed to the International Revolution under the leadership of the Soviets. At this criti­
cal juncture the revolution-reform cleavage produced a schism in working-class parties and 
union movements, though varying in salience (LlPSET & ROKKAN 1967, ROKKAN 1968).1 The 
Moscow-led Communist labour movement, like the Rome-led Catholic workers movement, 
added to labour disunity and amplified union diversity.
The revolution-reform schism was largely a response to the preceding cleavages, the 
labour-capital cleavage and the Church-State conflict. It will be argued in this chapter, that 
the salience of the revolution-reform cleavage was contingent on the degree of incomplete 
national and cultural integration of the working-class. The labour schism was most intense 
where social integration and system integration were incomplete, where radical, syndicalist 
counter-cultures existed due to incomplete national or cultural integration, and where 
labour remained excluded from society, polity and economy by the intransigence of
1 My terminology departs from Rokkan's "International-National" cleavage that alludes too 
closely to the Russian Revolution. The revolution-reform cleavage, in my own reading, includes also 
pre-1917 syndicalist union movements and non-Moscow-led leftist party splits (e.g. the Danish VS).
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Church, State and employers. The revolution-reform cleavage has been initially important 
in several of the twelve countries, but after a short postwar intermezzo in Communist pop­
ularity, it remained largely a phenomenon of polarized pluralism (SARTORl 1976), that is, lim­
ited to France and Italy.2 The development of a Communist movement in France and Italy 
contrasts with the labour movement in the other Western European countries. The analysis 
in this chapter will thus map the cross-national differences first, but later focuses mainly on 
the comparison of the French and Italian development. The diverging paths taken by these 
two Communist movements highlights again the issues of cleavage persistence and organi­
zational change, the degree to which social integration and system integration de-empha- 
size the salience of the revolution-reform cleavage. As in the previous two chapters, the 
formation, mobilization and representation aspects will be analyzed sequentially.
First, the formation of the revolution-reform cleavage and its transformation into 
Communist party and union movement will be examined. It will be shown, how the rela­
tively universal split became differently ingrained into the party and union systems, de­
pending on the forces that gave rise to the party and the strategic considerations toward the 
unions. Of long-term consequences for the party-union linkage and adaptation to change 
was the specific figuration: the Moscow-led Communist International, the national leftist 
party leaders and the syndicalist unions.
Second, the parallel mobilization of Communist party and unions, both appealing to and 
maintaining the same social base (the militant working-class) will be analyzed. Communist 
party and unions had chances to implant themselves where national and cultural integra­
tion was incomplete, that is, in regions of radical syndicalism and areas of dechristianiza- 
tion, that is, where Socialist and Christian organizations remained weak. Both Communist 
party and unions, favouring militancy and "pure” class appeals, utilised organizational 
control and social closure to maintain worker alignment and community radicalism. At 
critical junctures, workers militancy led to waves of radical mobilization, yet Communists 
remained unable to sustain mobilization in the interwar and postwar period with few but 
significant exceptions. In particular, the postwar diverging path of the two outstanding 
Communist labour movements, the French and Italian, will be compared. The two move­
ments chose between two opposing strategies: identity-maintaining social closure and ide­
ology-adapting social opening.
Third, the political and economic interest representation posed a challenge to the division 
of labour and party-union relations. Since the revolutionary doctrine had been the initial 
impetus to the schism, the acceptance of the logic of representation in the electoral and cor­
porate channel was a more retarded and ambiguous change in Communist movements. 
Given the party primacy and the importance of political over economic aims, the 
Communist unions were forced to wait for a political change that remained largely fore­
closed. The possibility for political alliances were reduced by the given political and union
2 Beyond the scope of this study, however, Communist movements and "polarized pluralism" 
has also continued into the postwar period in Finland, but also in Spain and Portugal (after democ­
racy was reinstalled).
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systems as well as the internal capacity for adaptation. However, the Italian and French 
cases provide diverging strategies in alliance building and in representational flexibility. 
Over the postwar decades, the two movements chose differently between pure but less ef­
fective 'class’ unionism in France and attenuating class alliance in Italy. While the former 
chose to maintain labour unity within its own Weltanschauung, the latter movement opted 
for reducing union diversity and enhance national labour unity.
I
Th e  T ra n sfo rm a tio n  o f  the  
Rev o lu tio n -Reform  C leavage
Communist party formation was universal and radical unionism was widespread across 
Western Europe in the early 1920s - in a phase of increased political and social mobilization, 
if not radicalization. For many workers, instigated by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia 
and the economic and political crisis at home, revolutionary action became the new expres­
sion in political strikes and within the works' council movement. For them, the reformist, 
parliamentarian road to Socialism was obsolete and the Socialist party seemed discredited 
by its war-cooperation. The major collective actors in the revolution-reform schism were 
the Moscow-led International Communist movement, the leftist party splinter (or dissi­
dents) and the syndicalist unions.
Communist party and unions have been - through "proletarian internationalism" - to a 
large degree dominated by decisions coming from Moscow, probably more than Catholic 
unionists by an encyclica send from Rome. With the establishment of the Communist 
International in Moscow (Comintern, 1920) the Soviet Communist movement enshrined its 
leadership role in Lenin's 21 conditions for affiliation, though this was not of immediate 
impact. For Communist unions, an international movement was founded (RILU, 1921), that 
remained under tight control of the Comintern and was later dissolved by the party. 
Comintern's strategy shifted back-and-forth in its early years, following the Soviet domestic 
changes as well as its "foreign" policy in a rapid changing World situation. Moreover, it 
took several years until it had moulded the national parties along its model of "democratic 
centralism" (cf. WALLER 1988).
Although a Communist party emerged universally across Europe, the way in which this 
transformation came about as well as its later strength and impact varied considerably. This 
was of importance for Communist unionism, too. Given the primacy of the party, the strat­
egy of Communists towards unionism was contingent, as will be shown, on the strategic 
considerations of the party. Depending on the party's strength and strategy, Communists 
attempted to organize within or outside the already existing union movement. That party- 
dependence proved to be a successful strategy particularly in countries which had hailed 
syndicalist union autonomy from party tutelage until then, seems to be one of history's 
paradoxes. However, as will be examined later, there is more than coincidence between 
prewar syndicalist traditions and later implanting of Communist unionism.
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Table 5.1
Foundation and Political Participation of Communist Parties, Western Europe
AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW S2 UK
Party: KPÔ PCB DKP PCF KPD CPI PCI CPN NKP VPK KPS CP
Predecessor 1918 1919 1905 1917 1919 1909 1918 1917
Year of founding 1920 1921 1920 1920 1918 1921 1921 1918 1923 1921 1921 1920
First election 1920 1921 1920 1924 1920 1927 1921 1918 1924 1917 1922 1922
Entry in parliament 1945 1925 1929 1924 1920 - 1921 1918 1924 1921 1922 1922
Entry in coalition 1945 1945 - 1936 - - 1945 - - - - -
Source: Lane & Ersson 1991 ; Jacobs 1989; Mackie & Rose 1991.
The Formation of the Communist Party
A Communist party emerged in all of the twelve countries, adapting a Communist pro­
gramme and affiliating to the Comintern between 1918 and 1923. Compared to the two other 
political cleavages, the party formation of Communist parties was universal and relatively 
synchron (see Table 5.1). However, the break with Socialist Reformism took different orga­
nizational forms depending on the structure of the Socialist party. The existence of left- 
wing splinters groups, the possibility for radical currents to capture the Socialist party 
structure, and the power position of the existent Socialist party were crucial factors in 
shaping the conditions under which the schism took shape. The break with the Socialist 
national and reformist road was a reaction to, and therefore varied in salience to, the 
Socialist party’s position towards the war, its acceptance of mass democracy, and its will­
ingness to enter into government. From a synoptical reading of Communist party history3 
one can derive four forms of founding (see Table 5.2): first, the capturing of Socialist parties, 
thus turning an already existing organizational structure at Communist use; second, the 
radicalization of an early, left-wing minority break-away that turned Communist but re­
mained split; third, Comintem-led party foundations that imposed Moscow-led strategies, 
thus being relative unadapted to national circumstances; fourth, the merger of left-wing 
splinter groups partly induced by Comintern but remaining an unstable minority.
First, the most prominent development took place in countries in which Communists 
adapted a strategy of 'capturing' and transforming existing Socialist party structures. A 
majority of French Socialist delegates opted to join Comintern, forcing the ''reformists" to 
refound SFIO in 1920. The Italian Socialist party joined the Comintern in 1920, causing in­
ternal party strife at which end not only the Social-Democrats but also the Communists 
broke away. This three-fold division still holds today. The Norwegian syndicalists captured 
the Labour party (DNA) in 1918 and joined - as the first Western party - the Comintern, also
3 On Communist parties see Bu t o n  1990, Ja c o b s  1989, M c In n e s  1975, T a n n a h il l  1978, 
W a ller  & Fe n n e m a  1988, W e n d e  1981.
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Table 5.2
Founding Origins and Organization Strategy of Communist Parties
Penetration Diffusion
Internal French PCF Dutch CPN
legitmation Italian PCI Swedish SVK
(internal split) Norwegian DNA German USPD/KPD
External Austrian KPO Danish DKP
legitmation Belgian PCB Irish CPI
(Moscow-led) Swiss KPS British CP
here first Sodal-Democrats split off and finally - after DNA turned around once more - the 
Communist wing broke-away. In all three countries, syndicalist tendencies and federalist 
party structures co-existed, allowing a capturing and consequential transformation of sub­
stantial parts of the existing (local) party structures into communist ones.
Second, in three further countries, Communist parties emerged from early leftist parties 
that opposed the "reformist" Social-Democratic party (German IJSPD, Swedish VS, Dutch 
SDP). In these countries, Communist were unable to gain a majority or sizeable minority 
within the Social-Democratic party but had to organize outside and instead turned towards 
the anti-militarist, syndicalist left-wing parties. In the other countries, the left-wing 
"revolutionary" movement was even further fragmented and weak. In the third formation 
pattern, the party formation was imposed by Comintern (Austrian KPO, Belgian PCB, Swiss 
KPS) that had only occasional small success. In the fourth pattern a merger was the result of 
a coming together of splinter groups (British CP, Danish DKP, Irish CPI) but remained a 
weak party.
Communist Union Organizing Strategy
Not in all countries did the political party schism lead to a rift in the union movement - the 
revolution-reform cleavage proved to be less universal in the case of unions.4 The forma­
tion of Communist unionism, given the ideological primacy of the party, depended largely 
on the strategy of the Communist party. The party strategy, in turn, depended on the elec­
toral strength of the party, its dependence from Moscow's directives, and its strategic con­
siderations of 'unions’ as a political mean. Three union organizing strategies can be de­
tected, they are partly contingent on the strength and strategy of the Communist party at 
the time and the existence of syndicalist traditions (see Table 5.3): first, the 'capturing' of a 
union confederation where it finds a near majority for a radical turn, yet taking the risk of a 
split in the labour movement; second, the organization of a more or less formal trade union 
opposition within the existing dominant union movement where it finds enough supporters 
and weak resistance, yet thereby increasing internal factionalism; third, the Communist in­
4 On Communist and syndicalist union movements see besides national accounts LINDEN & 
T h o r p e  1990, W aller  1990.
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filtration and organization of Communist-led rank and file action (Communist cells, ad-hoc 
direct action).
The first pattern, the strategy of 'capturing’, can only be successful where Communist 
party have enduring mass support, as in postwar France and Italy. In the interwar period, 
French and Italian Communists were in 1920 in a majority (or strong) position at the 
Socialist party congress, thus provoking an immediate split of the party and union move­
ment, though the Fascist rise prevented the latter to materialize in Italy. Yet it provoked 
non-Communist unionists to leave the captured union movements within the first postwar 
years and found rival organizations.5
The second, ’Trade Union Opposition" had been a relatively predominant strategy, 
though only for a short time, at the peak of the radicalization wave in the early 1920s in 
Norway and Germany. In Norway, the syndicalist trade union opposition (NFO) within the 
Norwegian LO under the leadership of the General Workers Union captured first the 
Labour Party (DNA) in its congress in 1918 and thereafter the union centre (NALF, the 
Norwegian LO), and for a short time affiliated with respective Communist International. In 
Germany, Communist union opposition was strong within the metalworkers union (DMV) 
and coexisted with Communist movement (Gelsenkirchener FAU) in the Ruhr area. Yet as 
precipitously as syndicalists and Communists had joined forces, they parted over the ques­
tion of affiliation with the Moscow Internationals.6 On the British Isles, syndicalist union 
leaders of mainly the general (unskilled) workers' unions at the peak of the interwar radi- 
calization embraced the Russian revolution instantaneously - only to turn disenchanted its 
back after visits to (or reports from) the land of 'proletarian dictatorship'.
Third, the existence of institutionalized factions within the union movement that provides 
a formal channel for party representation. This pattern was only established as a postwar 
compromise between various factions, the Communist faction, however, lost in importance 
over time (in Belgian FGTB in the 1950s and Austrian OGB since the 1970s).
A H istorical Chance for Labour Unity
The end of the Second World War brought a historical chance for labour unity. Having 
fought Fascism and occupation in joint resistance movement and acknowledging the inter­
war tragedy of labour disunity, many union leaders saw the need and chances for forming 
a unified all-partisan labour movement. At the time of liberation, Communists could rely 
on local activities and cells in many countries, particularly in France, Italy, and the Low 
Countries, though they were more restrained in occupied West Germany and Austria. 
Clandestine contacts or exile encounters of Communist leaders with union leaders from 
other parties, led to a number of historical settlements to overcome past divisions and build 
a unified union movement. In France, Belgium and the Netherlands, Communist and
5 In France: CGT-FO and FEN, in Italy: CISL and UIL in 1947/8 (see below).
6 The French syndicalist broke-away to found their own CGT-SR in 1926, the break-away of 
Norwegian Communist Party in 1923, the break-away of German Communists in the Ruhr area from 
the syndicalist FAUD.
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Socialist unionists joined forces, while in Italy, Austria and West Germany, Left party and 
Christian unionists combined in forming a unitary union movement. However, the 
Communists' strength and position varied considerable: were they were majoritarian, mod­
erate unionists broke away in France and Italy, while in other union movements the influ­
ence of Communists were severely reduced (and sometimes outed) within few years. 
Similarly, at the international level, the Socialist-moderate national union movements left 
the postwar unified International (WFTU) and founded a new Socialist International 
(ICFTU) in 1949.
In Italy, during the German occupation, leaders of the three major parties, the 
Communist, Socialist and Christian-Democrats signed the Rome agreement (June 1944) to 
form a unified union movement (CGIL) that would replace the Fascist corporatist labour 
organization (cf. ADAMS 1952). At the time when Socialist and Communists were excluded 
from government in 1947, the Communists were in the majority, followed by the split 
Socialists, while the Christian-Democrats were a small minority.7 A year later when 
Christian-Democrats and other moderates were more and more estranged by CGIL’s more 
radical government opposition, they left CGIL to form a new union centre (LCGIL, later 
CISL) in 1948. The anti-clerical Radicals and moderate Socialist left CGIL a year later and 
founded another union centre (FIL, later UIL) in 1949, while the majoritarian Socialist (PSI, 
also PSU) stayed in CGIL, remaining an important minority that (differently to France in­
creasingly) checked the Communist majority.
The French CGT was re-established in the continuation of the resistance union move­
ment, but the Christian unionists had immediately refounded their own movement (CFTC). 
Socialists participated within CGT but the Communists had profited most from its resis­
tance participation and soon controlled the majority of unions and locals.8 With the rising 
Cold War and Communist opposition to the Socialist-Centre coalition government, the 
more moderate Socialist union faction (FO) broke away in 1947. The teachers' unions (FEN) 
followed two years later but decided to be on its own and non-partisan vis-à-vis the gov­
ernment.
In the two Low Countries, Communists attempted to form a unity union movement 
with the Socialists, while the Christians abstained from the start. However, in both coun­
tries the Socialist were able to outdo, if not suppress, the Communist movement. In the 
Netherlands, based on its strength in the resistance movement, the Dutch Communist party 
(CPN) promoted the formation of a unitary union movement (EVC) under its leadership in 
1945. However, the Socialist N W  reappeared and soon outnumbered EVC with help of
7 Votes at the CGIL 1947 congress: the Communists (59.4%), majoritarian Socialists (22.8%), 
Christian-Democrats (13.8%) and Republicans and Social-Democrats (4-2%) (LAUNAY1990:386).
8 By 1946 the Communists controlled 21 out of 30 national federations and 4/5 of the depart­
mental unions, a considerable increase compared to the PCFs strength before the war that showed 
the comparative advantage of the Communist cell structure to manage the post-liberation mobiliza­
tion (ROSS 1976:507-8, n. 5).
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Table 5.3
Founding Origins and Organization Strategy of Communist (Syndicalist) Union Movements
Penetration Diffusion
Internal syndicalist-communist: localist-syndicalist:
legitmation Dutch NAS/EVC Norwegian LO 1920s
(union-led) Swedish SAC interwar German FAUD/BRI
External communist-led: communist faction:
legitmation French CGT Belgian FGTB 1940s
(party-led) Italian CGIL Austrian OGB
anti-Communist drives, while EVC stagnated and later split into syndicalists (1958) and 
Communists, who ended EVC in I960.9
In Belgium, the liberation brought a surge in Communist party support and the 
appearance of unitary union movements, too. The Socialist union leaders (CGTB with 
248.000 members) agreed to merge - on a par - with three resistance union movements that 
mixed Communist and syndicalist tendencies.10 But the newly founded union centre 
(FGTB) soon expelled the Communist faction (30% of FGTB) from congress and executive 
committee in 1948 (BEYME 1977: 26-7), thereafter Communist unionism never really 
recovered.
In Austria, the Communists were - according to the pre-liberation agreement - inte­
grated within the Austrian union confederation (OGB) with the status of a formal, political 
faction that was allowed to affiliate to the Communist International (WFTU). The 
Communist faction soon suffered set-backs, like the Communist party, in the Chamber of 
Labour elections where it fell after the Staatsvertrag (State Treaty, 1955) from 10% to 7% and 
dwindled since 1969 to 1% in 1989 (cf. SOMMER 1989). In Germany, the unified union con­
federation (DGB, 1949) maintained an anti-Communist policy once the immediate chance of 
reunification with the Communist-led Eastern unions had become nil. Communists were a 
minority in some DGB unions, but kept a low profile, particularly after the party suppres­
sion in 1956. Moreover, a rival union centre was not only ideologically difficult to legiti­
mate, it was also destined to fail in the anti-Communist West-Germany.
Although with the end of World War II, there existed a historical chance for labour 
unity, in the six countries where this had been attempted, in four cases Communism was 
curbed or out-competed by regaining Socialist unionists. Where it remained dominant, 
however, its partisan character estranged more moderate, minority groups that eventually 
left, adding to further union diversity. The fate of Communist unionism seems to be tied to
9 In 1945, N W  had 150.000 members compared to EVC with 170.000. CPN and EVC member­
ship was prohibited for civil servants in 1951 and expelled by NW  (excluded CPN members from 
its ranks in 1956) until 1971 when "non-political" Communists were reaccepted (cf. V oerm an 1990)
10 At the merger, CGTB had 248.000 members. Communist CBSU: 165.000, Syndicalist MSU: 
60.000, public sector SGSP: 52.000 (cf. HEMMERYCKX1990).
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the fate of the Communist party, its strength and strategy. Only where the Communist 
party maintained strong worker alignment, Communist unionism had a chance to claim its 
role. Communist unionism faced the problem of how to continue mobilizing when tied to 
the party, while other currents remained more flexible as economic interest organizations, 
as we will now examine.
II
Fro m  M o biliza tio n  for  Rev o lu tio n  
to  D iverging  M o biliza tio n  P aths
When Communist labour movements emerged, the Socialist (partly also the Christian) 
labour movements had already long established claims on worker alignment. For the 
Communist labour movement, political and industrial mobilization was not only important 
vis-à-vis the State and employers, but also for its maintaining its own influcence within the 
labour movement. Communist union organizing strategy, as already shown, depended on 
strategic considerations of the party, the possibility to mobilize most effectively within or 
outside the existing union movement. However, the conditions under which Communists 
were able to successfully establish themselves within the union movement varied according 
to the success of the party and unions representing the previous cleavages (labour-capital 
and State-Church). It will be now shown that the reform-revolution schism was limited in 
time and space to a number of mobilization waves (post-1917, mid-1930s, post-1944, late 
1960s) and to countries with incomplete social integration and system integration. A com­
parison of the varying implantation of Communism reveals some of the historical and con­
figurational factors that gave salience to the revolution-reform cleavage.
A second aspect to be considered is the diverging postwar mobilization paths of the 
French and Italian Communist labour movement. For the Communist party, according to 
its doctrine, the unions are an important but subservient agent for political mobilization. As 
a "transmission belt" the union serves the party to appeal to a larger section of the workforce, 
including workers that are not members or militants of the party. However, this doctrine 
limits the role of unions to auxiliary political mobilization agents and sees little use in non­
political economic action. As long as the union is subordinate and the party remains locked 
into working-class social ghetto, party and unions gain from parallel mobilization but their 
long-term growth prospective is limited due to the social closure strategy. However, if 
party and unions tend to overcome their limited appeal by opening to other groups, the 
linkage between the two organizations becomes more problematic and the synergist effect 
of joint mobilization drain. The comparison of French and Italan Communism, will show 
how the two movements made opposite strategic choices that led to diverse mobilization 
paths.
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From Syndicalism to Communism
For an observer in the early 1920s, the signs for a revolutionary change seemed to be gain­
ing critical mass: the general social and political mobilization after the First World War, the 
rise in labour disputes, the emergence of works' councils, and attempts at political insur­
rection. Yet, once parliamentarism was established, the Communist party had to face more 
or less severe electoral competition from other working-class parties. In fact, Communist 
unionists were able to attract large support in few instances after the First World War. What 
were the conditions under which Communist unionism had the best chances to implant itself in in- 
terwar societies?
First, as was pointed out, Communist unionism was contingent on the strategic consid­
erations of the Communist party, that reflected its own strength within a society. During 
the interwar period, the Communist party was only a minority splinter party that never ex­
ceeded 5% of the votes in Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Ireland (see 
Table 5.5). Communism showed temporary success in Norway (1921:4.6% of the votes) and 
Sweden (1928: 6.4%), particularly in areas of syndicalist-localist traditions in the 1920s but 
subsided thereafter. In Italy, when Communists contended their first election (1921) they 
mobilized only a small share of the votes (4.6% and even fewer seats), three years before the 
Fascists suppressed all parties. In Belgium, Communist extended their vote above 5% in 
1936 and 1939 following the Popular Front trend across the Southern border. However, the 
most remarkable electoral success was achieved by the German and French Communist 
parties, they mobilized at their peak a larger section of the working-class. Nevertheless this 
did not exceed more than one-sixth of the total electorate (1932: KPD 16.9% of votes, 1936: 
PCF 15.3%), since both parties opted for a pure 'working-class' mobilization strategy, in­
stead of using a broader social appeal.
Second, even where the party had gained some support, interwar Communist unionism 
depended largely on the existence of prewar sydndicalist and localist traditions of system 
opposition upon which Communist could mobilize. After the Communist split-away of the 
CGT, the Communist-led CGTU had about 80% of the membership of the moderate-syndi- 
calist CGT, yet only around 3% in density before the 1936 reunification. In all other coun­
tries, Communist unions remained a more marginal and volatile movement, notwith­
standing some "red” regions, radical industries and political strike movements. The pro- 
Moscow trade union opposition that captured the Norwegian LO in the early 1920s was 
concentrated in syndicalist unions that had a small majority (55%) at LO congress. 
Communism and syndicalism coexisted and remained fragmented in a number of coun­
tries: in Ireland and Britain, some syndicalist union leaders flirted briefly with the 
Bolshevik revolution, in Germany syndicalist and Communist splinters coexisted, and the 
traditional Swedish and Dutch syndicalist unions remained a minority.11 Like the Socialist
11 The British and Irish syndicalist unions organized about 15% in TUC or ITUC membership 
(according to RILU reports, cf. "RILU" in HEYDE 1931). About 10% of German unionized workers 
w e re  at the best affiliated to the Communist International in the 1920s, the separately organized syn­
dicalist (FAUD) and Communist unions (BRI) had a much smaller membership at the end of the
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Table 5.4
Ideological Split in Labour Movements (Interwar Period)
Ideological split Catholic Mixed Protestant
Unified labour Church-State alliance: Consociationalism: Early consolidation:
movement Austria, Belgium Netherlands United Kingdom
Ireland Switzerland Denmark, Sweden
Deep splits in State-Church cleavage: Late unification: Late independence:
left movement France German Reich Norway (1920s)
Italy
Source: adapted (tranposed) from Rokkan 1968:208; countries outside this study ommitted.
movement, Communist unions suffered from demobilization (or even deradicalization) 
during the mid-1920s and with the exception of the French popular front mobilization wave 
shrank to small local or industrial enclaves. Only in France after the re-unification of the 
CGT with CGTU in 1936 an unknown tripling in membership occurred.
Is it more than a coincidence that Communist unionists found the most fertile base for or­
ganization in syndicalist union movements?12 Communism found in fact its stronghold 
during the interwar period in countries (and areas) in which revolutionary syndicalism had 
found much support among the swelling unskilled workforce and isolated workers com­
munities. Revolutionary syndicalism was less based on a coherent ideology than a workers' 
movement that stressed direct economic action and opposed party-union links, Socialist 
Electoralism and parlamentarism. First, syndicalist union structures provided a fertile 
ground for Communist propaganda that radicalized and transformed the fragmented, lo- 
calist union structures for its own purposes. In France and Italy, the dual representative 
structure of functional and territorial interest intermediation (sectoral vs. regional unions) 
allowed ephemeral radical currents in small unions or local communities, thanks to the 
one-local-one-vote rule, to impose a more radical stance - even against a long-standing 
"moderate" leadership at the centre. This holds also for the Dutch syndicalists and German 
localist union movement, and to some degree even to the incompletely centralized 
Norwegian LO of the 1920s.
Second, the missing or weak party-union link in syndicalist movements provided, gave 
the Socialist a small possibility to moderate the unions, in fact, Communists and syndicalist 
allied in their radical opposition to Socialist reformism. Yet "syndicalist organizations 
nearly everywhere fervently supported communist internationalism in its infancy, until it 
became clear that the Comintern insisted upon parliamentarism and the subordination of
Weimar Republic (cf. "Germany" in: Linden & Thorpe 1990). The traditional syndicalist movements 
in the Netherlands and Sweden organized not more than 3% and 7% respectively over the interwar 
period (cf. VISSER1989).
12 On syndicalist union movement see LINDEN & THORPE 1990.
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Table 5.5
Election Results of Communist Parties, Western Europe 1918-1989
AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW sz UK
Party: KPÔ PCB DKP PCF KPD CPI PCI CPN NKP VPK PST CP
Average votes (%)
1918-1944 0.6 2.5 0.8 11.2 12.8 03 4.6 2.3 8.7 6.7 1.8 02
1945-1967 4.1 5 2 42 24.5 7.0 0.1 22.8 53 5.4 5.7 3.0 02
1968-1989 OS 2.6 1.8 18.0 03 0.0 28.9 2.6 05 5.1 2.0 0.1
Average seats (%)
1918-1944 0.0 1.6 OS 52 12.7 0.7 2.8 2.3 6.7 3.5 1.3 0.1
1945-1967 13 3.8 3.8 17 JS 5.7 0.7 23.7 5.1 1.8 3.3 23 0.1
1968-1989 0.0 1.4 1.0 10.9 0.0 0.0 30.3 2.4 0.0 5.0 1.6 0.0
SOURCE: own calculations, updated series from Mackie & Rose 1990, see Appendix B. N otes: (%) 
Average share in votes/seats - weighted by months of term; GE: 1918-30: USPD (partly merged with 
KPD); NO: 1921-4: DNA; SW: 1918-21: VS; -1944: incl. also (rival) Kilbom communists.
revolutionary unions to communist parties, whereupon most of them broke with Moscow" 
(Linden 1990:4).
Third, Communism gained from the decline of syndicalist appeal, providing instead a 
more coherent mobilization strategy. Since the early 1920s syndicalism had lost much of its 
raison d'être - with the maturing of industrial capitalism, pluralist industrial relations, 
growing welfare state, and parliamentary democracy, while revolutionary movements 
"took place in preindustrial or industrializing countries, and never in fully developed capi­
talist societies (UNDEN1990:18)."
Fourth, beyond these immediate organizational factors, the importance of the revolution- 
reform schism can further be explained by the persistence of social cleavages and the de­
gree of political integration. LlPSET has argued that "the more rigid the status demarcation 
lines in a country, the more likely the emergence of radical working-class-based parties" 
(LlPSET 1983:1-2). Although the rigidity of the status system fermented class consciousness, 
of crucial impact on revolutionary unionism was the sequencing, timing and character of 
political and economic citizenship, that is the way in which the dominant classes reacted to 
the rise of the working-class (LlPSET 1983: 2). In Latin Countries, union movements were 
long suppressed by the State and employers, leading to soaring class conflict, while fore­
closing effective reforms via the parliamentary route. Weak fragmented Left parties faced 
in these countries increasingly radical unions.
Fifth, in addition to partial system integration, the reform-revolution schism can also be 
related to incomplete social integration. The experience of the First World War and the ex­
ample of the Russian Revolution deepened the split within the working-class movement 
under two constellations (ROKKAN 1968: 207-8). On the one hand, a radical (partly 
Communist) labour movement emerged in Protestant and mixed countries with a recent 
nation-building process with late national independence or unification. In these countries, 
conflicts over cultural standardization and national identity persisted and the working-
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dass remained incompletely integrated, as interwar Norway and Germany.13 On the other 
hand, a schism occured in Catholic countries where the Church-State conflict had been deep 
and persistent. This had deepened the fragmentation of the working class, as in France and 
Italy (but also in Spain).
ROKKAN's thesis holds for the fragmentation of left parties, in France and Germany, and 
to a lesser degree in Italy and Norway. However, Communist unionism in the four 
countries took very different forms: from internal and regional radical opposition in 
Germany to an oscillation in orientation within the movement in Norway to a split-up in 
France and Italy. Moreover, it should be stressed that the thesis is time-dependent: the 
Norwegian and German working-class split abated after the interwar period as in the other 
non-Latin countries. In France and Italy, however, the fragmentation of working-class 
parties and unions persisted, this postwar divergence needs further analysis.
The Postwar D ivergence: From Social Closure to Openess
After the Second World War, Communist parties experienced a new surge in public sup­
port, thanks to their involvement in the resistance movement, partly due to hope for a radi­
cal change. Even in countries with small Communist inclination during the interwar pe­
riod, a sudden upsurge was visible - in the Scandinavian and Benelux countries in the first 
elections Communist parties received 10-13% of the votes. Yet after the Western capitalism 
with the help of the Marshal plan was installed, Communists received electoral set-backs, 
cutting votes by nearly a half in the next elections (6-8%). In West Germany, Austria, and 
Switzerland, anti-communism had already been entrenched by the time the first postwar 
elections (1947-9) were held in which the Communist Parties remained below 6% (in 
Austria already in 1945). On the British Isles, nationalist anti-Communism persisted since 
the war - there was no fruitful ground for "proletarian internationalism". With the excep­
tion of Austria (partly under Soviet occupation), no Communist party in these countries 
was able to hold on to its party membership.14
The French and Italian Communist Parties are thus outstanding, they were able to mo­
bilize one-fourth and one-fifth of the electorate respectively, though compared to the PCF, 
the Italian PCI had more than twice as many members and remained a growing mass orga­
nization.15 With hindsight, it is not surprising that Communist unionism was only in these 
two countries able to become thoroughly entrenched, while any attempts to secure influ­
ence in a unity alliance of all, or left partisan unionists had failed there by the late 1940s.
13 But also outside our comparison, Finland and Iceland, both countries with late independence 
from Russia and Denmark respectively (cf. Rokkan 1968).
14 Less than 2% of the electorate were Communist party members, or about one-third of votes in 
the late 1940s, (own calculations, cf. T u n n a h il l  1978).
15 In each country about 5 million votes in the late 1940s (cf. to 1.4 million in West Germany). 
While the PCF was able to mobilize around 800.000 members (15% of its voters, 3% of the electorate, 
including the newly enfranchised women), the PCI organized more than 2 million members (one- 
third of its voters, 7% of the electorate) (own calulations, cf. TUNNAHILL 1978).
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Table 5.6
Communist Union Membership (estimates) and Union Density
AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
Union Centre: (0 (0 (o)CGT(U) (s/o) (s) CGIL EVC (o) SAC (s)
Union membership (%)
1920s * * * 36% *10% 15% 3% <55% 7% * 15%
1940s 10% 15% . 5 5 %  . 65% 15% . 2 %
1960s 5% . 4 0 %  . 45% <¡3% . 1 %
1980s 2% . 2 5 %  . 4 0 %  . . <1%
Gross (net) density (%) 
1890-1917 
1918-1944 
1945-1967 
1968-1989
1.6
8.4
+17.1
+7.2
0.4 4.9
- +25.1
- +19.4
0.6
0.9
5.3
0.5
1.5
0.7
0.5
So u r c e s : own calculations, DUES database, see Appendix C. N o te s : (f) factions (1940s-), (o) union 
opposition (-1930s), (s) syndicalist; (*) estimates (1920s: partly affiliation to Profintem); 1940s-: AU: 
ÔGB-GE Fraction; FR: 80% of CGT; IT: 80% of CGIL; NE: EVC; SW: SAC. (+) net density (excl. 
pensioners).
This strategy to unite within such a unified labour movement as often envisaged in the ex­
ile or clandestine wartime resistance movements, was promoted by Communist parties. In 
France and Italy, the Communists were asured of a pro-unity majority at the labour con­
gresses, yet once they used their control the more moderate minority wings risked to break 
away, what they finally did in 1947 and 1948. However, the Italians were more flexible to­
wards the Socialist and Christian unionists, retaining a majority section of the former group 
(this was moreover possible since the Socialists had left government with the Communists).
In the other countries, the process was reversed such that Communists became more 
and more excluded as they quit postwar governments, lost votes, supported spontaneous 
strikes against the interest of the Socialist union leaders. The Swedish syndicalist-commu­
nist union (SAC), given the success of LO, had to accept the industrial relations system. It 
began also to provide unemployment benefits and to sign collective agreements. 
Nevertheless, it remained only of marginal importance. In the other countries, in Norway 
and Denmark, the British Isles and Switzerland, no Communist union centre emerged after 
the Second World War, and internal Communist union opposition loomed only occasion­
ally in regional or sectoral pockets.
Hence, the French and Italian Communist parties and union movements are outstanding 
in their persistence and level of mobilization. Nevertheless, the two movements chose dif­
ferent strategies and consequentially followed separate mobilization paths in their postwar 
development (cf. Tarrow 1976, Lance & Ross 1982). In both countries, the Communist 
party and unions suffered from stalemate, if not demobilization: during the 1950s the FCF 
and PQ  stagnated or even lost in electoral votes, while the CGT and CGIL lost dramatically 
in unionization during the 1950s (see Charts ??). The PCF recovered from its loss during the
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late-1950s political crisis and the constitutional changes and was able to stabilize its support 
around 20% of the electorate. The PCI was able to gradually extend its strength beyond the 
North-West working-class and rural workers in the "red belt" from around 20% to 25% in 
the 1960s. The PCF, that remained an orthodox Communist working-class party, suffered 
during the 1980s from the rise of the Socialist party and retreated to its traditional working- 
class bastions in the North and opposition regions in the Centre and South. The PCI, on the 
other hand, that adapted a more independent Euro-Communist line with a historic chance 
of sharing government responsibility, booming in 1976 to over 36%. In recent years, be­
coming increasingly moderate and flexible (dropping its Communist name in favour of 
PD5 in 1990), it suffered from a similar depillarization trend as other movements, losing its 
majority in the "red belt" in recent years.
However, the most striking divergence was the turn-round of the CGIL after 1969 and 
the continuing decline of CGT. The new wave of mobilization in the 1970s was not limited 
to the CGIL only, but a general trend of all three confederations. The renewed strength can 
be attributed to reforms in the industrial relations system and CGIL's change in union poli­
tics toward workplace representation and collective bargaining. The CGT, on the other 
hand, remained largely unwilling to drop its system opposition. While the Italian 
Communist movement moved from revolutionary working-class mobilization based on a 
strategy of social closure to a more open, flexible strategy, French Communists were unable 
to overcome polarization and their isolation.
I ll
From  P ola rized  P luralism  to  
P olitical  a n d  Ec o n o m ic  P a rticipa tio n
Dedicated to the international revolution, Communist parties and unionists expected a 
break-down of the democratic and capitalist system and showed contempt for political re­
formism and economic gradualism. Moreover, as part of an international movement, the 
Communist party was forced to follow and defend the international and domestic policy 
recommendations from Moscow, even if such policies showed limited national success. 
However, once the parliamentary system and economic system became institutionalized, 
and competing labour movements gained in influence, Communist party and unions came 
under pressure to shift attention to the political and corporate roads. Although Communist 
party and unions faced the contradictions between representation and opposition already 
during the interwar period, the following analysis will mainly look at the divergent post­
war patterns, in particular, compare France and Italy.
While the French interwar Popular Front (1936-38) was the first but incomplete attempt 
to Left-Centre alliance building, the participation of Communists in reconstruction cabinets 
after the Second World War was a break with past system opposition. However, the later 
exclusion from government (1947), the fragmentation of the left and the withering of the 
radical tide, led the Communist party to seek new but different alliances in France and
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Table 5.7
Government Participation of Communist Parties, Western Europe 1918-1989
AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
Party: KPÔ PCB DKP PCF USPD CPI PCI CPN NKP VPK - CP
Years in Government
1918-1944 - - - 1.9 (1-5) -
1945-1967 * *1.0 - (2.5) - - *0.8 • - (10.2) -
1968-1989 - - - 4.7 - - (3.0) - - (15.0) -
Cabinet share (%)
1918-1944 - - - 1.5 (1.7) - - • - . -
1945-1967 • *0.9 - (3.3) - - *0.8 - - (2.2) -
1968-1989 - - 2.8 - - (5.6) - - (31.2) -
So u r c e : own calculations, updated series based on Flora 1981, M ackie & Rose  1990, see Appendix 
C. No t e s : (%) Cabinet share • weighted by month in government; (): direct or indirect support of gov­
ernment; (*) immediate postwar all-parties coalition government; GE: USPD partly merged with KPD.
Italy. However, once political alliances showed success, the crudal question of system inte­
gration reappeared: are Communist unions willing to take government and economic re­
sponsibility and pursue incremental political and econonomic reform? According to the 
"transmission belt" doctrine, political aims had the prerogative and unions served mainly as 
political mobilization agency at the discretion of the party. However, Communist unions 
faced limited possibilities for economic action under rival unionism. The question was 
whether the Communist party would give the unions the freedom to cooperate together 
with other union movements and press for non directly political aims, such as economic 
improvements and industrial relations reforms. Finally, the different choices in respect to 
political and industrial partidpation taken by the French and Italian labour movements 
have also partly reshaped the party-union linkages.
Communist Participation
Soon after its foundation the Communist party accepted the rules of the 'democratic game' 
as it stood for elections in ail countries though it could hardly expect to achieve a majority 
and acceed to government by its own. With few exceptions, Communist parties abstained 
from entering democratic governments, even in the few instances that Communist votes in 
parliament supported centre-left or left governments (see Table 5.7). However, even in the 
political mobilizing Popular Front in France, the Communist members of parliament sup­
ported the Blum government but did not enter. Communist leaders carefully abstained 
from taking responsibility and became consequently d r a w n  into governmental politics, as 
later under Mitterand's first government in 1981. The strategic considerations were also 
partly imposed by Moscow's leadership and its often abrupt changes in strategy.
The Communists role in the resistance movement gave them popularity, while some of 
the right and Sodalist left had been discredited through collaboration. Thus to increase the 
legitimation of immediate postwar reconstruction governments, Communists were invited
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to join in Austria, Belgium, France and Italy.16 However, in all other countries Communist 
remained excluded from national governments due to the success of Socialist labour parties 
(Britain, Norway), or left-agrarian (or centre) coalitions (Sweden, Denmark), or centre-left 
coalitions (the Netherlands, and since 1946 Austria), or even more conservative coalitions 
(Germany, Switzerland). With the millitary alliances of the Cold War and Western eco­
nomic integration (Marshall plan), all opposed by Moscow-oriented Communist parties, 
Communists ended their government participation in Belgium, Italy and France in 1947. 
However, in Belgium and France, the Socialists remained within the government and be­
came increasingly moderate, while the more radical Italian socialist party (PSD left with the 
Communists, though the reformist Social-Democratic break-away (PSDI) soon joined again 
the coalition. Other non-communist leftist parties with a more distant relationship to 
Moscow emerged in other countries, particularly in Scandinavia they gained importance as 
a Left alliance partner. The bipolar political system in Scandinavia with small non-orthodox 
leftist splinter parties put these parties in the position but also under pressure to support a 
minority Socialist government in order to prevent a right bourgeois coalition.17
However, the pro-Moscow Italian and French Communist parties remained the most 
important and longest excluded opposition parties that claimed also to mobilize the major­
ity of the organized workers. The exit of the Communists from the government in 1947 in­
tensified in both countries the left-right confrontation. While in Italy the right was a relative 
cohesive bloc based on the Church-supported Christian-Democratic network within a 
fragmented party system under proportional representation, the French right was more 
fragmented until De Gaulle's Fifth Republic established a presidential system, that 
favoured the right bloc and limited the role of the parliament (with a new majority voting 
system). Since 1959, the Socialist party excluded from the government had to achieve a 
majority before it could re-enter government. Thus the Socialists had either to win enough 
dissatisfied Communist voters or to enter an alliance with the Communists to win a major­
ity. The Italian non-Communist Left on the other hand had been split and had been asked 
one by one earlier to join as junior partners into government already in the 1960s, thereby 
being drawn into responsibility and lured into the Italian patronage system. The Italian 
Communists gained from the political regionalization during the 1970s some influence in 
its regional strongholds, particularly the "red belt" (Emilia-Romagna, Toscany). The more- 
centralized French system, on the other hand, trapped the PCF to concentrate on Paris-cen- 
tred national politics only. While the PCF was willing to enter some tactical electoral al­
liances (Programme Commun) with the Socialists to overcome the majority hurdle, the PCI 
envisaged during the late 1970s broader strategic alliances (even with the left DC wing) in
16 The Communist party participated in government in Austria (April-December 1945), Belgium 
(March 1946-March 1947), France (November 1945-November 1947), and Italy (June 1945-May 1947).
17 The Danish leftist party (SF) supported occasionally Social-Democratic minority governments 
(1967-68,1971-73,1975-77) but did not enter. The Swedish Communist party (VPK) had a even more 
crucial role in supporting the Social-Democratic governments (1957-69,1970-76,1982-) since the end 
of the old red-green alliance in 1957. The small Leftist party in Norway (SV) has occasionally sup­
ported the DNA minority governments.
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order to participate in governmental politics in a compromesso storico. Ironically, the inclu­
sion of Communists in the first Socialist Fifth Republic government in 1981, however, was a 
short but stifling embracement. The PCF withdrew from the government before becoming 
completely entrapped into political compromise building in 1984. The Italian Communist, 
however, played an important role as the major opposition party, and at some occasions 
were a necessary supporting partner, without committing itself to a government role. 
Moreover, PCI's flexibility derived from the need for labour unity and labour-capital com­
promise in order to reform the economic system and overcome the regional disparities.
The W eakness of Rival Unionism and 
Strength of Labour U nity
Syndicalism traditionally repudiated alliance building, political horse-trading and com­
promise seeking, but hailed the obstructive force of direct action. During the interwar pe­
riod, as was shown earlier, revolutionary syndicalism remained a minority phenomenon 
amongst the unionized population, not to speak of the un-organized. The further split or 
oscillation between syndicalist and Communist-led union movements added to the inter- 
war fragmentation in those countries.
It was not before the end of the Second World War that Communist-led unions achieved 
a majority position in Italy and France. For the observer in the 1950s, Italy and France were 
prime examples of the "weakness of rival unionism" (GaLENSON 1961: 1-16), not only in 
terms of unionization but particularly in respect to their impotence in industrial relations. 
French and Italian unions, while lacking power in the economic sphere, would retreat to 
political struggles. Political motivated strike action that would primarily take issue with the 
state has a long tradition in France and Italy (cf. SHORTER & TILLY 1974, TILLY, TILLY, & 
TILLY 1975, SNYDER 1975), it was also encroached in anarcho-syndicalist union strategy of 
'action directe'. During the Cold War years, the state and employers were intransigent 
against the Communist-dominated labour movement in both France and Italy. Paternalism 
and "immobilism" of French and Italian employers had persisted over the Second World 
War, well into the 1960s. Although Communism and rival unionism provided the patromt 
(employers) further possibilities to rule-and-divide, they were not much more willing to 
bargain with non-Communist movements that grew in importance. In fact, it should be 
noted that only initially Communist-led CGT and CGIL represented the majority of union 
members as consequence of the ebb in mobilization, both organized around three-quarter 
of all organized in 1950 but saw their share deminish further to ca. 55% ten years later (ind. 
UIL in Italy, cf. VISSER 1989). Moreover, not all union members were supporters of the 
Communist party, particularly in CGIL an estimated one-fifth of the membership sup­
ported the minority Socialist (PSI) wing.
Not only the employers intransigence fed back on rival or polarized unionism, state in­
tervention into industrial relations was even more important given the increasing and pace- 
setting public and nationalized sector employment. First, as a consequence of the suppres­
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sion and the resistance pact, all major union movements could claim a right of existence. 
The status of representativity was granted to a the Communist-led unions (CGT, CGIL) as 
well as its break-aways (FO in France, CISL and UIL in Italy) and independent forces 
(CFTC, CGC in France). Given the weakness of rival unionism, the French minister of 
labour had the right to extend collective agreements (since 1950) that had been signed by 
the "most representative" union centres (dropped in 1978) and following further clauses 
(abolished in 1971), albeit CGT refused to sign most agreements (cf. STURMTHAL 1983: 75). 
Not until the late 1960s was collective bargaining at national level expanding and covering 
other than merely provisions on social security and employment conditions. Second, given 
the weakness of labour, the state intervened in setting the main labour market conditions 
through legal regulation, in particular, the minimum wage in France, the dismissal rules in 
Italy. This only reinforced the tendency to concentrate on political power struggles instead 
of the economic arena.
Since the 1960s French and Italian unions became increasingly involved in more de­
politicised 'bread-and-butter' union action, at sector and workplace level. Moreover, there 
were several attempts to form unity-of-action and cooperation between CGT and CFDT or 
CGIL and CISL (and UIL), a prerequisite for successful multi-union bargaining. Once the 
hopes for electoral success became a somewhat deadlocked case, the Communist party al­
lowed some form of autonomy to the union movement in economic action. "Organized by 
competing political parties ¿is well as by competing labor confederations, as labor unity in­
creased but agreement between the competing parties did not, the labor confederations 
sought to increase their independence from the political parties in order to reinforce the 
tendencies toward unity (WEITZ 1976: 569)". The French and Italian Communist union 
movement, however, differ in the degree of autonomy from the party, economic integration 
into collective bargaining, and overcoming rival unionism through labour unity of action.
The CGIL had more Spielraum (room for manoeuvre) than CGT, since CGIL included a 
increasingly critical Socialist faction and thus had to de-emphasize its party links, and its 
"rivals" were more willing to join, while CGT's unity-of-action was largely opposed by FO 
and CGC. Even more important were differences in the union system. The Italian regional 
and national unions gained in importance during the 1960s and were willing to take up 
multi-union collective bargaining for mainly economic reasons, while CGIL central leader­
ship still concentrated on political action. But even in political strategy, CGIL cooperated 
with the other movements in order to promote social and political reforms (pension reform 
and regional policies for the South) since the late 1960s. Following the strike wave of 
1968/69, the Italian government intervened into industrial relations, in particular work­
place representation (1970) and arbitration (1973) in favour of the representation of three 
main confederations. These measures channelled the protest and strengthened the access of 
the three union centres at the workplace, leading to increase and stabilization of unioniza­
tion in the 1970s. In France, besides less important changes in works councils (1968) and 
collective bargaining law (1971), major reforms of industrial relations (Auroux laws) were 
only implemented by the new Socialist government (1982-86) that required employers to
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bargain but did not halt the further decline of French unionism. Moreover, CGT favoured 
political means over narrow collective bargaining.
O vercoming the "Transmission-Belt" Linkage
The Communist party had the role of leadership in the revolutionary movement. In this 
conception, the party was not a mass party but a cadre party, organizing only faithful mili­
tants that would follow party orders. The trade unions would have the role of 
"transmission belts" in mobilizing the broader sections of the working-class. The primacy of 
the political party was also a consequence of the preference of political over industrial ac­
tion. As long as both channels remained closed, only a radical political change would be 
able to bring capitalism down. Following this doctrine, Communist unionism was largely a 
political instrument to use direct action to destabilize capitalism and radicalize the work­
ing-class. Industrial action for the betterment of working-conditions were secondary. To 
seek union recognition as a collective bargaining partner against the revolutionary ortho­
doxy.
However, Communist party dominance was difficult to establish where Communist 
unionism had been formed by internal forces or where Communist unionism remained 
scattered and diffused. The Norwegian syndicalist trade union opposition that had first 
captured the union movement and then the party, was not willing to become subdued to 
Communist control (the Communist party finally split away). In the Dutch and Swedish 
syndicalist unions that had become more under Communist control, some syndicalist locals 
left in protest founding even smaller unions. In France, it was foremost the PCF after its 
bolshevization that maintained tight control of the Communist union movement (CGT-U) 
that had separated from the syndicalists (CGT). Communist unionism during the later 
1920s was mainly infiltration of party members operating in small cells, a strategy that be­
came crucial during the later suppression. It was the Comintern and PCF that shifted policy 
from the disastrous 'class against class' strategy to the popular front tactics. As a conse­
quence the CGT-U joined again the CGT. At the international level, the Communist union 
centre was dissolved in order to prepare a merger with the Socialist International that did 
not materialize before the war.
A c o m p a r i s o n  of the party-union linkages of the two most important postwar 
Communist labour movement, reveals the difficult transformation from "transmission belt" 
subordination to autonomy in its own sphere.18 In the immediate postwar period, at least 
after the break-away of the moderate minority, the Communist party controlled the domi­
nant union movement, where it obtained a majority position at the level of the central or­
ganizations, the national unions and regional divisions. Yet the strength was not only at the 
central and intermediate level but also at the local level since it was the party cell (and not 
the union) that operated at the workplace (cf. Ross 1976, WEITZ 1976). During the first
18 F o r  literature o n  PCF-CGT: see ROSS 1976, ROSS 1982; o n  PCI-CGIL: see W EITZ 1976, FARNETTI 
1978, L a n c e  &  V a n i c e l u  1982.
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postwar decade, the unions (CGT and CGIL) were subordinated to the party (PCF and PCI) 
political goals, including the unions industrial action served primarily political goals, quite 
in contrast to their members wishes. It was in the mid-1950s that the "transmission belt" re­
lationship was replaced by greater autonomy, although the PCF-CGT relationship proved 
less flexible than the PQ-CGIL one. This happened in the context of increased competition 
from other union centres and political changes (the end of the French Fourth Republic and 
the breakdown of Communist-Socialist cooperation in Italy) that required more indepen­
dence from the union centres.
One major difference between the French and Italian union movements was the fact that 
CGIL included Socialist party members and wished to maintain the unity of the Left. Since 
the later 1950s, the Socialist fraction(s) gained in importance, advancing a critique of the 
"incompatiblity” between PCI and CGIL leadership (finally limited in 1969). Moreover, 
following trends to CGIL-CISL cooperation of the manufacturing unions and joint political 
action in the 1960s, the three union confederations agreed to build a common tripartite 
"federation" in 1972. The federation was not to last but CGIL had started a process of inde­
pendence from party tutelage that was difficult to reverse, if it had not already entered a 
'way of no return’ (FA RNETTI 1978: 435). CGIL retreated gradually from the Communist 
International and its close cross-border links with CGT; it was - on the recommendation of 
CISL and UIL - accepted in the non-Communist ETUC in 1978.
The French party-union relationship also changed towards more autonomy, albeit less 
fundamentally. The CGT, increasingly concentrating on depolitized matters, occasionally 
joined forces for common economic action with the secularized, Socialist-oriented CFDT 
(first with the 1966 CGT-CFDT pact), while the party became more concerned with building 
Left political alliances than relying on CGT as a class mobilization force. This "two-sphere" 
division of labour, however, "has not led to any change in the PCFs organizational control 
over the CGT (..) it has made considerable difference in the relationships between political 
leaders and trade unionists within the PCF. Recognizing the functional specificity of the 
CGT has led to a greater recognition of the functional specificity of its leaders in the party 
(RO SS 1976: 540)". The difference between the PCF-CGT and PCI-CGIL development is even 
more evident since the breakdown of the Communist regimes in the East since 1989, PCI 
changed its name (PDS) and deemphasized its Communist ideology, though risking the 
split-away of traditionalist Communist wing.
C o n c l u sio n
Following the theoretical propositions (see Chapter 2), we found that the revolution-reform 
schism occurred in countries were the working class was incompletely integrated, both in 
respect to system integration and social integration. The break with a reformist road to 
Electoral and Corporate Socialism was a reaction to closed or limited opportunities for po­
litical and economic participation. Although intellectual debate over revolutionary or re­
formist strategies predated the final schism, it occurred at the critical juncture of the na­
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tional integration of the Socialist labour movement (see Chapter 3). The Moscow-led 
Communist movement implanted itself particularly where prewar syndicalist traditions 
and left wing splinter parties had previously emerged. We found that workers broke with 
the reformist Socialist or Christian-Social movements where the working class had been in­
completely integrated, either nationally or culturally, that is, where local, syndicalist tradi­
tions persisted or where dechristianization advanced rapidly. Thus the labour schism came 
forth in reaction to the previous two labour cleavages, the labour-capital and State-Church 
cleavage. Where these cleavages had left uprooted communities without establishing en­
during alignment to the Socialist (and Christian) labour movements, Communist party and 
unions were able to implant themselves.
The main instances where the revolution-reform cleavage led to labour disunity, as de­
scribed in this chapter, can be summarized in four clusters (see Table 5.8): (1) most impor­
tantly polarized pluralism in France and Italy, (2) the temporary interwar currents in nation­
ally late integrated Germany and Norway, (3) the rapidly suppressed or subsiding postwar 
factions, and (4) the small traditional local-syndicalist movements that came partly under 
Communist control. The manifest form of cleavage transformation was an organizational 
schism that led to a split in the union movement between Communist or Syndicalist unions 
and non-Commmunist union movement, while the other form was internal opposition, that 
was pursued where Communists were not in a majority. The strength of Communist party 
was the most important factor for the enduring splits, in postwar France and Italy, systems 
of polarized pluralism.
While the early syndicalist tendencies denied links to political parties, the later 
Communist labour movement accepted the primacy of the Communist party and Moscow’s 
leadership. After the Second World War, an initial Communist surge in support soon 
abided with the onset of the Cold War with the exception of France and Italy. The historical 
chance for reunited labour movement failed in these two countries, as revolution-reform 
conflict over integration into the Western political and economic system soon reemerged. 
System opposition was the bases of the schism, and the party claimed its primacy. In both 
country, the schism led to polarized pluralism, a political and union system in which the 
working-class is fragmented and incompletely integrated into society and polity.
Communist party and unions, given their opposition to other movements, maintained 
their own cohesion through "social closure". Under the leadership of the militant cadre 
party, the union movement became a strategic agent for mobilizing party support and mil­
itancy. However, as was shown, the French and Italian Communist movement adapted op­
posing strategies, that led to different paths of mobilization and representation. The more 
mobilization was based on strategies of "social closure", long-term social change limited the 
mobilization potential, but an "open" strategy would dilute the ideological coherence and 
core ideological schism. The development of the PCF-CGT and PCI-CGIL development 
have been described as the two diverging strategies of closure, or ideology maintenance in 
France, and opening, or pragmatic adaptation in Italy.
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Table 5.8
Revolution-Reform Schism and Internal Opposition
Communist Union Centre 
Organizational Schism
Socialist Union Centre 
Internal Opposition
Strong polarized pluralism interwar currents
Communist French CGT Germany 1920/30s
party (10%-) Italian CGIL Norway 1920s
Medium local-syndicalist postwar factions
Communist Dutch EVC (-1960) Austria, Belgium, 1940s
party (5-9%) Swedish SAC (Germany, Norway) -1950s
The diverging mobilization patterns are closely linked to differences in representational 
strategies. Although the French and Italian movements are strongly pillarized under the 
leadership of the party, they became differently integrated into the political and industrial 
relations systems. While PCF and CGT sought political alliances and deemphasized their 
links for tactical reasons, PCI and CGIL became increasingly independent and promoted 
broader social alliances. In fact, CGIL became more drawn into building a "northern" type 
corporatist industrial relations system and thus assumes a more economic functions than 
merely a political role. This evolution shows how polarized pluralism (or rival) unionism 
can develop into segmented pluralism and co-operative unionism that opens chances for 
more labour unity. Yet, today's challenge to political unionism in France and Italy with 
their recent sectionalist strike movement, but also elsewhere, are conflicts based on non­
political, functional cleavages to which we will turn now. As will be suggested in the fol­
lowing chapters, these functional cleavages have gained in importance and sometimes su­
persede the three political cleavages.
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6
T h e  C raft-In dustry  C leavage
"Trade unionism is peculiar to modem industrial society; its rise is at­
tributable to forces activated By industrialization. Hu. growth, struc­
ture and ideology of the labor movement of any country art conditioned 
By the nature of the industrialization process; that is, By the character 
of the society in which industry first toof^root and By the tempo and 
reaction of industrial development. 'Ihis is not to say that political and 
cultural factors are not important. On the contrary, they may Be deci­
sive in determining the precise Ones of trade union growth at a given 
time. 'But the dynamic element, in terms of which one may oBtain the 
deepest insight into trade unionism, appears to Be the complex of events 
subsumed under the concept of industrialization. (GALENSON 1952B:
105.)'
Divisions in the labour process amplify union diversity. The Industrial Revolution gave rise 
to the formation of working-class party and unions (see Chapter 3), but the timing and 
character of the economic development had also an impact on union diversity. During the 
first, early industrialization craft unionism emerged based on occupational community tra­
ditions. As modem capitalism advanced labour faced the challenge of organizing the army 
of proletarians, the less or unskilled workers that were increasingly employed in mass pro­
duction. The craft-industry deavage reflects the division of interests between those that could 
exceed "craft monopoly" (PERLMAN 1928) due to their indispensable skills and position, and 
those that had no chance to unilaterally control their labour market power. The major line 
of conflict is the question of solidarity and labour unity: are the privileged maintaining 
their position by social closure or are they willing to combine with the more feeble less 
skilled and struggle for a general improvement of their situation? The choices of different 
union strategies, not only had long-term consequences for labour unity, but it also rein­
forced differences in the political character of the labour movement.
This chapter delineates two different trajectories in the transformation of the craft-in­
dustry cleavage with long-term consequences on union diversity. Based on the theoretical 
propositions (see Chapter 2), we expect an early entrenched mobilization by one form of 
organization to limit the scope for subsequent organizational development. Indeed, we can 
detect one sedionalist union path that can be traced from craft to allied-era ft to general 
unionism with the coexistence of earlier forms. The other solidaristic union path developed 
from craft to industrial to multi-sector unionism, the later forms tend to marginalize or re­
place the previous forms. The two chains of organizational adaptations were to a large de­
gree the consequences of two opposing forces: the persistence of craft traditions, decentral­
ized workplaces, and sheltered domestic market economies, and on the other hand, the
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penetration of industrial mass production, concentrated industries, and export oriented 
market economies. Following the scheme in the previous chapters, the formation, mobi­
lization and representation aspects of the craft-industry cleavage will be discussed.
First, the formation of the cleavage and the transformation into national unions and their 
coordination at the level of a union centre will be analyzed. Socialist union centres had in 
some countries assumed an additional role in reshaping the organizational structure, while 
in fragmented union systems they failed to do so due to their limited authority. Moreover, 
the union structure are under pressure to adapt to the national integration of labour mar­
kets, the increased centralization of employers, and the national regulation in industrial re­
lations. The formation analysis will argue that the diverging paths had already parted at 
the end of the initial phase of formation and consolidation by the early 1920s, albeit they 
needed several decades to fully develop.
Second, the mobilization strategies of closed unionism in early sectionalist movements and 
open unionism in later solidaristic union movements vary considerably in their growth pat­
tern over time and between sectors. Gosed unionism adapts a strategy of mobilizing 
through social closure, while open unionism aims at labour unity through an inclusive strat­
egy. Both strategies, however, are contingent on the environment, occupational changes 
and economic development that set the constraints for the growth perspective of the two 
strategies.
Third, the representation aspects of the closed and open strategies will be discussed, par­
ticularly in respect to the fragmentation of labour unity. Fragmentation of labour hampers 
union concentration and peak authority which reinforces fragmentation. The political char­
acter of the union centre and of its linkage to a political party - it will be argued - shaped 
the way in which workers' interest have been aggregated within the union system. Again, 
the timing and character of the institutionalization of industrial relations helped to freeze 
organizational forms. Hence, the craft-industry cleavage gave rise to differences in the 
union system but also in the organization of a union centre: the centralization, division of 
labour, the transfer of authority, or the concentration of power vary with the degree of 
fragmentation.
I
T h e  T ra n sfo r m a tio n  o f  
T h e  C ra ft-In d u stry  C leavage
The differences in today's union structure in industry, the way in which interests of manual 
workers in the productive sectors are aggregated, date back to the formation before, and 
consolidation of national unions after, the First World War. At the turn of the century, a 
large working class had been formed, representing more than half of the labour force (see 
Table 6.1), especially industrial production and transport became important economic ac­
tivities. The increasing economic integration, the spread of modem means of communica­
tion, the urbanization, and the growth of the nation-state, were all factors that promoted the
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development of national collective organization. Yet the pattern of union development was 
far from being universal. Although there is a convergence of countries towards an indus­
trial society, the timing and pace of industrialization varied considerably and so its impact 
on union diversity (cf. LORWIN 1958). The differences between forms of union organization 
stem partly from variations in industrialization but it is not merely an unmediated outflow 
of the economic development. Against a technical contingency interpretation, I will argue 
here that it were organizational choices and the interaction of political and economic devel­
opment that moulded the diverging paths in union development.
With the early industrialization, skilled workers in the spreading craft-shops became 
collectively organized thanks to occupational community bonds, and sometimes renewed 
preindustrial "guild" traditions. This 'labour aristocracy' could exert some control over the 
labour process, limit access to the craft, and define job territory. However, with the changes 
toward mass factory production during the second industrialization and extension of 
transport, the unskilled and semi-skilled workforce increased more rapidly endangering 
the status of craft workers. Labour faced a strategic decision between dosed unionism and 
open unionism (cf. TURNER 1962: 139-168, M A R K S 1989), that is b e t w e e n  sectionalist and 
solidaristic strategies. The choice was whether to integrate or separate the new non-craft 
workers within the same union movement. On the other hand, there was also the challenge 
to enhance labour unity across sectors in response to an increasingly interwoven economy. 
As the labour market became nationally integrated, local sectionalist strategies could not 
any more provide a solution to the interets of large sections of the workforce. There were 
two levels at which labour unity would have to be build in order to overcome labour's in­
ternal competition, solidarity had to be maintained through horizontal integration (across 
sectors) and vertical integration (across skill levels).
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Table 6.1
The Formation of the Working Class and "Industrial" Workers, Western Europe (1890-1970)
AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW sz UK
Dependent employed (in % of total labour force)
1890 45 68 58 53 65 58 44 49 83
1910 46 66 66 54 66 . 50 75 61 55 60 84
1930 65 69 65 59 67 45 54 79 60 65 70 89
1950 64 72 72 60 71 56 56 71 71 77 75 90
1970 78 81 81 82 84 66 51 85 83 88 80 79
Blue-collar ‘industriar workers in mining, isecondary and transport sector (in % of dependent employed)
1890 38 45 27 34 44 30 16 <51>
1910 45 62 27 37 51 . 33 40 36 30 46 <56>
1930 40 63 32 45 45 <34> 44 36 45 47 <56>
1950 46 57 39 54 50 <43> 47 42 45 46 46 <60>
1970 40 42 37 53 43 <48> • 32 *40 *40 39 40
SOURCE: own calculations and estimations based on Flora , Kraus & Pfenning  1987.
NOTE: closest census year; dependent employed (excluding family workers), Blue-collar 'industriar 
workers in mining, secondary (manufacturing, utilities, construction) and transport. <> incl. also white- 
collar employees.
The Formation of Industrial Unions
The early efforts to organize local craft workers date further back than the industrial take­
off and were partly collateral of guild traditions. However, modem national trade unions 
with organizational stability and durability emerged only in the later quarter of the nine­
teenth century with few exceptions. While the traditional craft-shop has been the setting in 
which craft unionism emerged, the spread of the factory system gave rise to new forms of 
unionism. At the time of the founding of Socialist union centres (see Chapter 3), much de­
pended on the balance between the plethora of smaller craft and local unions and the scat­
tered attempts to organize on a larger, national base.
The first crucial step toward modem union organization was the national integration of 
local unions within a central organization.1 The need for coordination of the local activities 
and the organization of the non-unionists became more pressing with the national integra­
tion of the labour, producer and consumer markets (cf. ULMAN 1955: 27-8). "Market forces 
work against any organization that operates only in a part of a market. Employers often 
will not been able to survive if they pay higher wages than competing firms. Thus an ex­
isting union often has an interest in seeing that all firms in any given market are forced to 
pay union wage scales. (...) In addition, workers with a given skill who migrate from one 
community to another have an interest in belonging to a national union that gives them ac­
1 This was often indicated by the name of such unions: Zentralverband, Centralorganisation, 
National Union, Centrale, or by using the National adjective, as Irish ...
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cess to employment in each new community. Finally, the political strength of a large union 
is obviously greater than that of a small one. The incentive to federate local unions and or­
ganize unorganized firms increase considerably as improvements in transportation and 
communication enlarge the market (OLSON 1965: 67-8)". With few exceptions, the first na­
tional unions emerged by the late 1860s in Western Europe (see Table 6.2).2 The national 
union integration, entailed the incorporation of pre-existing local structures within a na­
tional federation, or the building of a new network of local sections on the initiative and 
with the help of the central leadership. Where national unions grew out of combining al­
ready established local unions, centralization was more difficult to obtain than in the case 
of new centre-led organization building.
The earliest national organizations were commonly craft unions in printing due to their 
tightly knit occupational community (Chapel) and easier access to communication (cf. 
MARKS 1989: Ch. 4). These organizations remained often confined to a single trade or craft 
such as printers. Craft unions had many advantages at that time: they could rely on occupa­
tional solidarity, they could limit access to the trade by apprenticeship and other regula­
tions and they provided travel costs and other self-help to prevent undercutting of wage 
levels. Although they were small organizations, they could rely on their labour market 
power (craft monopoly) to set working and employment conditions unilaterally (PERLMAN 
1928). However, this sectionalist strategy was endangered by occupational changes and 
economic down-tums since it was not adaptive to change and to limited spread of risks.
The second step was the formation of open unions (cf. TURNER 1962, MARKS 1989), that 
would organize beyond the limited jurisdiction of a single trade or craft union. The process 
of concentration of the many small unions into few inclusive unions was a long-term pro­
cess that lasted more than a century and still has not ended. However, the concentration 
process has taken different forms of organizational restructuring: first, the amalgamation of 
occupational unions of similar trade or crafts (ex-craft unionism); second, the creation of 
new unions that cater for an industry (partly by absorption and amalgamation of compet­
ing craft unions); third, the organization of a general union that catered for the non-craft not 
yet organized, partly by absorption of smaller unions. Two hypotheses have been for­
warded to explain the diverging trajectories, a more economic contingency argument about 
the timing of industrialization (GaLENSON 1952b, INGHAM 1974, STEPHENS 1979) and a in­
stitutionalization argument on the entrenchment of craft unionism (cf. GALENSON 1952b, 
Clegg 1976, Korpi 1978).
Open unionism rose in the course of the second Industrial Revolution, the growth of 
Taylorist mass production and a less skilled workforce. Industrial unions came into being as 
a result of mergers in adjacent industries and largely dependent on the (small) size and the 
decline of separate industrial domains. General unionism, on the other hand, emerged in 
contest with both craft and industrial unionism, and once it had taken root it was difficult 
to dislodge in favour of industrially demarcated unions. As noted by CLEGG (1976), com-
2 The British AEU (1858), the "new model union” of engineers was the earliest, most prominent 
example of national ex-craft union.
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Table 6.2
The Formation of Industrial Relations in Western Europe
AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
Coalition right 1870 1898 1857 1884 1890 1824 1890 1855 1839 1864 1848 1824
Union confederation BFG CGTB DSF CGT ADGB rruc CGL NW AFL LO SGB TUC
Founding 1892 1898 1898 1895 1890 1894 1906 1905 1899 1898 1880 1863
(delay in years) 22 0 31 11 0 74 16 55 60 32 32
Employer association CCI DA CGPF VDA CGII C.O. NAF SAF ZOA BEC
Founding . 1914 1896 1919 1913 . 1910 1920 1900 1902 1908 1919
(delay in years) • 16 -2 24 23 • 4 15 1 4 28 56
Union recognition 1919 1919 1899 1936 1918 (1923) 1919 (1915) 1906 1919 (1916)
SOURCE: compiled from various sources: Alber 1981; Galenson  1952; Heyde 1931; M ielke 1983; 
V isser  1989,1990; W indmulleR/Gladstone 1984: passim.
meriting on British unions: “It is, however, much easier to persuade unions to come to­
gether by amalgamation than to prevail upon them to split themselves up or to transfer 
group» or members to other unions. Consequently advocates of industrial unionism may 
succeed in persuading occupational unions within a given industry to amalgamate into an 
industrial union, but they must expect strong resistance from general unions and occupa­
tional union which straddle industrial boundaries (CLEGG 1976: 31)." In fact, general 
unions since the interwar period have continued to grow by absorption in Britain, becom­
ing larger unions than many industrial unions in other countries. Nevertheless, they are dif­
ferently structured than industrial unions as they straddle across sectors without integrat­
ing all skill levels within a firm or all firms within a sector.
In countries with early and successful trade union formation (Britain, Ireland and Den­
mark), craft traditions persisted and shaped their union structure until today (cf. GALEN­
SON 1952b, FLANDERS 1952). The early entrenchment of craft unionism hampered a rational­
ization of union structure that could build labour unity by including labour of all skills and 
across all firms. In early industrialized and unionized Britain, the first phase of mass union 
growth began in the late 1880s, the p>eriod of "new unionism" (cf. HOBSBAWM 1985, POL­
LARD 1985), though craft unionism had already been entrenched. Similarly, Danish crafts 
unions emerged relative early as "descendants of guilds" (cf. GaLENSON 1952b/c), they re­
sorted to some degree of "craft monopoly", as the urban labour markets were 
"comp>artalized" by trade specific apprenticeship. Since Danish craft unions remained 
"closed" for the growing force of unskilled workers, general unions emerged (separated for 
male and female workers), thereby occupying the niche in which industrial unionism could 
have otherwise emerged.
A Scandinavian comparison provides further evidence for the imp>act of industrialization 
and labour market segmentation at the turn of the century on the union structure 
(GALENSON 1952b: 123 ff.). In fact, in contrast to Denmark, industrialization was later in 
Sweden and Norway, and more rapid (cf. GALENSON 1952b, LaFFERTY 1971) and craft
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unionism had not been as entrenched by the time national unions emerged (cf. KORPI1978: 
74). Since "late, rapid industrialization tend to skip the workshop stage of production and 
proceed directly to industrial mass production (STEPHENS 1979: 45)", industrial unionism 
was more prone to emerge in these countries. Moreover, the more industry was concen­
trated, as in Sweden compared to England, the stronger the tendency toward industrial 
unionism (cf. INGHAM 1974, STEPHENS 1979).
However, general unions emerged also in other countries, despite their later industrial­
ization, yet they became a "suppressed historical alternative" (MOORE 1978). For instance, 
besides Denmark, in the two other Scandinavian countries general unions emerged but be­
came literally suppressed by early crisis and turned into industrial unions.3 Also in other 
countries, general workers unions of semi- and unskilled factory workers existed, but they 
commonly developed into industrial unions of the chemical and allied productive indus­
tries (Austria, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands), or mainly of construction and al­
lied trades (Belgium). Hence, it is less the timing of industrialization that decided upon the 
form of union organization, but the degree to which early or late industrialization facili­
tated an entrenchment of craft-general unionism or exceeded pressures to combine across 
segmentational lines. There is empirical support for the entrenchment thesis: the two coun­
tries with the most prominent sectionalist fragmentation along craft-general lines, Denmark 
and Britain (plus Ireland), had the highest level of unionization before the turn of the cen­
tury.4 Thus craft and general unions had already been well established before Taylorist 
mass production and industrial concentration took off, thus occupying already the niche of 
industrial unionism, that became a phenomena for few new or marginal industries (e.g. 
railways). This finding links up to the thesis on the comparative advantage of first mobi­
lizing agencies and the subsequent structuring of alternatives (ROKKAN 1977, see Chapter 
2).
Before the First World War, only few unions had started to grow incorporating more 
than few confined trades. With the interwar mass mobilization, new groups of unorganized 
joined new or existing unions that grew rapidly. Yet not all union movements were able to 
enlarge, or only to stabilize their membership during the interwar economic and political 
turmoil. In fact a wave of mergers that were to reduce the growing economic interdepen­
dence of industries and occupations (see PFEFFER 1972), followed the wave of new founda­
tions (for Britain see W ADDINGTON 1988) in nearly all interwar countries, thereby further
 ^ The general unions were founded in Sweden (1891) and Norway (1895) and Denmark (18%, 
though in Copenhagen already in 1890). However, it was the Danish Labours' Union that became the 
largest union within the union centre (1913: 34.4% of LO), while the Swedish general union was 
severely hit by the 1909 strike (1907: 20%, 1914:9.5% of LO) and the Norwegian general union (1914: 
ca. 25% of LO) suffered from internal splits from its syndicalist episode in the mid-1920s.
4 Already in 1890, the Danish unions organized 6% of all dependent employed (cf. "Dänemark" 
in H eyde 1931), the second leading union movement after the British unions that unionized 11% 
(1892), a decade later both movements were at par with 12% and 13% respectively (cf. Ba in  & PRICE 
1980).
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concentrating the union structure, yet along the two different trajectories of sectionalist and 
solidaristic unionism.
The Formation of Union Centres
In addition the role of the union centre was important in shaping the union structure and 
enhancing labour unity. But the weakness or strength of the union centre itself was a result 
of past fragmentation or concentration. Thus we expect the early formation of a union cen­
tre to consolidate the existing fragmented union structure, while the later formation of a 
Socialist-oriented union centre had an additional impetus in promoting national centraliza­
tion and rational union structure. The success of the German and Swedish union centres in 
union concentration was attributed to the later development of a more Socialist union cen­
tre, in comparison to the early sectionalist British TUC (FULCHER 1991), though there have 
been also "suppressed historical alternatives" (MOORE 1978: Ch. 11). A comparison of the 
failure of British-type Liberal craft unionism in Germany, and the disaster of German-type 
Sodalist-solidarity unionism in Britain reveals again how some contextual factors 
"suppressed" one alternative and favoured the other.
Given TUC's weak centralization, attempts were made to form a German-type industrial 
federation (GFTU, 1899), yet it found not the long-term commitment of the larger and 
smaller unions to share in resources and transfer authority (cf. PROCHASKA 1982, FULCHER 
1988,1991). The GFTU with its motto 'unity is strength' started with high hopes, soon to be 
frustrated by sectionalism and overlapping with the TUC. While the 'TUC washed its 
hands of all responsibility for the new organisation (...) and so succeeded in riding itself fi­
nally of the problem of federation, with all the sectional quarrels that had bedevilled it", the 
GFTU was to experience, "that even its relatively modest demands upon its members were 
difficult to enforce and that its polities depended upon a very fitful sense of unity among an 
extremely individualistic membership" (PROCHASKA 1982: 22, 29).5 Neither, was the TUC 
able to promote a rational restructuring via merger policies to limit union jurisdictional 
disputes effectively; nor did it promote the integration of local autonomy within national 
unions (it still accepts locals as equals within its ranks).
But reversely, in Germany there existed also a British-type liberal craft-oriented union 
movement (Hirsch-Dunker, 1869). It remained active during the Anti-socialist laws but 
thereafter stagnated and was successfully competed by the new Socialist union centre 
(Generalkommission, 1890) that became a driving force for centralized inclusive unionism. In 
fact, "unity is strength" had been the best strategy given the experience of political suppres­
sion and severe employer resistance. Labour unity was enforced in terms of national inte­
gration, the eradication of localism, and in terms of centralized bureaucratic structures that 
match party strength. In respect to the industrial union principle, a "sowohl-als-auch" (as 
well as) pragmatic policy was adapted at the 1892 congress (cf. SCHONHOVEN1987: 73). The
3 The GFTU did not find the support of the large unions and a number of its affiliates joined
larger, general unions for protection (F u l c h e r  1988:256).
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metalworkers union (1891) remained one of the few prewar industrial unions, but even 
"occupational" unions gradually opened their ranks to the less skilled (cf. SCHONHOVEN 
1985,1987:73).6
Like the British TUC (1868) and German Hirsch-Duncker unions (1869), early union cen­
tres that coordinated craft unions and local union activities and were (initially) rather 
Liberal than Socialist emerged also in the Netherlands (ANWV, 1874), Switzerland (SGB, 
1880), Norway (DFNA, 1884) and Denmark (Copenhagen DSF, 1886). These Liberal-craft 
centres, however, either declined gradually in importance (Germany, Netherlands, 
Norway) or turned into Socialist-oriented union movements (Britain, Denmark, 
Switzerland).7 Craft unionism survived at a local level or in some trades in a number of 
countries, before a new Liberal union centre reemerged as a small third, non-confessional 
anti-socialist "pillar" in the three consociational countries (the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Switzerland).8 This leads us to the recognition of the impact of political cleavage-organiza- 
tions in fostering broader 'class' alliances and overcoming occupational sectionalism.
Most notably, the Swedish union movement (LO, 1898) followed the German centraliza­
tion model after the 1909-strike disaster and in reaction to the challenge of centralized em­
ployers associations (cf. FULCHER 1991). Again the metalworkers set the model with their 
work-material union, yet by 1923 about two-third of all LO members were organized in in­
dustrial unions, compared to 46% in 1908 (cf. KORPI 1978: 64). Nevertheless, even though 
the industrial principle had been accepted by LO in 1922, trades such as building and 
printing remained opposed (GALENSON 1952b: 123) and it took several decades to integrate 
all occupational unions. Similarly, in Norway, the acceptance of the industrial principle in 
1923 was difficult to enforce, particularly since a number of craft unions preferred disaffili­
ation over disbanding. Although forces against and for change coexisted as in Britain, 
Sweden, and Norway, the "Socialist influence tipped this balance towards organisation of 
an open, class-wide and unified character (...)" (FULCHER 1988:265).
In France, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium and Imperial Austria, the issue of union restruc- 
turation towards sector-wide unionism instead of sectional craft unionism was cross-cut by 
other cleavages, the politico-religious and ethnic-regional cleavages. In all these countries, 
industrialization had taken place in confined regions, while in others traditional preindus­
trial production methods and agriculture prevailed. Moreover, ethnic and religious compo­
 ^ There were two other prewar industrial unions (timber, construction). More than half of the 
original founding affiliates had merged or dissolved and seven multi-occupational mass unions 
(70% of all members) existed at the eve of the First World War (SchOnhoven 1985: 229). After the 
war, the industrial principle was accepted by the ADGB congress (1922) but it remained voluntary 
for already existing unions since they may have otherwise disaffiliated.
7 The SGB (1880) was initially more a liberal craft union, proceeding the Socialist party, and 
only in 1905 adapted Marxism. In Norway, a liberal artisan-agricultural union (DFNA, 1884) 
emerged in the periphery before the Socialists became a national centre (cf. "Norway" in LINDEN & 
ROJAHN1990).
8 In the Netherlands (ANV, 1912, 1929: NVC), Belgium (CGSLB, 1920/1930), and Switzerland 
(LFSA, 1919).
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sition varied, thus making a national integration of all union currents within one central 
movement difficult. In France and Italy, the coexisting regional organizations (Bourse du 
Travail, Camera del lavoro) led to a fragmentary dual structure within the movement, be­
tween local unions (syndicats) and national unions (fédérations), hampering a rational reor­
ganization and construction of strong, national industrial unions (cf. ADAMS 1952, LORWIN 
1952, KENDALL 1975). In Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands, the Socialist union 
movement and the Christian movement were based in different regions and trades, allow­
ing the first to be more based on industrial lines than the latter. Yet competition between 
the two movement, and diseconomies of scales due to rival unionism (see Chapter 4), drove 
both movements to rationalize their structure gradually, hence, even the traditional, corpo- 
ratist Christian union movements combined beyond their initial occupational outlook. 
Beside the impact of cleavage-organizations on union structure, the employers played also 
a role.
Centralization of Employers and Collective Bargaining
Union diversity reflected also the pressures on labour to meet the level of centralization by 
employers and the necessities of collective bargaining.9 INGHAM (1974) in a comparison 
between Britain and Sweden argued that the degree of centralization of the employers as­
sociation accounts for the centralization in industrial relations. The character of the em­
ployers association, in turn, is largely dependent on the structure of the economy: small 
countries being more specialized and having a more concentrated economic infra-structure 
(INGHAM 1974). Yet, it has also been argued that employers centralized in response to initial 
organization of labour, and by doing so, forced unions to organize as well (FULCHER 1988, 
1991). According to this view, "the dynamics of conflict were the driving force behind cen­
tralization, which was the unintended consequence of the escalating conflict set off by the 
rapid organization of labour (FULCHER 1991: 96)". Yet the iNGHAM-thesis of industrial con­
centration and the labour movement thesis of employers response to union power, are not 
necessarily contradicting. The two factors could be mutually reinforcing processes, much 
like the intriguing parallel drawn by Swaan (1988): "The process of amalgamation and fed­
eration of employers' and workers' organizations reveals many traits in the dynamics of 
state formation: it is an example of a figuration in which opponents compel one another to 
evolve to higher levels of integration" (Swaan 1988: 175). The threat to concentrate re­
sources and decision making by one, compelled the other, leading to an upward spiral.
Employer associations, like trade unions, were originally formed during the era of 'local 
markets" at a local level and for specific industries. At least at this level there seems to be 
some indication for the labour movement thesis of employer response to union organization: 
'The establishment of associations along industry lines generally preceded the formation of
9 Employers centralization and bargaining structure were in turn a result of the character of in­
dustrialization and the economomic structure, in particular the concentration, product heterogeneity 
and export dependency (see CLEGG 1976, INGHAM 1974).
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central employer associations. At the central level the creation of overarching bodies for 
broad representational, political, and legislative purposes lagged behind the rise of national 
trade union centres by roughly ten to twenty years (WlNDMULLER 1984: 3)." Looking at 
founding dates, there is even evidence for a lagging behind of the founding of peak em­
ployer associations in respect to the major trade union confederations (see Table 6.2), with 
the exception of Denmark.1® In Scandinavia, national employers' peak associations 
emerged in short response to labour, while in Britain and Switzerland, where craft union­
ism had emerged relative early, such organizations lagged behind.
Most continental European countries experienced the formation of central employer as­
sociations only around the First World War. Yet, comparatively, the strength, scope and 
comprehensiveness of employer associations varied considerably across Europe.11 The 
large, core industries, in particular associations in manufacturing and engineering, were for 
long dominant and remained more autonomous.12 Moreover, there is no need for the as­
sumption that actors do indeed replicate a 'parallel' organizational solution in all cases.13
Similarly one finds only a spurious effect between the character of collective bargaining 
and union structure. Collective bargaining structures provide no satisfying explanation of 
diversity in union structure per se (cf. CLEGG 1976). In some cases, intermediate forms of co­
operation such as bargaining cartels served much the same function as centralized indus­
trial unionism. Although unions may be able to negotiate in multi-union bargaining, frag­
mented union systems involve economic and political costs due to more sectionalist inter­
ests formation. Moreover, institutionalized bargaining served often to marginalize or ex­
clude non-recognized forms of unionism and increase organizational costs for the non-rep- 
resented to form their own unions. Also collective bargaining between centralized union 
and employer associations occurred in some cases before the First World War, it remained 
confined to some branches (printing, engineering) and nationally to few countries 
(Denmark, 1899). After the First World War, with union recognition and new institutions 
for the regulation of industrial conflict the existing union structure became institutionalized 
(see Table 6.2). In some countries, it was state intervention, in others "voluntary" agree­
ments between employers and unions that led to union recognition. Legislation on associa­
tion rights14 but also the integration of unions into statutory welfare systems could have an
^  In Denmark, the Copenhagen DSF preceeded the national employer association. Of course, in 
an other respect, "capitar had already earlier started to coordinate its pressure group and self-gov- 
emment activities via business interests associations and Chamber of Commerce or Industry.
11 Most organizations covered only the secondary sector, while separate bodies existed for agri­
culture, commerce and finance, and the public sector (cf. S isso n  1987, LANZALACO 1990). 
Furthermore, the French and Italian had a dual, regional and industrial representation structure, 
much like the unions.
12 The Swedish metal employers, for instance, joined SAF only in 1917.
13 While in Sweden centralized employer association and national unions emerged parallel, this 
was not the case in Denmark, where employers were relative early centralized but the Danish labour 
federation remained decentralized (Ga l e n s o n  1952b: 68-73).
14 For instance, the British Trade Union Acts (1917, 1964) set constraints on democratic proce­
dures for union mergers (cf. WADDINCTON 1988)
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additional impact on the persistence of union structure. Hence, the path of orgnizational 
adaptation has been shaped by a set of mutually reinforcing and mediating processes, not 
just by the industrialization process as such.
II
Fr o m  Exclusive t o  In clu siv e  
M o b iliza tio n  Strategies
The choice of an organization principle entails also a particular mobilization strategy. 
Closed unionism is an exclusive membership strategy, while open unionism adapts an inclu­
sive strategy (cf. MARKS 1989). Historically, craft unions pursuing an exclusive mobilization 
strategy had initially an advantage over open, inclusive unionism, whether industrial or 
general unionism. Secular changes set external limits to the growth of craft unionism and 
its strategy of labour monopoly and occupational solidarity. Open unionism may spread 
horizontally across sectors in form of general unions, or across skill levels within a given 
sector in form of industrial unionism. Accordingly, there are differences as to how indus­
trial unions are affected by changes in the employment structure, depending on whether 
they happen to be in growing or declining sectors. General unions have more possibility to 
be flexible in moving between growing or easy to organize sectors, while industrial unions 
are forced to spend resources on organizing also the difficult organizable groups and firms 
within their chosen sector. The second, important issue of membership mobilization is the 
growth pattern of industrial or blue-collar unionism The question is which type of labour 
movement was able to achieve a high degree of organization among the manual industrial 
workforce? However, important differences in the growth potential can be attributed more 
to contextual factors than to the organizational principle as such.
Exclusive vs. Inclusive M obilization Strategy
Craft unionism persisted not merely because of vested interests and inflexible leadership 
but a closed union strategy remained for a long time the more successful mobilization strat­
egy. The strength of craft unions is their small size since this guarantees labour unity and 
solidarity within its group. Small, local unions that catered for the skilled workers had rel­
ative advantages in overcoming the collective action problem as "small groups can better 
provide themselves with collective goods than large groups. (OLSON 1965: 67)" Closed 
unionism can provide more easily collective goods to the workers and exclude non-mem­
bers from sharing them. Craft unionism is still based on primordial occupational 
Gemdnschaft (community) that through social closure reinforced community boundaries (cf. 
WEBER 1922). Local craft unions provided also a social "club" function that maintained oc­
cupational ethos and group identity. Moreover, craft unions have been known to provide 
extensive social benefits to their members (cf. ElCKHOF 1973). Mutual benefits and insur­
ance provided an incentive and could be maintained thanks to the monitoring capacities 
and compliance pressures under group solidarity (cf. HECHTER 1987). However, market
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and political forces compelled unions to adapt a more inclusive strategy, organizing not 
only on a local level but on a national one, to cater not only for the skilled but also for the 
semi-skilled and unskilled (cf. OLSON 1965). Moreover, "when only part of an industry or 
skilled group is organized, employers also have a ready source of strike-breakers (OLSON 
1965: 68)", thus unions were forced to organize beyond their initial group boundaries to 
prevent undercutting competition by other groups.
However, the mobilization problems of large open unions were much larger than those 
of small sectionalist unions. Selective, collective goods were more difficult to be targeted at 
members and mutual benefits - given the lower average income - strained more union fi­
nances. Given the heterogeneity of membership inherent to open inter-occupational unions, 
group solidarity, membership compliance and individual monitoring are more difficult in 
large open unions (cf. HECHTER 1987). Moreover, since the action of large, open unions are 
more visible, and externalities more noticeable, unionism becomes a more political matter. 
Such an inclusive strategy therefore is more likely to attract counter-mobilization, if not re­
pression, by its contenders, the employers and the state. On the other hand, open unions 
until they have become organizationally strong and recognized as bargaining partner by 
the employers will tend to use strike and political action as means of pression ouvrière for 
political representation and state intervention, as the prewar strike movements in Western 
Europe indicate (cf. SHORTER & TILLY 1974: Chap. 12). Open unions, given their more con­
tentious strategy, concentrated their resources more on strike funds and less on welfare 
benefits than closed unions (cf. ElCKHOF 1973).
Hence, closed and open unionism are based on different strategies of unity and strength. 
Closed unions opt for unity and strength through communal group solidarity; open union­
ism aims at strength through class unity of labour to prevent intra-class divisions. Not only 
that these two forms emerge at different stages, exclusive and inclusive strategies are also 
liable to demise under different circumstances (cf. FRIEDMAN 1990). In contrast to craft 
unions that were spreading horizontally across industries, industrial unions that encom­
passed vertical skill hierarchies in specific industries suffered from higher turnover rates 
and were more subject to economic cycles. The willingness of unions to combine and pool 
resources with others in order to overcome these limitations varies also with economic con­
ditions. In times of a general membership growth, unions may seek to expand into new 
domains in order to cope with interdependence between domains, whereas in times of 
membership stagnation or decline competition and interdependence between unions 
within a domain becomes more severe (FREEMAN & BRITTAIN 1977:176).
An instructive insight into the strategy and growth pattern of closed and open unionism 
can be derived from comparison of the early printers and metalworkers. Printing unions 
maintained organizational stability by an elaborate system of mutual benefits, that pro­
vided not only an incentive but also a means to prevent wage competition through laid off 
workers (cf. MARKS 1989: Ch. 4). "Instead of relying on brute force of the strike, these 
unions preferred to control the supply of labour at its source by encompassing as much of 
the work force as possible, monopolizing the task performed by labour, and unilaterally
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denying employers a supply of cheap non-union labour (MARKS 1989: 126)“. The British 
and German printers unions showed sustained, increasing growth pattern in the decades 
before the First World War thanks to their advantageous labour market position. "The low 
degree of substitutability of employers of their labour, intense competition among employ­
ers, the invulnerability of employers to foreign competition, and especially in the newspa­
per side of the industry, the extreme perishability of the product gave printers a favourable 
economic contest to exercise their organizational leverage (MARKS 1989: 152)". However, 
although the printers - thanks to their pre-entry closed shop - were highly organized, a 
number of separate unions for allied workers coexisted in printing. For instance, in 
Germany, semi-skilled workers, lithographs and bookbinders remained separately orga­
nized within the Free union movement until their suppression in 1933, they were reformed 
into one industrial union for printing and paper trades in 1949 but were recently merged to 
a "media" union. In Britain, not until the 1960s did the competing London and national craft 
unions merge, facing increased competition with industrial unions (SOGAT82) after radical 
changes in printing technology eroded their craft base since the 1970s.15
In the case of metal workers labour monopoly based on craft skills was undermined by 
the introduction of mechanization and homogenization of the labour process and the in­
crease in surplus labour in the Second Industrial Revolution (cf. GORDON, EDWARDS & 
REICH 1982: Ch. 4 on USA). Occupational unions were compelled to organize the unskilled 
and semi-skilled within its industry in order to counter employers strategies to undermine 
their strength and strike force through cheap labour and strike-breakers. Employers, on the 
other hand, were more under international competition and sought to limit labour costs, 
they were therefore interested to combine and set wage and working conditions for the 
whole industry. The centralization tendencies of the employers and the more fierce anti­
union activities in Germany and Sweden as compared to Britain and Denmark, led the 
metal workers' unions in the former countries to seek centralization and federation of the 
various occupational groups, including semi-skilled and unskilled workers (cf. FULCHER 
1991, SCHONHOVEN 1980, GALENSON 1952b). In both countries, the work-material union 
was the first step toward industrial unionism, organizing first all grades working with a 
given material (metal, wood), by organization drives beyond craft boundaries and attempts 
to absorb existing craft unions and allied trades. Solidaristic mobilization for collective ac­
tion was their main weapon, yet growth in membership was less sustainable by mututal- 
benefits and more endangered by employer resistance. Open unionism was much more 
contingent on employer and state action but also on the business cycle, particularly on 
changes in labour supply and demand. Only after union recognition was achieved on a na-
15 In Germany, semi-skilled workers, lithographs, bookbinders remained separately organized 
within the Free union movement, they were regrouped in 1949 to one industrial union for printing 
and paper trades and recently merged to a "media” union (1988). In Britain, only in the 1960s merged 
the competing London and national craft unions, facing increasing competition by SOGAT and tech­
nological errosion of the craft since the 1970s.
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Table 6.3
Level of Union Organization (Union Density), Western Europe (1900-1940)
AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
Overall Union Density (%)
1890 <1.0 <1.0 6.0 2.0 3.0 <1.0 <1.0 <1.0 <1.0 <1.0 11.0
1910 5.8 5.1 17.3 9.1 18.1 • 8.3 11.0 8 2 8.3 6.6 14.6
1920 51.0 38.6 33.4 10.6 52.5 32.6 345 31.1 20.3 27.7 26.3 45.2
1930 37.6 28.8 36.9 7.8 32.7 27.8 - 27.7 19.0 36.1 23.6 25.4
1950 56.8 33.2 48.9 31.6 33.7 37.1 40.3 42.0 47.9 66.7 39.7 40.6
1970 53.0 445 57.1 21.5 33.0 48.6 33.4 365 55.6 66.2 28.9 44.6
1989 43.6 53.4 76.0 9.7 315 41.7 34.0 23.6 53.8 812 27.6 38.9
Source: based on VlSSER 1989,1990,1991, and DUES database.
tional level, metal workers could bargain improvements based on its potential strength 
without necessarily risking a defeat in an industrial dispute.
General unionism is also based on a open union strategy that is mainly integrating hori­
zontally (across sectors) and less vertically (across skill levels). Given the lack of a craft 
base, its organization strategy has no particular industrial boundaries, since it organizes 
labourers that have historically been relative mobile between industries. Historically, gen­
eral unions tend to be an amalgamation of various confined occupational and workplace 
pockets, such as lorry drivers and dock workers, that show strong community bonds and 
can exert social pressures to combine (and establish closed shops). General unions provide 
some form of stectional autonomy to absorb organizations (via trade sections or special 
representation rights), at least for an initial period.16
Quite in contrast to industrial unions that gain strength from encompassing organiza­
tion, that is, mobilizing all workers in a given industry, general unions can base their 
strength on concentrating on the most mobilizable and strategically important work 
groups. Thus stagnation in employment and economic contraction hits confined industrial 
unions more than general unions that are more "industrially diversified" much like corpo­
rate conglomerates in comparison to industrial firms. General unions are in fact more flexi­
ble to sectoral and technological change than industrial unions with their fixed organizing 
domains. On the other hand, industrial unionism when it is the dominant principle pro­
duces less overlap and multi-union bargaining except for new emerging industrial 
branches, while general unions often come into jurisdictional disputes with craft, occu­
pational and industrial unions in a given sector.
The Growth of Industrial Workers' U nionism
Given the different organization forms and mobilization strategies one could expect im­
portant variations in overall union growth. Closed unionism certainly had a higher degree
16 For instance, the British TGWU errected under Bevin a dual structure of trade sections and re­
gional federations that would prevent sectionalist autonomy undermining labour unity.
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of unionization than other strategies, albeit within its more limited boundaries of its juris­
diction. In fact, while craft unionism may have contributed to overall strength when the 
skilled workforce was still dominant, with the growth of mass production workforce the 
early success of craft unionism has turned into a structural disadvantage.17 Although craft 
unions showed higher unionization rates within their jurisdiction before the First World 
War, the new emerging industrial unions, such as the British miners federation contributed 
to a higher level of organization within their sector.18 After the First World War, the two 
strategies of craft-general or industrial unionism have both shown to be as capable of mo­
bilizing a large share of the workforce, though general unions seem to rely more on union 
shops to secure membership.
It is difficult to attribute differences in union density to the organization principle as 
such, at least we lack detailed comparison that could account for skill levels and control for 
other factors. Even more cautious are claims on differences at the overall level of unioniza­
tion, such as the claim that the persistence of craft unionism shows an inverse relation to 
union density.19 General unionism may be more effective and flexible in organizing un­
skilled workers and part-time workers who move between sectors or in and out of the 
labour market. As will be discussed in more detail later, the major differences between the 
two strategies are in respect to the degree of encompassing interests.
In order to compare the impact of manual industrial unionism on the overall strength of 
labour movements, some comparison over time and across countries give some indications, 
albeit comparability is conditional. The level of unionization varies considerable across 
Western Europe (see Table 6.3), even if we discount for concealed inactive membership and 
other problems in reporting membership between labour movements (cf. VISSER 1989,1990, 
1991). The Swedish labour movement, taking net union density as an indicator, is the best 
organized union movement today (81%), followed by the Danish (76%). These countries 
have increased their level of organizations continually since the Great Depression when 
they both organized about one-third of the dependent employed. This record in union 
growth has been attributed partly to the strength of the left labour movement (cf. KORPI 
1978) but also to the favourable impact of union-led unemployment insurance schemes (cf.
17 In a historical studies of spinner and weavers it was found that craft unions often frustrated 
efforts to organize others: "where less-skilled workers organize first, this has apparently provided a 
better basis for trade unionism in genera! then was an initial organization of skilled workers alone 
(TURNER 1962:167).”
18 Lacking detailed statistics based on skill-levels, evidence from sectoral comparison of 
unionization can only provide some indications. In Britain, union denstiy rose in coal mining from 
595% in 1892 to 74.1% in 1911, while in craft-dominated printing rose from 27.7% to 35.9% (cf. BAIN 
& P r ic e  1980: 45). While the growth rates were similar, the difference in level shows thats craft- 
dominated sector was less successfull to mobilize beyond the skilled crafts.
19 The lower Danish union density as compared to Sweden was attributed by Stephens to the 
craft tradition (STEPHENS 1979:45), yet density levels have become close in the 1980s. In fact, Danish 
union density was higher than Swedish unionization until the early 1930s, particularly in manufac­
turing it had already achieved a high level of union density (see Table 6.3).
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RoHsTEIN 1990). In fact, the next two high unionization countries have such schemes 
(Belgium) or had them in the past (Norway).
However, part of today's unionization record of theses countries is also the success in 
the organization of white-collar employees and public sector workers.20 A comparison of 
the impact of industrial unionism should compare the degree of unionization in the indus­
trial sector and among blue-collar workers (see Table 6.(?)). Such an analysis can provide 
more insights into the causes of unionization, particularly where institutions, like unem­
ployment insurance or union recognition can be expected to have different impact for spe­
cific sector and groups. For instance, unemployment insurance may be less an incentive in 
the sheltered public service sector, while union recognition depends on central state action 
in this sector (see Chapter 8). The question arises to what degree has industrial unionism 
provided the base for subsequent waves of organization in the later growing white-collar 
and tertiary sector.
Since union density for manual industrial workers are unavailable for all countries, a 
comparison of the manufacturing sector may give some indications.21 In the Scandinavian 
countries, a high level of union density was attained already in the early postwar period 
and remained high. In Belgium, unionization overall and in industry in particular increased 
with the mounting of unemployment (since the 1970s) as workers stayed with their unions 
due to the union-led (state subsidized) unemployment insurance and because of union 
support in case of plant closures. Thus in all these countries, unionization levels were al­
ready above the national and even European average during the decade of full employment 
but increased further to near saturation during the years of mounting unemployment and 
economic crisis. The reasoning of British syndicalists that union-led unemployment insur­
ance would privilege only the few unionized and gainfully employed and therefore en­
hance labour disunity, proofed to be turned up-side-down: labour unity is strengthened as 
everyone is induced to become a union member.
In Germany union density in manufacturing was relative higher than overall level with 
the exception of the 1960s. Access to the workplace made up for lack of other union securi­
ties in Germany.22 Similarly in Italy, unionization increased considerably during the 1970s 
as a consequence of the more workplace oriented union politics and cooperation of the 
three Italian confederations (see Chapter 5), though density has declined gradually since 
the early 1980s. Given the institutionalized role of the Austrian union confederation, 
unionization in Austria was higher than in Germany or Italy, though union density has de­
clined gradually since the 1970s, including manufacturing.
20 In fact, in the Scandinavian countries the traditional industrial manual workers account only 
one-third of overall union membership.
21 Differences in unionization of white-collar workers will still account for some of the difference 
in union density in manufacturing, albeit probably not more than 10% since the level correlates fairly 
with overall differences.
22 There was an increase in unionization after the reform of the works' council law in 1972, den­
sity increased by one-third from 42% to 56% (1970-85).
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Table 6.4
N u m b er of Affiliates to Main Union Confederation 
Western Europe (1900-85)
AU BE OE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
Union Centre: ÓGB FGTB LO CGT DGB rruc CGIL FNV LO LO SGB TUC
Number of affiliates
1900 *298 *52 58 - - 21 30 *191
1913 *76 *59 49 26 21 *207
1920 *65 31 *55 52 32 31 19 *213
1930 45 28 *57 31 37 14 *210
1950 16 16 70 (30) 16 22 (40) 28 39 45 15 186
1970 16 13 60 29 16 53 38 20 35 27 15 142
1985 15 11 33 (30) 17 47 21 15 33 24 15 98
SOURCE: Affiliates: various reports of confederations, V isser 1991; DUES database 1991. 
NOTE: O  includes also autonomous locals
In Britain the closed shop contributed considerably to the higher degree of unionization 
in the sector. 46% of manual workers in industry were member of a closed shop in 1977 and 
after the Conservative's legal changes around 20% in 1989.23 The weakening and waning of 
this institution as well as the detriment in union recognition account for a substantial part 
of the decline in unionization from 56% to 46% overall (64% to 41% in manufacturing) in 
the last decade (1979-1989).
In Switzerland, France and the Netherlands, voluntary unemployment insurance had 
also a long tradition and became only belated compulsory state schemes (1981, 1967, 1949 
respectively). However, different to the Belgian or Scandinavian countries, these mutalites 
were never as effective union-led schemes that provide an incentive for union membership. 
In Switzerland, unionization in the manufacturing sector remained on a relative low level 
partly due to the institutionalized union-employer relations since the 1937 "peace" agree­
ment. Employer resistance and lack of bargaining strength of French unions hampered (and 
has nearly eroded) unionization in French industry, except for a number of large, often 
state-controlled enterprises. The most striking decline in the last decade, only comparable 
to the British one, occurred in the Netherlands, where unionization in industry fell from 
50% to 41% (1980-85), following a general trend in Dutch blue- and white-collar unionism 
This decline reflects the lack of workplace access of the highly institutionalized and cen­
tralized Dutch unions (cf. VISSER 1992) that face rising unemployment, deregulation and 
deindustrialization.
This broad overlook on unionization trends in manufacturing can only indicate some of 
the wide differences in union strength across countries, time and sectors. Many factors can
23 30% in partial closed diop in industry firms (above 50 employees) in 1977 (WIRS survey, cf.
Br o w n  1981: 56), that is an estimated 2.1 Mio industrial workers (of 53 Mio employees). By 1989, 
closed shops had fallen by half to 12% overall (or 2.6 Mio employees) and to ca. 20% in manufactur­
ing and 30 in utilities (St e v e n s , M il l w a r d  & Sm a r t  1989:619).
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be included in a list accounting for the differences in unionization: employers resistance, 
workplace access for unions, union-led unemployment schemes, institutionalized union- 
employer relations, and the "closed shop" and other union securities. Here, we have consid­
ered mainly union-led unemployment insurance and forms of workplace access that seem 
to explain some of the cross-national differences in unionization. The recent British and 
Dutch decline in union membership need additional reasoning, they reflect general changes 
in industrial relations against the background of profound economic crisis and structural 
restructuration. In both cases, the traditional bases for the strength, whether 'closed shop' in 
Britain or the Dutch institutionalized representation, have become undermined by these 
changes. Too much reliance on the successful strategies of the 1960s turned in to a disad­
vantage in the 1980s.
m
Fr o m  Sectionalism  to  C lass Solidarity
Closed unionism and open unionism are not merely two different forms of mobilizing 
strategies. Closed unionism is based on the representation of sectionalist interests, while 
open unionism aims at overcoming sectionalist interests in favour of more encompassing 
interests. Class solidarity entails the accommodation of both intra-class and inter-sector dif­
ferences of life chances. Hence, to the degree that unions encompass interests both verti­
cally (from lower to higher skill levels) and horizontally (from core to peripheral sectors) 
one can speak of class solidarity, though disregarding other political and functional cleav­
ages. The transformation of the craft-industry cleavage into union organization has impor­
tant consequences for the way in which interests of labour are aggregated and represented. 
The degree of concentration or fragmentation and the number of actors within the labour 
movement vary considerably with consequences for the coordination of labour interests at 
the central level. Moreover, union fragmentation leads to multi-union bargaining that en­
hances costs of coordination and possibility of inter-union disputes. However, secular 
changes, in particular the changes that give rise to new sections of the workforce, set limits 
to the dominance of manual labour or industrial unionism within the labour movement. 
While this will be the discussion in later chapters, the traditional party and union relations, 
and the leadership of blue-collar unions become increasingly contested as other groups mul- 
tiplyand fragmentation increases.
Concentration in Union Structure
National integration and the rationalization of union structures were important challenges 
to labour movements and a precondition for effective representation in major union cen­
tres. The national integration of functional interest organization remained an obstacle, par­
ticularly in countries with large regional disparities in economic development or an early 
development of unionism when labour market were still of local scope. An integration of 
the independent local unions within national unions and only an indirect representation
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within the union centre were important steps toward encompassing aggregate functional 
(not politizised territorial) interests on a national level.24
After their foundation the new union centres had much larger numbers of affiliates than 
today (see Table 6.4). Although there were mergers following economic pressure or rec­
ommendations of the union centre, there were also new unions that joined or were founded 
in previously uncovered sectors. The major concentration wave happened during the in­
terwar period less a result of the union recommendations but as a consequence of the in­
terwar membership and financial crisis. The Austrian, Belgian, German and Swiss union 
centres reduced their number of affiliates, though rival political unions or unions of white- 
collar or civil servants multiplied outside their realm. The Scandinavian unions showed 
some slight increase, albeit there were a number of mergers to form industrial unions. Yet 
the British TUC remained on its high level of more than 200 affiliates with an increasingly 
skewed size distribution.
After the Second World War, in some countries a unique chance for reformation was 
given after the years of union suppression. Union leaders stepped ahead and realized the 
interwar plans of reform on the drawing board only in Austria and Germany, and partly in 
Belgium and the Netherlands. The number of unions was cut to 16 affiliates in Austria, 
Belgium, and Germany which came closest to a neat industrial union principle. Other 
union centres followed only gradually, such as the Dutch union centre and the 
Scandinavian union movements (first Sweden, then Denmark, and Norway in 1988 with 
the FF-merger of 5 unions). Although the number of unions was cut by half, the TUC still is 
the most fragmented union organization with nearly 100 affiliates, albeit an increasing ten­
dency of the largest unions to swallow the smaller and become "super" unions.
Although there is a secular trend toward concentration within the major union centres, 
major differences in the degree of fragmentation and union structure persist. A comparison 
of the number of unions that organize blue-collar workers in the private sector (see Table 
6.5) reveals the differences in union organization across countries. By the 1950s, the British, 
Danish and Irish union systems showed a considerable persistence of craft union fragmen­
tation with more than 45% of all unions catering for blue-collar occupations, while in 
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, a smaller number of craft unions co-existed with a 
membership share of more than 5%. The French and Italian union systems with weak na­
tional unions at the time was probably between the two former groups, albeit no data is 
available. In the other countries, craft or occupational unions were more rare or unimpor­
tant in strength. Supporting the historical account, craft unionism coexists were general 
unionism is important, while industrial unionism became dominant and replaced craft
24 In Britain, locals (and "autonomous" sections of absorbed unions) preserved the representation 
rights on TUC, even though a similar national federation existed. Historically, the prewar Austrian 
union centre had over 200 independent affiliated locals, the became gradually integrated into na­
tional unions before 1918. The German union congress decided early (1892) to exclude independent 
locals and excluded those unwilling to join a national unions. While in the French and Italian case a 
dual structure remained in effect until today (see Chapter 5).
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unions and prevented general unionism in the other countries. General unions accounted 
for a large share of overall membership and blue-collar workers in the private sector in the 
typical craft-general union systems of Britain, Ireland and Denmark. In Britain, the share of 
general unions was smaller due to the larger share of multi-craft unions that spread across 
industries much like general unions, albeit only for skilled workers. The Belgian general 
union of construction and allied trades (within FGTB) accounts for the - surprising - large 
share in membership but is a borderline case to industrial unionism.
A general trend toward concentration but also toward shrinkage in overall membership 
share can be seen from a comparison with 1985 (see Table 6.6). The Overall number of 
unions in this domain have been reduced, while in some cases the overall number in­
creased due to the proliferation of public and white-collar unionism. While systems with 
establishment of a rationalized postwar structure showed not much change, like in Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, further concentration into fewer industrial unions occurred in the 
Netherlands (particularly after the FNV merger), and Sweden and Norway. In the craft- 
general union systems, a trend toward concentration can be detected but not to the advan­
tage of industrial unionism but general unionism. Moreover, a reduction in the share of in­
dustrial and general unionism indicates the shifting emphasis from industrial to post-in­
dustrial unionism. Only in Germany did the industrial unions still represent the majority of 
union members by the 1980s (discounting the agricultural share in Italian unions), while in 
Norway and Sweden it came into a minority position with one-third of all union members 
within the overall labour movement.
Unionism has not only historically grown out of blue-collar unionism, it has been until 
the 1970s the dominant force in the union movement. Until the 1970s, the majority of all or­
ganized union members were blue-collar workers in the private sector (see Table 6.7). Due 
to the growth of white-collar and public sector unionism (see Chapter 7 and 8), first in the 
most advanced welfare societies, in Sweden and the Netherlands, then later also in the 
other industrialized countries, the traditional blue-collar labour movements became chal­
lenged, not only in terms of membership but also in respect to leadership in the union 
movement and collective bargaining. The major national union centres, however, vary in 
their degree of encompassing the other two cleavages. The Swedish and Swiss labour 
movement, in particular, remain concentrated on blue-collar workers, while white-collar 
workers joined mainly unions outside the major union centres (LO and SGB). In Belgium, 
Germany and Switzerland, Socialist labour movements remained still more dominated by 
blue-collar unionism in the private sector than in the labour movement in general.
Multi-Union or Single Union Bargaining
As long as closed unionism could rely on unilateral regulation, collective bargaining was 
not much more than a formalization of informal practices. Open unionism, whether indus­
trial or general unionism, was dependent on collective bargaining to achieve any improve­
ment, and it is consequently the expansion of collective bargaining that allowed open 
unions to spread beyond privileged occupations (cf. CLEGG 1976:30). However, any form of
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Table 6..5
Number of Craft, General and Industrial Unions (1950. 1985)
1950 AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
Overall 16 32 119 33 109 327 125 156 66 720
private sector 10 23 64 11 58 73 29 35 23 393
industrial 10 18 5 9 4 52 14 21 9 13
general - 2 6 . 4 1 1 • 2 2
craft - 3 53 2 50 20 14 14 12 378
1965
Overall 15 40 129 82 80 65 236 148 75 72 286
private sector 9 22 24 18 30 33 21 27 23 23 70
industrial 9 17 3 14 3 26 12 13 17 11 10
general . 2 5 1 3 - 1 1 • 3 2
craft
• 3 16 3 24 7 8 13 6 9 58
Note: Instead of 1950: DE: 1953. GE: 1951, NO: 1956; exluding locals (NE: 58 and UK: 286). 
Source: own calculations based on DUES database.
union is compatible with collective bargaining as long as unions are recognized by employ­
ers. "Consequently collective bargaining supports and preserves union structure as it ex­
isted at the time of recognition; and, for each trade union movement, that structure was 
shaped by the state of industrial organization and technology during the period of its birth 
and development (CLEGG 1976: 30).” The impact of early institutionalization can account, 
the persistence of craft union structure, for instance, in the printing industry that was 
amongst the earliest to bargain.25 Moreover, on the national level, countries with persistent 
craft unionism, union recognition was widespread already at an early time. The Danish 
unions signed their first national agreement as early as 1899. "The Development of collec­
tive bargaining in Britain was a more gradual process than elsewhere. Employers' resis­
tance to unions was less intense than in many countries, and collective bargaining was 
therefore less dependent on legal support and regulation (WINCHESTER 1989: 496)". This 
gradual development of collective bargaining in Britain and Denmark promoted a more 
fragmented union structure to emerge.
Yet, such union fragmentation - in addition to rival union pluralism (see Chapter 4 and
5) • weakens labours’ position vis-à-vis capital in general and in collective bargaining in 
particular. "Unions have always striven for, but have not always been able to achieve, unity 
within their ranks in the justified belief that unity enhances bargaining power, whereas 
splits and divisions weaken it. (WlNDMULLER 1987: 19)". Multi-union bargaining entails 
problems of coordinating and aggregation of interests. Moreover, employers have an ample 
chance to use union rivalries or sectionalist interest to 'rule-and-divide' labour unity and 
steer in tra-class conflicts. Even if jurisdictional disputes between craft unions and general
25 The German printers union (1866) signed its first national collective agreement already in 18% 
(cf. also M a r k s  1989).
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Table 6.6
Membership Share of Craft, General and Industrial unionism (1950,1985)
1950 AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
Overall 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
private sector 58.5 74.9 70.6 . 65.8 75.2 m 65.5 61.7 62.5 55.7 68.6
industrial 585 585 7.7 64.3 4.7 63.9 49.4 55.8 45.0 16.1
general . 155 43.3 . 54.1 0.2 4.6 5.0 23.0
craft • 0.9 19.6 • 1.5 16.4 • 1.4 7.7 6.7 5.7 29.5
1985
Overall 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
private sector 43.1 62.1 41.9 54.0 59.6 68.6 43.3 35.0 35.3 46.9 42.7
industrial 43.1 45.7 4.9 . 53.3 1.6 545 40.1 28.6 33.7 405 6.0
general 15.8 29.7 0 2 44.6 0.1 3 2 3.3 24.9
craft • 0.6 7.3 • 0.5 13.4 14.1 3.1 3.2 1.6 3.1 11.8
Note: Instead of 1950: DE: 1953, GE: 1951, NO: 1956. 
Source: own calculations based on DUES database.
unions in a given industry are limited, conflicts of interests between these unions over bar­
gaining strategy and "just" redistribution are more likely to become explicit and can be ex­
ploited by employers to play off one side against the other. An important function of en­
compassing, centralized unions is to devise and maintain distributional norms for inter-oc- 
cupational levelling, while a centralized union centre complements further inter-union con­
sensus building (cf. SWENSON 1989). However, intermediary negotiating bodies are also a 
device to coordinate action prior or during negotiations with employers, like the federa­
tions in Britain or sector cartels in Scandinavia.
A further difference between craft-general and industrial unionism in collective bar­
gaining is that between horizontal and vertical integration. Industrial unionism as it en­
compasses different skill levels and occupations along the vertical hierarchy has to build 
consensus on inter-wage level differentiation within a given sector. It is more limited by its 
strength in the sector, the resistance of employers in the sector, and faces more directly the 
externalitites of its action. A general union, on the other hand, would have an interest to 
maintain similar wage levels across sectors but an improvement in relation to other non-or- 
ganized wage groups, whatever the resistance of employers in a given sector. While indus­
trial unions tend to prefer industrial or territorial collective bargaining, general unions 
would tend to profit from either national bargaining or local bargaining.26 Furthermore, re­
cent trends seem to suggest that the advances of non-union firms in new growth sectors in 
Britain have been a result of union fragmentation and workplace strength (cf. WINCHESTER 
1989), while in countries where industrial unions cooperate with central employer associa­
tions derecognition by individual firms is more limited.
26 However, it should be mentioned that their is a more recent trend of the two forms, industrial 
and general unions, to merge into multi-sector unions that spread over several loosely connected 
sectors.
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On the other hand, coordination through a union centre could balance out the sectional- 
ist tendency of fragmented union structure if (!) central leadership had enough authority to 
bargain in the general interest. Yet, fragmented union movements with an unequal distri­
bution of membership across many small unions and few large unions have commonly 
hampered the transfer of authority to a higher level. Comparing the degree of centralization 
of resources at the peak level in respect to strike funds, finances and union staff, Jelle Visser 
has ranked in a comparative study the Austrian, Dutch, Norwegian and Swedish union 
centre (all with industrial unionism) as the most centralized, followed by Germany (with 
relative strong and unequal industrial unions), and finally the Danish, Italian, Swiss, French 
and British union centres (with craft or large local-regional autonomy) (cf. VISSER 1990: 
176).27 These crude indicators suggest that there seem to be two contrasting forms of inter­
ests organization: a centralized-industrial unionism with large "solidaristic" element and 
more decentralized-fragmented unionism with a tendency towards sectionalist interest con­
flicts.
Legacy of Working-Class U nionism
About a century ago, blue-collar craft and multi-occupational unions were the founding 
members of Socialist union centres and provided often important organizational support to 
the emerging Socialist parties. The legacy of working-class unionism is still having its im­
pact on today's Socialist union centre and party. As was shown before (see Chapter 3), 
Socialist party and allied unions follow a similar mobilization logic since both initially ap­
peal to the same social base, the manual industrial working-class. Qass cohesion is the 
strength of labour: to mobilize a class on the base of their common interests and class soli­
darity. Open unionism, whether industrial or general unionism, propagated collective class 
ideology and reinforced the formation of working-class identity. The Socialist working- 
class mass party and the solidaristic, centralized industrial union movement became the 
model of Socialist party and unions. The model was unquestionable as long as both their 
support base overlapped, as much as class identity was maintained through both organiza­
tions and ancillary intermediary structures, and as party and union leaders were still in­
spired by the same ideology and aims.
Blue-collar unions are nearly everywhere affiliated with the major Socialist union centre 
(or in the case of rival unionism another major union centre). Liberal-neutral craft unionism 
or independent unions have been a phenomena of the past or have become marginal since 
the late 1950s.28 During the interwar period, blue-collar membership outside the main 
union centres was at some time still considerable (up to one-quarter) due to independent 
craft unions or unions of foremen. Nevertheless, given the strong tendency of blue-collar
27 With the slight upgrading of Denmark, the same rankorder holds for the degree of centraliza­
tion in postwar collective bargaining structure (cf. VISSER 1990:176) that is necessarily contingent on 
the transfer of authority and resources.
28 The Belgian movements (CGSLB) being the exception with about 5-8% of overall postwar 
membership, though mainly in public transport.
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Table 6.7
Blue-coUar Private Sector Membership
AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
Overal share (%) 
1920 60.1 86.0 62.4 67.6
b) c)
60.8 86.7 72.6 61.0 a)79.0
1950 58.5 69.8 84.3 64.8 75.1 60.8 63.3 74.6 63.7 58.3 b)67.4
1970 52.3 63.2 58.7 a)47.4 53.8 73.6 64.1 48.8 50.9 44.8 52.9 b)59.4
1985 42.2 545 42.9 48.2 58.9 57.8 34.2 35.1 36.3 48.5 b)49.1
Union Centre ÓGB FGTB LO CGT DGB ICTU CGIL NW LO LO SGB TUC
Membership share (%) 
1920 63.2 94.3 725 90.2
c)
76.4 86.7 78.0 75.4
1950 58.5 73.1 84.3 . 71.6 61.0 70.2 74.6 79.1 72.5
1970 52.3 63.9 74.9 a)57.4 64.9 . 70.3 56.0 65.3 73.0 73.1
1985 42.2 60.0 59.3 • 57.1 63.6 48.8 52.4 60.5 72.5
NOTE: (a) incl. white-collar workers; b) incl. public sector membership of mixed sextor unions, (c) incl. 
white-collar workers but excluding agriculture; SZ: 1985
SOURCE: calculated from tables in V isser 1989 (membership: market - blue-collar), except BE, IR 
and UK calculated from DUES database.
unions and the much smaller support among non-manual employees, blue-collar unionism 
dominated for long the European labour movement.
Indeed, European Socialist parties and allied unions are descendants of working-class 
organizations and for the first part of the postwar time Socialist party and unions remained 
so.29 Advocates of a change toward catch-all parties and encompassing all-grades unions 
underlined the need to open party and unions to the growing middle class or white-collar 
salariat (cf. PRZEWORSKI & SPRAGUE 1986). However, even where this was declared official 
policy the stagnating traditional working-class base of party and unions was only gradually 
superseded by middle class voters and the unionization of non-manual employees (see 
Chapter 7). Party and unions are still reflecting past social structure due to structural inertia, 
though the membership structure of party and unions tend to be more resistant to change 
than electoral support (including social and works council elections), or for that matter, 
leadership. The loss of the proletarian character of the Socialist party and union, in partic­
ular of the leadership, was already observed in 1911 as stated in Michels thesis on the "iron 
law of oligarchy" (MICHELS 1911). Nevertheless, blue-collar workers are still overrepre­
sented amongst the Socialist party's electorate and the allied union membership, despite the 
claim of catch-all party and all-grade encompassing unionism.30 The party and union cen-
29 In  th e  1950, m o re  th a n  tw o - th ird s  o f th e  v o te  w e re  ca s t m a n u a l w o rk e rs  a n d  th e ir  fam m iles  
(cf. PRZEWORKSI & SPRAGUE 1986), sim ila rly  b lu e -c o lla r  w o rk e rs  re p re se n te d  70%-90% o f S ocia list 
u n io n  m e m b e rsh ip  (cf. VISSER 1989,1990).
30 Overrepresentation of manual workers electoral support was still around 20% in the 
Scandinavian Social Democratic parties in the 1970s (see ESPING-ANDERSEN 1985: Tab. 4.9)
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tres given the process of social imprinting and institutionalization became locked into the 
past social structure (STINCHCOMBE 1965). The established union centres overrepresent 
those groups that were important at the time of consolidation, while it underrepresents 
new groups.31 The Austrian union centre had been the most adaptive in its membership 
structure due to the reorganization in 1945, the smaller dominance of a blue-collar indus­
trial workforce at the time, the assodational monopoly in representation, the successful, 
non-contentious integration of white-collar and public employees within the movement 
(see Chapter 7 and 8).
C o n c l u sio n
The craft-industry cleavage emerged with the growth of mass production, its transforma­
tion in union organization depended largely on the entrenchment of previous organiza­
tional decisions and the mutual reinforcing processes at work. There were two challenges 
to union movements in overcoming sectionalism: the national integration of local structures 
and the broadening of the organization base. Two trajectories of union organizations have 
been found. In some countries due to the persistence of craft traditions, open unionism or­
ganized those workers that had not been covered by closed unionism leading to a patch­
work of union organizations, yet skewed by large general unions. In the other countries, 
employer resistance, weak craft traditions, and socialist ideology led the occupational 
unions to federate and finally merge in industrial unions that due to a more equal spread of 
forces were willing to transfer decisions to the level of central unions. Although there were 
"historical alternatives", these efforts at turning the path around became, however, sup­
pressed through the described forces.
These findings underline the general theoretical claim that previous organizational deci­
sions and contextual conditions in conjunction have structured the organizational alterna­
tives for an adaptation of labour unionism to the changing structure of the economy. Where 
a craft-general union system became entrenched, the union centre that was to emerge was 
less centralized, was less dedicated to Socialist ideology, and had less authority to promote 
union restructuration and centralization. The paths diverged early on since they led to dif­
ferent mutually reinforcing processes, an upward spiral of inclusive industrial unionism, 
national integration and centralization, and the blockage of such a process due to local au­
tonomy, craft sectionalism, and uncontrolled growth of "big" unionism.
In the historical account we have pointed at various differences between national union 
movements. However, if we attempt to summarize the findings (see Table 6.8), we can de­
tect four main clusters of the transformation of the craft-industry cleavage into union orga-
31 Comparing union membership of 1985 and labour force structure, the Swedish LO and Swiss 
SGB represent the social structure of the 1920s, the German DGB the 1950s, the Austrian, Danish, 
Dutch and Norwegian union centres the 1960s. There is a trend toward increasing overrepresenta­
tion in all union centres, particularly strong in Sweden and Switzerland that have locked into the 
interwar structure.
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Table 6.8
Craft-lndustry Cleavage and Union Centralization
CRAFT TRADITIONS SECOND INDUSTRIALIZATION
Local Craft-General Dual structure
autonomy UK, IR, DE FR, IT
(decentralized) (early entrenched) (late functional)
National Mixed industrial Central industrial
integration BE, SZ, (NO) AU, GE, SW, (NE)
(centralized) (regional concentrations) (early centralizing)
nization: (1) craft-general systems in which craft and local traditions were early entrenched 
and led to the formation of general unions for the non-organized; (2) mixed systems in 
which some broader unions spread unevenly across the country due to different regional 
development; (3) a dual structure of territorial and functional representation where the latter 
emerged belated and assumed less dominance; and (4) central industrial unionism with in­
dustrial unions within a centralized union movement. While in the craft-general and dual 
structure local unionism is only incompletely integrated within the national unions and 
union centre, in the two other cases, national union and union centres have been able to 
penetrate into and control the local structures. The centralization and strength of the union 
centres versus the sectional local or union autonomy increases "diagonally" as one moves 
from the craft-general to the central-industrial type, the two other cases of union centres 
under segmented and polarized pluralism were not capable to aggregate all interest via 
few inclusive functional organizations.
The mobilization pattern of closed and open unionism have been found to vary. Closed 
unionism has advantages due to its stress on social closure, yet it finds it limits by labour 
competition, changes in the employment structure, and employers resistance. Open union­
ism, by its very aim is forced to grow, yet it has a more difficult task given the lack of 
labour monopoly, weak occupational solidarity, and the collective action problem for large 
organizations. Differences between the two forms of open unionism, industrial unionism 
and general unionism are less important in respect to mobilization potential today. General 
unionism tends to be more flexible in mobilizing but in contrast to industrial unions may 
not have a large incentives to organize all employees within a sector. Yet, in terms of the 
aggregation of interests, in respect to the accommodation of intra-class (cross-skill) interests 
the differences between industrial and general unions are more important.
The representation of workers interest has been found to differ between the two types of 
union systems, disregarding other factors as rival unionism. Craft-general union systems 
multiply the number of actors in collective bargaining, while one-firm-one-union systems 
give way to more centralization in collective bargaining. While the former system has 
problems to accommodate vertical inter-class interests, the latter is more in need of further 
coordination (central negotiation or wage leadership) to adjust for differences between 
sectors. The strength of labour unionism, particularly industrial unionism, relied on class
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solidarity and close alignment with a working-class party. The changes in the employment 
structure, however, have reduced the former dominance of industrial or manual workers 
unionism, while unions representing new functional cleavages increasingly compete and 
challenge the traditional ideological and wage leadership. It is to these cross-cutting class 
cleavages that derive from the social division of labour that we will turn now, the division 
of interests caused by the white-blue collar cleavage (see Chapter 7) and public-private 
cleavage (see Chapter 8). The historical irony seems to be that once labour unity had been 
nearly achieved after long battle against sectionalism within the manual class, unity became 
subsequently challenged by union diversity again, yet from interest organizations of non- 
manual employees and workers in the state sector.
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7
Th e  W h ite-Blue C o lla r  C leavage
'Union structure has an important Bearing upon tfu evolution of 
white-collar unions. In several countries this has Bun and continues to 
Be a Basic issue Between white- and Blue-collar wori&rs and their orga­
nizations. The main issues an these: ¡fat wfute-collar worfers to Be in­
cluded in industrial unions together with their Blue-collar colleagues?
I f  so - what degree of autonomy an white-collar worsts to have 
within tfu industrial union? I f  there an to Be separate white-collar 
unions which may straddle industrial Boundaries, an they to Be affili­
ated with the same federation to ivfuch the unions of Blue-collar woril_- 
ers Belortg? Is then to Be a separate federation of white-collar unions 
and what ought to Be its relationship with the Blue-collar federation?'
(STURMTHAL 1966B: 381)
Status distinctions in society hamper labour unity further. In many Western European 
countries, collarline differences arising from the social, market and work situation of white- 
collar employees in contrast to blue-collar workers, split labour unity and amplify union 
diversity.1 With the advancement of capitalism and modem industrial production, the de­
mand for white-collar work increased even more rapidly than the industrial manual work­
force. The new service class with its ambiguous class position was not only a problem to 
Marxist class theory as observed by the German Social-Democrat EDUARD BERNSTEIN and 
the Austrian Socialist Karl RENNER (cf. GOLDTHORPE 1982), it was also a challenge to 
Marxist-oriented blue-collar unionism (cf. LEDERER 1912). Most of all it was a question of 
labour unity: can one integrate white-collar employees within a unitary labour movement 
or even within one encompassing union? Some unionists wanted to leave on the side the 
new middle-class oriented white-collar group in order to maintain working-class purity. 
However, the collarline cleavage varies in salience and scope across countries and time due 
to differences in state policy, employers action and middle-class aspirations. The transfor­
mation of the collarline into union structure was partly a reaction to the existing blue-collar 
union structures, the importance of industrial unionism and party-union relations that pro­
vided an obstacle for white-collar unionization.
This chapter explores the conditions under which the collarline cleavage became trans­
formed into union organization, at both the level of national unions and of peak associa­
tions. It will analyze the formation, mobilization and representation aspects of the collarline 
cleavage for white-collar organization.
1 The concept of "collarline" ("Kragenlinie") is a translation from the German literature on 
white-collar social histoiy (cf. K o c k a  1977,1981a, 1981b) that is even more intuitive in English due to 
the common usage of white-collar vs. blue-collar workers.
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Table 7.1
The Rise of the White-Collar Salariat
AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
White-collar employees (%)
1920 16 23 21 23 20 18 16 22 22
1930 22 21 25 23 25 21 19 18 24 25
1950 31 27 30 28 16 31 26 35 30 31
1960 38 37 36 38 19 38 34 41 33
1970 45 45 45 45 45 32 29 47 42 44 43 40
1965 51 58 52 59 57 56 54 50
NOTE: IR 1971, GB 1985 estimated:
SOURCE: own calculations based on Flora, Kraus & Pfenning  1987; V isser  1989
First, it describes the formation of separate white-collar unions and union centres. To un­
derstand the interaction of collarline formation and union structure, the strategies of the 
state, employers and middle-class pressure groups have to be analyzed. On the other hand, 
the strategic decisions of the blue-collar unions to include and accommodate or to exclude 
and disregard white-collar interests were cmdal for the salience of the organizational splits.
Second, the mobilization patterns of white-collar employees differ considerably from blue- 
collar workers. In general, white-collar employees have been less likely to join unions and 
were less prone to go on strike, though this difference has become less important over time 
and for many countries. Collarline differences in union density vary according to the differ­
ent organization strategies and institutionalization of union securities.
Third, the representation of white-collar interests has amplified the fragmentation and 
heterogeneity of labour interests. White-collar interests are commonly less centralized and 
coordinated than blue-collar interests. Moreover, they have become increasingly self-con­
scious and strong opponents to blue-collar interest representation. Finally, the political het­
erogeneity of white-collar employees has mounted pressures to deemphasize union link­
ages with political parties.
I
Th e  Fo r m a t io n  o f  th e  C o lla rlin e  C leav a ge
The collarline between white-collar employees and blue-collar workers emerged with the 
advancement of industrial capitalism and mass democracies. The rise of the white-collar 
salariat become a nearly universal feature in all Western European countries since the end 
of the First World War, when about one-fifth of all employees were in white-collar occupa­
tions, though some late industrializing countries lagged behind (see Table 7.1). With the 
second industrialization phase, the transition to Taylorist mass production, service func­
tions and tertiarization expanded within and outside the factory (on see FOURAST1E 1949). 
Administrative, technical, supervising and commercial activities multiplied and became
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differentiated from the production tasks and delegated to non-manual employees or service 
organizations (CRONER 1962:112-3).
White-collar workers had a long history of maintaining middle-class orientations fos­
tered by better education, social advancement prospects, and less working-class social 
background. Furthermore, the collarline cleavage was reinforced by more favourable social 
protection, fringe benefits and employment protection for white-collar employees, granted 
by employers or by the state. Thus the collarline reflects differences in three spheres: the 
market, work and social situation (cf. LOCKWOOD 1958). In each society, however, the col­
larline was drawn somewhat differently and with more or less vigour by state policy, em­
ployers action and middle-class aspirations (cf. K o c k a  1981a).
These social status differences were reinforced by blue-collar aversions toward inte­
grating white-collar employees and status conscious pressure group politics of the middle- 
classes. Initially, blue-collar workers had often shunned the few patronized clerks holding 
the view that the black-coated employees were less unionate, willing or capable to join in 
the class struggle. Similar convictions led union leaders to doubt whether to trade-off 
working-class solidarity and cohesion against inclusion of the then still small and heteroge­
neous white-collar salariat. In most countries, "white-collar employees tend to see their in­
terests as different from those of manual workers and to prefer their own separate occupa­
tional unions (CLEGG 1976: 39)." In the following, the formation of white-collar unions and 
the formation of separate union centres or the integration of white-collar employees within 
the existing labour movement will be sketched.2 Moreover, the interaction between state 
social policy and employers action and the emerging white-collar organizations will be as­
sessed.
The Formation of W hite-Collar Unions
Although some white-collar associations were descendants of officer or commercial guilds, 
the first national organizations emerged in the more advanced industrialized countries in 
the last decades of the 19th century.3 White-collar associations, with few exceptions, were 
initially "social clubs", welfare societies, or professional associations. The Austrian, German, 
Swiss and Dutch white-collar associations achieved some degree of organization already 
before the First World War, maintaining in most cases, however, harmonic relations with 
the employers. Only few developed into more contentious unions short before the First
2 On the history of white-collar unions there exist few comparative studies, see ADAMS 1974, 
CRONER 1962, E b b in c h a u s  1988, otherwise one has to rely on the readers by STURMTHAL 1966a, 
K o c k a  1981a beside numerous single country or union studies, for Germany: notably LEDERER1912, 
SPEIER 1934, KOCKA 1981b, for Britain: LOCKWOOD 1958, Ba IN 1970, for Sweden: SANDBERG 1969, 
N ilsso n  1985, for Switzerland: KÓNIC, SlECRlST & VETTERLI 1985, for the Netherlands: REINALDA 
1981,1985.
3 In Germany, with the earliest and best organized white-collar prewar movement, the oldest 
commercial clerks association was founded in 1858, but most larger white-collar unions (including 
technicians) date back to the 1880s and 1890s (cf. EBBINCHAUS 1988:128-30), part of the activites were 
the occupational sickness insurance schemes.
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World War, most others remained dedicated to middle-class aspirations of individual ad­
vancement, professionalism and respectability (cf. KOCKA 1981a). In addition, Christian 
clerks associations that were to shelter the "respectable" young employees from the vices of 
industrial, modem societies were among the earliest Christian organizations.4
In societies with persistent status differences and promoted class divisions, the collarline 
cleavage led relative early to sectionalist interest organization. In Austria and Germany, 
white-collar associations cooperated in loose pressure group cartels to influence public 
policy making, in particular the drafting of favourable statutory social policy (see K o c k a  
1981a). The social reference group for white-collar employees were largely the 'civil ser­
vants' and free professions that received high social esteem and state privileges, while the 
blue-collar labour movement was seen with much contempt.
However, in some countries, there were also white-collar employees in the public or 
semi-public sector that became relative early collectively organized, some of which in 
unions close to the blue-collar union movement (see next Chapter 8). Moreover, techni­
cians, foremen, lower grade clerks and female employees, often with blue-collar social fam­
ily background, tended to become organized by unions that were more willing to approach 
the Socialist labour movement. It should be stressed that the white-collar salariat was dif­
ferentiated into many occupational and status groups spread across many sectors and 
placed within different ranks of authority lines. Therefore differences in organization pat­
terns were large between white-collar groups, between office clerks and technical employ­
ees, between shop assistants and bank clerks, not to speak of the differences in the public 
sector (see Chapter 8).
White-collar unionization became a wide-spread phenomenon only after the First World 
War, in the context of high unemployment and inflation, as well as a general social mobi­
lization that affected for the first time white-collar employees. In nearly all countries there 
was indeed a convergence to some degree of harmonious middle-class orientation and a 
more unionate labour movement. On the one hand, traditional associations became more 
"unionate", accepting the strike weapon. On the other, white-collar unions close to the blue- 
collar labour movement grew into mass organizations. Yet during the course of the inter­
war period, with the onset of the World economic crisis, white-collar employees in most 
countries resorted to status defense (see KOCKA 1981a), but particularly in Germany and 
Austria nationalist organizations regained in importance (see EBBIN G H AU S1988).
In union systems with craft-general unionism, many white-collar technical occupations 
(technicians and foremen) became organized parallel to blue-collar craft unions in occupa­
tional unions, some of which amalgamated with blue-collar crafts or became later sections 
of general unions. However, the more academic credentials and state careers were impor­
tant fom higher grade technicians the more he (sic!) opted for separate technical cadres or­
ganizations, particularly in Germany and France. Moreover, the more industrial unionism
4 Notably die German an ti-S em itic  protestant clerks asso c ia tio n  (DHV, 1893) and the French 
Catholic clerks asso c ia tio n  (SEQ, 1887), while in Britain and e ls e h w e re  a c tiv itie s  re m a in e d  lim m ite d  
to Christian y o u th  clubs.
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dominated, the more white-collar employees in industry tended to organize outside blue- 
collar unions. In the private service sector, particularly in distribution, blue-collar unions 
were less strongly organized, yet varied in their success to integrate sales girls and other 
lower grade clerks, at least outside the cooperative sector.5 Most of the learned professions 
and occupational associations (e.g. pharmacists, bankers) were organizations that often in­
cluded initially also self-employed and maintained harmonious labour relations.
Most strikingly, the collarline divisions of labour largely persisted after the Second World 
War. In the Austrian, German and Dutch case, where a rational postwar reconstruction was 
most deliberate and comprehensive, white-collar status cleavages proofed to be more per­
sistent than the religious or ideological cleavages. In Austria, one white-collar general 
union (GPA) organizes employees in the private sector within the unified OGB that applies 
otherwise the industrial principle. Although the industrial unions in Germany and the 
Netherlands extended their scope to white-collar employees, they were challenged by 
reappearing white-collar occupational and staff associations.
In the United Kingdom and Ireland, but also elsewhere, white-collar employees had 
been organized by staff associations (sectionalist company unions of higher grades), partic­
ularly in manufacturing offices, chemical industry laboratories, banking and insurances 
head offices. A number of federations of staff associations were formed in order to provide 
some loose coordination and representation on a national level. In the United Kingdom, 
staff associations failed as much as white-collar unions to federate successfully, instead a 
number of staff associations were swallowed by the aggressive merger policy of general 
white-collar unions, in particular the ASTMS (now: MSF) in the 1970s.
In the postwar years another generation of white-collar unions emerged, that is, profes­
sional (and academics) associations, mainly in the (semi-)public sector, and staff associations 
representing supervisory, managerial and technical staffs. Where they emerged they re­
mained usually outside the encompassing or white-collar union centres that had formed 
until then. In most countries that organized white-collar employees in encompassing or 
even industrial organizations, organization for technical, managerial and professional staff 
mushroomed in Western Europe. In Germany and France, these organizations of "Leitende 
Angestellte" or "cadres" date back to the interwar period (VELA 1919, CGCEF 1937), at the 
time when a surge in overall unionization and an extension of collective bargaining com­
pelled managerial employees to organize collectively, too. Similarly to France, the Italian 
line of white-collar fragmentation had been cut at a higher cadres level ("quadri", 
"dirigenti"), with their own independent associations. In Scandinavia, in addition to white- 
collar occupational and industrial unions, associations of professional employees 
(academics mainly), sometimes also open to independent professionals, grew rapidly in 
Sweden (SACO, 1947) in the 1950s, in Denmark (AC, 1962/1972) in the 1960s and in 
Norway (AF, 1974) in the 1970s following the extension of the public and semi-public 
(welfare) sector.
5 For instance the commercial unions in Scandinavia and Britain organized sales people, while 
German and Swiss commerce and transport unions failed to do so (cf. EBBINGHAUS1988).
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The Formation of W hite-Collar Union Centres
White-collar organizations even where they had gained some influence remained only 
loosely coordinated, if at all, at least until the First World War. In Germany and Austria, 
white-collar cartels emerged first as a pressure group for social policy of the prewar white- 
collar pension debate. Later these cartels that had been split on political lines formed 
standing committees that were the founding bloc for the Socialist white-collar union centre 
(Afa) in Germany and a Socialist white-collar section (within BFG) in Austria (see Table 
7.(?)). In a number of countries, the critical economic situation of white-collar employees, 
the general mobilization, and the recognition of blue-collar unions demanded some reac­
tion of the increasingly challenged white-collar organizations. The strategic choice for 
white-collar unions was to join an existing blue-collar movement or to go independent. 
However, this decision was very much contingent on the willingness of the Socialist (or 
other political) union movements to provide some autonomy to the white-collar minority 
within the union movement. Seen from the blue-collar union centre, four organization 
strategies emerged from the interwar period onwards: (1) a strategy of benign neglect to­
wards white-collar union organization with the consequence of the emergence of a sepa­
rate centre, (2) a gradual inclusion of unions for white-collar workers (particularly in lower 
grades), (3) a separate pillar within one movement, (4) a historic break for an encompassing 
labour movement with integration of white-collar employees within all-grades unions. With 
the exception of the last strategy, these adapted strategies rooted in the interwar years, 
when white-collar workers where still a small status-conscious minority.
First, in response to the benign neglect by manual labour separate white-collar organiza­
tion, mostly non-political union centres were formed in Switzerland (VSA, 1919) and 
Sweden (DACO, 1931,1944 merged with TCO). The blue-collar Swedish LO and Swiss SGB 
agreed to leave the organization of white-collar employees (outside the coop movement) to 
these other organizations. There was thus not much actual competition (they are on coop­
erative terms) and the blue-collar movement could maintain its working-class identity.
Second, the gradual inclusion and integration of white-collar unions into the Socialist (or 
other politico-relgious) confederations was attempted in Austria (1919 into BFG), Belgium, 
Britain, Ireland, and France, though with varying success in mobilizing white-collar em­
ployees. Moreover, in Denmark and Norway, white-collar employees, in particular lower 
grades, were organized in unions that eventually affiliated to the LO.6 In both countries, 
development of independent white-collar unionism was retarded in respect to Sweden, 
though civil servants had founded early on representative associations (see Chapter 8).
Third, one finds an intermediate (pillar) solution, in interwar Germany, where the 
Socialist white-collar unions (federated since 1917) formed a peak federation (AfA) which 
was not affiliated to the blue-collar confederation (ADGB), but was linked by a cooperation
6 The Danish (HK) and Norwegian commercial unions (NHK) affiliated during the 1930s, 
whereas in Sweden there were two unions (Handels, in coop movement), one with LO and the other 
(HF) cofounded DACO (cf. EBBINGHAUS 1988).
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Table 7.2
Socialist Party-Union Ties and White-Collar Union Strategy (1989)
Party- unio n  T ies 
(Party type)
Union strategy towards white-collar (private sector) employees (in %) 
All-grade S ectorial M ixed Inclusion Benign neglect
Institutional ties  
(modernized party)
Norwegian LO (11%) Swedish LO (9%) 
British TUC (<15%)
Irish ICTU (<12%)
historical ties  
(catch-all party)
German DGB (15%) Belgian FGTB (18%) * Swiss SGB (2%) 
Dutch N W /F N V  (14%) Austrian ÖGB (22%) *
Danish LO (17%) *
W eak ties  
(middle-dass party)
French FO (<15%) 
Italian UIL (<15%)
NOTE: (<) upper limit (British, Irish, French and Italian figures estimated); (*) include large white-collar 
general unions.
agreement. In the Liberal and National-Christian camp separate white-collar federations 
emerged as well, with loosely coupled co-operation arrangements with their blue-collar 
sister federations.7
Fourth, some union centres change to encompassing all-grades unionism, though not 
without costs in terms of organizational competition and lower unionization rates. The 
German (and gradually the Dutch) union movement attempted to integrate white-collar 
unions not only within a non-unified union centre but within industrial all-grades unions, 
risking the split-away of white-collar peak associations (DAG from DGB in 1949, MHP 
from merging FNV in 1974).8 This had an impact on the long-term cohesion and mainte­
nance of solidaristic principles forwarded by (male) blue-collar unionism within theses 
union centres.
We can detect a relationship between the degree of integration of white-collar unions 
within the Socialist movement and the degree to which the industrial union principle has 
been enforced (see Table 72). Hence, the organization of white-collar employees, the trans­
formation of the white-blue collar cleavage into union organization was partly contingent on 
the previous strategic decisions taken in respect to the craft-industry cleavage (see Chapter
6). In countries with a craft-based union structure and with separate occupational organi­
zations for white-collar employees outside the confines of all-grades industrial unions, 
white-collar unions were more easily allied to the main union confederation, though per­
haps difficult to integrate, like in Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Ireland, Norway. On
7 Within the Christian-German National movement the white-collar organization were domi­
nantly Protestant while the blue-collar unions were Catholic (see EBBINGHAUS 1988)
8 Similar plans within the ÖGB did not materialize, once the white-collar affiliate (GPA) had 
consolidated during the 1950s.
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the other hand, in countries with already strong industrial union affiliates white-collar 
unions - if they had the means to do so - tended to organize separately, as in Germany, 
Sweden, Netherlands, and Switzerland.
State and Employer Collarline Policies
Historically, the collarline was particularly pronounced in countries where social policy 
was tailored to status groups, as in Germany and Austria (cf. SPEIER 1934, KOCKA 1981a, 
ESPING-ANDERSEN & KORPI1985). In these countries social policy was initially a reaction to 
the Arbeiterfrage (the manual workers' question), the rising blue-collar workforce that in­
creasingly was drawn into the Socialist labour movement and demanded extensive political 
and social rights. The Angestelltenfrage (the salaried employees' question) became immanent 
after the turn of the century, when white-collar employees were an increasing but crucial 
middle-class electorate (Austria 1907, Germany 1911 elections), that saw its former social 
status endangered. Moreover, the white-collar scheme was falling between the workers 
welfare schemes that were unable to guarantee a continuation of the 'respectable' middle- 
class life style, while they were excluded from the favourable state protection of civil ser­
vants. On the other hand, where social policy was based on universalistic citizenship prin­
ciples, such as in Britain and Sweden, status divisions were mainly based on management 
policies. Before white-collar employment became a mass phenomena, employers used rule- 
and-divide strategies at the workplace by special treatment of white-collar employees in re­
turn for a special subdued service.
In Germany, the different corporative schemes promoted collarline divisions and mobi­
lized white-collar organizations to press for their continuation, reinforcing the formation of 
the collarline cleavage (cf. EBBINGHAUS 1988).9 Even in countries where universalistic social 
policy schemes were introduced, superannuation can become a dividing issue, as in 
Scandinavia. Moreover, favourable firm schemes for white-collar employees were also es­
tablished, particularly in Britain and Switzerland, yet without much coordination.
The state intervened further in behalf of white-collar employees in regulating terms of 
employment and industrial relations (cf. EBBINGHAUS 1988:15-7). In a number of countries, 
special dismissal notices for white-collar employees were legislated between the two wars 
and later extended as a consequence of increased unemployment.10 While blue-collar 
unions were able to struggle for favourable conditions on their own, white-collar employ­
ees lacked collective strength and demanded therefore state protection since traditional 
rights were increasingly endangered by economic crisis and rapid expansion of service 
work into new fields. Moreover, as white-collar employees lacked collective strength in
9 The issue of separate status-group or universalistic welfare scheme sdll divides the German 
DAG from the DGB, though both organizations are led by SPD members.
10 Special dismissal notices of at least six weeks and often increasing to several month after stip­
ulated years of service were introduced in the interwar period (Austria, 1921, Germany, 1926, 
Denmark, 1938) and are still statutory (similar rules apply also in Belgium, France, and Switzerland) 
(cf. BLANPAIN 1977, EBBINGHAUS 1988).
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terms of unionization and strike proneness, the state intervened on their behalf and granted 
special provisions in collective bargaining and workplace representation.11 With the partial 
exception of Sweden, the special social protection of white-collar employees has been par­
ticularly important in countries in which the collartine cleavage became important within 
the labour movement. This is a mutually reinforcing process. In societies where early social 
status division existed special interest organizations emerged propagating state (and em­
ployers) intervention on their behalf that once implemented reinforced the dientelistic 
pressure group politics along the collarline cleavage even further.
II
W h ite-C ollar  U n io n iz a t io n
Historically, white-collar employees, particularly in the private sector, were commonly 
known to be less inclined to join a collective organization, and if so to choose one of a less 
contentious character than blue-collar unions. White-collar organizations have become 
more contentious or "unionate" over time and in some countries white-collar employees are 
organized within industrial unions. However, white-collar unionization is still lagging be­
hind blue-collar workers and public employees. Yet some forms of organization have 
proven to be more effective in mobilizing white-collar employees. Quite similar to blue- 
collar workers, there exist two strategies of occupational and class solidarity. Professional 
dosure and collective promotion unions can be singled out as two different mobilization 
strategies for white-collar employees. Again, these strategies are only successful under 
some circumstances that favour professionalization or collective solidarity. Further factors 
in the work, employment and sodal situation of white-collar employees and other orga­
nizing conditions will be discussed as variables affecting white-collar unionization.
P rofessional Closure or Collective Promotion Unionism
From the early days of white-collar unionization two strategies of mobilization emerged 
that correspond to two different modes of boundary setting. Like closed and open union­
ism that provides the different principles of craft unions and industrial unionism (see 
Chapter 6), a similar difference between sodal dosure and indusive mobilization emerged for 
white-collar employees, too. "Professional associations are nothing more than craft unions 
for educated labour. They pursue the same sort of limitation of supply which craft unions 
attempt, albeit more successfully. In particular professions have achieved legal closure to a 
degree undreamed of by skilled craft workers (STEPHENS 1979: 46)." On the other hand, 
white-collar employees that worked in jobs which became increasingly bureaucratized, 
standardized, and interchangeable, could only hope to gain from an encompassing strategy
11 Special arbitration procedures were granted in Germany, Sweden, Denmark and special 
workplace representation rights in Austria, Belgium, Germany (cf. BLANPAIN 1977, EBBINGHAUS 
1988).
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of open unionism and collective promotion. Service workers, such as sales people, office 
clerks, draughtsmen, are forced to combine on a large scale, encompassing all employees 
within the same sector to prevent wage competition by the unorganized.
As in the case of craft unions, professional associations could base their strength on mo­
nopolization of control over the work and closure of entry to the profession. Like appren­
ticeship in the trades, white-collar employees had to have on-the-job training, if not aca­
demic credentials were required. In the latter case, professional associations sought to self- 
regulate professional standards or influence statutory regulation. In so far, these organiza­
tions provide a collective good to their members, regulating competition within the profes­
sion and from outside. Professional associations provide thus an important function in job 
certification and govern thereby mobility into the occupation (STINCHCOMBE 1990: 261-5). 
That these professional employees can indeed have some degree of job control and monop­
olize access is to some degree a result of the uncertainty problem that employers face 
(STINCHCOMBE 1990). Non-standardized service work, quite different to productive labour, 
cannot be accumulated and measured by efficiency standards but only by its long-term ef­
fectiveness (BERGER & OFFE 1981: 40), instead of output control only by input control (e.g. 
office hours in large administrations). Professional associations can provide collective 
goods for their members in form of access control and provide thus an incentive for mem­
bership. However, different to the blue-collar workers, professionals are not as much de­
pendent on a collective strategy to advancement, they "are powerful enough within the 
labour market because of the scarcity of their skills, but who also gain considerable advan­
tages from joining a professional association (CROUCH 1982: 69)". White-collar unions differ 
in respect to the importance of professional skills for a service job and the need for collec­
tive protection in lack of individual advancement possibilities (cf. SCHEUER 1986, CROUCH 
1982: 67-8).
On the other hand, open unionism can only be a successful mobilization strategy when 
favourable social and organizational conditions are given. Bureaucratization at the work­
place provides a favourable climate for collective organization, since lower grade employ­
ees have only channelled and reduced individual mobility chances and uniform, imperson­
ally regulated working conditions (LOCKWOOD 1958: 141-2). LOCKWOOD has argued that 
"bureaucratization represents a set of conditions extremely favourable to the growth of 
collective action among clerical workers. It is not too much to argue that in fostering black- 
coated solidarity buraucratization has played a role analogous to that of the factory and 
labour market in the case of manual workers. (LOCKWOOD 1958:142)". This is a mutual re­
inforcing process, "as bureaucratization provides fertile ground for unionization, so union­
ization, once established, leads to further bureaucratization by its demands for uniformity 
of working conditions (LOCKWOOD 1958: 142)." Historically, male clerical workers, for in­
stance, organized in status defence against female employment12, but had to realize in the
12 With the growth of clerical work, feminization increased constantly and provoked initially a 
status defense reaction of male clerks and latter recognition that only the organization of the lower
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long run that only an inclusive strategy could prevent salary competition. Open union­
ization through collective advancement is a viable mobilization strategy, yet it is contingent 
on a collectivizing employment situation and on union recognition of white-collar union 
activities (BAIN 1970).
Hence, there are two forms of organization, professional closure and collective promo­
tion, that both can provide the basis for white-collar unionization. This may explain why 
there are two contradicting hypothesis in the literature about social structuration and 
white-collar union growth (cf. B a IN, C o a t e s  &  ELUS 1973), for instance, Sturmthal's sum­
mary account of Western white-collar unionization amasses partly contradictory explana­
tions (STURMTHAL 1966b). One school of thought, claims that unionization increases with 
the declining social position, or over time, with proletarianization (KUNGENDER 1935). The 
other assumes the inverse relationship, that white-collar unionization increases with status 
position and the degree of professionalization (K a s s a l o w  1965). The contradiction between 
the two hypothesis can be resolved, if we take account of the variations in organization that 
intervene in a social structural explanation of union growth. Thus unionization depends on 
the possibility and availability of professional closure in the case of higher grade white- 
collar employees, or on a open service union that can provide collective advancement in the 
case of lower grade white-collar employees.
COLLARLINE DIFFERENCES IN UNION DENSITY
According to Sturmthal, who summarized the findings of a comparative study on white- 
collar unionization in 1966, "white-collar employees are organized best where unionism in 
general is strong" (STURMTHAL 1966b: 376, italics removed). Similarly, Kassalow formulated 
as a general rule for Western Europe, that "it is probable that the higher the percentage of 
blue-collar unionism in a country, the higher the percentage of white-collar unionism" 
(K a s s a l o w  1969: 196). The thesis on a "spill-over effect" is largely based on cursory com­
parison in lack of systematic studies.13 In fact, white-collar union density is comparatively 
higher in countries with a relatively high degree of blue-collar unionization (see Table 7.4), 
though these figures include public sector employees. There is, however, a considerable 
variation in the ratio of white-collar to blue-collar union density across countries. In some 
countries the difference between white-collar and blue-collar union density is small (a ratio 
close to one), while in others it is marked (Austria, Germany, United Kingdom and 
Sweden). Yet in recent years union density of white-collar employees has approached the 
figures for blue-collar workers more closely and in the Netherlands and Norway it is even 
equal.
paid female workers could provide a solution to the salary competition (see "Postscript" to 1989 edi­
tion, Lo c k w o o d  1958:222)
13 Due to lack of comparable data evidence is more impressionistic, cf. BEYME 1977: 46-7; 
St u r m t h a l  1966: 376; Ka ssa lo w  1969: 196, for newer comparisons see: Ba in  & PRICE 1980, 
Eb b in g h a u s  1988, V isser 1989,1990.
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Table 7.3
White-Collar Union Density, Western Europe (1900-85)
AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
White-collar density (%)
1900 14 *15
1913 42 *40 *25 12
1920 66 15 19 7 52 43 2 22 26 26
1930 65 18 10 50 36 3 26 30 22
1950 53 *28 44 34 36 12 51 38 33
1970 50 *38 55 22 26 34 59 62 26 36
1985 51 79 28 25 62 71 34 45
NOTE: (*) private sector only; FR 1940*1937
SOURCE: BE and 1900-13: own calculations; 1920-85: Labour force based on Flora , Kraus & 
PFENNING 1987; VlSSER 1989
Seen from an institutional perspective, one can interpret the spill-over effect, the corre­
spondingly high or low level of union density in the two status groups, by reference to the 
existence or lack of institutional arrangements (e.g. labour legislation) which are favourable 
to the organization of both blue-collar as well as white-collar labour. There exists a 
favourable climate of industrial relations in the Nordic countries which fostered also the 
organization of white-collar workers. Oonce union membership is accepted in a firm it will 
be more difficult to deny the same right to white-collar employees. Thus on a sector level 
one could argue that once a union organizes already the core blue-collar workforce in a 
given industry or workplace it will be more capable of organizing marginal group>s (i.e. 
white-collar employees) - even against the resistance of employers. Yet this may be limited 
to those systems were blue-collar unions organize white-collar employees or are friendly to 
separate organizations. On a societal level, however, there is also an indirect effect of 
unionization, as blue-collar unionization compels other groups in society to become orga­
nized (cf. KASSALOW 1965: 38). The proximity to blue-collar workers can also be a favourable 
condition to the organization of white-collar employees. In Austria and Sweden, for exam­
ple, factory supervisors (foremen) are well organized, partly due to their proximity to blue- 
collar workers at the shop floor. Furthermore, factory supervisor are mainly recruited from 
skilled blue-collar workers who have been already exposed to a pro-union environment 
and their particular contentious situation between management and rank-and-file forces 
them to become organized as well (cf. KASSALOW 1965:42-6).
How can we explain the lower level of white-collar employees, particularly in the pri­
vate sector, to join a collective organization? Studies often advanced the arguements based 
on individual choice, however, this is difficult to prove by comparing aggregate statistics. 
Nevertheless, one can reason that a number of structural factors intervene in the unknown 
individual decision process, they create or define the situation in which decisions to join or 
leave a union take place. One of the most prominent factors correlating with inter-industrial 
differences in union density refers to the concentration of employment. An economy of
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scale effect in a union's recruitment efforts increase with the size of an employment site. 
"Organizing small groups of members or individual members in different establishments is 
difficult and costly" (STURMTHAL 1966b: 379). In fact, historically and still in some sector, 
white-collar employees are spread across small employment sites and are therefore difficult 
to organize, for instance, unionization among assistants in small shops is low compared to 
employees in large insurance offices. Moreover, with the size of the establishment, as 
Lockwood has pointed out, bureaucratic administration becomes dominant. This in turn is 
a more favourable climate to union organization compared to "paternalist" administration 
of face-to-face employer-employee interaction (LOCKWOOD 1958:141-2). Thus the size effect 
due to organizational and situational factors seems to foster white-collar unionization, 
while collective organization in small places remains unlikely.14
Historically, white-collar employees often shunned collective action in the hope for indi­
vidual advancement, though the chances for upward mobility have become more limited, 
notably for female and lower level clerks. As C.W. Mills observed, "there is a close associa­
tion between the feeling that one cannot get ahead, regardless of the reason, and a pro­
union attitude" (MILLS 1951: 307). As white-collar workers are subject to a career "block’ 
there is a strong tendency to organize collectively. "The existence of career "blocks' (so- 
called balkanisation), undoubtedly is the major factor influencing unionisation among 
those of superior market capacity." (GlDDENS 1981: 191). Therefore, one can expect career 
blockage and therefore unionization to increase with bureaucratization and size (cf. also 
LOCKWOOD 1958: 141-2). Unionization is the more desirable the more employees are de­
pendent on collective action and the more such action may be successful in improving their 
working and living conditions (cf. CROUCH 1982; cf. MÜLLER-JENTSCH 1986: 83).
With the extension of white-collar employment more and more grades and occupations 
became subject of collectively determined standardized job description, grading systems, 
salary schemes and employment regulations. This has also been part of the strategy of trade 
unions to include as many grades as possible under the jurisdiction of collective agree­
ments, while employers and some higher echelons of employees prefer the individual fix­
ing of contracts. The late and separate organization of professional and managerial staff (or 
cadres), reflects the more common individual employment regulation of that group.
The importance of union recognition for the explanation of white-collar unionization has 
been underscored by G.S. Bain for Britain (BaIN 1970). Yet it is useful to differentiate be­
tween union recognition by the state, the employer associations or individual employers.15 
A recognition by the employer association or the state may not automatically yield to union 
recognition at the workplace, sometimes employers in services were not members of the
14 A British study provides evidence that "establishment size increases the probability of unioni­
sation increases but at a decreasing rate” (BAIN & Elias 1985: 82). Similar results are supported by 
German surveys that show among salaried employees the unionization but also proneness to join in­
creases with the size of the establishment (cf. Infas survey 1981,1985,1986).
15 Historically, union recognition by German employers associations (1918) and legislation in 
Scandinvian countries in the 1930s, have been decisive for the wave in white-collar unionization in 
the interwar period.
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industrial employers association, or the associations were to weak to compel member com­
panies to follow peak agreements. Thus completeness and membership discipline are im­
portant factors to "top-down" union recognition, and as a popular saying goes, "if even the 
bosses need an organization they can hardly refuse that right to their employees" 
(KASSALOW 1965: 42). Yet, in service sector, such as commerce and finance, employer asso­
ciations had a lower level of coordination and centralization had a diverse structure and 
was at distance from industrial employers, in fact, various employer associations existed 
without much coordination in these sectors.16 Once blue-collar unions are recognized, 
management will be in a more difficult situation to refuse the right of organization to 
white-collar employees. Yet, a direct "spill-over*' effect in non-manual dominated services is 
unlikely. In general, union recognition by management is likely to correlate with employ­
ment concentration, that is, the smaller the establishment the more prevail patriarchal em- 
ployer-employee relations which are hostile to union organization. On the other hand, 
some large scale enterprises have aimed at undermining union activities by introducing 
their own staff associations.
Several other factors related to the structure and character of the labour market have 
been noted as hampering unionization. Labour turnover, more associated with female em­
ployment or part time employment, and small, private firms, for instance in commerce, 
hampers unionization, too. Part-time employees, often female employees, may not expect a 
substantial return from their union membership, nor have they been much welcomed by 
traditional unions which feared undermining of full employment conditions. Although 
unionization between female and male employees varies considerably, this is often more 
the result of gender specific job differences than unionateness, in fact, there are no more 
significant gender differences in unionization in Denmark where part-time workers are rel­
ative well organized.17
Compulsory membership, such as in a "closed shop" or "union shop" are relative un­
common in white-collar occupations, with the notable exceptions in the highly unionized 
co-operative companies, were check-off agreements are also very common. Where white- 
collar organization had successfully pressed for subsidized occupational welfare schemes, 
there was an additional incentive to join a union. In contrast to blue-collar worker, as long 
as white-collar employees were rarely strike prone and had a more limited risk of job-loss, 
unemployment and strike insurance were rare and a particular incentive. A very common 
union service were special white-collar vocational education, some were later co-financed 
by the state (for instance, in France, Germany and Switzerland). In Denmark, Sweden and 
Belgium, the high level of white-collar unionization can be attributed to the union-con-
16 The cooperative movements in commerce and finance, given their close link to the union 
movement, were amongst the earliest recognized unions and are still the best organized (cf. 
E b b in g h a u s  1988).
17 Scandinavian unions have developed more recently particular recruitment strategies for part- 
time workers, e.g. over 25% of all office members in Danish HK are part-time employees in the 1980s 
(cf. LO reports).
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Table 7.4
Collartine Differences in Union Density in Western Europe
Country Year
Blue-
collar
White-
collar Ratio Year
Blue- White- 
collar collar Ratio Year
Blue- White- 
collar collar Ratio
Austria 1930 (31%) (53%) 1961 71% 52% 1.4 1985 65% 51% U
Denmark 1930 36% 18% 2.1 1960 65% 53% 1.2 1984 87% 79% 1.1
France 1930 7% 10% . 1975 21% 22% 1.0
Germany 1925 30% 33% 0.9 1961 36% 28% 1.3 1985 40% 28% 1.4
Britain 1931 25% 22% 1.4 1964 53% 30% 1.8 1979 63% 44% 1.4
Netherlands 1930 25% 36% 0.7 1960 42% 39% 1.1 1985 23% 25% 0.9
Norway 1930 20% 3% 6.7 1960 60% 55% 1.1 1985 61% 62% 1.0
Sweden 1930 39% 26% . 1960 80% 54% 1.5 1985 92% 71% 1.3
Switzerland 1930 22% 29% 0.8 1960 35% 34% 1.0 1980 40% 34% 1.2
NOTE: Ratio: blue-collar density divided by white-collar density.
SOURCE: own calculations based on V isser 1989; Bain & Price 1980; 1983.
trolled unemployment schemes (see Chapter 6), at least since unemployment became an 
actual risk for white-collar employees, too.
Access to the workplace is also crucial for recruiting white-collar employees (cf. A d a m s  
1975). In the German-speaking countries as well as in Belgium special provisions guarantee 
white-collar employees separate representation or voting procedures. The shop stewards 
play an important role in union-member contacts, not only by recruiting members but also 
by maintaining direct contact with these members. However, in the private service sector, 
one finds representative workplace structures only in larger or medium sized employment 
sites, like insurance head offices, bank institutes and larger outlets, department stores, su­
permarket chains and larger shops.
Summing up, evidence supports the observation that union density of white-collar em­
ployees falls behind the level of unionization amongst blue-collar workers (see STURMTHAL 
1966a; BAIN & PRICE 1980; VISSER 1990). In most countries, the majority option of white- 
collar workers, in the private sector, has been to stay away from unions altogether 
(EBBINCHAUS 1988). However, there are several indicators that suggest that the collarline 
lost its significance in society as well as in politics. This is probably true also for unioniza­
tion - especially if we differentiate between industrial sectors, within blue-collar and white- 
collar occupations and take account of levels of skill, location in the internal labour market 
of larger firms or the public sector, and the position in the authority structure. With white- 
collar growth and the blurring of the collarline, the structural problems of white-collar 
unionization have not ended, nor have the lines of conflict subsided but are redrawn on a 
somewhat higher level in the hierarchy. Instead of the old line between the initially numer­
ous blue-collar workers and the white-collar employees through social policy legislation 
and employers' personnel policies, conflicts emerge between the mass of lower white-collar 
occupations and higher grades or professions with particular educational credentials. Let 
us consider now the impact of the collarline fragmentation on interest representation.
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Table 7.5
Number of All-Grades and White-Collar Unions in Private Sector (1950,1985)
1950 AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
Overall 16 32 119 33 109 327 125 156 66 720
private sector 12 21 30 13 26 117 38 56 25 174
all grades 10 18 5 9 4 52 14 21 9 13
white-collar 2 3 25 4 22 65 24 35 16 161
1985
Overall 15 40 129 82 80 65 236 148 75 72 286
private sector 11 23 54 32 25 32 65 44 39 29 124
all grades 9 17 3 14 3 26 12 13 17 11 10
white-collar 2 6 51 18 22 6 53 31 22 18 114
NOTE: Number of unions includes locals; all countries 1950 or 1985, except for DE: 1953, GE: 1951, 
NO: 1956;
SOURCE: own calculations based on DUES database.
m
Fr o m  Sec tio n a lism  T o  Service U n io n s
White-collar unions amplify union diversity and are a major challenge to labour unity. The 
separation of collarline interests had some advantages for class solidarity within each 
sphere, but hampered unity between the two groups. The wave of foundation of small, sec­
tional white-collar unions multiplied centrifugal tendencies and amplified fragmentation 
within labour movements, at a time when the blue-collar union movement was about to 
consolidate its structure. But the same pressures toward centralization and coordination as 
in the case of blue-collar movements operated as well, albeit later and more slowly. White- 
collar union centres remained less centralized and empowered, they remained more inter­
nally fragmented than the blue-collar unions. Moreover, white-collar unions were less 
likely to have close links with a political party, particular a left party, given the more het­
erogeneous political orientations of their members. It will be argued that there is a relation­
ship between political alignment and white-collar unionism, the closer the political linkage, 
the less likely it will be that white-collar employees will join and the more likely there is 
room for a separate union.
Union Structure and W hite-Collar U nions
White-collar unions since their wave of foundation in the 1920s amplify union diversity. 
The process of fragmentation was not completed in the early postwar period, new organi­
zations emerged, while some white-collar employees became integrated by all encompass­
ing union centres or even unions. The highest fragmentation in terms of a large number of 
sectionalist white-collar unions are found in Britain with over 100 unions, but also in
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Table 7.6
Membership Share (%) of All-Grades and White-Collar Unions in Private Sector (1950,1985)
1950 AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
Overall 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
private sector 70.8 68.5 23.2 715 15.9 72.3 61.4 67.1 61.9 26.7
all grades 58.5 58.5 7.7 64.3 4.7 63.9 49.4 55.8 45.0 16.1
white-colar 12.3 10.0 15.5 72 11.2 8.4 12.0 11.3 16.9 10.6
1985
Overa» 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
private sector 64.9 64.5 375 64.7 15.8 57.1 512 45.3 53.0 60.9 22.1
all grades 43.1 45.7 4.9 53.3 1.6 545 40.1 28.6 33.7 405 6.0
white-collar 21.8 18.8 32.6 11.4 142 2.6 11.1 16.7 19.3 20.4 16.1
NOTE: all countries 1950, except for DE: 1953, GE: 1951, NO: 1956 
SOURCE: own calculations based on DUES database.
Denmark and the Netherlands with over 50 unions (see Table 7.5). A large number of sepa­
rate white-collar unions can be found in countries in which these unions have been able to 
set up their own confederations, outside the traditional main labour movements (Denmark, 
Norway, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland), except for United Kingdom where such at­
tempts have failed. In Austria and Belgium, white-collar workers were organized sepa­
rately by general white-collar unions (GPA; SECTA, LBC) within the main union confeder­
ations (OGB; FGTB, CSC). In Germany, given the strict industrial unionism principle 
adapted by the DGB in 1949, a cross-sector white-collar union (DAG) decided to organize 
outside the DGB instead of splitting up and merging with industrial unions. With the 
rather uniform increase in the white-collar salariat across Western Europe the patterns of 
organization have not become more alike in contrast to the thesis of convergence in indus­
trial relations (see KERR 1960,1983). Instead, the differences between countries seem to have 
been growing - Denmark being the most striking example of white-collar sectional interest 
organization. In Austria and Belgium, the growth of the general white-collar unions to one 
of the largest affiliates has added to internal conflict within each union movement. 
Fragmentation due to white-collar sectionalism has been relative common in all countries in 
the 1950s, ranking between 7% to 17% of total membership but 35 years later it had in­
creased to between one-third in fragmented systems (Denmark) and 10% in countries with 
all encompassing unions (Germany, Netherlands) (see Table 7.6).
In order to evaluate the relative weight of separate interest representation for white-col­
lar employees we can look at the measure of assodational monopoly among white-collar em­
ployees (see Table 7.8). In the interwar years, when white-collar employment started to be­
come a considerable share of the work force, the Austrian Free union centre (BFG) was 
most successful in integrating white-collar unions, granting the previously independent 
white-collar occupational unions a special "section" status. In Germany, the organization of 
white-collar employees in a collateral Socialist white-collar federation (AfA) was in the
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Table 7 .7
W hite-Collar Membership and Major Union within Major Union Centre
AU BE OE GE IR IT NE NO SW UK
Union Centre: ÔGB FGTB CSC LO DGB ICTU CISL FNV LO LO TUC
Membership share (%)
1950 12.3 5.9 . 9.6 5.4 . . 9.2 7.6 72 .
1970 18.4 10.6 . 14.1 9.0 15.7 8.8 8.8 (10.0)
1989 21.7 175 • 15.7 14.7 • • 13.4 9.7 9.4
Major Union: GPASETCA LBN HK HBV IDATU FIBA DIBO NHK Hand. MSF
Membership share (%)
1950 10.7 5 S 8.5 7$ 1.4 9.3 . 5.3 5.9 6.9 .
1970 17.3 8.4 9.4 15.7 2.3 4.3 6.4 7.1 7.6 .
1989 20.7 14.9 18.6 22.7 S2 3.7 2.1 13.9 7.6 12.5 73
rank 1st 4th 1st 1st 6th 5th • 4th 3rd 4th 5th
Note: White-collar private sector membership; Ranking of affiliates by membership share within union 
centre; BE: SETCA 1987; LNB incl. CNE; OE: HK incl. public sector; GB: MSF 1988; IR: 1950: CIU.
course of the Weimar Republic more and more contested by two - Liberal and Nationalist - 
rival white-collar movements. In Switzerland, the neutral white-collar federation VSA re­
ceived large support but could not over the long run absorb the independent white-collar 
unions and staff associations - in particularly not in banking, and in the public sector. In the 
Scandinavian countries, while the LO’s - especially in Denmark and Norway - have at­
tracted clerical and other groups of white-collar employees in the public sector, the majority 
of organized white-collar employees have combined in independent federations. In France, 
Italy and Belgium white-collar unionism was more successful within the Christian labour 
movement, except in the case of technicians.
The measure of associational monopoly (see Table 7.8) shows the postwar differences in 
the capacity of the main union federations to integrate white-collar workers. In Austria, all 
organized white-collar employees are either member of the general white-collar union in 
the private sector or member of all-grades (industrial) public sector unions. In Britain the 
overlarge majority of organized white-collar employees are in the main union federation 
(TUC), but they remain in separate unions and are poorly integrated. Although the inter- 
war cleavages have not been successfully overcome by the creation of an encompassing in­
dustrial union centre in Germany, the DGB does nonetheless represent more than half of all 
organized white-collar workers and has successfully fought out the competition from the 
general white-collar union (DAG), except in the service sector. In Denmark and Norway, 
the major labour organization have increased their share in white-collar unionization to 
over 40%. In the Netherlands the main federations, especially the Christian one, have in­
creased their share in white-collar unionization mainly in the (semi-)public sector, but rival 
public and private white-collar organizations have mushroomed, too. In Sweden and
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Switzerland, the benign neglect of the Swedish LO and the Swiss SGB becomes increasingly 
precarious as blue-collar employment declines relative to white-collar employment.
Coordination among Fragmented Unions
Since white-collar unionization in the private sector falls behind blue-collar workers, the 
question arises how can white-collar interests become voiced within an all encompassing 
union centre or through a rival separate union movement? Within the major encompassing 
unions, the membership (and share of delegates) of white-collar unions is constantly 
growing (see Table 7.7). Although, white-collar membership is thus still below one-quarter 
of a confederations membership, they tend to be concentrated in special general or service 
workers unions that have grown in size. In some countries, white-collar (quasi) general 
unions, that organize all white-collar occupations across most private sectors, have grown 
to importance within the major union centres. The white-collar general unions have become 
the largest single affiliate within the Austrian OGB, the Belgian Catholic CSC and Danish 
LO (organizing one-sixth of all members), they are third or fourth in the Belgian Socialist 
FGTB, Dutch FNV and Norwegian LO, while in the other cases they ranked 5th or 6th and 
organized only a smaller share of membership. These unions were either general white- 
collar unions (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Britain) or service workers unions in 
commerce and allied trades (Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden) including also few 
blue-collar workers.
When blue-collar union centres accepted white-collar unions or even became truly en­
compassing movements the question arose how were the special interests of the white-col- 
lar unions and members accommodated. In Britain, the TUC provided white-collar unions 
until 1981 group representation on its General Council via two "trade" groups (secondary 
and tertiary sector) besides two sections for public employees and civil servants.18 This 
'archaic' system of trade group representation that was remnant of the 1920’s hope for in­
dustrial unionism, was changed in 1982 to a new system that acknowledged the increased 
role of "super" unions (including MSF) and medium sized white-collar unions (e.g. finance 
union).19 In comparison, the German DGB with its all-grades industrial unions has pro­
vided some special recognition of white-collar employee representation by special con­
gresses and a special union secretary at the level of the union centre and its affiliates. 
However, again white-collar employees, particularly in private sector, remain underrepre­
sented with half the unionization rate of blue-collar workers.
18 For instance, on the 1970 TUC Congress, 45 white-collar unions with two million members 
(more than one-half in the public sector) were representing one-fifth of membership and 8 out of 37 
General Council seats, while white-collar employment was about 45% at the time. However, a num­
ber of general and mixed unions encompassed a white-collar membership, sometimes granted spe­
cial section status (700.000 members and 20 General Council seats, cf. L u m l e y  1973: App. 1-4).
19 The new 1982 system gives 'automadty' in representation for larger unions (above 100.000 
members) and some minority small union representation plus extra female delegates (cf. M a k sy m iw  
1990:7,12-13).
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Outside the encompassing labour movements, the coordination of the many, fragmented 
white-collar organizations was a long process and an evolution of their representative 
functions. The earliest common activities before the First World War were social policy 
committees that coordinated pressure group politics vis-a-vis the state. With recognition of 
white-collar unions as collective bargaining partner after the First World War, white-collar 
union centres (Germany, Switzerland) provided some form of coordination though only 
few matched the more centralized union centres. During the Weimar Republic, the three 
white-collar union centres (Af A, Ring, Gedag) were loose coordination structures (also with 
aligned blue-collar union centres) but especially in the Liberal and Christian-National 
camp, the main white-collar general union dominated union relations. The foundation of 
white-collar centres in Scandinavia since the 1930s was mainly a reaction to the increasing 
centralization of the major union centre in its incorporation into policy making and collec­
tive bargaining.
Still today white-collar confederations are less centralized and have less authority over 
their affiliates, particularly no right to collective bargaining. This is partly a consequence of 
the large fragmentation into many occupational unions and sometimes some larger general 
unions. Historically, white-collar unions were much less strike-prone and therefore had less 
need for a central strike fund and common action platforms. As long as pressure group 
politics was the main task for white-collar union centres, a loose coordination and a small 
consultative staff sufficed. However, the situation changed with increasing importance of 
collective bargaining, and particularly when blue-collar unions showed success in negoti­
ating wage increases and employment conditions that white-collar employees had been 
granted by employers or state unilaterally. New forms of cooperation with blue-collar 
unions or bargaining cartels of white-collar unions (like PTK in Sweden) were established 
to coordinate union positions prior to and during negotiations. In some countries, larger 
white-collar unions that had long adhered to an occupational principle in internal organi­
zation remodelled their structure to fit bargaining by industry (e.g. Dutch unions and 
German DAG unions in the 1970s).
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Table 7.8
Associational Monopoly among White-Collar Employees, Western Europe 1920-85
Membership in % of all white-collar members
Confederation 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1985
AU Socialist BFG ÔGB 66 55 100 100 100 100 100
Catholic ZKCG 7 16 -
BE Socialist FGTB 26 28 32 32 40
Christian ACV . . 74 72 68 68 60
Liberal CGSLB • • • • « • • •
DE Socialist LO 11 16 70 43 40 42 46 48
employees FTF . . 38 34 31 28
staff AC • • • • 6 7 8 7
GE Socialist Ala DGB 48 30 62 49 53 61 62
Christian Gedag CGB 29 35 - - 4 4 4 4
employees GDA DAG 18 25 - 21 18 15 12 12
civil service DBB • • - 15 25 23 20 19
NE Socialist NW FNV 10 19 19 24 24 31 44 43
Catholic KNV 6 4 9 12 14 12
Protestant CNV 6 7 10 12 13 12 18 21
staff MHP 6 13 13
civil service AC * 7 6 6 12 11
NO Socialist L0 • * • 44 48 45 43
employees YS . . . 17 18
staff AF - (6) 12 13
SW Socialist LO 32 37 34 28 25 21 18 18
employees DACO TCO . (59) 64 66 69 65 68
staff SR SACO • • (6) 9 10 11 12 14
SZ Socialist SGB 6 11 16 19 17 16 15 16
Catholic CNG 0 1 1 2 3 3 3 4
employees VSA 74 60 53 41 44 43 41 42
UK Labour TUC * * * 54 65 • 84 •
SOURCE: adapted from Vis s e r  1990: Table 7.21; and DUES database 1991
From Social Poucy to Collective Bargaining
Social policy has reinforced collarline differences not only in terms of social distinctions but 
also in respect to organizational impacts. Social insurance schemes and their administration 
can provide an important incentive to sectionalist collarline interest politics.20 Moreover,
20 in Germany, social insurance funds are self-administred, white-collar sickness funds can pro­
vide more favourable schemes since they cover less occupational risks. Moreover, social insurance 
elections provided a means to sectionalist professional politics, thus the German DAG not only has
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elections to works councils and other statutory participation committees provide in some 
countries special representation status to white-collar employees (Germany, Austria, 
Belgium) or to cadres (France). These institutions with their separate representation modes 
thus reinforced the social division and provided ample possibility for interest organizations 
to exploit sectionalist interest representation to legitimatize and promote their organiza­
tional separation.
The labour interests are also split along the collarline, in respect to income (wage) policy, 
industrial relations, and social policy. This caused particular strains on common positions 
within union centres and conflicts of interest representation vis-a-xns party and state. Since 
initially white-collar employees, particularly in the private sector favoured different, more 
h a r m o n i o u s  labour relations than blue-collar workers, they had traditionally shown more 
reluctance to go on strike. Moreover, white-collar unions, given the lower degree of union­
ization and strike proneness but particularly given their larger fragmentation and loose co­
ordination were in comparative disadvantage compared to b l u e - c o l l a r  unions in wage bar­
gaining. In fact, blue-collar unions were able to achieve and continue wage leadership in 
the postwar economic growth years, while white-collar unions fell behind. To overcome 
their disadvantage through fragmentation into many occupational unions, and being 
spread across rival and weakly centralized union centres, white-collar unions attempted to 
reform their coordination and organization structures. Bargaining cartels, like PTK- cartel 
for private sector white-collar unions in Sweden, were one first step towards centralization 
in bargaining. Moreover, white-collar general unions that were internally organized by oc­
cupational sections restructured their organization to better serve sector collective bar­
gaining.21
Partisan Alignment and Political H eterogeneity
Political alignment of white-collar employees is much more heterogeneous and more 
volatile, reflecting their more ambiguous class position and more mixed social background 
(cf. GlDDENS 1979, GOLDTHORPE 1984. Political white-collar unionism was often unable to 
attract more than a minority of white-collar employees, mainly those with working-class 
background. The reluctance to align to a Socialist movement has also been an important 
motive to create an explicitly politically "neutral" white-collar federation as in Switzerland 
(VSA, 1918), in interwar Germany (GDA, 1921), and in Sweden (DACO, 1931). Since white- 
collar workers tend to vote considerably more for bourgeois parties, political alignment of 
white-collar unions is a critical issue.
In Austria, while manual unions are dominated by the Socialist faction, in the largest 
OGB affiliate, the white-collar union GPA, the Socialists are in the minority. In Britain, a
its century-old sickness scheme but mobilizes still today one-third of votes in social elections of 
white-collar insurance schemes (Bf A, DAK)
21 For instance, German DAG introduced industrial sections, while some British white-collar 
unions reorganized into broader sector unions (BIFU) or absorbed staff associations (ASTMS later 
MSF).
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number of white-collar organizations has been reluctant to affiliate with the Labour Party, 
while some technicians' unions are known for their radical leadership. According to the 
1913 Trade Union Act, unions need a majority vote before establishing a political fund, as 
consequence most partially white-collar unions had such funds but few white-collar unions 
(cf. LUMLEY1973: 90-1).22
In respect to social policy, white-collar unions can come into conflict with the universal- 
istic social policy of Socialist governments, for instance, the privately or publicly enforced 
superannuation became a dividing issue in Scandinavian welfare-states.23 In general, uni- 
versalistic welfare schemes and equalizing tax burden as advocated by Socialist party and 
union leaders found more resistance within the white-collar middle-class, especially in 
higher echelons. Wage and income policies that followed equalizing, solidaristic principles, 
though perhaps favoured by lower white-collar grades, spurred on indignation by higher 
earning and better educated white-collar workers to regain wage differentials through sec- 
tionalist unionism. The Socialist face the dilemma to appeal to and integrate white-collar 
employees within party and unions, while at the same time not to reinforce the collarline 
divisions and dilute its universalistic policy when attempting to accommodate the diverse 
interests.
C o n clu sio n s
The formation of white-collar unionism did not occur in a void but was a reaction to previ­
ous cleavage organization. The integration of white-collar unions into a unified labour 
movement or the emergence of rival separate white-collar union centres was contingent on 
the opening up and depolitization of the blue-collar movement. Yet the cleavage was on the 
one hand shaped by state and employers, but it was also partly promoted by the emerging 
white-collar, middle-class pressure groups that asked for further codification of the collar- 
line. Once white-collar organizations existed, they reinforced the collarline cleavage for a 
considerable time through sectionalist interest formation and status pressure group politics. 
Since the craft-industry preceded, blue-collar unions had often already chosen an organiza­
tion strategy that was exclusive or integrative towards non-mannual groups. Separate 
white-collar unions emerged in reaction to the early application of the industrial organiza­
tion principle and the close links to a left political party of blue-collar union centres.
On the continent, white-collar separate unionism reflected the importance of social sta­
tus destinctions and dividing social policy. In Scandinavia, it was more the role of the blue- 
collar union movement that favoured class solidarity and universal social policy that
22 Only few private white-collar unions or sections affiliated to the Labour Party in addition to 
sponsoring MP's, notably the now MSF-merged ASTMS and TASS, albeit a substantial share of its 
members contracted out of the political levy (cf. LUMLEY 1973:92).
23 While the Swedish SAP-LO campaign gained from TOD'S endorsement, while the Norwegian 
and Danish attempt were less successful in finding broader support (cf. ESPING-ANDERSEN 1985:160- 
165)
173
m / F u n c t i o n a l  C l e a v a g e s
Table 7.9 
White-Blue Collar Cleavage
M anifest collarline Latent collarline
rival status centres separate status unions
Separate unions Worker vs. Status Worker plus Status
benign neglect / integrated affiliates
rival centre marginal independent
SW. SZ, (DE) UK. IR. AU. BE,
Encompassing unions Unity vs. Status Unity vs. cadres
encompassing / encompassing /
rival centre cadres separate
GE.NE FR, IT, (NO)
shunned off some white-collar groups. On the British Isles, white-collar employess became 
mainly organized by special organizations, though the fragmented union system and the 
possibility of opting out allowed them to eventually join the major union centre. The fourth 
pattern is given where status divisions exist but employer intransigence has postponed 
white-collar unionization, the major division separates the higher level employees (cadres) 
from other employees.
In the historical account, we have seen the intricate interaction between collarline dis­
tinctions in society and organizational decisions taken by the labour movement. Today, we 
can summarize the main patterns by four clusters of collarline transformation (see Table 
7.9): (1) toorker union movements that remained negligent (and left voluntary) to the orga­
nization of white-collar employees, thus separate status centres became early established; 
(2) toorker union movements that accepted within the union centre status organizations for 
the sake of overall unity; (3) postwar labour unity movements that attempt to encompass all 
employees in industrial unions, however, they face resistance by traditional status organi­
zations that formed separate union centres, (4) postwar political unity movements in which 
political alignment supersedes functional cleavages, except for higher grade cadres. The 
collarline is most entrenched and manifest in the Swedish and Swiss case, than through the 
existence of rival centres in Germany and the Netherlands, while the line is more internally 
accommodate in Austria and Belgium, more latent in Britain and Ireland, and finally most 
narrowly defined in France and Italy.
The mobilization pattern of white-collar unions differ between reference to professional 
skills or the same social situation (carrer blockage). Professional unions and promotional 
unions have some possibility to overcome the severe collective action problem of the indi­
vidualist oriented white-collar salariat. The major factors explaining unionization are the 
availability of such union (union recognition and workplace access), the degree of bureau­
cratization, and the possibility for professional closure.
The representation of white-collar interests poses particular problems given the large de­
gree of fragmentation, of minority status within encompassing unions, and the lower de­
gree of centralization with white-collar confederations. They have also less linkeage to the
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left political parties, but on the other hand are free to pressure all parties. Changes towards 
more centralization and more numerical weight have altered the picture in recent decades 
but provided more possibility for confrontation across the collarline cleavage. White-collar 
employees are increasingly unwilling to remain secondary in collective bargaining and 
union policy making.
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8
T h e  Public-Private C le a v a g e
In Western ‘Europe, there is, of course, great variation, from country to 
country concerning tfie rights of unionization and Bargaining of puSGc 
employees. At the outset it is necessary to distinguish Between civil ser­
vants (usually nonmanuals whose joB tenure is mort or less permanent, 
unless they commit very grave offences), and nonestablished, or noncivil 
service public employees. (...) As far as this (latter) noncivil service 
group is concerned, their Bargaining and stri^f rights have evolved to 
the point where they approach or equal those of employees in the pri­
vate sector of the economy. (...) The status of the civil servant has un­
dergone an enormous transformation in the past thirty or forty years.
Civil servants were, for a long time, a highly privileged, special caste of 
worfes, whose personal conduct was even subject of public scrutiny 
and regulation, let alone strides, were nearly unthinkable. As for 
strife, penal sanctions were generally provided This state of affairs 
has changed substantially in every Western country (KASSALOW 
1969:223)".
State traditions provide a further potential for labour divisions. Trade unionism originated 
from collective organization of wage labourers in response to the penetration of market 
economies, yet the situation in public employment was different. While liberal-market cap­
italism had replaced labour contracts for previous status relations, pre-capitalist state and 
status traditions continued in the civil service and became written into public law. In most 
countries, employment relations and collective bargaining follow very different rules in the 
public and government regulated sector. Employment security, status hierarchies, and 
grading systems, led to sectionalist interest of some grades and professions, particularly 
those with granted civil servant status and those engaged in academic or regulated profes­
sions. Certainly, with the growth of public administration, infrastructural and social ser­
vices, a modem state bureaucracy emerged that resembled private enterprise administra­
tion (TORSTENDAHL 1991). However, one main qualitative difference to the market sector 
remained: public employment tends to be much more sheltered from market logic, from 
profit and cost-rentability considerations (BERGER & OFFE 1980). Political considerations 
matter more, leaving ample space for pressure group politics and political divisions over 
the expansion and regulation of public employment conditions. The public-private cleavage 
created the third challenge for labour unity to bridge the diverse interests in an increasingly 
interdependent "mixed" capitalist market and state regulated economies. With the rise of 
the Welfare States public employment expanded, though the state expansion reached its 
limits since the 1970s and privatisation programmes have been launched since the 1980s. 
This has only furthered the division between market and state for labour, too.
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This chapter discusses the last of the three functional cleavages that intersect with the 
political cleavages. The public sector divide entails two intersecting divisions: the state- 
market division and the status-contract division. First, the state - market division derives 
from the particular nature of the employer - the state - and the type of services produced - 
mainly non-marketed public goods. The determination of labour demand, employment 
conditions, and remuneration are guided by political considerations, and less object to 
market logic and subject to productive measurement (cf. BERGER & OFFE 1980). Thus a 
manual worker may do the same job in the private and public sector (see Chapter 6), the 
determination of the employment and pay conditions differ considerably. Second, given the 
particular nature of the state and pre-capitalist state tradition, the state in order to guaran­
tee loyalty and impartiality maintains status relations where public authority is delegated to 
its functionaries. While employment conditions of a part of the manual workers and clerks 
are defined by labour contract under private law, the status of civil servants tends to be 
unilaterally set by the state under public law. The public status-private contract division, al­
though it largely overlaps with collarline differences (see Chapter 7), draws in the public 
sector an even more rigid division.
Following the scheme in the former chapters, the formation, mobilization and represen­
tation aspects of the public-private cleavage will be elaborated.
First, the formation of the public-private cleavage will be shown to interact with state 
structure and status traditions. The formation of two forms of public employees organiza­
tion will be singled out: the staff association of civil servants and encompassing public sec­
tor unions. The integration of the two forms was the challenge to the labour union centres 
of the time. Yet in a number of countries separate civil service centres had emerged at the 
beginning of the Welfare state expansion. The variation in organizational forms reflect the 
differences in state tradition and the regulation of collective organization, bargaining, and 
strike rights.
Second, the mobilization strategies of status defense or professional closure and of open 
collective cartels differ considerably. Given a favourable environment, both mobilization 
strategies proof to be quite successful compared to some manual workers unions and 
white-collar unionization in the private sector. Therefore changes in the state-market divi­
sion will affect the overall unionization.
Third, the representation pattern in the public sector represents the balance between the 
two forms of organization: the fragmentation into sectional professional interests or con­
centration into encompassing public sector unions. The particularities of collective bar­
gaining and fragmentation in the public sector will be discussed. Finally, given the political 
control of public sector employment, 'clientelistic' politics become a crucial issue within 
public sector unionism. On the other hand, the more status conscious civil servants, the 
more heterogeneous their political alignment and distance to political unionism.
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Table 8.1
The Rise of the Public Sector Employment
AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
General Government Employment (in percent of labour force)
1690 1.9 3.8 2.7 35 22 22 3.0 1.7
1910 4.7 4.6 4.4 2.7 55 4.4 4.6 3.4 35 5.7 4.1
1920 8.1 7.1 4.7 3.8 85 55 6.3 5.0 45 6.4 6.1
1930 7.6 65 42 3.4 5.1 5.8 4.7 4.7 5.8 5.6
1950 9.6 7.6 63 8.7 8.7 7.1 8.1 7.1 8.1 7.6 11.6
1970 125 9.3 10.4 125 10.9 12.0 10.1 10.8 8.3
Public sector employees (in percent of dependent labour force)
1920 13 14
1930 13 16 13
1950 21 19 15 14 19 23 12 19
1970 22 21 22 24 17 19 19 23 24 27 11 22
1985 28 26 33 26 20 25 24 26 29 38 13 24
NOTE: IR 1971, GB 1985 estimated; SOURCE: own calculations based on F l o r a  1983, F l o r a ,  
K r a u s  & P fe n n in g  1987, V isse r  1989
I
Th e  Fo r m a tio n  o f  th e  
P ublic-Private C leavage
The modem public administration became the prime model of modem bureaucracy and 
rationalization (WEBER 1922: 551-579), though it also conserved some pre-capitalist tradi­
tions. The modem constitutional state, in order to claim legal-rational legitimacy, regulated 
the civil service with lifelong tenure, depersonalized service, and merit based careers. The 
modem state transformed pre-capitalist status of personal services not into (capitalist) con­
tract relations as in industry but to impersonal service relations that are based on status 
principles. Like private white-collar employees (see Chapter 7), established civil servants 
were initially a small status conscious group with no right to radical political activity, 
strike, unionization or even negotiation (K a s s a l o w  1969: 221). With the growth of the 
public sector, like in the case of private white-collar employment growth, this particular 
status diffused into a growing share of public employment, though internal differences in­
creased with ongoing bureaucratization.
Over one century, impelled by two World Wars, public employment was extended far 
beyond traditional public administration into infrastructure, nationalized industries and 
welfare services. The level of public employment varies (cf. Table 8.1), however, between 
countries and over time (cf. ROSE 1985). Today, the public sector accounts between one- 
quarter and one-third of the total labour force, while it was normally below 10% before the 
First World War. Although the extension of public services following the First World War
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augmented public employment by an average one-third over the interwar period, an explo­
sion of the public sector occurred after the Second World War when public resources be­
come transferred from 'warfare' to 'welfare'. While Germany was the leader in public sector 
employment until the Second World War, Beveridge's British welfare state with the na­
tional health service and nationalized basic industries became the postwar model. While 
most continental European welfare states nearly doubled their public employment over the 
last four decades, the Scandinavians and Low Countries extended their welfare states even 
beyond the British model. A substantial part of the employment growth was due to the ex­
tension of the social programmes, in particular education and health, while at the same 
time labour intensive services were cut, notably in basic industries (e.g. nationalized min­
ing in Britain and France), public transportation (in particular railways) and - in some 
former colonial countries - defence (cf. ROSE 1985:21).
The Formation of Public Service U nions
The origins of public sector unionism are twofold, quite similar to white-collar unionization 
in the private sector (see Chapter 7): the early status-conscious professional organizations of 
privileged civil servants and the collective mobilization of workers in communal and public 
services. An overview over the history of public sector unions remains sketchy since there 
are only few systematic studies1. The difficulty derives also from the diversity in pre-capi- 
talist state traditions and special national paths towards bureaucratization and moderniza­
tion.
In Britain, with its early craft labour movement and initially limited central state tradi­
tion, it is paradoxically in the state regulated sector that "industrial" unionism was to 
emerge, quite in contrast to the manufacturing sector. Besides the union in the nationalized 
mining sector (NUM), the post employees’ union (UCW, 1920) and railway workers' union 
(NUR, 1913) were formed by amalgamations and organized all-grades within the sector, 
particularly the railway union was known as one of the first militant and politically active.2 
The two largest general unions (GMB, TGWU), originating from amalgamations of prewar 
unions in the 1920s (see Chapter 6), also organize in the public sector.3 In competition to the 
general unions, the National Public Employee's Union (NUPE, 1928) and the National and 
Local Government Officers Association (NALGO, 1905) have grown particularly with fe­
male employment in local and NHS services to one amongst the largest British unions. The
1 On the development of public service unions see the following studies CLEGG 1976, readers by 
STURMTHAL 1966, Rose  1985, on Germany: Keller  1983; on France: BlDOUZE 1979, SlWEK- 
POUYDESSEAU 1989.
2 Following a regional railway strike, the predecessor of NUR was declared liable (Taff Vale 
case) but achieved a repeal by parliament (Trade Union Dispute Act, 1906) and was a founding 
member of the Labour Party, its collective political levy became a legal dispute (Osborne judgement) 
that was again repealed (Trades Union Act, 1913).
3 GMB covers in particular municipal workers and national health service (NHS), while TGWU 
concentrates in public transport and docks.
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First World War brought a surge in non-manual public sector unionism, although many 
had prewar predecessors. Civil servants are organized by a number of divisional unions 
(CPSA, CSU, SCFS) that initially catered for particular grades but increasingly branched 
out. Moreover, in the NHS a number of public service unions (COHSE) and non-TUC pro­
fessional organizations (BMA, RCN, RCM) coexist. The British pattern is largely replicated 
in Ireland, where partly British unions coexist beside the main unions, in particular the 
large general union (IGTWU).
In Germany, with an authoritarian bureaucratic state tradition and politicised labour 
movement, only the communal worker union was affiliated to the Free union movement 
before 1914, while several unions for railways workers and post and telegraph employees 
remained independent or affiliated to the Christian or Liberal movement.4 After the war, a 
railways union (since 1917 affiliated), the communal and transport workers unions were 
amongst the ten largest ADGB unions, though as many civil servants were independently 
organized.5 Despite the attempt to unitary unionism after 1945, a very similar union struc­
ture reappeared in the public sector: the large OTV (follower of the 1930 merged commmu- 
nal and transport workers' union), a railways union and a post office union (both with 
many civil servants) and two civil service unions (teachers and since 1978: police), all 
within the DGB, vis-a-xns a multitude of Beamte organizations (as in Weimar Germany, 
matching the DGB Beamte membership). Similarly, in the Netherlands, neutral civil servants 
associations and partisan public sector unions coexisted, while in Switzerland, given the 
liberal weak central state tradition the pattern resembled the early British case: coexisting 
public sector unions and professional staff associations (lacking a particular Beamte status).
In Sweden, differently to Germany, not only the communal workers' union but also 
railway driver, post and telegraph workers' unions became early affiliated to the major 
labour union centre (cf. AmarK 1986), the latter unions merged to become the largest LO af- 
filate (SF, 1970). However, civil servants and white-collar employees were organized out­
side LO during the interwar period, albeit some organizations date even further back. Four 
types of organizations became present in the public sector: manual unions, white-collar 
unions, higher civil servant organizations, and professional (academic) associations. 
Similarly, in Denmark and Norway different centres for white-collar and civil servants 
emerged, though the dividing line between manual and white-collar organizations are not 
as strict as in Sweden.
4 In 1913, three Christian regional unions (55.700 members), two Liberal regional ones (9.000), 
four independent unions (132.200) organized railway workers (incl. construction) (Statistical 
Yearbook, 1915).
5 The Socialist-oriented public service unions organized about one million members, yet about 
as many were organized by status conscious dvil service unions (DBB) in the interwar period (the 
Nazi abolished later all status related differences).
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In France, since the Napoleonic reorganization of the dvil service, the grands corp de 
l'Etat recruits its ranks from particular technical or administrative schools (grands écoles).6 A 
further cleavage inherent in French state centralism is the division between state officials 
(functionaire d’Etat) with tenure and the socially inferior local officials and personnel with 
less secure employment status and lower wages. Professionalization was the initial drive to 
combine dvil servants. Cadres and teachers considered themselves given the aims of cen­
tral planning and national education as the modernizing etite. Thus French public sector 
unionism from its early origins remained fragmented into sectionalist professionalism and 
independent unionism but also incomplete national organization of the more 'peripheral' 
communal and welfare services. In comparison, the newly united Italian state never suc­
ceeded in establishing a French-type central state bureaucracy. As in the other three 
Catholic countries, the civil service was endangered to become servant of old traditional 
elites, the Catholic church interests or of political mandators, though measures to depoliti- 
dsed and professionalize the administration had only partly success. In particular, the 
Italian public administration was affected by favouritism, patronage and clientelism that 
continued into the postwar period, this was reinforced by increased recruitment of south­
ern Italians for public administration.
The Formation of Public Union Centres
Historically, where civil servants had a particular duty obligation and were prohibited 
from political activity, strikes, and collective bargaining, close contacts with existing labour 
union centres were considered to be an affront against the state. Civil servants preferred to 
organize not only within their own status associations but formed their own independent 
peak associations. These organizations were to differ considerably from blue-collar political 
unionism of the time by stressing political neutrality and harmonious labour relations. 
Following the union recognition and the rising power of the labour movement, civil service 
centres were formed in a response to defend their status around the end of the First World 
War in Germany (DBB, 1918), the Netherlands (CRP, 1916; CMHA, 1917), Sweden (SR, 
1917) and Norway (EL, 1918).7 The German DBB grew considerable with interwar union 
recognition, general unionization and high inflation pressures, though banned from collec­
tive bargaining and strike right until today. A more contentious ADGB linked dvil service 
centre emerged (ADBB) in competion but remained much smaller.8 After the Second World
6 The later introduced concours (pre-entry examination), the grands ¿coles diploma, and seniority 
rules further reinforced the strong esprit de corps of the French dvil service (cf. TORSTENDAHL 1991: 
203-212).
7 The Dutch and two Scandinavian federations o f government officials remained docile, small 
staff associations (with a few 1000 m em bers or less than 2% of all organized), they later joined in 
with larger, m ore rapidly growing professional organizations or assodations of academics (Dutch 
MHP in 1974, Swedish SACO in 1974, Norwegian AF in 1975)
8 The first major instance of a public sector strike in railways caused a rift between the politi­
cally neutral dvil servant centre and Social-Democratic members, the latter group split-away (ADBB,
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Table 8.2
Integration or Separation of Public Sector within Main Union Centres, Western Europe 1945-1989
AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
civil servants ÓGB main AC (FEN) DBB (ind.) (ind.) AC AF SACQ (ind.) TUC
(higher grades) (ind.) DGB ICTU [ELI SR (ind.)
white-collar clerks ÓGB main FTF main DGB ICTU main
Q
.
X2
YS.YH TCO SGB TUC
(lower grades) DAG (ind.) (auto) main LO (ind.) (ind.)
blue-collar workers 0GB main LO main DGB ICTU main main LO LO SGB TUC
(without Beamte) (auto) (FOV)
Note: see Table 8.(?); underlined: separate union centre from main centre(s); main: main union cen­
tres; ind.: independent unions; auto: autonomous and independent movements (COBAS, etc.).
War, while the German and Dutch labour movement attempted to build all-grades indus­
trial unions, important civil servant centres reappeared (German DBB, 1949, Dutch AC, 
1946) organizing today more than one-fifth of white-collar public employees (cf. VlSSER 
1990).
In a number of countries, white-collar employees in the public sector organized outside 
the major blue-collar union centres. White-collar employees' associations were founded in 
Sweden (TCO, 1937), Denmark (FTF, 1952) and Norway (ST, 1923, FSO, 1951). Facing the 
increasing power of Social-Democracy and LO unions, the success of establishing a forceful 
white-collar separate federation depended on building a broad middk-dass alliance of public 
and private employees. Such an encompassing alliance was achieved by the Swedish TCO 
(old TCO and DACO merged in 1944), partly in Denmark (FTF, but independent unions co­
existed), yet not in Norway with its fragmented union structure outside the LO (cf. 
FIVELSDAL1965).9
However, in the majority of countries, public employees' union were more or less grad­
ually integrated into existing labour union centres (see Table 8.2). The unions of railways 
workers, post office employees, municipal workers and teachers tended to be the earliest, 
unions of teachers, lower grade civil servants came second, and higher grades and health 
and other service workers last.
State Traditions and Status D ivisions
State traditions, the legacy of public law, and administrative structures have shaped the 
public sector employment relations, the internal divisions and the differentiation from the
1922), while a smaller organization of high ranking officials (comparable to the Scandinavian ones) 
coexisted.
9 By the same rank order, the degree of centralization and conduct of collective bargaining de­
clines from the Swedish to the Danish to the Norwegian federations.
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private sector. The legacy of authoritarian state traditions had an impact on an early en­
croachment of hierarchical, status oriented, semi-autonomous civil service, while early con­
stitutional reform, liberalism and parliamentarism provided pressures for a more publicly 
accountable state bureaucracy. The territorial constitution, administrative structure and 
distribution of resources shaped the degree of centralization and standardization of em­
ployment conditions. Within public administration proper, in unitary states beside the 
central administration, and local (communal or county) administrations co-existed, though 
the degree of local autonomy over such matters as utilities, welfare institutions and educa­
tion varied considerable.10 These differences in centralization and territorial constitution 
were important in shaping the internal differentiation of public sector labour relations, es­
pecially to what degree the central government could intervene in public employment reg­
ulation and to what degree a fragmentation of responsibility hampered the centralization of 
public employer interests. Moreover, social differentiation could arise with different em­
ployment and authority relations.11
The second deavage arose through state policy granting privileges and separating the 
employment status of public employees from private employees. The particular status at­
tributed to state employees reflects the "continued importance of pre-capitalist legal forms 
(HEPPLE 1986b: 54)", particularly where public officials (Beamte, embedsmaend, functionaire, or 
ambtenaar) became modelled as politically neutral, bureaucratic functionaries qua legal au­
thority (WEBER 1922) combined with a premodem duty to loyal service. These established 
civil servants enjoy in most countries considerable employment security (tenure) in return 
for special obligations of impartial service and state loyalty (cf. VOCEL-POLSKY 1986: 183- 
4).12 However, even beyond the established civil servants, public employees profited from 
more employment security than in private enterprises since mainly budgetary constraints 
not sudden bankruptcy or economic cylces would determine continued employment.
An important element in maintaining status distinctions were special state pensions, yet 
the coverage and status distinctiveness varies across Europe. First, a large public pension 
system that covers a large share of public employment exists in Austria, Belgium, France, 
Ireland, Italy. Second, a privileged state pensions for civil servants only exists in Germany, 
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. In liberalist (Switzerland) or universalistic state- 
dominated welfare systems (Norway, Sweden, Denmark) public sector pension have a 
more reduced scope (cf. ESPINC-ANDERSEN 1990: 86-7).
In the continental tradition, civil servants are not employed by an individual contract 
under private law but according to public law. This has important consequences for the 
application of labour law, particularly dismissal procedures, strike and bargaining rights.
10 In federal states (German Reich and Federal Republic, Switzerland, Austrian Republic), an 
intermediary state level was an important, partly autonomous, tier in between the central and local 
administration.
11 For instance, the centralized privileged position of central state employees compared to local 
employees in France.
12 Dismissal is only possible in the case of severe break of law or regulations and as the conse­
quence of disciplinary or legal measures.
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In Britain and Scandinavian countries collective bargaining rights were eventually granted 
to trade unions (and the national government was relative free to negotiate within 
parliamentary budget control), while in countries with civil servants under public law 
collective bargaining was first established for non-established, lower ranking public 
employees and workers. Political activity or affiliation to political unions were prohibited 
to civil servants in prewar Germany but also for instance in interwar Britain (1927-45).
Furthermore the strike right of public employees varies considerably across countries 
and time (cf. HEPPLE 1986b, BEYME 1977: 189-90). Some state have exempted civil servants 
or prohibited strikes in important services (military police, railways, hospitals) or limited 
their extend, duration and arbitration. However, even where the strike right was not ex­
plicitly granted it became in some cases common practice.13
II
Pro fessio n a liza tio n  a n d  
C ollective M o biliza tio n
Once public employees were free to collectively combine and their organizations were rec­
ognized by the government, they became organized in large numbers. This is remarkable 
for two reasons. First, industrial unionism was a strategy that developed from the labour- 
capital conflict in the private sector over labour productivity and a fair share of profits. Yet 
public unionism was successful among lower clerks and manual workers in non-marketed 
services as well. Second, white-collar employees, especially status conscious civil servants, 
were organized to a larger degree than white-collar employees in industry or private ser­
vices. Apparently the conditions under which public employees can organize and the ra­
tional to join collective organizations have somewhat different bases in the state sector than 
in the market section. Nevertheless we find again two opposing principles of organization, 
similar to the ones discussed for the blue-collar and white-collar unionization (see Chapter 
6 and 7): status defense and collective solidarity. These mobilization strategies operate, of 
course, under somewhat different conditions, given the particular employment conditions 
and labour relations in the public sector. A discussion of the context favouring high level of 
unionization in the state sector can reveal some of the particular factors inducing collective 
organization.
Esprit de Corps or Open Cartel
As much as craft unionism was a successful mobilizing strategy for skilled workers and 
professional unionism was so for white-collar professional workers, status-related strate­
gies provide the base for organization of established civil servants and other higher-edu­
cated public employee groups. The public sector, particularly public administration, is
13 In Britain for police and post office employees, in France and Italy a duty of special notices in 
advance was stipulated.
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commonly organized as a meritocratic, hierarchical bureaucracy. Recruitment into civil ser­
vice is based on objective merit criteria, measured by university education credentials or 
professional certificates and in some cases universal entry examinations (concours). 
Education therefore determines entry chances and placement with a civil service rank from 
which one has a foreseeable career trajectory, mainly based on seniority rights. "In every 
major Western country the pattern is dear: government employs a higher proportion of ed­
ucated personnel than the private sector (...). Everywhere the difference is great it is four 
times higher in Germany and Italy, almost three times higher in France, and twice as high 
in Britain and the United States (ROSE 1985b: 37)." The better paid public sector jobs are 
much more dosed than in the private sector where entry barriers and individual advance­
ment tend to be more open.14 Hence, professional closure is a successful rational strategy 
for dvil servants. This accounts for the astonishing high organization rate of higher dvil 
servants and professional employees, at least where special civil service status organiza­
tions or professional associations exist.
Even where collective negotiations are excluded and employment and pay conditions 
are set unilaterally by the state, collective organization may still play an important role. In 
fact, pressure group politics of status and professional interest vis-à-vis the government and 
parliament are particularly important in the public sector, given the governments and par­
liaments budget authority and regulatory capadty. Pressure group politics of dvil servants 
in lieu of collective negotiations is a promising avenue. Civil servants were more repre­
sented within bourgeois political parties and most importantly knew "how to work the 
system".15
The same holds also even to a large degree for those in non-supervising "over crowded" 
grades that require educational or professional credentials but are characterized by large 
equalizing corps, for instance, teachers, police officers and nurses. For them, individual ad­
vancement can only be achieved by "climbing" the relative defined and seniority based 
promotion ladder (e.g. schoolmaster, senior officer, supervisor). Otherwise, only collective 
advancement through collective interest representation may bring improvement. The 
'blocked' corps sectionalism prevails in the dvil and professional public services: the multi­
ple grade, department and staff associations as separate organizations or as sections are 
numerous within public sector unions.16
On the other hand, public employees unions with collectivist strategies followed similar 
strategies as general or industrial unions in the private sector (see Chapter 6). They used 
collective strategies to form an open cartel, gaining strength from encompassing organiza­
tion. These largely manual public sector unions in railways and public transport, commu-
14 Although top salaries tend to be lower in the public sector, there are relatively more better 
paid positions available.
15 Civil servants also had historically an advantage to other groups since they tended to be ear­
lier enfranchised and more likely to be active in politics (see on Britain: ROUTH1966).
16 For instance, teachers are often organized according to school scheme, educational credentials 
and rank, dvil servants often according to grade, corps and department
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nal services and utilities, were not very different to blue-collar unions in manufacturing. 
They tended to affiliate earlier to the labour union centre (and to the Labour party), col­
lected money for strike funds and used the strike weapon were possible.17 Favourable for 
collective organization in the public sector were a number of contextual factors, such as the 
centralization of employer associations, the bureaucratization and union recognition, as al­
ready discussed for white-collar employees (see Chapter 7) that were even more 
widespread than in private industry or services. A comparison with private sector union­
ization can reveal some of the specific environmental factors that foster public sector 
unionization.
Bureaucratic State and U nionization
For many Western European countries strong evidence has been provided that postwar 
unionization in the public or semi-public employment sector is higher than in the market 
sector (cf. CLEGG 1976, Bain & PRICE 1980, ROSE 1985b, VlSSER 1990). The differences in the 
level of unionization (see Table 3) are particularly marked in those countries where overall 
density is generally low or moderate (France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland), 
especially due to low (private sector) white-collar unionization (see Chapter 7). Given the 
more extensive public employment of non-manual employees, a generally higher level of 
density in public employment will contribute to the overall level of density of non-manual 
employees.18 Moreover, in countries where public sector employment remains high, overall 
unionization remained higher than in other countries during the last decade of overall 
membership crisis.19
For the high overall unionization rates in Sweden, Denmark and Belgium, it has been 
claimed that union-led unemployment insurance schemes provided selective incentives 
(see Chapter 6), though this seems to be less an explanation in the case of public sector 
unionism. In countries with union-led schemes, public employees are not always covered, 
given tenure as established civil servants, or the selective incentive may be reduced, given 
the lower risk of job-loss in the public sector.20 Moreover, since public sector unionization 
exceeds private sector unionization also in countries in which unemployment insurance is
17 The three British "industrial” unions in nationalized mining (NUM), in railways (NUR) and 
postal services (UCW) are political industrial unions nearly uncommon in the productive sector.
18 For instance in 1985, the white-collar employees account for 80% of public employment (51% 
of market sector) in the Netherlands (cf. V isser 1989) and 78% in Germany (Statistical Yearbook 
1988), albeit some manual workers are considered established civil servants (ambtenaar, Beamte), par­
ticularly in railways and PTT.
19 The oon-eladon of public employment and union density increased from 1970s to 1980s, see 
Be a n  & H o l d e n  1992:56.
20 In Belgium ca. 80% of all private and public employees are insured, though established civil 
servants are excluded; in Denmark all wage-eamers are covered by union-led schemes, in Sweden 
the schemes are not compulsory; in Austria and Germany established civil servants are excluded 
from compulsory unemployment insurance; Dutch public employees have a separate scheme since 
1922 (cf. F lo r a  1986: Vol. IV).
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Table 8.3
Public and Private Union Density in Western Europe
Country Year Public Market Ratio Year Public Market Ratio
Austria 1961 80% 59% 1.4 1985 71% 52% 1.4
Denmark 1984 82% 81% 1.0
France (1975 43% 14% 3.1) 1985 (22%) (6%) (35)
Germany 1961 70% 27% 2.6 1985 56% 28% 2.1
Italy 1961 29% 26% 12 1985 43% 39% 1.1
Norway 1960 81% 53% 15 1980 95% 50% 1.9
Nethertand 1960 67% 35% 1.9 1985 46% 17% 2.7
Sweden 1960 68% 70% 1.0 1985 87% 77% 1.1
Switzerland 1960 75% 30% 2.5 1980 61% 25% 2.4
U.Kingdom 1968 64% 37% 1.7 1979 82% 44% 1.9
NOTE: Ratio: public sector density divided by private sector rate; France 1985 estimated. SOURCE: 
own calculations based on V isser 1989;
state provided other explanations have to be sought. In fact, the role of public sector unions 
seems to be reversed: less to secure insurance for the case of unemployment but expand 
employment chances and prevent job cuts in the first place.
In a comparative study of six countries, Hugh Clegg explains the higher unionization in 
the public sector "by variations in the extent and depth of collective bargaining and in sup­
port for union security" (CLEGG 1976: 27). An important condition for membership recruit­
ment, particularly of white-collar employees, is (or better was) union recognition by state 
and employers (cf. Bain 1970), in fact both tend to be identical in the public sector. Once 
unionism is recognized by the central authority, public employees will hardly be obstructed 
from joining by superiors.21 In fact, public unionism may serve the central government to 
centralize and control employment and pay conditions throughout the public sector, even 
in the more remote decentralized local authorities, departmental divisions or semi-public 
enterprises.
Moreover, due to the more bureaucratic structures, especially for white-collar employees 
(cf. LOCKWOOD 1958), advancement is more closely dependent on collective determination 
and less based on individual employer-employee agreement (Cf. CLEGG 1976: 23-27). 
"Public employment tends to be concentrated in large or even gigantic establishments 
making both organizing and 'servicing' easier and less costly. It is perhaps on accident then 
that the degree of unionization of municipal employees, (as in Sweden) (...), is less high 
than that of the white-collar employees of the central government. The average size of the 
establishment in the local government is most probably less than that of the central gov­
ernment, even though individual local establishments may be larger than many agencies of 
the central government (STURMTHAL 1966:380)*'. Indeed, given the primacy of legal bureau­
21 For instance, in a statement of the British Treasury (1958), "civil servants are (...) encouraged 
(...) to belong to associations, for the existence of fully representative associations not only promotes 
good staff relations but is essential to effective negotiations on conditions of service (ciL in Ro u t h  
1966:184)".
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cratic rule in the public sector, the pay scales and grade system do not allow individual su- 
periors-employee discretion of employment or pay conditions as in industry but require le- 
galislative control. "Wages and working conditions are set down by regulations and de­
crees. The individual sees himself confronted by an overwhelming power. The protection of 
the union seems indispensable to him, if he is to influence his own fate at all (STURMTHAL 
1966: 380)”.
However, the comparison of private and public sector unionization, conceals intersect­
ing differences in white-collar and blue-collar unionization. In most countries blue-collar 
density and public density (for both status groups) are much higher than white-collar den­
sity in the private employment sector (see Chapter 7). Due to the lack of cross-sectional data 
on membership or/and on dependent employment in most countries, we can only illustrate 
this effect with data from the Netherlands. The Netherlands represent one of the most ad­
vanced Welfare states in Western Europe (cf. Vall 1970): the share of public employment 
has doubled in the postwar period - every fourth employee was on the public pay-role in 
the 1950s, while every second employee is so today. Similarly, the share of white-collar em­
ployees doubled from some 30% in the 1950s to 60% in the 1980s (cf. VlSSER 1989: Ch. 6). On 
the other hand, the Netherlands are one of the countries were a long-term decline in union 
density has accompanied the structural shifts in the dependent labour force. Over the 
whole postwar period one can observe that overall union density in the public employment 
sector had been always above the degree of organization in the private employment sector. 
In fact, before the 1980s, more than every second public or semi-public employee was a 
member of a union, while in the originally much larger private employment sector the de­
gree was below 40%. Similarly in Germany, public sector unionization is the reverse of pri­
vate sector pattern: white-collar employees are far better organized than blue-collar work­
ers in the public sector and even better than blue-collar workers in the private sector.22
Unionization in the public sector is counter-intuitive also in respect to the high rate of 
female unionization that tends to be lower in the private sector. Female and part-time em­
ployment tend to be larger in the public than in the private sector. In the Scandinavian 
countries female and male unionization rates have nearly merged, particularly due to the 
mobilization success of female employees, including part-time workers, in the public sec­
tor.23
Given the special state pension system in most countries and status orientations of many 
civil service organizations, public employees tend to remain within their unions after re­
tirement.24 High pensioner rates are reported for unions with aging male manual work­
22 White-collar employees, particularly Beamte, are well organized, albeit not all by the main 
labour confederation (DGB) but half of all civil servants are organized by DBB.
23 The Scandinavian welfare state can be considered a "job creation machine” for female employ­
ees, they represent more than two-thirds of public employment in Sweden but only ca. 40% in 
Germany (cf. ESPING-ANDERSEN 1990:202).
24 In  fac t, s in c e  th e  n u m b e r  o f  p e n s io n e rs  a re  o ften  co n cea led  u n io n iz a tio n  ra te s  te n d  to  b e  o v e r­
e s tim a te d  (cf. Ba in  & P rice  1980, VlSSER 1989,1990). P e n s io n e rs  in  1985, fo r c o u n try  (o r w h e re  sp ec i­
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force as unions in railways, also in post offices, and in (nationalized) mining, while some 
civil servant organizations (e.g. German DBB, Dutch AC) retain a large pensioners share as 
well. With the growth of public employment and aging male manual or civil servant labour 
force structure the share of the non-active membership increased in most countries and 
major union centres. This may lead to strains in union finances, since special pension pay­
ment and lower dues rates are still common. Nevertheless, it also indicates the life com­
mitment of public employees to their union but may increasingly change the function of 
unions as most notably in Italy.25
in
Fr o m  Sec tio n a lism  t o  C u e n t e u s m
Given the two organizing strategies, sectionalist grades organizations and collective soli- 
daristic unions, the question of integration or fragmentation of interests arises. It seems to 
be difficult to achieve labour unity through encompassing unions and prevent the emer­
gence of sectionalist organizations. Differences in state traditions but also the interaction 
between dominant union principle, political orientation and integration or separation of 
special interests accounts for much of the large public sector union diversity. The degree of 
encompassing centralization and fragmentation vary considerable across countries: the de­
gree to which the traditional political industrial unionism (see Chapter 6) was able to inte­
grate interest representation of public employees. The particular character of the public 
sector compared to the private sector derives also from the different structure, character 
and realm of collective bargaining. Yet wage bargaining provides also the potential conflict 
not only between sectionalist and solidaristic interest organizations within the sector but 
between class organizations in the market and state sector. This spreads increasingly fur­
ther into politics, where the traditional party-union linkages become obstacles in organiza­
tion or provoke internal splits over market primacy or state expansion.
Section a ust Fragmentation and Cartel Concentration
The degree to which public sector unions became encompassing and were integrated into 
the major labour movement varies across countries (see Table 8.4). In Austria and Belgium, 
the main union centres were able to monopolize public service unionism and collective 
bargaining rights, public employees are highly concentrated in four unions (ÓGB), and in 
Belgium in one general union (FGTB, also CGSLB), or two general unions plus four teacher 
unions (CSC). High concentration also exists with four to five unions in the main union 
centres in Germany (DGB), Italy (CGIL, CISL), the Netherlands (FNV) and Switzerland
fied: union centre) AU: ÒGB ca. 16.0%, BE: CSC ca. 18.6%, DE: LO ca. 8.0%, GE: DGB 12.5%, IT: 
28.4%, NE: 17.4%, NO: LO 17.0%, SW: LO 133%, SZ: 7.4%, (cf. VI9SER 1989; DUES database).
25 The Italian unions centres, particularly Communist-led CGIL, retain a large share of public 
pensioners who participate in union (and party) social life and see their unions as welfare pressure 
group vis-à-vis the state.
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Table 8.4
Number of National Unions in Public Sector (1950,1985)
1950 AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
Overall 16 32 119 33 109 327 125 156 66 720
Public Sector 4 6 30 18 29 189 72 86 24 166
encompassing 4 3 7 3 . 4 10 11 3 3
sectional - 2 21 10 25 179 59 72 18 150
rival union - 1 2 5 4 6 3 3 6 13
1985
Overall 15 40 129 82 80 65 236 148 75 72 286
Public Sector 4 12 54 46 28 26 162 90 30 31 102
encompassing 4 2 4 3 15 4 9 2 3 4
sectional - 9 47 31 26 11 151 81 26 21 93
rival union * 1 3 12 2 0 7 2 7 5
NOTE: Number of unions includes locals; all countries 1950 or 1985, except for DE: 1953, GE: 1951, 
NO: 1956. SOURCE: DUES database (own calculations).
(SGB), albeit many sectional unions emerged outside the labour union centres. In the 
Scandinavian countries with the coexistence of union centres for blue-collar workers, white- 
collar employees, and civil service or professionals organizations are threefold, not to speak 
of the more fragmented organization patterns of the latter groups. Within the three 
Scandinavian LOs, the Swedish LO is most concentrated, than the Danish LO and finally 
the Norwegian LO, thus in reverse relation to the degree of integration of white-collar em­
ployees within their ranks.
While public sector unions within the major union centres became increasingly concen­
trated, sectionalist civil service organizations and staff associations multiplied at the border. 
An increasing fragmentation into many sectionalist unions seems to be the common trend 
with the growth to limits of postwar Welfare States, except for countries where sectionalism 
was institutionally excluded (e.g. Austria, Belgium). There are more than forty non-DGB 
organizations in Germany, and over twenty non-SGB organizations in Switzerland. In the 
Netherlands and Britain, the number of sectionalist unions is particularly high, but has be­
come curtailed as some staff associations merged or became absorbed by larger unions. 
Increasingly, these sectionalist organizations became what they had initially or traditionally 
abstained from in favour of interest group representation: they adopted militant strategies 
and pressed for recognition as collective bargaining partner.
In the early 1950s, public employees comprised still a small minority in the Socialist 
electoral support or in the membership of allied union centres. Public unionism comprised 
about one-sixth or one-fifth of membership in these confederations, with the exception of 
the Austrian OGB (29%), which profited from the extensive state sector, fears of cuts in civil 
servant privileges, and a monopoly in representation. With the growth of the Welfare state 
and public employment, particularly in Scandinavia and Austria, the Netherlands and 
Britain, a remarkable shift in union membership of the Socialist union centres occurred un-
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Table 8.5
Membership Share (%) of National Unions in Public Sector (1950,1985)
1950 AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
Overall 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Public Sector 29.2 15.1 13.9 27j0 13.7 26.0 26.2 26.1 27.4 20.7
encompassing 29.2 12.4 5.5 21.7 . 7.1 17.4 15.3 16.0 2.6
sectional . 2.3 5.8 3.3 10.3 12.5 8.6 8.5 73 9.0
rival union 0.4 2.6 2.0 3.4 6.4 02 23 35 9.1
1985
Overall 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Public Sector 35.1 19.1 25.5 34.6 26.3 28.8 45.5 48.1 45.4 32.7 41.1
encompassing 35.1 13.1 105 21.1 . 27 2 23.3 26.5 23.7 13.7 19.6
sectional . 4.8 11.0 9.6 24.0 1.6 17.8 21.6 13.0 12.0 17.4
rival union • 12 3.7 3.9 22 • 4.4 • 8.6 7.0 4.1
NOTE: all countries 1950, except for DE: 1953, GE: 1951, NO: 1956. SOURCE: DUES database (own 
calculations).
til the welfare growth came to its limit in the 1970s. By the mid-1980s, public unionism 
contributed over one-third in Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom (see Table 8.5). In Britain, due to the severe membership losses in the 
private sector during the Thatcher government years, the public union share gained rela­
tively, while absolute membership stagnated. In Germany, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland, 
the record of public unionism growth was less remarkable, partly due to competition by 
other organizations (Germany, Belgium), or slower employment growth (Switzerland). In 
France, the Socialist teachers union FEN is the fourth largest movement, the public sector 
accounts probably around three-fourth of combined membership of FO, CFDT and FEN, all 
three (particularly the latter two) movements are within the orbit of the Socialist party.
In terms of associational monopoly (see Table 7), the Austrian unitary OGB enjoys an 
undisputed monopoly in all sectors, including the public sector, in which the political com­
position is more diverse than in industry.26 The Belgian Socialist unions lost not only 
among the private employees but also in the public sector to the Christian unions (with 
their more status related structure) that are today majoritarian, a considerable increase from 
15% in 1920. In France and Italy, political cleavages are also more dominant, the 
Communists tend to receive somewhat less support in the public sector, particularly 
amongst teachers (organize separately in France) and civil servants, while the Italian secu­
larized Christian centre and in France the anti-communist FO unions are overportionally 
represented in the public sector. However, in both countries independent ad hoc strike 
movements and in Italy (here not counted) autonomous and independent sectionalist
26 However, internally it has a more heterogeneous partisan composition with public sector 
unions tending more to the left (as blue-collar unions) and some more to the centre (as white-collar 
unions).
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Table 8.6
Public Sector Union Membership and Major Union within Major Union Centre
AU BE DE GE IR IT NE NO SW S2 UK
Union Centre; ÓGB FGTB CSC LO DGB ICTU CISL FNV LO LO SGB TUC
Membership share (%)
1950 29.2 21.0 . 5.8 26.3 18.0 19.2 >20.0
1970 29.4 26.6 . 85 29.1 26.1 245 >30.0
1989 36.0 22.5 19.0 175 30.2 41.2 395 30.0 >40.0
Largest Union: GÓD CGSP CCOD DKA ÓTVLGPSU ABVA NKF SKAF SEV GMB
Membership share (%)
1950 82 18.2 4.8 25 13 .3 . 135 9.4 7.6 15.1 .
1970 8.5 23.3 6.1 2.7 14.6 1-3 20.6 13.3 15.1 13.4
1989 13.9 21.3 7.8 8 5 15.7 3 5 8.7 28.1 245 31.4 13.0 10.0
rank 3rd 2nd 6th 4th 2nd 5th 4th 1st 1st 1st 3rd 2nd
Note: White-collar private sector membership; Ranking of affiliates by membership share within union 
centre; unions mainly in public sector; DE without HK
movements have gained in importance and challenged the "big" five French and three 
Italian union centres.
In Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland, the main union movements (Socialist or 
Christians) faced severe competition from civil service centres or independent unions al­
ready since the interwar period. Those sectional organization represent today about one- 
quarter of public sector membership in Germany and more than one-third in the 
Netherlands and Switzerland. In the Scandinavian countries, the main labour centre de­
pending on its degree of white-collar organization faces competition from white-collar 
unions and additionally professional associations.27 In Britain and Ireland, a considerable 
share of overall membership tended to be organized by white-collar unions and profes­
sional associations not affiliated to the main union centres (TUC, ICTU) but some joined 
during the postwar movement, leaving mainly some organization of medical doctors and 
nurses outside the TUC realm.
27 The Norwegian LO profits from its larger share and the fragmentation outside, the Danish LO 
still makes inroads into public sector, mainly female and part-time employees but faces a strong 
white-collar centre (FTF) and smaller rivals, and the Swedish LO looses gradually in importance 
(from 55% in 1950 to 46% in 1980) compared to the cooperating TCO (ca. 40%) and the growing sta­
tus defending SACO-SR (12%).
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Table 8.7
Associational Monopoly in Public Sector, Western Europe 1920-89
Country Centre Type 1920 1930 1939 1950 1960 1970 1980
AU ÔGB (Soc.) 75.8 665 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
ZCG Chr. 10.9 20.9 -
Nat Nat 13.3 12.6
BE FGTB Soc. 84.7 795 74.4 505
CSC Chr. 15.3 205 25.6 49.7
CGSLB Ub.
DE LO(DSF) Soc. 53.8 58.6 37.0 32.0 395 48.0
FTF white 51.7 45.4 40.0
AC acad. 25 6.4 5.8
others ind. 46 2 412 63.0 13.4 8.4 62
FR CGT(U) Com. 51.4 365 100.0 35.6
CGT-FO Synd. 48.6 635 18.8
CFDT sec. 16.1
CFTC Chr. 2.0
CGC cadre 15
FEN educ. 25.7
GE DGB(ADGB) (Soc.) 17.6 78.9 63.7 63.1 665
DBB Beamte 47.0 13.8 25.4 25.8 24.6
DAG (Aia,GDA) white 195 4.4 3.8 3.6 3.9
CGB (Gedag) Chr. 15.9 3.2 2.7 3.5
others ind. 2 S 3.8 4.8 1.6
IT CGIL Com. 55.8 31.3 32.7 37.7
C1SL sec. 372 52.9 49.7 42.8
UIL Soc. 7.0 15.7 17.6 195
NE FNV(NW) (Soc.) 22.1 26.9 22.8 24.3 24.4 29.8 44.9
NKV Chr. 9.6 9.3 9.9 12.3 13.0 10.1 FNV
CNV Chr. 72 8.3 9.9 12.3 14.0 135 22.0
AC Beamte 6.9 75 82 165
others ind. 61.1 55.6 57.4 442 412 385 16.5
NO LO(NAF) Soc. 56.1 63.1 54.7
AF (EL) acad. 6.1 6.0 9.3
YS(YH) white 11.6 9.7 13.4
others ind. 265 21.1 22.6
SW LO Soc. 91.4 90.0 67.0 55.1 50.0 462 45.6
TCO white 275 35.9 405 41.6 425
SACO-SR acad. 8.6 10.0 5.3 9.0 95 122 115
SZ SGB Soc 773 66.1 66.0 645 59.6 54.9 495
CNG Chr. 15 22 3.1 55 7.0 8.8 9.7
others ind. 212 29.7 30.9 29.7 335 36.3 40.6
No te : IR and UK not available; years vary slightly (see source), but note GE: 1925; including prede­
cessors; Soc.: Socialist / Labour; Chr.: Christian; Sec.: secularized; Com.: Communists; Synd.: syndi­
calists; Lib.: Liberals; ind.: independent; white: white-collar; Acad.: academics; Beamte: civil servants. 
Source: own calculations based on V isser 1989, DUES database.
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Collective Bargaining
The particular nature of the public sector arises from the determination of employment and 
pay conditions in the public sector in contrast to the private sector. Different to the private 
sector, in some countries all or part of the public employment conditions are unilaterally set 
by the public authority. The practice and scope of collective bargaining varies with the 
public law tradition, government or parliamentary authority, and the status of the civil ser­
vice. Paradoxically, even in countries where the government promoted collective bargain­
ing in the private sector, many states have long postponed or partly still excluded collective 
bargaining in favour of unilaterally fixed, politically determined employment and pay con­
ditions. Thus where civil servants had or still have no bargaining rights, pressure group 
politics via parliament petition or government appeal remained an open strategy. The con­
sequence of this was, however, that interest representation remained largely fragmented 
into many sectional interests of mainly those that were in higher echelons whithin public 
administration on whose cooperation governments of all political colours had to rely.28
Such unilateral, political settlement was much more problematic for the more rapidly 
expanding lower civil service, communal workers, education and welfare sector. These 
lower grades public employees became increasingly organized within strike prone unions 
allied (or close) to the labour movement. They fought "from below” for union recognition, 
collective bargaining and strike rights already before the First World War. With the demo­
bilization after the war, public sector unionism became recognized in most countries, col­
lective bargaining was initiated and strikes became a more likely option.29 On the other 
hand, given several competing organizations, union recognition could become a political 
issue, as the state would have to decide on granting recognition rights.30
With the exception of nationalized industry, the employers’ interests in the public sector 
are commonly organized outside the private sector employer associations (see Upham 1990, 
LANZALACO 1992). While in the private sector employer associations provide also pressure 
group activities, there is no need for state-employers in the public sector since public au­
thorities can use the day-to-day political-administrative channels.31
Where multi-union bargaining existed, like in Scandinavia, the union centres created 
intermediary bargaining cartels to coordinate bargaining activities.32 In addition, pressures
28 Moreover the pay conditions for these higher civil servants were mainly based on political 
considerations, the maintenance of status position that would preclude bribery and guarantee loy­
alty to the state.
29 In Britain, following the Whitley recommendations (1918), local and national negotiating ma­
chinery was introduced for the civil service in 1919.
30 In Britain, it was enforced that only one civil servant organization per grade would be recog­
nized, while for the non-established public employees multi-union bargaining remained common.
31 One does find some form of coordination of the various national or regional administrations, 
local authorities, public enterprises and welfare services, sometimes through initiative of the central 
government, in some cases formal coordinating bodies but rarely a peak association similar to die 
private sector.
32 In Norway: LO cartel, 1936, Denmark: LO cartel, 1953, FTF cartels, Sweden: TCO-ST cartels.
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mounted to better centralize and coordinate public unions, particularly among unions for 
manual workers and lower white-collar employees. Indeed, collective bargaining was in­
creasingly used by the central government to control and standardize employment condi­
tions and pay structures throughout the central administration, the Länder administrations, 
local services and other public services. Compared to the private sector, today's pay struc­
tures are relatively uniform throughout the public sectors.33
However, a major difference between public and private bargaining is the difficulty to 
determine productivity (since profitability is outruled) within the public service and there­
fore other considerations have to be taken into account. When during the 1970s public sec­
tor debts and inflationary pressures mounted, governments were tempted to impose wage 
restrains serving a Vorbild (as an example) to private sector negotiations, this in turn insti­
gated militancy in the public sector (cf. HYMAN 1978: 43-5). The public-private cleavage be­
came a "Sollbruchstelle" (potential breaking point) within the main labour movement as the 
public sector unions became increasingly centralized (due to central bargaining), d e  
manded favourable policy of incumbent allied political parties, and were to pass the lead­
ing productive sector unions in size and power. In fact, public sector unions (see Table 8.6) 
were the largest by the 1980s in Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands, or were the second 
largest affiliate in Belgium and Germany, or third in Austria and Switzerland (see above). A 
conflict of interest emerged within the labour movement over 'fair comparison’ between 
private and public sector wages. As financial limits and monetary pressures narrowed the 
margins for wage increases, it became a zero-sum game between market and state sector 
"public financing is the private sector’s loss (SWENSON 1991:381)".
"Clienteusm" and Politics
Before the first World War, higher civil servants were commonly apolitical and loyal 
"servants" of conservative or liberal governments. In some communes and public services, 
mainly manual workers were organized in the left political party and union movement. 
Where Socialist party entered early in government, in local, regional or most importantly: 
national government, political public unionism found more favourable conditions. 
Moreover, once governments recognized unions after the First World War, public employ­
ees could more easily receive their right to organize than private employees. With the 
growth of the Welfare state, particularly following the Second World War, public employ­
ment grew rapidly (ROSE 1985b), though under different weitere regimes, each with a par­
ticular welfare-labour market nexus (ESPING-ANDERSEN 1990). Where the Socialist party be­
came the driving force of postwar welfare state growth, public employees, particularly in 
municipal, education and welfare services, profited from the amicable relationship to 
Socialist party and allied public service unions. Moreover, since the 1970s the leadership of 
Left political parties and allied union centres was increasingly recruited among public
33 For instance, in the more decentralized Federal Republic of Germany, the same (federal) pay 
schemes apply to all employees, albeit with some local adjustments (cf. KELLER 1983).
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unionists, symbolising a silent shift from traditional "Fordist" towards a postindustrial ori­
entation within the labour movement.
Until the growth to limits (cf. Flora 1986) of public welfare spending, public unionism 
was not a conflictarian but reinforcing element in internal union centre cohesion and party- 
union relations. Public unionism had developed into a kind of 'dientelistic' relationship, 
where public unions via their links to the incumbent Socialist party could promote public 
employment growth, largely influence recruitment policies and co-define grading schemes 
and seniority rules. Welfare state development maintained a labour intensive manual 
workforce and created primarily lower and medium white-collar jobs in the education and 
health sector, which were thought to provide new mobility chances to educated working- 
class children and job-seeking women. Also in terms of voting behaviour the public sector 
cleavages has been found to be an important cleavage, at least in Scandinavia (cf. HOEL & 
KNUTSEN 1989:196).
However, with the crisis in public finances public unions faced employment stagnation 
or even reduction, budget cuts limiting possible wage and salary rises, privatisation of 
public services, particularly of state-owned companies, PTT and railways. The strong grip 
of public unionism on welfare state and the proliferation of clientelistic interests through 
party-unions linkages, or through autonomous strike movements provoked strong reac­
tions against excessive "union power" (cf. Docan & PELASSY1987: ch. 5).
On the other hand, higher grade public employees, particularly civil servants, tended to 
be politically more heterogeneous, if not traditionally allied to the bourgeois parties. 
Political unionism on the side of the lower public employees provoked initially state regu­
lation and restrictions on political unionism, strike rights and politicisation of civil servants 
by the state that became only gradually relaxed with the integration of left parties into the 
democratic political system. Much like higher white-collar grades in the private sector, civil 
servants remained heterogeneous in political alignment. The higher the grade, the more 
civil servants tended to be organized by status organizations that were against solidaristic 
political class unionism and egalitarian taxation welfare politics. For instance, the Austrian 
election to personnel representation in the public sector show the split between "red” 
(Socialist) and "black" (Christian-Democratic) politics, the communal and railways workers 
vote largely for the Socialist fraction, while the federal and state employees but also part of 
the PTT employees favour the Christian camp.34 Where civil servant centres exist, these or­
ganizations tend to go along with the political majority amongst their rank and informally 
ally with bourgeois parties, even in countries where Socialist parties are in government. 
Given the need for any political party in government to seek cooperation with the non-po- 
litically mandated civil service, pressure group activities of civil service organizations, even 
where they tend to be critical of the incumbent party, have good chances to be heard. 
Moreover, civil servants are conspicuously overrepresented in political parties and in par-
34 For the Socialist fraction FSG (cf. the Christian FCG) voted 89% (6%) communal workers, 84% 
(9%) railways workers, 59% (36%) PTT employees, 31% (65%) federal and state employees (1977-79 
Personaltfertretungen), cf. PELINKA1980:191.
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liament, given the professional advantages to know how the system works and often 
favourable exemptions from work during political activities, in fact, there is some truth to 
the view of a Beamtenparlament (parliament of civil servants) in public opinion. Among the 
unionized, union-sponsored or union-leaders in parliament, the public sector unions have 
therefore an advantage.35
C o n c l u sio n s
The public-private cleavage is relative universal, although it leads to different forms of in­
ternal splits within the labour movement and within the sector as such. Like the organiza­
tion of white-collar employees, the unionization of the public employees emerged in the 
context of the previous cleavage organization but also particular state traditions. The inte­
gration of public employees within the main labour union centre depended on whether po­
litical industrial unionism became an obstacle to encompassing union organization. The 
more political unionism and industrial unionism were dominant, the more likely sectional- 
ist grades organization emerged, particularly were the state reinforced traditionally the 
status cleavage by mle-and-divide politics. It is in respect to the intra-sector cleavage, the 
differences between professional and solidaristic orientations that the impact of state tradi­
tions and pre-modem cleavage structures are most notable (see Table 8.8).
In Scandinavia with its Protestant-state professional bureaucracy, white-collar employ­
ees in private and public sector allied to form a joint movement against political industrial 
unionism, yet higher grades professional organizations emerged or remained indepen­
dently. In Germany and the Netherlands, while public employees became integrated within 
encompassing public sector unions, given the particular Beamte status and legal-rational 
public administrations, sectionalist status and pressure groups organized independently. In 
the Anglo-saxon countries (but also Switzerland) with past liberal state traditions, numer­
ous grades and staff associations coexist with larger public service unions in the decentral­
ized local, welfare and education services. In the Catholic countries with a tendency toward 
politicisation and patronage, political cleavages (the Church-State and reform-revolution 
cleavages) remained more dominant than public vs. private cleavage. Besides some frag­
mentation due to independent dvil service unionism, most public employees are organized 
along politico-religious lines (or integrated via fraction within a unitary movement as in 
postwar Austria).
The public-private cleavage entails in itself two divisions, one intra-class and one inter- 
dass divisions. First, the state-market differences provides the potential for a conflict be­
tween industrial unionism and public sector unionism over the redistribution of national 
welfare growth. Ironically, in countries where public sector unions became highly concen­
trated and integrated within the main labour union centres, they are more likely to come
35 For instance, in the Xth German Bundestag of 230 unionized members of parliament (1983): 91 
OTV, 42 teachers union, 10 others DGB public service unions and (mainly outside SPD) 51 DBB dvil 
service unions (cf. NlEDENHOF & PECE1987).
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Table 8.8
Integration and Separation of Civil Servants
C ivil Service C ivil Service
Unions Integrated C entre Separated
General vs. Grades Labour vs. Academics
DEMOCRATIC Liberal-state Scandinavia
Tradition autonomous professionals
UK, IR, (SZ) SW, DE. NO
Communes vs. Centre Labour vs. Bemate
Statist Catholic countries legal authority
Tradition corps public status
AU, BE, FR, IT GE, NE
into conflict within their "comrades" in the traditionally leading market sector. Second, the 
division between status and contract relations, between professional closure and collective 
solidarity, is the second intra-sector cleavage between middle-class and working-class in­
terests. In most countries, this cleavage has not subsisted and may become more conflictar- 
ian as privatisation or public sector reforms will endanger traditional privileges.
The mobilization strategies in the public sector apply the same two principle as for other 
cleavages: closed or open mobilization strategies, once union recognition was granted. Due 
to the stress of education and professional credentials in the public sector, the strategy of 
"professional closure" is relative successful, as high unionization rates of professionals and 
civil servants indicate. Yet, also the strategy of open "collectivist" strategy has been more 
successful in mobilizing the majority of public employees, particularly since bureaucratiza­
tion, career blocs, and political budget control gave an incentive to organize.
The representation of public employees' interests shows a similar division between sec- 
tionalist and solidaristic unionism. For status organizations, given the political heterogene­
ity of their members, sectionalist pressure group politics is the main channel of influence. 
The open public sector unions, on the other hand, were traditionally allied to the political 
labour movement, this provided a helpful channel of influencing government decisions 
when Socialists were incumbent, though in recent years, with strained public finances, the 
internal private-public cleavage within the labour movement became more manifest.
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9
The model of democratization was 'too atomizing; it treated each case
in isolation, without taking account of its connections with its
surroundings, of the geopolitical position of the area in question. I 
Began to study the Gn& in space among the different cases, and Became 
convinced of the decisive importance of interregional relationships,
Both in the process of nation-Building and in the further structuring of 
mass mobilization' (ROKKAN, mimeo, cit in TILLY 1984: 132, cf.
ROKKAN1980)
Europe shows bewildering variation in union diversity. And labour unity seems not to 
prevail in Europe. In the preceding two empirical parts on political and functional cleavages, 
we had been examining each cleavage in its own right, finding an exhausting variety in 
union diversity. We have asked for each conflict: whether it was present in a society and if 
so, when it came to the fore and how it was transformed into union organization? We found 
that in some countries labour unity is more or less attained in political terms, while it lacks 
social inclusiveness, while in many others the reverse is more the case. Moreover, each 
national labour movement went through distinct stages of responding to arising internal
interest conflicts. As in the light of one conflict an organizational decision was taken, soon
new challenges emerged - it seems like a 'never ending story". However, examining the 
sequence and interaction of previous to later mobilization of cleavages has given us a tool 
to understand the main ramifications in the diverging paths in union development across 
Europe. We will be reflecting again at the trend and future relevance of cleavages for union 
development in the concluding chapter (Chapter 10).
The contention of this chapter on encompassing union diversity is that there is some order 
in diversity. In singling out the main sources and forces that were involved in transforming 
cleavages into organization, we will see how there are systematic variations across Europe. 
Moreover, the model of sequencing of cleavages and the national channelling will be a 
guide to understand why some cleavages became more dominant than others and why 
they took different organizational forms. In this chapter, the task at hand is to try to 
encompass the extensive union diversity across Europe. After having studied 
diachronically each cleavage transformation it is now time to halt and take account. Thus 
we will take a more elevated position as an observer, drawing a European map of union 
diversity from a bird’s-eye-view.
But first we will be scanning the structuring of union systems from a far distance. We 
need to look at the whole system of cleavages, to understand what kind of conflicts were 
more or less likely to be transformed. In addition, I shall give some overview over other 
cleavages that were not exposed in the historical chapters. That these other cleavages have
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not been as dominant or manifest will provide us with an extra clue to understanding the 
salience of the six cleavages discussed thus far. Secondly, it will further be asked again what 
were the external forces that intervened in cleavage crystallization. We can now assess 
whether there is a relationship between the union environment and the structure of union 
systems. Thirdly, I will attempt to sketch ideal-type clusters of labour movements based on 
our reading of political cleavage structures. This will lead us to the final task of drawing a 
European map of union diversity spanned by Rokkanean "master variables". With the map of 
union diversity at hand, we can ask whether there is or will be a chance for European labour 
unity, at least in form of a most common denominator coordination around the main 
clusters at a higher trans-national European level?
I
M anifest  a n d  L a ten t  C leavages
As we moved, in the last two parts, from one cleavage to the next, we found increasing 
differences in whether a cleavage became important or not. Why are some social cleavages 
to become crystallized and monopolized, while others remain absent or latent? Indeed, I 
would like to remind the reader to the distinction introduced earlier (see Chapter 2) 
between manifest and latent conflicts (MERTON 1948, cf. DAHRENDORF1959). Accordingly we 
can also distinguish more or less manifest and latent cleavages in union systems. Looking 
at the six cleavages that became manifest, we have seen how they vary in universality. In 
the following we will be looking at the universality of the labour-capital cleavage and the 
sources of the cross-cutting cleavages again. I will stress first the importance of the 
sequence in organization formation for variations in the labour-capital cleavage. The 
second claim is the legacy of preindustrial social cleavages that became reinvigorated and 
mobilized once labour movements came into being. This will lead us to the consideration of 
other cleavages that - according to ROKKAN - had been important in the structuring of mass 
democracies but that have not played a dominant role in structuring labour movements. 
Moreover, I will be discussing briefly some additional, latent cleavages that have not yet 
become manifest cleavages but could come to the fore in the future.
The Universal Labour-Capital C leavage Revisited
UPSET and Rokkan’S (1967) claim that the labour-capital cleavage is relative universal was 
shown to be valid in respect to the emergence of a working-class party (and union centre) 
before the First World War (see Chapter 3). Certainly, the formation of a working-class 
party and union centre, whatever form they had, was a general phenomena in Europe, and 
as such has not added to differences between party (or industrial relations) systems. 
However, the character, orientation and base of Socialist parties varies across Europe, in 
particular, and most relevant here, the relationship between party and unions are multiple. 
In fact, ROKKAN (1968) and UPSET (1983) discussed variations in the reformist or 
revolutionary character, signified by strong Communist labour movements and working-
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class splits (see Chapter 5), but seemed to assume the preceding labour-capital cleavage to 
be ubiquitous and therefore less in need to be examined. Thus, differences in Western party 
systems were taken to derive form variations of the first three Rokkanean (pre-capitalist) 
cleavages (centre-periphery, urban-rural, Church-State) and a "possible" fifth cleavage 
(national-international), yet the fourth labour-capital cleavage was considered to be less 
important.
The labour-capital cleavage, as was shown (see Chapter 4), led to considerable differences 
in the timing, sequence and character of party and union formation and subsequent 
relations. This had important consequences for the further structuring of alternatives, not 
only in terms of the reform-revolution schism but - as was shown in this study - on all 
subsequent political and functional cleavages in union movements. The four patterns of 
party-union relations deriving from the labour-capital cleavage (the union-led, party-led, 
interdependent and independent party-union formation) had consequences for the 
integration of anti-Sodalist, non-political, or politically heterogeneous Church-going 
workers, manual industrial workers, white-collar employees or civil servants. The flaw in 
the labour-capital "universality" thesis can be repaired without doing injustice to, but 
instead reinforcing, Rokkan's claim of the importance of each cleavage for the structuring of 
alternatives. As a consequence of the pre-capitalist cleavages, the distinct pre-industrial 
legacies and the permutations of elite strategies to integrate the working-class in polity and 
economy, the seemingly "universal" industrialization process became differently 
transformed into Socialist party and union alliances.
My claim is that history and politics matters, while the "logic of capitalism" - in both the 
Marxian or Modernist view - leads not necessarily to convergence in the organization of 
labour interests. The industrialization process swelled the "proletarian" labour force and led 
to population shifts from rural to urban, from agricultural to industrial areas all across 
Europe with the well-known variations in timing (cf. ROSTOW 1952). Yet, industrialization 
led hardly uniformly to working-class formation (cf. KATZNELSON & ZOLBERG 1986), and 
even less to uniform organization of labour interests. Certainly, the timing, rapidity and 
character of industrialization had an impact (cf. GALENSON 1952b, LORW1N 1958), albeit 
indirect and mediated, on the formation of working-class labour movements (cf. LAFFERTY 
1971, ELIASSEN 1974). The economic development first of all set the conditions under which 
the functional cleavages became transformed, particularly, in respect to the craft-industry 
cleavage (see Chapter 6). The c r a f t- in d u s tT y  cleavage and the labour-capital cleavage were 
mutually reinforcing - the persistence of sectionalist orientations or the cultivation of class 
solidarity ideology had been advanced by, and had consequences for, both party (cf. MARKS 
1989) and unions (cf. FULCHER 1988,1991).
The Pre-Industrial Legacy of Labour Cleavages
While the thesis of the "universality" of the labour-capital cleavage has to be amended, 
Rokkan's contention in respect to party systems that "the decisive contrasts among the 
systems had emerged before the entry of the working-class parties into the political arena
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(ROKKAN 1970: 113)*' can be confirmed and shall be even extended to the corporate 
bargaining arena. For historical-sociologists it may not be surprising to ascertain that pre­
industrial traditions shape the crystallization of labour interests and that historical 
continuities remain, despite uprooting social, political and economic changes. CROUCH, in 
the same vein, offers "a reminder that complex societies very rarely present tabluae rasae, 
even after events as shattering as two world wars, and that recent institutions and 
behaviour have deep historical roots (CROUCH 1986: 178)". In contrast to teleological 
convergence views of modernization theorists (cf. KERR et al. I960), the formation of labour 
movements was the result of a partial modernization process (cf. RUESCHMEYER 1979), a 
junction of modem and pre-modem forces. This historical perspective will lead us to 
discern the origins of diversity in the specific conditions under which the path of 
development branched out and was further carved. Yet, in order not to be just a credo of a 
profession that legitimates its interest for history against their "timeless" sociology 
colleagues, one should single out which traditions had what effect and how this was 
preserved over time, despite the view of a constant changing society.
The pre-industrial legacy had an impact on both political and functional cleavage 
crystallization. The rise of an industrial workforce with industrialization and urbanization 
did not eradicate the impact of previous social distinctions, established political alignments 
or traditional cultural rootings. In respect to each political cleavage, the importance of pre­
industrial cleavages have been highlighted: the political, religious and cultural traditions all 
moulded the crystallization of political cleavages within the labour movement. By the 
formation of the first national union centres in the 1890s, a century of partial political 
integration or exclusion of the "lower estates" had passed since the French Revolution of 
1789. The impact of liberal state traditions and early suffrage reform in comparison to 
authoritarian state traditions and exclusive strategies have been mentioned as important in 
shaping the formation of the labour-capital cleavage, the persistence of lib-lab traditions or 
their replacement by Marxian Socialist ideology (see Chapter 3). The importance of the 
religious factor and State-Church relations prior to the educational mobilization of the 
working class, led to the preserving of religious identity or of secularisation (or even 
dechristianization) within the working-class (see Chapter 4). The preserving of local and 
work communities in opposition to the centralizing Nation-State, and the failure of national 
cultural integration, were a profound base for the emergence of revolutionary counter­
cultures (see Chapter 5).
Even more striking is the pre-industrial legacy on functional cleavages, since these 
remain most closely linked to divisions in the labour process and thus should be subject to 
the convergent pressures of economic development. Yet, since DURKHEIM (1893), sociologist 
have stressed that the division of labour is a social division, one that reflects social 
differentiations and power relations in society (cf. RUESCHMEYER 1986). The persistence of 
pre-industrial craft traditions intervened not only in the "organization of work in industry" 
(RUESCHMEYER 1986: Ch. 5), but had also an important impact on union organization: the 
degree of sectionalist or class solidarity (see Chapter 6). In respect to the white-collar
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cleavage, it was stressed how much pre-industrial status distinctions where reinforced and 
expanded by paternalistic employers and state strategies to nde-and-divide labour (see 
Chapter 7). Finally, pre-industrial state traditions had their impact on status relations within 
the civil service and the scope of unilateral state intervention (see Chapter 8). These 
historical legacies were not to determine the future - say an observer in 1890 was to predict 
1990 - but set the predispositions on which the further development draw.
Peripheral Cleavages and N ational Labour
ROKKAN's cleavage typology (1970) proposed five cleavages that emerged as a result of the 
Industrial, National, and International Revolution (see Table 9.1 X1 However, not all of these 
cleavages were of salience to labour unity, some remained peripheral (centre-periphery, 
rural-urban), other cleavages (Church-State, Revolution-Reform) were more or less limited 
to some countries or time periods (see Chapter 4 and 5). The explanation for the variations 
in cleavage salience across Europe, compared to party systems, derives from the 
particularity of divisions within labour and the national integration of labour. The two 
peripheral cleavages, though of some historical or regional importance, hardly led to 
schism in national labour movements, particularly since the labour movement had become 
so much integrated within the national polity and economy. Working-class party and 
unions became stepwise oriented towards, if not drawn into, the national electoral channel 
and the national bargaining channel (see Chapter 2). As the diffuse political regulatory 
power and the local labour (and producer) market became increasingly national, the 
organization of labour interests were compelled to reorganize on the national level as well. 
After a century, the national parties and union centres are so much taken for granted that 
the long-term difficult process of centralization and national integration is often 
overlooked. Until this was achieved, the rural-urban cleavage and the centre-periphery 
cleavage had long challenged national labour unity and union centralization.
The centre-periphery cleavage became increasingly encompassed by national central 
unions and union centres in an attempt to eliminate politicized localist and sectionalist 
regional independent organizations (see Chapter 4). Historically, until the end of the 
Habsburg Empire, different left party and union organizations existed for the language 
groups in the Austro-Hungarian multi-cultural "nation-state". Also in the German Reich 
(until 1933), the Polish immigrant workers had, for instance, their own union organizations. 
On the British Isles, the centre-periphery cleavage led to the formation of regional union 
centres (ITUC) as a consequence of the national-functional hierarchical integration of the
1 Inconsistently, LlPSET k  ROKKAN (1967: 47) propose four critical junctures (Reformation, 
National Revolution, Industrial Revolution, and as a "suggestion”: Russian Revolution) and four 
cleavages (centre-periphery, State-Church, Land-Industry, Owner-Worker), while 33 pages earlier 
they state that the four cleavages were the result of the two twin process of National Revolution and 
International Revolution (LlPSET & ROKKAN 1967: 14; see also ROKKAN 1970: 131 and 101 
respectively). In my view there are five cleavages and three junctures (cf. also FLORA 1981) to which 
one would be "tempted to add" a sixth national-transnational cleavage.
205
I V / C l e a v a g e  S a l i e n c e
Table 9.1
Political Cleavages (based on Rokkan)
Critical Juncture Cleavage Co nflict
(1) National 
Revolution
(1) centre-periphery
(2) State-Church
national (dominant) vs. local (minority) culture 
secular vs. religious control of culture
(II) Industrial 
Revolution
(3) urban-rural
(4) labour-capital
urban-industrial vs. rural-agrarian production 
employers vs. workers
(III) international
REVOLUTION
(5) revolution-reform
(6) trans-national
national integration into polity vs. world revolution 
national protection vs. interdependence
Source: Scheme frei nach (based on) Rokkan (1970:101,131), U pset & Rokkan (1967:14,47), see 
also F lo ra  (1981).
No t e : concepts vary in source; own suggestion: for sixth cleavage see text.
British TUC in 1895 when local trades union councils were excluded from direct 
representation within the congress.2 After the Republic of Ireland was established, the 
"national question” led to a split over the British-based (Protestant-led) unions and the 
formation of a national Irish (Catholic-led) union centre (CIU, 1944). The two organizations 
merged later to form a new union centre (ICTU, 1957) that includes both Irish unions in the 
Republic and the North as well as the Irish sections of British-based unions. The domiance 
of the national question has helped to deemphasize a manifest religious split (see Chapter 4), 
between Catholic and secular Socialist union movement in the Republic, though 
'nationality' represents a quasi religious split through British or Irish-based unions in the 
North.
While in most countries, regional differences became less divisive in labour relations, the 
centrifugal language conflicts in Belgian "society" and national party system led also to a 
regionalization tendency, albeit it still laggs behind the political parties (the Socialists split 
in 1978, the Christian party in 1968). The Christian white-collar union, given the importance 
of language for clerks and the segmentation of the labour market for their profession, was 
the first to start a process of devolution (it split in 1980) that may continue to affect all 
Belgian unions. Today, in French-speaking Switzerland, on the Danish independent 
islands, and recently in Northern Italy (efforts to build local unions allied to the Leghe), 
there are smaller regional union organizations that coexist with the national ones. Outside 
the scope of this study, there exit regional-linguistic labour movements besides the two 
main Spanish union centres, most notably in Basque country, Catalonia and Galicia. 
Otherwise, however, the centre-periphery cleavage remained less prone to lead to 
organizational splits in national labour movements.
Nevertheless, besides organizational splits, regional variations in unionization may be 
considerable, reflecting regional disparities and partially segregated labour markets. The
2 Regional congresses with partly TUC affiliated and partly independent unions emerged in 
Scotland (STUO, in Ireland (ITUO and later and most incompletely in Wales (Wales TUC, 1974).
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regional differences in the Italian labour movement are outstanding, while the two non- 
Communist union centres organize more than one-third of their members in the South 
(including the islands), the Communists only one-quarter. Regional clustering of voting 
patterns for Communists, Socialists and Christian-Democrats (cf. TODD 1990), and scattered 
indications of similar patterns for unions, underline the claim developed in this study of 
regional social milieus or urban ghettos that provide the stronghold for cleavage 
organizations. For a better understanding of the regional clustering of territorial cleavages 
(centre-periphery, rural-urban) and segmentational cleavages (labour-capital, state-church, 
reform-revolution) regional analysis could provide more insights than comparative 
national analysis, albeit this is beyond the scope and possibility of this study.
Urban Workers and Agrarian Labourers
The urban-rural (land-industry) cleavage had a more historical than enduring impact on the 
alliance chances of Socialist parties and the importance of peripheral-rural opposition for 
labour movements. The organization of agrarian labourers was a difficult task and in most 
countries a belated and largely unsuccessful attempt. An exception is the Italian labour 
movement that organizes extensively not only agrarian labourers but also tenant farmers 
(besides small shopkeepers). Historically, the agrarian question was a challenge to both 
working-class party and unions. Given the large differences in agriculture and landholding 
structures across Europe, industrial and urban workers found that the possibility for red- 
green alliances were differently foreclosed. Since Moore's path-breaking thesis (MOORE 
1966) a long debate on the impact of agrarian-labour versus agrarian-bourgeois alliance 
structures on the stability of political systems ensued (most recently: cf. ESPING-ANDERSEN 
1985, Stephens 1989, rueschm eyer, Stephens & Stephens 1992, luebbert 1991). There 
are two forms of alliances between urban workers and rural peasants; on the one hand, 
political alliances between red and green parties, and on the other, the mobilization of 
agricultural labourers (and small tenants) by labour movements.
In respect to the impact of rural-urban cleavages on labour unity, it can only be briefly 
indicated that all three political labour movements attempted with varying success to build 
social and political alliances. In the case of the Socialist labour movement, the 
Scandinavians (in particular the Swedes) were most successful in building red-green 
alliances exactly at the moment when democratic regimes were most endangered (see 
Chapter 3). Christian parties, especially the Austrian and Belgian pillarized Christian- 
Democratic parties, build on a triple alliance of farmers, employers and workers 
associations (see Chapter 4). Finally, in respect to the Communist movement, a major 
difference in the alliances of the French and Italian Communist movement is the latter's 
openness to agricultural labourers and small farmers (see Chapter 5). Nevertheless, the 
union movement remained largely dominated by the urban craft and industrial workers. 
Many unionists hold the view, often based on ideological convictions or statistical 
observations, that agricultural work was only a transitory state and was soon to be 
swallowed by industrialization.
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Indeed, until the Fust World War, the collective organization of agricultural labourers 
and tenant farmers (e.g. the South-Italian Fasti, the 1907 fanner revolts in France) was rare 
and largely dissociated from the industrial worker movement (cf. TILLY, TILLY & TILLY 
1975). Although in most interwar countries agricultural wage labour was still a sizeable 
force but remained difficult to organize, agriculture had declined to below 10% by the 1950s 
with few exceptions.3 Thus with declining agricultural sector and less important increased 
unionization in the sector, the drag of lower unionization in agriculture became less notable 
(cf. VISSER 1990: 41) and with it the labour movement's conem or debate over the agrarian 
question.
N ational Labour and Transnational Cleavages
With increasing international dependency nation-states and economies became 
interdependent in both politico-military and political-economic relations, not to speak of 
the intensification of global communication and cultural exchanges. The Bolshevik 
Revolution and the postwar East-West division demonstrated that revolutionary changes of 
a society were difficult to maintain if the revolution remained homemade and could not be 
exported to neighbouring and other countries. The reform-revolution cleavage, that cut 
across labour unity, operated on a world scale, it led to the East-West competition of two 
politico-economic systems: the capitalist Market economy and the planned State economy. 
After each of the two wars, European Labour was divided whether to follow the national 
reformist road to Socialism that aimed at gradually transforming Market economies or the 
international revolutionary fight to replace a Market economy by Socialism. Of course, one 
should add that the evolutionary theory of the "logic of industrialism" of KERR (KERR et al. 
1960, KERR 1983) predicted the long-term convergence of the two models to a "third" 
optimal way in between market allocation and state planning.
A possible sixth cleavage, besides the révolution-reform cleavage, derives also from the 
increasing international interdependency: the national-transnational cleavage. With the 
dependency from World Markets and international political cooperation (in particular the 
increasing European integration), the Nation-State loses some of the national sovereignty 
and possibility to intervene into the national economy. The first Socialist government under 
Mitterand under the French Fifth Republic, for instance, faced the impossibility to maintain 
a national Keynesian demand-side economic policy against the increasing World economic 
and monetary pressures (cf. HaLL 1986). The increasing political and economic integration
3 Between the two wars, agricultural wage labourers (including fishers) varied between around 
one-quarter of all wage and salary earners in most countries (Austria, Denmark, France, Ireland and 
Norway) to below 10% in Britain (and small peasant Switzerland), albeit in Italy over 40% worked in 
agriculture (FLORA, Kr a u s  & PFENNING 1987). With the exception of sudden wave in the early 1920s, 
agricultural labourers remained most difficult to organize, less than 15% were unionized (cf. VISSER 
1990:42-3). Since the 1950s agricultural had declined to below 10% of the dependent labour force (in 
Denmark and Ireland: 1960s, Italy: 1970s), while unionization in the smaller, increasingly regulated 
sector increased, particularly in Austria, Scandinavia and Italy.
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Table 9.2 
Functional Cleavages
C ritical Juncture Cleavage Conflict
(I) W orkplace 
O rganization
(1) craft-industry
(2) insider-outsider
skilled craft vs. less skilled factory workers 
core (tenured) vs. peripheral employment
(II) Educational 
mobilization
(3) white-blue collar
(4) female-male
status vs. class; service vs. productive workers 
equal opportunity vs. established position
(III) (In ter )national 
Market regulation
(5) public-private
(6) exposed-sheltered
public regulation vs. market logic
export dependent vs. protected domestic markets
Note: (see text).
within Europe, and the European Community in particular, is a new challenge to labour 
unity. This may contribute to a new cleavage, a conflict between interest groups that profit 
from the mobility of capital, goods, services and labour, and those that loose out given the 
loss of national social protection. The national labour movements, both party and unions 
that had become increasingly integrated within the national channels of interest 
representation, may realize how much they have grown dependent on the national power 
resources and regulation capacities, while transnational (and decentralized) action will be 
in future demand. I will return to the difficulties of transnational organization of labour 
again at the end of this chapter.
A dditional and Concealed Functional Cleavages
The analysis of functional cleavages was limited to the three most salient, manifest 
organizational splits (see Table 9.2): the craft-industry, white- vs. blue-collar, and public- 
private cleavage. However, other latent conflicts derive from labour market segmentation 
and differences in social position of employees, albeit they have been less transformed into 
separate organizations. I would like to point briefly at three latent functional cleavages: the 
gender, the insider-outsider, and the domestic-export cleavage. These conflicts are still 
mainly concealed and thus internal to national unions and union movements. They add 
further strains on the accommodation of the "traditional" functional cleavages discussed in 
this study, as they partly reinforce, partly cross-cut existing organizational splits.
With the increasing participation of women in previously male employment position, 
conflicts over the organization of women emerged. A number of status defensive 
organizations, for instance, male office clerks against female typists, mobilized male 
workers and led to social closure strategies (see Chapter 7). In some countries, coalition and 
political rights were initially limited, most notably suffrage was commonly extended to 
women only after the First World War, in some Catholic countries after the Second World 
War, and in Switzerland only in 1974. In some countries, separate union organizations for
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female employees were founded and remained existent for a long period.4 However, an 
open organization strategy was largely adopted, the best long-term solution for the interest 
of both female and male employees was to organize both. In order to prevent undercutting 
of male labour by "cheap" female labour, unionists attempted in a long battle to rise the 
wage level and improve the working conditions for women as well, a struggle that is still 
going on. However, except for female dominated services, in particular the public welfare 
sector, trade unions still tend to overrepresent male manual workers and underrepresent 
female non-manual employees. The particular employment situation for women (e.g. 
temporal positions, part-time work, service jobs) has often hampered union organization, 
as a consequence women are underrepresented and feel not attracted by male-dominated 
inert unions.
The insider-outsider cleavage, is the latent conflict between those that are traditionally 
well organized and those that are largely unrepresented is situated in the workplace and 
employment situation (cf. HEINZE et al. 1981, SABEL 1981). The insider are the 
Stammbdegschaft (the core employment) that have received tenure-like job security and 
collective mobility through union-controlled dismissal procedures and internal labour 
markets. The outsiders are those that are excluded from participation in this primary labour 
market, mainly the unskilled workers, the immigrants, the part-time employees, the 
untrained young, the unemployed. Even more than in the case of the gender cleavage, the 
insider-outsider cleavage remains latent and concealed, since the outsider have less 
possibility for voice (within existing unions) or exit (organize separately). They neither 
have much resources for collective action and given their diverse social composition and 
hope of individual advancement lack collective identity. Again, the salience of the cleavage 
depends largely on the organization strategy of unionists, their conception of class 
solidarity, to include or exclude those in peripheral employment positions. Again 
differences between labour movements across Europe are large as to whether unions are 
open to, and particularly make an effort to organize, foreign workers and the unemployed.
The third, still largely concealed functional cleavage, the domestic-export cleavage that 
follows from the same international changes as my suggested sixth political (national- 
transnational) cleavage. With the international division of labour and world trade, the core 
sectors of the economy become tied to the international economy, while other peripheral 
sectors remain domestic in orientation. An analysis of the weight of exposed and protected 
sector union movements can be linked to neo-corporatist behaviour (CROUCH 1990), this 
finding links up with the insights on the impact of World Markets on small export-oriented 
European states (KATZENSTEIN 1985), the economic impact of centralized negotiations (cf. 
Flanagan, Soskice, and Ulman 1983), and the importance of 'encompassing organization' 
that internalize national economic development for internationally competitive economies 
(OLSON 1982). With the shift within union movements from main industrial sectors to 
service and public sector, from industrial workers to white-collar employees, even in the so
4 For instance, the Danish female workers union, a parallel organization to the male general 
union.
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far nationally centralized union movement centrifugal decentralizing tendency will 
commence, furthered by flexibility and decentralization efforts of employers (cf. Baguoni 
& CROUCH 1990). But the exposed core versus sheltered periphery cleavage cuts not only 
across national union movements, it also is latent within multi-sector unions in conflicts 
about preserving non-competitive industries or firms for the sake of employment security.
II
C leavage C rystallization  
a n d  U n io n  D iversity
For an understanding of union diversity, we have to consider not only the legacy of social 
cleavage structures and the emergence of new conflicts, but the forces that are involved in 
the process of cleavage crystallization and transformation. We have seen that, for instance, 
the religious factor as such provides only the potential for union cleavages, more important 
is the interaction of the main actors, in this case the Nation-State and the Church. For each 
cleavage, the main actors involved in the formation of cleavages were singled out. I shall 
summarize briefly the main figurations of actors that led to cleavage crystallization. This 
will lead us to the question to what degree cleavage structures of party systems and 
employer association systems have had a "spill over" effect on union cleavage systems. In 
the functional cleavage chapters, we have found some interdependence of party and unions 
and some compulsion through employers centralization on the development of union 
systems, nevertheless, the influence is far from being unidirectional and universal. A third 
important "player” in the game of cleavage crystallization was the state. In particular,the 
state rule-and-divide, and as was already mentioned the state structure and traditions had 
an impact on cleavage formationand also on cleavage institutionalization.
Cleavage Crystallization and Figurations
A comparative cleavage analysis tends for practical and conceptual reasons to stress mainly 
structural factors. This study has pointed, however, also to the role of strategic actors and 
alliance building in the process of cleavage transformation. Rokkan himself stressed the 
role of "political entrepreneurs" in building alliances, choosing mobilizing strategies and 
the arena (ROKKAN 1977: 564). More generally he considered the role of mobilizing 
agencies, the political, cultural and economic agencies (ROKKAN 1977: 566-8) in the process 
of transforming cleavages into organizations. A similar conceptualization can be found in 
ELIAS' figuration sociology (ELIAS 1970), that stresses the interdependence of actors. For 
instance, SwaaN analyzes the power relations and coalitions of the four-sided figuration 
(the petty bourgeoisie, employers, workers, the regime) that played a crucial role in the 
creation of social security institutions (SWAAN 1988:167-177).
The figuration that gave rise to the labour-capital cleavage was the interplay between 
political agencies (State, party) and economic agencies (employers, unions). Yet my 
structural analysis took the strategies of state and employers largely as given, due to a
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pragmatic and conceptual choice. They were considered to be external structural 
constraints (or thresholds) on the opportunity structure of party and unions. Additional 
historical analysis could provide further insights on the role of these agencies in the process 
of cleavage formation. Similarly, the analysis of party and union relations was mainly 
structural, looking at the organizational foundation and consolidation process. Again, 
further insights could be derived from historiography of party and union leaders and their 
strategic decisions, though the aim of this study is mainly limited to the structural 
constraints of union formation.
The Church-State cleavage added a fifth "player", the cultural agency: the Church. In the 
case of the trans-national Catholic Church, the power and influence spread from the 
Vatican to the hierarchical clergy to the Catholic action groups, though the dependency 
from Rome as well as Papal policy varied between countries and over time. In the Calvinist 
(and Protestant dissident movements) power over cultural identity was much more diffuse 
and fragmented, a disadvantage in strategic political alliance and organization building 
(though individual lay leaders, like the Dutch Calvinist Kuypers had more Spielraum as 
political entrepreneurs). In contrast to the rise of the Socialist labour movement, the Church 
had a more important role than the party in the Christian union movement, though in 
postwar secularizing Europe the Christian-Democratic party gained in importance (e.g. 
Italian and Austrian Christian-Democratic party members played a key role in founding a 
separate union centre and unified movement respectively).
The third political cleavage, the revolution-reform cleavage was initially an internal labour 
conflict (reformist and revolutionary adherents within party and unions) but after the 
Russian revolution in 1917, the International (Moscow-led party) became the additional 
strategic actor (a political but also cultural agency that had casted ideological identity). 
Again, the strategies and influence of the Moscow-led Communist International varied 
across time and had different implanting in each movement leading to the organizational 
diversity despite the ideological unity (cf. TANNAHILL 1978). Again, "exceptionalist" 
historiography has often stressed the role of leadership and intellectuals that led to 
different developments, while this study concentrated on the impact of structural 
differences from a comparative view.
Also in respect to the functional cleavages coalitions of agencies and social groupings 
have been formative. In particular, state and employers policy to rule-and-divide by 
granting special status to skilled workers, white-collar employees, or civil servants has 
played an important role in obstructing labour unity. Moreover, middle-class groups and 
civil service corps, the beneficiaries of these policies, mobilized themselves and struck 
strategic alliances to defend and extend their privileged status. The analysis of figurations 
can reveal a more dynamic perspective of changes in power relations and 
interdependencies of elite strategies, it can build into the comparison some element of 
agency, though it often requires for all practical reasons limitations to historical case 
studies.
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Political Parties and Cleavage Structures
In the part on political cleavage structuration, the interaction in the formation phase 
between political and economic interest organization and the subsequent multiple links 
between party and unions were discussed. In terms of political cleavages, we find thus a 
large degree a congruence of cleavage structure in party systems and union systems. As a 
general rule, countries with high fragmentation in the party system tend to have a higher 
fragmentation in the union system (though one party at least would be subtracted from 
correlations, since it will be most closely related to "capital"). The riassiral opponents, the 
British two party system and the French multi-party system find their correspondence in a 
weak but encompassing British union centre (TUC) and many rival unions in France. In 
countries in which the Church-State cleavage led to party divisions (in the Southern and 
mixed countries), the cleavage also cross-cut the labour-capital cleavage, thus giving rise to 
Christian union movements. Yet the unions could rely only on a section of all-class support 
of the allied Christian party and had often a minority role within the party (see Chapter 4). 
The analysis of the revolution-reform cleavage showed as well a close link between party 
and union systems, particularly where the Communist party found large support, political 
schism within the labour movement occurred (see Chapter 5).
Again, sequencing and timing of party and union development provides a key to 
understand the congruence or divergence between party system and union system. Where 
union movements emerged relative early and preceded political party formation, it is the 
cleavage structure of the union system that put its stamp on the labour cleavages in the 
party system. Whereas in all the other cases, political splits provoked also deep rifts in the 
union movement, thus political cleavages spread out from the party to the union system. 
Although the thesis of party-led pillarization (STEINICER 1977) may not hold in all cases for 
union formation (see Chapter 4), we can expect an overlap of party and union cleavages in 
pillarized systems, as cleavage-organizations in the political and corporate channel seek 
alliances through linkages. The major exceptions to party-union parallelism are the postwar 
unified labour movements in Austria and Germany, and outside the scope of this analysis, 
the failure of Iberian Christian unionism and the overcoming of Communist-split Finnish 
unionism (cf. VISSER 1990:107-109).
However, a number of cross-cutting political cleavages (urban-rural, centre-periphery) 
may add to the number of parties without necessarily increasing the number of union 
centres. Moreover, new left and other parties, as well as the social movements, that 
emerged since the 1960s have not provoked organizational splits in the established union 
movements but led to a further dealigning of union centres from traditional party linkages. 
For instance, the Danish LO faced internal splits between old supporters of the Social- 
Democratic party and new militants of the new leftist party. Similarly, the environmental 
movement and the Green party added to internal union conflicts between traditional 
"materialist" unionists and younger "postmaterialist" militants, for instance, in the nuclear 
energy debate in Germany and Sweden (cf. JAHN 1991). Although the integration of these 
new political groupings remains a challenge to the relative inert union movements, given
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the heterogeneous composition of the new social movements and the high institutional 
thresholds for new political unionism, they did not mobilize so much against but through or 
outside existing unions.
An other factor that leads to divergence between party and union system is the different 
impact of functional cleavages. While functional cleavages have gained in salience within 
union system, we find a opposing trend that functional cleavages decline in party systems 
as class-based or socially based political parties become increasingly encompassing catch­
all parties (cf. KIRCHHEIMER 1966). As LEDERER (1912b) pointed out - in an early, seminal 
article - political parties, even working class parties, have in the long-run to consider the 
public interests, while functional organizations push for their sectional interests and 
attempt to press political parties in their clientele's interest. With Lederer we may ask* Why 
is there no Angestelltenpartei? While the functional cleavages gave in many countries rise to 
sectional union organizations (see Chapter 7 and 8), they never really provided the base for 
a white-collar or public employee's political party, though some smaller middle class 
parties tried to court salaried employees and civil servants. As was pointed out, the more 
encompassing and the more white-collar grades and public employees are organized, the 
more politically heterogeneous is the social base of a union. White-collar and civil service 
organizations have commonly no particular links to political parties but instead use 
pressure group politics to gain broad support among bourgeois and labour parties. The 
same social changes, the growth of white-collar and public employment, have thus had 
very different effects on party and union systems, particularly in the countries where 
sectionalist interest organizations emerged.
Employers Associations and Cleavage Structures
Given my thesis developed earlier (Chapter 1 and 2) that trade unions as collective and 
corporate organizations are locked into the social structure and linked to the organizational 
system, we would also expect employers associations to be divided by social cleavages. On 
the other hand, we may expect cleavage structures of employers associations to have an 
impact on, or in turn reflect, cleavages in union systems. LANZALACO (1990), also adopting 
Rokkan's cleavage analysis, claims that business associations are "più numerosi e di natura 
differente" (more numerous and of different kind) than cleavages in union systems 
(LANZALACO 1990: 58). Moreover, he finds that in each country the degree of segmentation 
varies between the business and union systems. More careful and differentiating 
comparison, however, reveals some of the reasons for this surprising and contradicting 
finding. The comparison of the organization of capital and labour are faulty if the 
differentiation of business interests into employers and trade associations are not taken into 
account. In a number of countries, these two functions are combined within one 
organization (Britain since 1960s, France, Belgium, Italy, Ireland), while in others they have 
been separated (Germany, Sweden). The emergence of separate employer associations in 
Germany and Sweden, besides the pre-existing multiple pressure group associations of 
industry and commerce, was an attempt of capital to create strong, central employers
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associations with enough resources for fierce lock-outs in response to rising labour 
movement and industrial unrest (cf. on Sweden: FULCHER 1990).
A prion, we would expect employer interests to be more politically divided than trade 
interests which would reflect more functional interest differences. In fact, if we compare 
only employer interests vis-à-vis the unions, we find similar pressures towards politico- 
religious segmentation, yet these were less strong and were partly overcome. Religious 
belief, Catholic as well as Calvinist, forced some Church-going employers to oppose liberal 
capitalism and rely on special links to religious parties, quite like Christian workers. Yet, 
such religious orientations remained more limited to small shopkeepers and medium-sized 
factory owners, particularly in areas with strong religious "pillarized" sub-cultures in the 
Netherlands, Belgium, France and Switzerland. Particularly, where Liberal and religious 
parties cooperated as in Belgium and Switzerland, the dominant (initially Liberal) 
employers association became increasingly a representation of all employers. Other 
political cleavages were only rarely found with the exception, for instance, of Italian 
communist or socialist shop keepers and tenant farmers (independent but not employers) 
that joined the respective union movement.
In terms of the functional cleavages, one finds again less salient cleavages in employers 
interest organization. The main cleavages were the historical split and today more internal 
divisions between large industry and small and medium sized, the missing integration of 
service employers (commerce, finance), and the frequent separate organization of public 
sector employers (often divided by level and authority). The functional fragmentation of 
course provides obstacles for centralized collective bargaining and national economic 
management. However, there is no clearcut one-to-one relationship between employers 
association and union structures, but an interaction that led in some countries to more 
centralization of both and in others tended to remain fragmented.
In general, employers interest organization seems to be more concentrated, more 
politically and functionally encompassing than union systems, while business interests are 
often more functionally but even less politically differentiated. This may explain why in the 
debate on the "two logics of collective action", OFFE and WlESENTHAL’s (1980) claim that 
capital has advantages in collective organization compared to labour, has been criticised for 
being at odds with the fragmentation of business interests associations (cf. W A ARDEN 1990). 
Thus in respect to "class interests" in the labour market capital (employer associations) and 
labour (unions) seem to drive towards encompassing organization and achieve strength 
through unity, whereas producer interests (trade associations) in the product market 
remain largely fragmented (cf. STREECK 1988). Indeed, capital has a dual task to organize 
labour market and producer market interests, though one could also claim that labour is 
potentially split between labour market and comsumer interests.
State and Cleavage Structures
Cleavage structures are structures through being embedded into political institutional 
arrangements, some even enshrined into law. Moreover, as I have stressed before, the state
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is one of the collective actors (or players) in the figuration bringing about deavage- 
organizations of labour by rule-and-divide. The national configuration of interest systems 
can be seen - in a Rokkanean view - as an outcome of the 'sequential interaction1 of state 
(and administrative) structures and the organization of society" (LEHMBRUCH 1988: 142). 
Not dissimilar to the "freezing of party systems" (UPSET & ROKKAN1967), LEHMBRUCH has 
observed that "these network patterns may then form new sediments, that is, acquire 
institutional momentum and become self-sustaining" (LEHMBRUCH 1988: 145). The degree 
to which political institutions monopolize "political space" or share it with organized 
interests depends on the impact of pre-capitalist state traditions and preserved pre-modem 
autonomous corporate structures (CROUCH 1986). Thus cleavage structuration of labour is 
interactive and contingent on the role of the state and administrative elites in integrating 
labour into polity and economy or excluding and amplifying divisions.
Several statutory or state-induced institutional arrangements have been indicated in 
reinforcing and freezing cleavage structures of labour, such as partisan works councils and 
social insurance scheme elections, institutionalized corporatist representation of labour, or 
status dividing corporate social security schemes. Through the "attribution of public status 
to interest groups", the state can "regulate the type and scope of their activities" (OFFE 1981: 
223). State traditions define also whether the state intervenes into industrial relations or 
based on liberal-market conceptions leaves the regulation to voluntary agreement between 
capital and labour. SORGE observed that workplace representation was introduced by the 
state (instead of bipartite voluntary arrangements) in those countries in which the state had 
been more repressive in terms of coalition and strike right (SORGE 1976). Moreover, 
industrial relations rules, particularly enshrined in legislation are inert due to risks of 
change even during crisis or particularly under uncertainty, following a decreased learning 
curve in ageing systems, and increased complicated decision making structures 
(ARMINCEON 1992:170-2).
HI
M a pp in g  U n io n  D iversity
Finally, there remains the task of encompassing the wide diversity of unionism in a 
conceptual map - a difficult, if not "risky", enterprise (cf. TILLY 1984). Certainly, such a map 
abstracts from national and historical particularities and contingencies, but it can provide 
additional insights by systematizing the most important factors that led to differences and 
similarities across countries. The fist step is to reflect on commonalities and derive some 
clusters of similar developments. This is surely more an intellectual device than a statistical 
derivation, it is a interpretative view of long-term configurations. Yet such typologies only 
steer the wish to go one step further, to look at variables that might account for the 
placement of countries according to the type (or outcome). A possible device are the rigid 
comparative tools of Boolean algebra as developed by RAGIN (1987). However, these "true 
and false" table lack the beauty of the encompassing comparison in form of a conceptual
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Table 9.3 
Four Clusters of European Unionism
Cluster Cleavage Party-Union Countries
Labourist unionism labour-capital party < -  union UK, IR. (DE), (SZ)
Solidaristic unionism labour-capital party - >  union SW , NO, (AU), GE
Segmented pluralism Church-State party <•> union NE. BE. SZ, (AU), (GE)
Polarized pluralism revolution-reform party >-< union FR, IT, (NO ). (GE)
Note: •> unidirectional, <-> mutual, >-< independent influence (see Chapter 4).
map, as developed by ROKKAN (1975, 1980). The advantage of these maps is that they 
provide a tool to place countries along "master variables" and to map common clusters. 
This provides us with a view of union diversity but also of labour unity across Europe. This 
will be the final task: to reflect on how to find a common denominator of union diversity 
across Europe upon which European labour unity could be build.
Four Clusters of European U nionism
Given union diversity in Europe, many students of European union history either claimed 
the 'uniqueness' of each national labour movement, or generalizing from one to three 
models of union development with one large or important country for each case in mind. 
Both comparative strategies stress at the end the 'exceptionalism' of each individual or 
model country, provoking the question of "how many exceptionalism are there? ” (ZOLLBERC 
1986), and what is the normality from which they depart? Many historians of European 
union history, for instance recently SLOMP (1990), take the large nations, Germany, France 
and Britain as the three models for all Western European union movements. Surely within 
the international labour movement, as well as across borders, the large national labour 
movements influenced the development in smaller countries, while the reverse was less the 
case. Nevertheless, there is a danger of Großmacht historical sociology, for the sake of 
convenience or sheer disregard, to readily discard developments in smaller nations. Like 
many comparativists from small or peripheral countries, ROKKAN felt uneasy in 
generalizing on the basis of the experience of large countries only, instead he called for the 
inclusion of small countries (ROKKAN 1968) and the systematic study of Europe as a World 
region (ROKKAN 1975). As a first step the construction of ideal-type models that represent 
clusters is a legitimate device, however, the subsequent challenge is to specify how 
deviations from these models can be placed along "master variables" in an encompassing 
map.
Four ideal-types of union systems have been developed in this study that represent 
distinct clusters of national union systems across Western Europe (see Table 9.3). From the 
outset it should be stressed that countries may fall in between and even move over time
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between these ideal-types that remain heuristic labels for particular configurations of 
cleavage structures. The four cluster primarily cover the political cleavage structures, also a 
linkage to functional cleavages will be discussed later. Each cluster represents a particular 
configuration of cleavage structures, they represent different outcomes of the structuring of 
alternatives. The four (in particular the first two) clusters derive from the labour-capital 
cleavage, the last two from the Church-State cleavage and the last from the reform- 
revolution cleavage. The cleavage clusters can be short-named as (1) labourist unionism, (2) 
solidaristic unionism, (3) segmented pluralism, and (4) polarized pluralism.
First, labourist unionism derives from the early political and economic integration of 
sections of the working class. As a consequence, liberal craft unions emerged and preceded 
mass working-class parties, most notably in the United Kingdom and Ireland, and partly 
Denmark and Switzerland (see Chapter 3). The Socialist party was formed on the initative 
of the trade unions, initially as a pressure group for favourable union legislation. Only 
gradually, with the rise of general and industrial unions the movement gained a more 
radical socialist ideology over lib-lab orientations, albeit the labour party remained under 
the influence of the (collectively) allied unions in Britain and Ireland until recently when 
pressures toward more independence have mounted.
Second, solidaristic unionism emerged in countries in which the political integration of the 
working class was retarded (see Chapter 3). Socialist political parties were forced to 
concentrate resources and mobilize for suffrage reform, while the incipient union 
movement supported the primacy of political unionism (cf. LIPS ET 1983, MARKS 1989). The 
party became the leader and initiated further centralization and coordinating of the union 
movement. Class ideology further reinforced the building of centralized industrial unions, 
the counter-mobilization of employers bolstered the need for open cartel and solidaristic 
strategies (cf. FULCHER 1988, 1991). However, in a number of countries cross-cutting 
cleavages intervened hampering the mobilization of the working-class and limiting the 
alliance possibility of socialists.
Third, segmented pluralism (cf. LORWIN 1971) led to fragmented labour movements in 
countries in which the Church-State cleavage cross-cut the labour-capital cleavage, that is 
in Catholic and mixed religious countries (see Chapter 4). Two competing networks of 
organizations and segmented social milieus were build under the leadership of the party in 
the case of Socialist labour movements, and under the initiative of Church circles in the case 
of the Christian movement. Both "camps” maintained their position through social closure, 
reinforcing thereby structural inertia. While in Austria and Germany, the interwar Lager 
were unable to stabilize through elite accommodation, the consociational countries 
(Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland) preserved and institutionalized a complex system 
of pillarized accommodation (cf. UpHART 1968). The post-1945 Austrian and German 
labour movement attempted to internally accommodate the Church-State cleavage and 
thus came closer to the second ideal-type European cluster.
Fourth, polarized pluralism (SARTORI 1976) was the result of the revolution-reform 
cleavage in response to the two preceding cleavages. The labour schism occured where
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national or cultural integration was lacking or belated (cf. ROKKAN 1968), particularly in 
France and Italy, but also in interwar Germany and Norway (see Chapter 5). In the two 
catholic countries not only the Church-State split had led to a fragmentation of labour but 
also the left party was split into opposing proponents of a more or less revolutionary path 
to Socialism. Employer intransigence and partial exclusion from political integration 
reduced the possibility to achieve improvements via economic means. Thus in countries 
where the party-union links was incomplete, political fractionalization was common, and 
syndicalism claimed union independence, thus unionism became a political affair. The 
resistance unity pacts broke down during the 1940s as the political party currents within 
the union movement buoyed again union schism.
A Conceptual Map of Political Union Diversity
The proposed four clusters highlights some of the differences, yet some national labour 
movements seem to fall somewhere in between. How can we encompass the variety of 
transformations of cleavage structures into union systems? Rokkan has developed in his last 
years an ingenious heuristic tool of encompassing comparison: the conceptual maps of Europe 
(ROKKAN 1975, cf. Flora 1981, Tilly 1984) for systematizing the development of Nation- 
States. Such conceptual maps take into account the "decisive importance of interrelations" - 
the geopolitical differentiation across space. They place each country along the relevant 
conceptual axis, though being confined to two dimensional representation on paper. This 
kind of cross-tabulation of country cases goes beyond a mere "scattergram" of a number of 
quantitative or qualitative variables. It allows to map diversity as the result and in the 
context of particular configurations, while highlighting (regional or analytical) clusters of 
countries with similarities. One shortcoming, however, is the "flatness" (TILLY 1984:139) of 
the maps - it is difficult to incorporate changes in time other than by "moves" (or time 
arrows) along the map to account for dynamic changes in the configurations.
The conceptual map of political union diversity in Western Europe presented here (see 
Table 9.4) is a sketch of the main configurations that account for the three political 
cleavages and four ideal-type configurations discussed before. The map plots three axes 
along two dimensions one downwards and two across the page. Following Rokkan's map, 
it groups downwards along a NORTH-SOUTH AXIS: the religious factor - the northbound 
distance from Rome, that is the decreasing Catholic trans-national influence. In the 
horizontal direction, it sketches two dimensions across the West-East AXIS: the economic 
and political integration of the working-class into polity and economy. The second 
dimension is the speed, balance and timing of national (and cultural) integration - 
particularly in the right hand comer this leads to the persistence of local community 
structures that remain resistant to the centralizing state. Thus countries are plotted by their 
distance from England (left, upper hand) as the bedrock of the Industrial Revolution, from 
which it spread into other countries. At the far, lower end, countries with a belated 
industrialization but with political upheavals are placed, that is, countries coming close to 
the French National Revolution.
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Table 9.4
A Conceptual Map of (Political) Union Diversity in Western Europe
<-w est-East->Political integration Unbalanced Integration National Integration
Early Gradual Postwar Interwar Early State Late Nation
P r o t e st a n t Labourist (Labourist) Solidaristic Solidaristic
N o r t h Britain Denmark Sweden Nonway
•M ixed* Segmented Einheit <— Lager Segmented Nation-split
Centre Switzerland W.Germany German Reich Netherlands Ireland
C atholic Segmental Einheit <— Lager Polarized Polarized
So u t h Belgium Austria (11 Rep.) Austria (1 Rep.) France Italy
The first, labour-capital cleavage has led in some countries to rather reformist labour 
movements (England and Denmark, also Switzerland and Belgium), countries with early 
industrialization and urban craft unionism (compared to its surrounding countries). In 
these countries the split between liberals and socialists was retarded or less pronounced, 
both political movements had pushed together for political citizenship rights (the cluster 
spreading from England "eastwards").
The second, Church-State cleavage has led to segmentation (verzuiling) in those countries 
were Catholics had mobilized against the secular Nation-State and in countries with mixed 
religious composition (the cluster of countries in the Southern and Central part). Yet 
segmentation, as has been pointed out above, has not led everywhere to peaceful 
accommodation, in fact in two configurations segmentation degenerated. Historically, in 
Germany and Austria, segmentation turned into Lager-building with pro-system, anti­
system and indifferent camps. Only after the end of the Nazi regime, these two countries 
(under international pressure) found a Einheits- accommodation of centrifugal tendencies, 
be it the German depolitized "unity" DGB or the Austrian fraction-integrating OGB.
Thirdly, the reform-revolution cleavage led to further segmentation in France and Italy, 
where the integration of the working-class into society was most retarded and incomplete. 
In other countries, this cleavage had led to historically confined waves of radicalization: in 
Norway in the 1920s, in Ireland in the 1910s-20s (becoming overshadowed by the national 
question), in Sweden and the Netherlands, small pockets of syndicalist radicalism 
contented the reformist labour movement. In both interwar Austria and Germany 
Communist Lager-opposition added centrifugal tendencies, while after the war, due to the 
particular geopolitical situation within Coldwar-Europe and the integration of the working- 
class into society, they had lost in virulence.
A Conceptual Map of Functional U nion Diversity
Correspondingly to the political cleavages, one can sketch a conceptual map of functional 
union dioersity in Western Europe (see Table 9.5). It covers the main configurations that 
account for the three functional cleavages. It also plots three axes along two dimensions one
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Table 9.5
A Conceptual Map of (Functional) Union Diversity in Western Europe
<-w est-East->Early Industrialization Uneven Industrialization Later Industrialization
(Relations) F irs t Second Postwar Interwar Centre PERIPHERY
V o lu n taris t craft-general craft-general status split status division
N o rth  Britain Denmark Sweden Norway
CORPORATIST status division (inclusive) <— status split status split Big unionism
CENTRE Switzerland W.Germany German Reich Netherlands Ireland
P aterna list inclusive inclusive <— status division fragmented (fragmented)
South Belgium Austria (II Rep.) Austria (1 Rep.) France Italy
downwards and two across the page. Again it groups downwards along the NORTH-SOUTH 
AXIS the division of state and society in the ‘political space' (CROUCH 1986) that corresponds 
here largely with the religious factor - the northbound distance from Rome and Sodal- 
Catholic teaching. Voluntarist industrial relations remain largely clustered in the Protestant 
North, though historically with distance from England state intervention and regulation 
increases. The mixed countries share liberal and corporatist, voluntarist and paternal 
traditions, while in the South employer paternalism and state intransigence and state 
corporatist traditions are most dominant.
In the horizontal direction, it sketches across the West-East AXIS the economic 
development, mainly the industrialization and its pace, balance and diffusion. It follows 
much the same placement as in the political map. Thus again countries are plotted by their 
distance from England (left, upper hand) as the bedrock of the Industrial Revolution, from 
which it spread into other countries. An other dimension that is of relevance here is the 
"central belt” of countries that were exposed to the persistence of an urban network of 
smaller cities with entrenched guild and mutual self-help traditions along the axes from 
Flanders to Northern Italy (cf. ROKKAN 1975), though a shortcoming of the conceptual map 
here is that it places countries not regions for the sake of convenience.
The craft-industry cleavage (see Chapter 6) divides European union movements into 
countries in which craft-general unionism and those with dominant industrial unionism 
(Britain and Denmark). The early developed countries with entrenched craft tradition saw 
the consequential rise of general unions that foreclosed further union centralization and 
industrial unionism. In the other countries industrial unionism became more or less 
dominant within the main union movement (with the exception of Ireland that continued 
the British induced pattern).
The white-blue collar cleavage (see Chapter 7) adds further to fragmentation through 
internal or external splits within the union movements. In union movements with an early 
industrial union principle, white-collar unions emerged independently leading to an 
"industrial split" between industrial manual workers and service employees (particularly in 
Scandinavia and Switzerland). In postwar Austria and Germany, as well as in Belgium and
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the Netherlands, inclusive all-grades union centres were formed, though in Germany and 
the Netherlands, past status distinction persisted and gave rise to rival unions.
The public-private cleavage (see Chapter 8) added further fragmentation internally and 
externally. Here state traditions and the growth of the public sector challenged the 
traditional industrial unionism, leading to potential internal conflicts in the main union 
movements and the separate organization of sectionalist interests of higher (educated) 
employees, particularly civil servants.
Remaining W hite Spots on The European Map
For various methodological, theoretical and pragmatic reasons, this study draws a 
European map of union diversity covering "only" twelve Western European countries (see 
Chapter 1). There remain white spots on the map, particularly the democratized Southern 
countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece), two ’peripheral' Nordic countries (Finland and Iceland) 
and all (former) East European Socialist economies. The Southern and Nordic countries are 
not completely term incognita thanks to recent interest in more encompassing European 
comparisons but would have required more careful research before they can be integrated 
into the map of union diversity as presented here. At least for the first two groups, the map 
could be extended without major revisions of the "master variables" - the countries would 
be placed at the Southern and Northern fringes. The - of Mid-1970s democratized - 
Southern countries (with the exception of Greece) are part - with France and Italy - of the 
"polarized pluralism" cluster, with more regional disparities in Spain than France and Italy. 
The two missing Nordic countries (Iceland and Finland) are part - with the Scandinavian 
welfare state - of the dominant "solidaristic unionism" cluster, though they share with 
interwar Norway the coexistence of syndicalist-communist union movements and a 
tendency towards "polarized pluralism".
A future task for labour historians and industrial relation specialist will be to map the 
past (pre-Communist) and future (post-1989) union cleavage structures of East European 
coming-into-being market economies. The oldest, East European "Free" union movement, the 
over a decade old Polish Solidamosc, faces much of the same basic problems that were 
shown in the historical analysis of Western European labour movements: the differentiation 
and division of labour between a political and economic interest representation, between 
party and unions. A comparison of the new emerging East European with the past West 
European development may provide new insights into similarities and dissimilarities of 
labour organization. The debate remains open whether pre-Communist cleavages are 
concealed but frozen and will break out once the political and economic system stabilizes, 
or whether new cleavages or no persistent cleavages will materialize given the long-term 
social equalization and the sudden democratic transition (cf. KITSCHELT 1992). With 
increasing mobility of capital from West to East and labour from East to West, the challenge 
of labour unity in union diversity will become increasingly an - even more encompassing - 
challenge to European labour.
9 /  E n c o m p a s s i n g  U n i o n  D i v e r s i t y
European Coordination and N ational Cleavages
As economic and political integration enhances in Europe, European labour faces the 
challenge to organize at trans-national level. However, working-class parties and unions 
are veritable national organizations, but the challenge to today's labour movement is to 
adapt to a weakening of the regulatory capacity of the Nation-State. Both the transfer of 
power to a transnational level and the growing dependence on world markets call for unity 
of labour at the transnational level, particularly in a more integrated and enlarged 
European community (cf. VlSSER & EBBINCHAUS 1992). However, union movements are 
also drawn into the opposite direction by recent trends toward regionalization of politics 
and decentralization in industrial relations, thus they need also to adapt to the sub-national 
level, thus there emerges a ]anus-faced dual challenge to the national labour movements. 
This challenge meets the obstacle of national union diversity, the large variety of 
institutionally and socially embedded national union movements across Europe. 
Neverthless, from the European map, we can see several clusters around which a European 
union movement can be formed or after which it can be modelled. However, the challenge 
is to encompass and not exclude one or the other cluster.
Until the 1970s the main divisions of European labour reflected conflicts of 
segmentational, functional, and territorial nature (see VlSSER & EBBINGHAUS 1992). Besides 
the national political and functional cleavages, national labour movements had different 
conceptions about the territorial scope of transnational cooperation at the European level 
(EEC, EFTA or beyond?), for various economic and political considerations, thus adding a 
territorial cleavage. Given the persistence of the political and functional cleavages in both 
national and international labour movements, the formation of an encompassing trade 
union confederation at the European level was a late but considerable achievement.
With the foundation of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) in 1973 and the 
subsequent transfer of the Christian European union organization in 1974 and of other 
union centres, some of the most persisting and salient political cleavages have been 
overcome at the European level. Nevertheless, labour lagged between one and two decades 
behind the European political and economic integration process and the peak organization 
of capital (UNICE, 1958). The overcoming of most political schism is not merely a "spill­
over" of the European integration process. It was, for the first time, a proactive attempt to 
respond at a particularly favourable moment of national concertation and at an uncertain 
conjuncture of European integration (the EC enlargement). National concertation of rival 
union movements in corporatist arrangements, co-ordinated industrial action, and tentative 
merger talks in the early 1970's opened the avenue for a unification of labour at the 
transnational level. The ETUC profited from the search of national reconciliation and in 
tum provided the forum for further contacts between rival national union movements. The 
realignment of labour was more successful at the European than at the international level 
(the 1970s international merger talks aborted), given the more pragmatic and conciliatory 
orientation of European union centres (cf. WlNDMULLER 1980) and the more "limited” 
diversity than on a global scale.
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Until 1973, an uncoordinated set of pressure group associations had been established, for 
each ideological camp (Socialist, Christian, Communist) and for the main regional 
cooperation areas (EEC, EFTA). The voting procedure was changed from unanimity to a 
two-third qualified majority in the ETUC, thus introducing some supra-nationality rule, but 
making it at the same time impossible to decide against the veto of British, Scandinavian 
and other EFTA unions. A contentious issue remained the affiliation demands of the 
Communist union movements, today however only the French and Portuguese Communist 
unions remain excluded.5 The integration of various functional cleavages, was less 
complete but also less salient to the formation of unity peak association at the time.6 
Moreover, since the early 1950's there exist two European organizations of public service 
unions (OF) and for managerial and professional staff (C1C). The major Nordic white-collar 
unions (Danish FTF, Finish TVK, Swedish TCO), all cooperating with the blue-collar union 
centres, are represented in the ETUC. With the recent addition of the German DAG, the 
representational monopoly of the ETUC in the growing white-collar and public sector is 
thus not really impaired. The formation of the ETUC was not only a major effort to 
encompass major segmentational and functional cleavages, but to create a unitary 
European peak association that is more than a mere EEC pressure group organization - a 
response to the increasing regional economic integration in Western Europe.
However, the concentration of power and authority resides in most union movements at 
the level of national sectoral unions thus foreclosing macro-level arrangements. The main 
difference to national union movement is that the ETUC until today lacks the "hierarchical 
ordering" and "functionally differentiation" important for interest intermediation 
(SCHM11 ltR 1974). At a sectoral level, trans-national cooperation, the International Trade 
Secretariats (TPS), have a long history of mainly independent, parallel development in 
respect to the international (cf. WlNDMULLER 1984). Similarly, the European sector 
organizations (EIC) formed mainly independent and remained incompletely integrated into 
ETUC. Attempts to integrate the sector organizations within the ETUC failed (STOCKL 1986: 
29-30), since British and Scandinavian unions feared further decision-making impasse and a 
weakening of international strategies against multinationals. National traditions and 
institutional arrangements are still so different that they can hardly be encompassed by
5 The Italian Communist CGIL (after having changed its status to a mere associate of the WFTU 
in 1973) was accepted by the ETUC in 1975. This application demand was supported by the other 
two Italian union centres (CISL and UIL), yet a minority was against (German DGB, French CGT-FO, 
and the Belgian, Luxembourg, and Swiss Christian union centres). The French CGT (and similarly 
the Portuguese Intersindical) had been refused affiliation in 1980 since it remained allied to the 
Communist party and International. The Spanish Communist CCOO became recently affiliated 
(January 1991), while it had failed a decade earlier, thus French CGT remains the sole large union 
centre outside the ETUC. (cf. Ba RNOUIN 1986:26-40; DEBUNNE1987:57-8,61-6)
6 Among the organizations that remained outside the ETUC were a number of white-collar or 
public sector peak associations, in particular the German civil service confederation DBB and white- 
collar union DAG (recently accepted), the French teachers federation FEN, and the Swiss white- 
collar federation VSA.
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general rules. Moreover, one particular institution in industrial relations in a country may 
serve quite a different function than in an other, making harmonization a difficult task 
(SCHREGLE 1981). Furthermore, a number of important national union confederations are 
not entitled to collective agreements, such as the British TUC, the German DGB, or the 
Swiss SGB and thus will not be able to transfer this right to the ETUC or co-sign any 
agreement. This holds similar for the side of capital; the private and public employers 
associations (UNICE and CEEP) are both not entitled to sign binding agreements.
C o n c l u sio n
In this chapter I have argued that labour movements have become increasingly intricated 
into national systems of interest representation. The once international labour movement, 
in order to become a credible counter force against state and employers, had to adapt to the 
national circumstances. In the effort to achieve labour unity on a national level, labour 
movements became subject to the internal conflicts and forces within their nation. For 
achieving labour unity, labour movements mobilized along the social cleavages present in 
the society at the time. Yet the formation of class solidarity was hampered by existing social 
cleavages that were reinforced by other agencies and led in many cases to counter­
mobilization. As national labour movement attempted to align along social cleavages for 
national mobilization and representation, a number of non-national and concealed 
cleavages remained largely suppressed and latent. These may lead to new internal or even 
external cleavage lines in the future.
The cleavage structures in each country reflected not only the "nationalization" of 
labour, that is, its adaptation to the national social cleavages, but was also the result of the 
particular national configuration in which it emerged. Of crucial importance were also the 
structure, traditions and strategies of the political system and parties, the employers and 
their associations, and the state and her institutions. Hence, union diversity derives from 
the particular interaction of these agencies, the potential cleavages and the opportunity 
structure for organizations. While this study had to limit the scope of systematic 
comparison to the latter two factors, further studies on the impact of agencies could surely 
reveal further insights in the process of cleavage crystallization.
The conceptual maps of union diversity attempted to systematize the variations of 
political and functional cleavages. This was not to "test" the validity of cleavage analysis 
but to derive the main clusters and "master variables". These are interpretative abstractions 
of configurations under which labour movements formed in Europe. Following ROKKAN, I 
consider these maps as a device to generate hypothesis for further elaboration (ROKKAN 
1980). They lead also to further reflection about the extension of the analysis to the "white 
spots" on the European map, the non-covered countries in the Northern periphery, 
Southern Europe and more recently Eastern Europe. It also suggests a new perspective in 
analyzing European labour unity, not just to study "EC' organizations but the interaction of
225
I V / C l e a v a g e  S a l i e n c e
national diversity and transnational cooperation. The challenge of European labour remains 
very much what it always has been since the early days of union development; to strife for 
labour unity in union diversity.
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10
C o n c l u s i o n : 
Fro m  D iversity to  U nity?
Hfitfe there are common themes in many ‘European labor movements 
and industrial relations systems, the variations and differences in 
union, management, and pu6Uc thinking and Behaviour, in laws, in 
traditions, and in circumstances an so zvide that a general answer is 
likely to Be vague. There is 'Unity and (Diversity' (a tide I gave to an 
earlier Book) in ‘European laBor. ‘But there is less unity and more 
diversity Between the movements and systems of the countries of 
‘Europe today than earlier. It requires a wry high level of abstraction to 
make statement of general or even fairly widespread validity. ‘Below 
this level, however, there is a wide range of questions of great 
significance and interest. And it is precisely in this area that xve 
encounter the high degree of diversity that is of mast interest to the 
intelligent observer. (STURMTHAL1983: 252)
As a concluding step, with the map of union diversity at hand (see Chapter 9), one would 
like to follow the path that European unions are going. Will in the future labour unity replace 
union diversity? We will turn from our concern about the origins of diversity to a reflection 
on the persistence in union diversity and the changes toward more labour unity. For some 
observers of current events, the map of union diversity reflects merely past history, as 
Europe marches relentlessly towards political and economic integration. Unions all over 
Europe face similar international challenges and crisis symptoms are a global feature. 
However, at the beginning of the Introduction (Chapter 1), I have warned against a too 
rapid adaptation of a convergence view in industrial relations. My contention remains that, 
although there are similar social changes and global pressures, social cleavages will remain 
the sources of national union diversity and a challenge to European labour unity.
In this conclusion, I will not restate the historical path of union diversity but stress the 
claim on the persistence of cleavage structures in union systems. I should immediately add 
that my contention is not to rule out change but to stress that there are no tabulae rasae, that 
the possibilities for adaptation are limited, though not determined, by entrenched past 
strategic decisions. In the last chapter, I have stressed in the explanation of union diversity 
in Europe, the "structuring of alternatives” (ROKKAN 1977), the different ramifications in the 
path of national union development across Europe. If this view is valid, we have to doubt 
the thesis of a fast convergence of union systems around a European average or towards 
the most dominant model.
I shall discuss three sets of arguments for cleavage continuity or discontinuity. My aim is 
to line out the main factors that lead to change but not necessarily to union convergence or
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eradication of cleavages. First, I shall contend claims that cleavage decline will unfreeze 
cleavage structures. In addition the evidence on convergence and centralization will be 
weighted against that of divergence and fragmentation. Secondly, I shall restate the two 
processes of social closure and opening that had been discussed in each cleavage chapter 
segmentation versus desegmentation and pillarization versus depillarization. Thirdly, the 
salience of political and functional cleavages will be weighted against each other. In 
concluding, while looking at new cleavages, I shall restate my contention that old social 
cleavages may last much longer than continuing social change makes us believe.
I
D iv erg en ce  o r  C o n v e r g e n c e?
Persisting divergence or progressive convergence are the two opposing paradigmatic 
perspectives in the social sciences. The question of "divergence or convergence?" as such, of 
course, can never be answered definitively and yet we can balance pros and cons. The 
argument about a convergence of cleavage structures across Europe can be derived from 
the literature on cleavage decline. Though cleavage analysis can reveal insights about the 
origins of past diversity, since the 1970s, critics claim, there has been a decline of the 
significance of social cleavages. We have encountered some evidence in the part on political 
cleavages, that worker, religious or radical alignments lost some of their past grip. 
Nevertheless, the argument I am forwarding is that deavage-organizations have the 
capacity to continue despite changes in the social structure that dissolve gradually the base 
from which the cleavages originated and upon which the organizations mobilized. The 
common social and global economic pressures will not necessarily lead to similar solutions 
and uniform outcomes. Organizational inertia and institutionalization, but also the 
structured alternatives for adaptation and new alliance formations, provide strong forces 
for continuity and survival despite secular change, though there are systematic variations 
between countries and organizations.
Frozen Cleavages or Cleavage D ecline
Can we still subscribe to Lipset and Rokkan's freezing hypothesis "the party systems of the 
1960's reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920's” (LIPSET & 
Rokkan 1967: 50)? Can the freezing hypothesis be extended to union systems and does it 
hold for the 1960's or even today? There is empirical evidence for a freezing of party 
systems, at least until the 1960s (cf. ROSE & URW1N 1970). Since that time, however, 
increased electoral volatility, shifts in electoral alignment, and emergence of new parties 
suggested change instead of persistence (cf. PEDERSEN 1979, MAGUIRE 1983, FRANKLIN et al. 
1992). On the other hand, it was found that electoral changes across the labour-capital 
divide have tended to decline since the 1920s (cf. BARTOUNI & MAIR 1990). 'While Lipset 
and Rokkan were concerned with the stabilization of cleavages and the party systems which 
reflected these cleavages, the evidence of electoral change over time is based on measures
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of the stability /  instability of the votes of individual parties’' (MAIR 1990: 14). Indeed, 
empirical studies test electoral volatility at the individual or aggregate level, expecting 
direct correlations between social cleavages and party choices to be a strong test of the 
freezing thesis.
Few of those researchers with the electoral data at hand seem to have taken notice of the 
very next sentence following the freezing hypothesis: "This is a crucial characteristic of 
Western competitive politics (...): the party alternatives, and in remarkably many cases the party 
organizations, are older than the majorities of the national electorates. To most of the citizens of 
the West the currently active parties have been part of the political landscape since their 
childhood or at least since they were first faced with the choice between alternative 
'packages' on election day.” (LlPSET & ROKKAN 1967: 50). Applied to union systems, the 
freezing thesis is that potential union members can only choose from a limited set of 
historically bound organizations to represent their labour market interests vis-à-vis the state 
and employers at the national level or in a given sector or occupation. Moreover, for any 
individual or group, opportunities to create a new organization are limited, because the 
first mobilizing agencies have an advantage (ROKKAN 1977) and high organizational costs in 
terms of institutional arrangements (e.g. union recognition) are levied on new 
organizations. Yet while organizational ’exit' may be difficult as in the 1960’s, ’voice’ can be 
a viable option to protest against inert representation structures, as the "resurgence of class 
conflict’’, particular wildcat strikes, in the late 1960s (cf. CROUCH & PlZZORNO 1978).
What remains to be explained is less the stability of electoral or membership alignments 
per se, but the persistence or change of cleavage-organizations. How much have cleavage 
systems changed since the phase of 'befestigte Gewerkschaften' (BRIEFS 1952) (entrenched 
unionism) of the 1920's. Of the prewar Socialist oriented union movements in the twelve 
countries studied here, there are still ten that exist, seven still exist as such and three have 
become more encompassing (AU, GE, NE), whereas the two French and Italian movements, 
given the lack of (or incomplete) party-union linkages, never consolidated. Surely there 
were changes in terms of membership support and alignment, nevertheless there remains 
long-term continuity (see Chapter 3). Since the 1920’s the TUC has gained somewhat in 
overall associational monopoly, thus more unions chose to align with it, but the level of 
support to the Labour party have decreased since the 1950s (after the ’opting in’ period, 
1927-46). In the Scandinavian countries it was found that Socialist party and LO unions 
faced a postwar stabilization of mobilization patterns (i.e. party turnout and density rate). 
Similarly, in the consodational countries, the cross-cutting labour-capital and Church-State 
cleavages froze party and union mobilization levels at a medium range. Like the 
Scandinavian movements, the Socialist unionism in the segmented pluralist countries faced 
limits set by the white-collar cleavage. In the two countries with a significant change 
(Austria and Germany), unified union movements were build by strategic alliance building 
after the war, the integration of Christian unionists within the Einheit union movement 
(though the interwar strength of the Socialists had already a claim on 70-80% of union
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members). In the Dutch merger (FNV, 1977/1981) of Socialist and Catholic unions, it was 
the rapid decline of the latter that made such a move necessary.
Indeed, in terms of the two other political cleavages, important changes occurred, 
though more in terms of changes in importance and strategy than mere cessation. In three 
of seven union movements with a past religious split, these organizations continued 
(Belgian and Swiss Catholics, Dutch Calvinists), two unions secularized (French and 
Italian), two became integrated (and accommodated) within unitary labour movements 
(Austrian, German, also Dutch Catholics). Thus facing ongoing secularisation, Christian 
unions struck different alliance strategies (see Chapter 4). In the French and Italian 
countries, in which the Christian-Democratic parties had been vital in reestablishing the 
movement, the organization became increasingly independent and secular when in France 
the MRP withered away and in Italy the DC became the unaltered leading governing party. 
The Dutch Protestants and Swiss Catholics showed furthermore astonishing survival as 
minority movements, while the Belgian Christian movement opened itself to non-Church 
goers and became the dominant union movement. Hence, cleavage organization once 
established have a considerable ability to maintain pre-modem cleavage structures and 
organizational continuity through strategic adaptation and institutional securities. If 
cleavages remain important for ‘'packaging” interests, have union system become more 
alike in other respects?
Convergence or D ivergence ?
How much have national union systems converged or does union diversity persist? According to 
the "logic of capitalism" we would expect unions to become more alike as they serve similar 
functions within capitalist systems. Convergence of union systems, of course, can be 
measured in many ways. Given the conception of labour unity, provided earlier (see 
Chapter 1), as one of strength and encompassingness, I will turn to two aspects: the 
mobilization potential (measured by union density and union growth rates) and 
representation patterns (operationalized by associational monopoly and concentration).
The overall level of unionization (much like industrial dispute) are not only very 
dissimilar across Western Europe, but also they tend to diverge on the long-run (cf. KORPI 
1983, KAELBLE 1987, V1SSER1989). Certainly there were phases of universal convergence in 
which national labour movements seemed to become alike. The post-1917 upsurge in 
collective mobilization led to unidirectional upward pushes in the early 1920s in all 
Western European countries. However, the unprecedented high level of mobilization was 
not to last into the economic and political crisis of the late 1920s, bringing the European 
countries, particularly those with sudden influx of new members down to some band of 10 
to 40% in union density. However, following the Global Depression, national labour 
movements diverged with persisting mass unemployment in the 1930s. The Scandinavian 
and Belgian unions gained due to their control of unemployment insurance, while in other 
countries unions stagnated or declined until the outbreak of war (or were suppressed by 
authoritarian regimes). Again, after the war and labour's outstanding role in the resistance,
230
10 / C o n c l u s i o n
a widespread wave in unionization and union recognition gave the impression of a general 
convergence. In fact, the 1950s showed all signs toward convergence, the same upward 
trend (with the exception of French Communists). In this situation, modernization theorists 
coined their convergence thesis (KERR et al. 1960) and the thesis of the "withering-awmf of 
industrial disputes (ROSS & HARTMANN 1960).
However, by the mid-1970s, the traditional mobilization patterns of unions had 
changed, after the resurgence of industrial conflict (cf. CROUCH & PlZZORNO 1978) new 
groups had entered the unions, but also different forms of workplace representation 
became institutionalized (cf. SORGE 1976). After the OPEC crisis, unionization level 
diverged considerably, some labour movements were hit by severe losses in elections and 
in union membership, others remained better fitted to resist, especially where union-led 
unemployment insurance provided incentives to stay in a union. By the mid-1980s, the 
incremental growth of the Swedish, Danish and Belgian unions became highly organized, 
the Norwegian, Austrian, Irish and German unions were able to consolidate through 
institutional arrangements their medium position, the Italians had regained in strength, the 
Dutch, French and British unions lost - for similar and different reasons - considerably, thus 
coming close to their interwar level. Certainly, the membership crisis has by now affected 
all countries, yet the situation is different and the opportunities for change, too. Hence, 
union diversity persisted not only in terms of variations in labour unity by cross-cutting 
cleavages, the mobilization of labour diverged considerably across Europe. Instead of 
convergence we perceive a persistence, if not divergence, of unionization patterns across 
Europe.
Centralization or Fragmentation?
How fragmented or encompassing are national union movements? Given the political 
cleavage structures, the number of union centres, the number of main actors vis-a-tns the 
state and employers, varies considerable. Certainly, in some countries political schism are 
only peripheral, representing a small minority of dissidents, while most union members are 
organized by the main union movement. The mere number is not a good indicator, better 
are indicators that weight the importance at least quantitatively by membership. We have 
found in the preceding chapter that political fragmentation in union systems corresponds 
to the fragmentation of party systems (see Chapter 9). We found the effective number of 
union centres varies between bipolar (labour-capital) political systems with one to two 
union centres and segmented pluralism with two to three union centres and polarized 
pluralism with up to five union centres. The trend toward political union fractionalization 
has persisted or even grown as the non-partisan functional union centres play an increased 
role iris-d-vis the traditional leading political union centres.
Indeed, this study has shown an increasing fragmentation along functional lines in most 
countries (see Part Three). Although most main union movements were able to absorb 
nearly all unions of manual workers by the 1950s, not all were able to encompass all 
manual workers within few, large industrial unions (see Chapter 6). Thus while the main
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union centre have a near associational monopoly, they face internal fragmentation, especially 
where affiliates showed a skewed size distribution and had frequent jurisdictional disputes 
due to overlapping domains. On the other hand, the more successful union movements 
were in establishing manual industrial unions, the more difficult it was to encompass the 
other functional cleavages. The blue-white collar cleavage was shown to add to union 
fragmentation, particularly in countries where the main union movement was closely 
linked to a Socialist party and had adopted class solidaristic industrial unionism (see 
Chapter 7). The public-private cleavage, moreover, led to fragmentation, be it internally 
within the main union movement or externally through further sectionalist white-collar, 
professional or civil service organizations (see Chapter 8). Further universal, secular trends 
(deindustrialization, decline in manual work, public sector restructuration) will amplify in 
the future the potential and actual fragmentation of union movements.
II
Exclusive o r  In clu siv e  La bou r  U nity
If the "logic of capitalism” has not been the driving force towards convergence, it has often 
indirectly provided the compulsion to labour unity. There are general pressures toward 
encompassing organization: it is the more rational strategy to prevent internal competition 
of labour and to gain in power xris-à-vis employers and the state. However, an inclusive 
strategy is not the most effective mobilizing strategy, given the collective action problem of 
large organizations (cf. OLSON 1965). The argument forwarded in this study is that at an 
early stage cleavage-organizations maintain themselves through exclusive strategies. Yet 
once they are compelled to change toward an inclusive strategy and become increasingly 
integrated, destabilizing processes in form of depillarization and desegmentation undercut 
the very bases of cleavages. In discussing these two proceses, we will return to the key 
concepts of system integration and social integration (cf. LOCKWOOD 1964, STREECK 1987) as 
developed earlier (see Chapter 2) in order to place once again the clusters of union 
movements into a grid that summarizes the pillarization and segmentation processes.
Labour Unity and Social C losure
Social cleavages are per se a "set of social relationships which implies some level of external 
closure'’ (BARTOUNI & MaiR 1990: 218). In this study, we have found that social closure 
processes were at the very root of the capital-labour and cross-cutting class cleavages. We 
often assume labour unity to be equated with class solidarity, though over the setting of the 
boundary of "labour” (or class) long disputes arose. In fact, "it would be a mistake to 
underestimate the extent to which members of class organisations - both parties and unions 
- have sought to improve their position through a monopolisation of this social relationship 
and through its closure vis-à-vis the external world. One need only recall the debates within 
the Second International on the 'peasant question'; the resistance of the skilled working
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dass to the incorporation into the movement of unskilled workers; or even the more recent 
problems experienced by immigrant workers" (BaRTOUNI & MAIR1990:218).
Social closure was found to be the initial base of cleavage mobilization for political and 
functional deavages. The labour-capital, Church-State, revolution-reform deavages build 
upon and reinforced existing Gemeinschaft (community) bonds among the urban craft 
workers, the religious Church-going, or the radical working dass communities (see Part II). 
Politico-religious group identity was transferred from generation to generation through the 
family or community. Later, new members were further socialized through the well-tied 
net of social and cultural organizations. Similarly, in the case of craft-industry, white-blue 
collar, public-private cleavages, social closure was the initial mobilization strategy of craft 
unions, white-collar professional associations, or dvil service corps organizations (see Part 
HI). These social deavages had much of ascribed attributes, at least social mobility chances 
were seen to be conveyed by soaal origin, they remained visible signs of group distinction. 
In the preceding chapters, it has been stressed that strategies of social closure where 
important for the early phase of cleavage formation. Social closure entails both external and 
internal closure (cf. WEBER 1922). External closure counter-mobilized against an opponent, 
thus reinforcing group identity, while internal dosure ties group bonds and thus reinforces 
group solidarity. Labour unity was equated with group solidarity and identity, social 
dosure is the process to reinforce unity.
However, as has been noted for each deavage, in the long-run this strategy became 
devalued by secular changes and competitive pressures. Increased differentiation and 
integration of political systems and labour markets required a shift in strategy from 
community to assodation, from Vergemeinschaftung to Vergesellschaftung (cf. WEBER 1922). 
With the expansion of electoral and labour markets, with the successful competition by 
rival labour movements, with the growth of unskilled labour, with the blurring of the 
collarline, with the welfare state growth - a closed mobilization strategy became self- 
defeating. The strategic choice for political entrepreneurs was to see the need for "opening 
up" to new groups but also the capacity of the unions to adopt an encompassing strategy. 
Yet, in many cases, structural inertia and encroached traditions prevented adapatation at an 
early stage and the long-term oriented inclusive strategy was not adapted. Where the early 
integration failed, the spiral of sectionalist sodal dosure of the new opponents started 
again, to the detriment of long-term overall labour unity. Moreover, to encompass cross­
cutting cleavages by an indusive strategy is to promote cross-group solidarity, and to stress 
the unity of labour.
L abour U n ity  a n d  Pilla r iza tio n
The twin process to social dosure was organizational interlocking or pillarization. Building 
on the Dutch sociological and political science literature, I have followed Rokkan’s call for a 
"generalized concept of verzuiling" (ROKKAN 1977) by showing its fruitfulness in 
understanding political and functional cleavage organizations. Both party and unions 
maintain organizational links for at least two reasons: reinforcing group identity through
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social closure and pool resource for mobilization against opponents. The figuration that 
gave rise to the deavage-organizations, the interdependences and the consolidation process 
shaped the initial linkage between party and unions (or other cultural agencies). Through 
pillarization, deavage-organizations could shelter their followers from external influences. 
Moreover, through assoaational dosure they could maintain social bonds, especially when 
primary community bonds lost in importance or were not given (e.g. in the diaspora). On 
the other hand, alliances with other organizations in the same economic, as well as in other, 
political channel helped mobilizing resources and support against contenders. Or as 
ROKKAN summarized the importance of pillarization for Norwegian parties: "votes count, 
resources decide" (ROKKAN 1966).
We have found the degree of interlocking most prominent where organizations in both 
channels had to mobilize jointly in opposition against relative closed political and economic 
systems (pre-war German and Swedish Social Democrats, the prewar Belgian and Austrian 
Catholic labour movement, the postwar French and Italian Communists). The party or 
Church provided the inner core of deavage crystallization and ideology building around 
which the social and organizational life turned in concentric circles. However, in the 
historical analysis the "up" and "downs" of pillarization have been shown. At the peak of 
pillarization in the Netherlands in the late 1950s, for instance, at the time when sodal 
scientists coined the theory of Hx>erzuiling“ (pillarization), it had become a frozen structure 
that lacked much contact with reality and showed a decade later the signs of 
depillarization.
* As a consequences of secular changes, party and union leaders face strategic choices to 
adapt the organizational structure. We have witnessed the postwar trend for party and 
unions to deemphasize, more or less, earlier or belated, the institutional links and to open 
to new social groups. Here, organizational inertia and entrenchment of linkages in the early 
phase of consolidation limited in many cases the ability to reorganize, thus the Spielraum for 
independent action varied considerable. The more these organizations were dependent on 
each other and the more decisions had been entangled, the more difficult was a change 
towards flexibility. In the case of the British Labour Party, the Dutch Catholic union 
movement, or the French Communist labour movement we have seen how strongly 
pillarized organizations can become inert and inflexible, clinging to a shrinking group of 
faithful supporters. On the other hand, the functional cleavage-organizations, lacking a 
dear political ally, attempted to use mainly a pressure group strategy. However, in contrast 
to the political labour movement they lacked cohesion within their own arde, never really 
matching the degree of centralization within the historically politically unified union 
centres.
System I ntegration  of Labour
Cleavage-organizations formed in a process of social closure and counter-organization 
through the mobilization of group interests against a contender (cf. TILLY 1978). However, 
once ’’dissident" party and unions passed the thresholds of incorporation and recognition,
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once they become integrated into polity and economy, cleavage-organizations became 
institutionalized and consolidated. Through the process of system integration (see Chapter 
2), cleavage-organizations that reflected conflicts in the labour market became thus 
integrated into the political and industrial relations system. Similar conceptions have been 
develop in DAHRENDORF*S thesis of the "institutionalization of class conflict" (DaHRENDORF 
1959), BRIEFS' concept of "befestigte Gewerkschaften" (BRIEFS 1952, 1980, CF. ElCKHOF 1973), 
and UPSET & Rokkan’s freezing of party system thesis (LlPSET & ROKKAN1967). Following 
our theoretical propositions (see Chapter 2), we expect cleavage-organizations not only to 
consolidate and become structurally inert but to become increasingly drawn into political 
exchange and accommodation. In highly pillarized systems, we found a entangled network 
of intra-cleavage and cross-cleavage organizational linkages. With system integration, elite 
interactions and political exchange became common between former 'friends and foes' (cf. 
LIJPHART 1968, SCHOLTEN 1987).
However, the more successful party and unions are to claim their participation, i.e. the 
more they became integrated into the system, the more these organizations are endangered 
to develop into highly institutionalized hierarchical organizations that sell their 'elite deals' 
to their constituency. Indeed, much in the vein of MICHELS' "iron law of oligarchy" (1911), 
the danger is that cleavage-organizations become detached from their social base and 
through institutional arrangements monopolize representation against expression of "new 
comers" that voice emerging or underrepresented interests. The process of depillarization 
or organizational linkages have been noted since the 1960s, at the peak of frozen cleavages 
systems. With hindsight, we know that neither pillarized consociationalism, nor social- 
democratic corporatism remained a stable system of interest intermediation (cf. SCHOLTEN
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1987, Lash & URRY 1987, BAGUONI & Crouch  1990), though neither seems to be there a 
complete "End".
So c ia l  I ntegration  of L abour
Parallel to system integration, even as a result to the very success of cleavage-organization, 
social integration gradually undercuts the social base of these cleavages. Not only the 
organizations of labour but also their members and constituency became integrated into 
society. With social integration, occupation, class, and religion lost much of their primacy 
as a determinant of one's life chances and social behaviour. Social closure as a mobilizing 
strategy required encircled life spheres, while increased social differentiation fosters the 
"Kreuzung sodaler Kreise" (SlMMEL 1908), the crossing of social life spheres. This enhances 
multiple allegiance and individualization, thereby undermining the closure mechanism for 
the "Selbsterhaltung der socialen Gruppe” (SlMMEL 1898), the maintenance of a social 
group. Processes, like the decline in working-class party alignment, secularisation, 
deradicalization have been often noted in the debate on the decline in cleavage salience 
(and in the "End of Ideology" debate).
Although these processes seems to be secular, labour movements differ between 
countries as to how much they are affected from a loss of party and union alignments 
through continuing social change and social integration. In systems with high pillarization 
and strong opposing cleavages, labour movements were able to maintain allegiance to a 
higher degree and longer than in other countries, as was indicated by corresponing 
differences in worker alignment to Left parties (see Chapter 3). In recent research on decline 
in social-class determinants of voting behaviour, a decline in "cleavage politics" is found to 
have started in Britain and France before the 1960s, in Denmark and Belgium in the 1960s, 
and somewhat more gradually in the Netherlands and Sweden, and even later in Norway 
and Italy (FRANKLIN et al. 1992: 394), there seems to be a relationship between lack of 
pillarized cleavage organization (France, Britain) and political industrial unionism 
(Denmark, Sweden, Norway) and pillarization (Belgium, Netherlands, Italy).
System a n d  So c ia l  D ifferences
The developed concepts of system integration and social integration (see Chapter 2) can 
also help to map the different degree of union integration in a historical, comparative view. 
The grid of labour's integration distinguishes horizontally the ideological distance and 
degree of system integration, and vertically the degree of social integration or segmentation 
(see Figure 10.1). Early integration in polity and economy but also in terms of lacking pre­
industrial social differences has led to the emergence of bipolar party systems and Labourist 
unionism (United Kingdom, Ireland), a system that is largely dominated by the labour- 
capital cleavage. In the case of the socially relative homogeneous Scandinavian countries, at 
least until the accession to power of the Social-Democratic parties in the 1930s, the labour 
movement remained united against the bourgeois bloc and promoted solidaristic "class"
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ideology (Sweden, Norway), while Denmark takes an in between status of early economic 
integration.
In countries with social pre-industrial segmentation, the two different regimes 
dependened largely on the traditions and timing of elite accommodation. In the case of 
segmented pluralism, system integration of the deavage-organizations preceded the Second 
World War, in polarized pluralism with a strong reform-revolution cleavage system 
opposition and employers and state intransigence remained for long dominant. In the case 
of Austria and Germany, the postwar Einheit (unity) labour movement had struck an 
important change towards system integration and encompassing social segmentation.
From this scheme of the historical political union clusters, a n  intricating problem of 
achieving la b o u r  unity ca n  be visualized. For establishing a truly encompassing union 
movement not a "convergence" is required but in fact at least four different institutional 
adaptations, in graphical form, in order to "meet" in the middle, each duster has to move in 
a different way. More theoretically formulated: each union system is historically embedded 
into a particular social structure (segmentation) and into an institutionalized web of inter- 
organizational relations. In order to achieve indusive unionism not only an encompassing 
organization has to be formed on the basis of existing ones but the very b o u n d a r y  of labour 
unity and labour's alliances will have to be redrawn.
m
O ld  a n d  N ew  C leavages
Finally, the question arises to what degree old cleavages are still salient or new deavages 
become more important. Like in the case of party systems, newly emerging organizations 
cause much interest and are often taken as indication of incessant change. In the discussion 
of social integration and system integration we have seen that deavage organizations can 
become increasingly detached from their original cleavage base. The freezing of a deavage 
system depends on the ability of the existing organizations to monopolize their 
representational daims. The danger, however, is that cleavage-organizations become inert, 
inflexible and exclusive, thus new, sectional interests may form separate organizations. 
Moreover, there is the possibility that deavage-organizations fail to adapt, and lacking 
institutional security ultimately fail. Hence, the freezing of cleavage systems is more an 
empirical question on how adaptable organizations are, though there is good reason to 
belive that old organizations have comparative advantages through institutionalization but 
the disadvantage of inertia. I will suggest the following hypothesis: first, a depoliticization 
of party-union relations; second, intensifying functional deavages in union systems; third, 
new political deavages are secondary in union movements.
Po litical C leavages Loose in  Salience ...
From the discussion of the three cleavages and the mapping of the differences it became 
evident that the two cross-cutting cleavages, the Church-State and revolution-reform cleavage,
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although important in some countries and in some periods, are less universal and overall 
less salient than the universal labour-capital cleavage. The Church-State cleavage accounts 
today for the split of seven union centres (incl. French CFDT and Italian CISL) out of 22 
politically aligned union centres in Western Europe, while the revolution-reform cleavage 
accounts for only two (French CGT, Italian CGIL) or three (incl the tiny Swedish SAC). 
Both trans-national movements, the Rome-led Catholic labour movement and the Moscow- 
led Communist labour movement have not succeed to overcome the dominance of the 
national, reformist road to Socialism, with the significant exceptions.
A number of processes have to be mentioned that lead to depolarization and decline in 
political cleavage salience. A short list of structural changes should suffice to indicate the 
context in which the new challenges emerge and to which the old political cleavage 
organizations have to adapt. The initial party-union relations come increasingly under 
pressure by processes that lead both party and unions in diverging directions (cf. TAYLOR 
1989). Three trends are of particular relevance for a evaluation of "continuity and change" 
of political cleavages in union structures.
First, both party and unions are challenged by social change that undermines their social 
base, their core membership and supporters. Thus both party and unions have to open up 
to new supporting groups. Ever since BERNSTEIN's thesis (1898), the route for Socialist 
labour movement has been laid out: the party is to deemphasize its 'class' character and 
build on broader social alliances (cf. PRZEWORKSI 1980, PRZEWORKSI & SPRAGUE 1986). 
Much like the aim of working-class parties is to adopt the image of a catch-all Volkspartei 
(KlRCHHEIMER 1966) without losing its old followers and identity, the union movement 
ventures to include new occupational groups in modem, all-grades, service-oriented 
unions without alienating the solidarity-oriented blue-collar workers. Such a change in the 
appeal of long standing organizations as party and unions compromises not only a trade 
off, losing old sections while opening up for new sections, it can also meet internal and 
external opposition to change. Socially embedded organizations may have a leadership and 
membership that overrepresents the old sections and have vested interests in remaining 
faithful to the old appeal. As has been pointed out at the beginning, organizations are not in 
a void and can choose the optimal strategy. Instead, they are dependent on the path taken 
and the powerplay between vested interests, many of the alternatives have been 
preselected or are constrained by earlier organizational decisions, following a "nested game" 
(cf. TSEBEUS 1990, KOELBLE 1992).
Second, while party and unions may have been close allies during the struggle for 
recognition and participation, once the party attained government responsibility and when 
the unions finally took seats at the bargaining table with employers and the state, their 
primary interests became less congruent. A governing Socialist party may want the unions 
to abstain from industrial disputes and high wage demands, while the allied unions would 
like the party to implement employment programmes and labour relations reforms. With 
the growth to limits of modem welfare states and public expenditures, the allied political 
parties cannot as easily deliver the services unions expect.
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Third, if we look at each cleavage line we would expect a decline in cleavage salience 
given the following processes. The labour-capital cleavage has become less salient through 
the decline of the core supporters, the manual, industrial working-class and the rise of 
female, non-manual, service sector, and public employment. While the old social networks, 
the old working class communities - the traditional stronghold of the labour movement - 
stagnated or declined, new social groups that are more politically heterogeneous and 
volatile, and less easily unionized become increasingly dominant. The Church-State 
cleavage has become less salient through the process of secularisation that will in the long- 
run overtake even the encapsulated pillarized religious communities. The leadership of 
religious party and unions has become increasingly independent from the Church and 
adopted a more secular, interdenominational orientation (German CDU, Dutch CD A), there 
is also a convergence with the general labour movement (Dutch FNV merger, secularizing 
CISL and CFDT). The revolution-reform cleavage has become less salient, it may have even 
been completely discredited by the recent events in Eastern Europe (since the Communist 
labour movement was heavily externally legitimated, the loss of the Soviet model is of 
importance)! Communist unions and parties faced the same social structural challenge as 
socialist movements elsewhere, the decline in working-class support. The integration of (or 
alliance with) new social movements since the late 1960s within a party and union under 
"democratic centralism" has not been too successful, particularly due to the emergence of 
New Left parties and Green parties.
... But Func tio n al  C leavages Spur on
In the case of union movements, a number of functional lines of cleavages have become 
more important, while political cleavages have declined in salience. We have examined the 
three main functional cleavages: the craft-industry, white-blue collar, public-private
cleavages (see Part Three), and mentioned a number of latent cleavages (see Chapter 9). The 
growing importance of these cross-cutting non-political cleavages led to an increase in 
heterogeneity within the major politically allied union-centre or in a loss of the monopoly 
status of this centre vis-á-vis other non-political rival unions. The relationship between 
working-class party and allied union (see Chapter 3) became increasingly under tension as 
both attempted to adapt to the social change and build broader social alliances. For the 
working-class party to change towards a catch-all Volkspartei open to new social groups is 
to give up some of its core identity for the sake of voter maximisation. For the allied union 
centre to become all encompassing and integrate the status conscious white-collar 
employees and civil servants is to lose some of its internal cohesion and class solidarity. 
Hence, there seems to be a "trade-off’ for a union centre between strong political alliance 
and egalitarian union policy and the possibility to organize sections outside the core blue- 
collar industrial workforce.
In the last chapter I have pointed at the fact that not all functional cleavages have 
become manifest yet. The public-private cleavage most notably entails not only the status 
cleavage between civil servants and other public employees, it also can lead to a market
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sector versus public sector divide. The interests between private sector workers (and as tax 
payers) versus the public sector employees has the potential to become as was pointed out 
a zero-sume game (see Chapter 8). This divide would cleave the main encompassing union 
centres and further strain party-union links. Recent rifts between private and public sector 
unions within large union centres have pointed into this direction (cf. SWENSON 1991). The 
other latent functional cleavages may further devide the labour movement from within, 
especially in times of enduring high unemployment and economic restrucuration.
Differences in the organization of functional interests are as diverse as in the case of the 
discussed political cleavages. In fact, we have found functional interests to lead to even 
more union diversity and obstacles toward labour unity. Thus we can expect from an 
increase in salienc of functional cleavages an increase in union diversity. Even where 
established cleavage organization have long been in a monopoly situation and were 
successful in exluding peripheral sectionalist interests from collective bargaining and 
participation in corporatist arrangements, this may not hold for the future. Under the 
constraints of current economic crisis, sectionalism comes more to the fore, and it can less 
easy be tapped by more encompassing interest organizations. A number of potential 
conflicts have found recent attention, for example, the "autonomous" union movements 
(COBAS) in Italy, or the volatile strike movements in France. Regionalist tensions have also 
grown in impact on parties and unions in countries such as Belgium and Italy.
N ew  Po litic a l  a n d  So c ia l  C leavages
Finally, a note on new or emerging cleavages that may cross-cut, or overlay the old three 
political cleavage lines, though this will not lead everywhere to new organizational splits. 
Instead it is more likely that these challenges will work from inside or outside the 
established organizations. This stems from the fact that, different to earlier times, the 
transformation of cleavages into organization has become more difficult. The stage is 
already set by the old cleavage-organizations that have often secured their position through 
institutional arrangements. The organization costs to establish a new party or a new union 
are relatively high, though they vary considerably between political systems (e.g. 
thresholds for entering parliament) and industrial relations systems (e.g. recognition as 
bargaining partner). Some of the new cleavages have actually become expressed in volatile 
new social movements that do not want to become entrenched into bureaucratic mass 
organizations but maintain non-parliamentary or ad hoc collective actions. The question for 
the future will be whether these new movements are temporary phenomena or become 
drawn into one of the two channels of political or economic participation.
The list of new, potential cleavages runs rather long, partly because it is not yet clear 
what will become the more important, enduring line of conflict in the future (see ALBER 
1989). It is questionable, however, whether value cleavages, for instance, post-materialism 
(INCLEHART1977) is comparable to the social cleavages á la Rokkan that provided enduring 
conflicts and the base for social groupings. Labels, like post-materialist, post-industrial, 
anti-establishment, have been coined to describe the phenomena of value change in society,
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particularly among young cohorts and new social groups that are highly socially mobile 
(thanks to higher education) but feel politically excluded. If they do not abstain from 
politics altogether, they become politically mobilized outside the traditional parties and 
unions. Although the ecological movement has found in some countries expression in new 
political parties (Greens), ecological issues have led more to internal discussions within 
unions about such issues as nuclear policy and economic growth strategies, not necessarily 
to new organizational forms. In fact, one of the divergences between party and unions is 
and will be the depoliticization of the union movements. As unions become increasingly 
non-politicized interest groups of functional interests, we may even see political cleavages 
to become more and more passed over in future industrial relations.
The Persistence of O ld C leavages
However, old cleavage-organizations, following the thesis of the first mobilizing agency, 
have possibility to survive, not only by adapting to social change but to reinforce old 
cleavages. This study was mainly about the diversity in interest organization, it excluded 
largely the question what party and unions actually do. This is certainly a subject in itself to 
study the policies of party and unions and the differences in transforming interests into 
politics. Nevertheless, there is also a feedback mechanism by which the policies of party or 
unions may further reinforce cleavage structures. This may provide a further clue for why 
cleavage organizations persist. Politics can foster or hamper the process of social 
integration, it can reinforce social divisions or mend them. At several instances, I have 
pointed at social policy measures that on the pressure of interest groups have reinforced the 
social cleavage, for instance, particularistic white-collar pension politics in prewar 
Germany. Social policy can also serve the reverse purpose of attempting to prevent or 
mend social cleavages and build and maintain broader social alliances, as for instance, 
universalistic social policy in Sweden. Hence, politics may matter, not only in terms of 
shaping the configuration under which cleavages become transformed into organizations, 
but also as a means of these organizations to persist.
Other means to maintain cleavage organizations are practices that derive from the 
pillarization of organizations. Organizations can attempt to control the system of interest 
representation and thus exclude other organizations and interest groups, like new social 
movements, from direct access. I have pointed at various occasions to the institutional 
arrangements by which pillarized cleavage-organizations have raised "tolls on entry” for 
new interest organizations to become part of the political or industrial relations system 
Organizational costs may be so high that the "entry” option for new interests to become 
organized is rather limited. Yet there remains an individual "exit" option to withdraw 
(abstaining from elections, quit membership) and an occasional collective "voice" option 
(e.g. protest votes, wildcat strikes). Established parties and unions today are alarmed by an 
increasingly the symptoms of a crisis in their support base, they face a reluctant 
constituency, disloyal voting behaviour or membership withdraw. As "exit" and "voice" 
options are too much foreclosed, ’loyalty" degenerates.
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Although there is a decline in the salience of political cleavages, an intensification of 
functional cleavages and a depoliticization of party-union relations, my conclusion is that 
union diversity remains with us for the future. I have pointed at several process why social 
cleavages lead to organizational splits in the labour movement. I have also pointed at 
processes by which cleavage organizations maintain themselves but also at processes that 
challenge the initial cleavage base. For the sake of convenience for the reader, I have 
ventured in providing "generalizations'' on E u ro p ea n  union diversity in a short form of 
twelve theses (at the end of the chapter). These are more propositions and elements toward 
an approach than a deductive theory. My aim was to contribute to an analytical 
understanding of the processes underlying the transformation of cleavages into 
organizations. A full fledged theory would need further elaborations. This study aimed at 
generating hypothesis that can be further extended and "tested" by national, historical or 
comparative investigations.
This study attempted to provide a long-term view of the development of union diversity 
across Europe. Such an approach helps us to understand the underlying processes of 
division in labour unity. My approach was to study the problems of labour unity by 
examining the reverse problem: where does union diversity come from? And further, how does 
union diversity persist? The approach undertaken was sided toward a structural view, it 
attempted to show how strongly cleavages are institutionalized within organizational 
structures. This was not to rule out individual choice but to show the structuring of the 
alternatives under which individuals make choices of how to adapt to a new situation. 
Party or union leaders, but also party and union members have tried in the past to change 
the existing organizations and they will continue to do so. However, they have always had 
to struggle with those structural constraints that dated from older days. Moreover, change 
may pose difficulties not only for organizational inertia and institutionalization, as was 
examined here, but also because it is difficult to replace the ideological Weltanschauung with 
which one grew up and find a new consensus about the future course.
Hence, labour movements are slow in adaptation, despite the challenges of social and 
system change to cleaved union organizations. Strategic decisions may be taken, yet the set 
of alternatives is bounded due to previous, organisationally and socially entrenched 
decisions and internal vested interests. Certainly, party and unions will adapt to some of 
these changes, they will attempt to redefine the new role of party and unions in a changing 
society. But if any broad guess can be made, one cannot expect a radical change. In times of 
change and crisis, when we do not know what the future will bring, old ideologies often go 
a long way, and the already established structures will only slowly adapt, sometimes they 
will try to shape the environment and exploit the potential lines of conflict for their own 
purpose. Thus in the light of the European challenge and despite the described changes and 
new potential lines of conflict, one should not easily discard the old cleavages. They will 
stay with us, for good or worse to labour unity and union diversity, for a long time to come.
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T welve T heses
(1) Union diversity derives from cleavages: Cleavages, Le. enduring interest conflicts, lead to 
union diversity. Cleavages are the base of la b o u r  unity - social mobilization and allianrp 
building. Unions, as collective (membership) organizations are embedded in the social 
structure and as corporate (representative) actors seek allianrp«; against contenders in 
polity or economy.
(2) Universal and cross-cutting labour cleavages: The labour-capital cleavage led universally to 
working-class party and unions. However, the timing of political and economic 
integration and party-union sequence (and different party-union relations) led to diverse 
cleavage transformation with long-term consequences. Pre-industrial and new cleavages 
intersect with the labour-capital cleavage, thus adding to further diversity.
(3) Freezing and inertia hypothesis: Existing deavage-organization have advantages to 
monopolize representation and become institutionally secured. Yet frozen cleavage 
systems enhance further structural inertia and lack of adaptation to social change.
(4) From closure to openness: Cleavage-organizations mobilize by external and internal closure. 
However, an Exclusive strategy meets limits through competition. Unions when adapting 
inclusive strategies are forced to seek alliances beyond the initial cleavage base, thereby 
lowering internal unity. Moreover, social integration undercuts the cleavage-base and 
group solidarity.
(5) From pUlarization to integration: Unions seek alliances with other organizations in order to 
mobilize additional resources and support. Pillarization leads to structural inertia and 
lack in flexible adaptation to changes. Moreover, system integration binds unions in cross­
cleavage consensus finding that preempt initial cleavage basis.
(6) Functional supersedes political cleaxxtges: Functional cleavages gain in importance, while 
political cleavages become less salient (as consequence of system and social integration), 
the functional cleavages lead to external unions the more union movements are politically 
cleaved.
(7) New political cleavages remain internal: New political cleavages and value changes lead less 
to schism in labour movements but to gradual internal change and distancing from 
existing party links. New social movements have less potential to split than sectionalist 
industrial unrest. The latter can mobilize social closure against encompassing strategy of 
main labour movements.
(8) Party-union distancing: As a consequence of increased salience of functional cleavages, 
party and unions in order to encompass new social groups tend to deemphasize former 
ties, the more encompassing union movements are the less they can maintain close 
linkages with one political party.
(9) National channelling: Labour movements have become increasingly drawn into the 
national political and industrial relations systems with increased national regulation and 
labour market integration, therefore trans-national or sub-national cleavages became less 
manifest in union movements.
(10) Structuring of union diversity: The sources of union diversity have been the persistence of 
preindustrial cleavages, but also their subsequent mobilization by cleavage organizations. 
The more entrenched early cleavage organizations became through social closure, the 
more likely separate organization emerge through counter-mobilizing external social 
closure.
(11) Divergence in union diversity: Union diversity has remained over time, the attempts 
towards encompassing union movements have led to more labour unity and some 
convergence but labour unity is endangered by the growth of functional cleavages and 
sectionalist organizations.
(12) European integration: European labour unity faces the obstacle of entrenched union 
diversity. Cooperation is hampered by nationally institutionalized union diversity. 
Cooperation thus far lacks hierarchical ordering and functional differentiation, transfer of 
authority and inclusion of sectoral unions, the prerequisites to labour unity.
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Table A.1 
Foundation and Name of Socialist Parties, Western Europe
Country Abbrev. Founded Name (Changes)
AU SPÔ 1889 Sozialistische Partei Österreichs (1874 illegal; 1889 unity; 1945: refounded)
BE POB
PS/SP
1885
1945
Parti Ouvrier Belge / Belgische Weridiedenpariij (1877, regional merger) 
Parti Socialiste /  Socialistische Partij (reform of POB, 1978 regional split)
DE DSF
VS
1878
1967
Sodaldemokratiet i Danmark (predecessor 1871, *1961 : SDF) 
Venstresoaaistieme (left break-away of DSF)
FR SFIO
PS
1905
1969
Sécbon Française de rintemational Ouvrière 
(1905 merger: 1880 POP and others; see PCF) 
Parti Socialiste (1969 reform of SFIO)
GE SPD 1875 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (merger ADAV, 1863 & SDAP, 1869)
IR IrLP 1922 Irish Labour Party (1912 union congress; 1944: Nationalist split; 1950 merger)
IT PSI
PSDI
1892
1947
Partito Socialista Italiana (1919: pro-Comintern; 1921/22 schism:'PCI, PSU) 
Partite Socialista Democratic» Itabano (PSI break-away, 1966-9 PSI alliance)
NE SDAP
PvdA
1894
1946
Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij (reformist break-away from SDB (1882)) 
Partij van de Arbeid (reformed SDAP, left Christians; 1970: DS70 right wing split)
NO DNA 1887 Det Norske Arbeiterpartei (1918-23: pro-Com.; split 1921: mod. (-1927), 1923 NKP
SW SAP 1889 Sodatdemokratsiska Arbetareparli
SZ SPS 1888 Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz (predecessor 1880; 1904 Socialist party)
UK Lab. 1906 Labour Party (1900 LRC: formed by TUC, HP (1893), co-op, &c.; 1918: indiv. members)
Source: compiled from Lane & Errson 1991; Jacobs 1989; U nden 1990; Patterson & Thomas 
1977; WENDE 1981
260
A P P E N D I X
Table A.2
Foundation and Name of Socialist Union Centres, Western Europe
AU BFG
ÔGB
1893
1945
Bund Freier Gewerkschaften (before 1920s: ’Reichsverband*)
Österreichischer Geiwerkschaftsbund (unitary, but dominant FSG Socialist fraction)
BE CGSB
FGTB
1898
1945
Confédération Générale du Travail Belgique (-1937: CS within POB party)
Fédération Générale du Travail Belgique (merger of CGSB and resistance movement)
DE LO(DSF) 1898 De Samenvirkende Fagfortxmdet (1886: Copenhagen only; later: LO i Danmark)
FR CGT 1903 
CGT-FO 1947
Confédération Générale du Travail (merger of 1892 Bourses and 1886 CGT congress) 
CGT-Force Ouvrier (reformist break-away from Communist-ied CGT)
GE ADGB
DGB
1891
1949
Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (1891: Commission, 1919: ADGB) 
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (unitary; 1947: Bi-zonal; 1949: West Germany)
IR rruc
ICTU
1894
1959
Irish Trade Union Congress (British- and Irish-based unions)
Irish Congress of Trade Unions (merger ITUC and 1944 Nationalist break-away CIU)
IT CGL
UIL
1906
1948
Confederazione Generate del Lavoro (1924 suppresed)
Unione Italians del Lavoro (reformist break-away of Communist-led CGIL)
NE NW
FNV
1905
1981
Nedertands Verband van Vakvereiningen (reformist breaw-away from 1893 NAS) 
Federate Nedertands Vakbeweging (1981 : merger, 1976: federation of NW  and NKV)
NO LO(NAF) 1899 Norsk Arbeidemes Faglige Landsorganisajon (1920s: syndicalist, later: LO)
SW LO 1889 Landsorganisationen i Sverige
SZ SGB 1880 Schweizer Gewerkschaftsbund (1905 reformed)
UK TUC 1863 Trades Union Congress (1895 reformed; GFTU 1899 reform failed later)
Source: Compiled from Launay 1990; Linden & Rojahn 1990; Visser 1989,1990; DUES database 
1992.
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Table A.3
Foundation and Name of Christian Parties, Western Europe
AU CP 1895 ChristlichsoziaJe Partei (pari. 1691*)
ÔVP 1945 Österreichische Volkspartei (reformed CP)
BE KP/PC 1884 Kathofieke Parfj / Parti CathoJique (1936 regional)
CVP/PSC1945 Christene Volkspartjj /  Parti Social Chrétien (1968 regional)
DE KRF 1970 Kristeligt Folkeparti
GE Z. 1870 Zentrum (1919 Bavarian break-away)
CDU 1945 Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (in Bavaria CSU)
FR PDP 1924 Parti Démocrate Popdaire
MRP 1944 Mouvement Répubiicain Popuiarire
CDS 1965 Centre des Dómocratss Soctaux (-1976 CD)
IT PPI 1919 Partito Populäre ItaSano
DC 1943 Democrazia Christiana
NE RKSP 1904 Roomsch-Katholieke Staatspartij (*1904)
KVP 1945 Katholieke Volksparti] (1980 -> CDA)
ARP 1879 Artö-Revolutionaire Partij (1980 -> CDA)
CHU 1897 Christlich-Historische Union (CHK-1908 merger; 1980 •> CDA)
CDA 1980 Christlich Demokratischer Appell (merger; 1975 federation)
NO KrF 1933 Krisfetg Folkeparti
SW KDS 1964 Kristdemokratiska SamhdU spartet
SZ KK 1912 Schweizerische Konservative Volkspartei (1881 KU)
CVP 1957 Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei (-1970 KCVPS)
EVP 1917 Evangelische Volkspartei (1919 national)
Source: Fogarty 1957, irving 1979, Madeley 1991, Righart 1986, W ende 1981, Jacobs 1989
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Table A.4
Foundation and Name of Christian Union Centres, Western Europe
AU ZCG
FCG
1909
1945
Zentraikomission der Christlichen Gewerkschaften Österreichs (1902 League) 
Fraktion Christlicher Gerwerkschafter (fraction within ÖGB)
BE CSC 1912 Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens / Algemeen Christeiijke Vakververbond (ACV)
FR CFTC
CFDT
1919
1964
Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens
Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (secularized); but CFTC split-away
GE CGO
CGB
1699
1959
Christliche Gewerkschaften Deutschlands (1919 ind. prot white-collar unions) 
Christlicher Gerwerkschaftsbund Deutschlands (refounded, merger with Saar unions)
IT CIL
CISL
1916
1950
Confederazione Italiana dei Laboratori 
Confederazione Italiana dei Sindacati Lavoratori
NE NKV
CNV
1909
1909
Nedertands Katholieke Vakbeweging (1961 FNV-merger with NW) 
Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond
SZ CNG
SVEA
1909
1920
Christlich Nationaler Gewerkschatts-bund
Schweizerischer Verband evangelischer Arbeitnehmer (1981 •> CNG)
S o u r c e : Fogarty  1957; Laubier 1985: Ch . 2; Launay  1991 ; R ighart 1986; Scholl 1964; V isser 
1989,1990
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Table A.5
Foundation and Name of Communist (and Leftist) Parties, Western Europe
Country Abbrev. Founded Name (Changes)
AU KPÔ 1918 Kommunistische Partei Österreichs
BE PCB 1921 Parti Communiste de Belgique (merger of FCW and Jacquemottians)
DE DKP
SF
1919
1958
Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti (name: 1920) 
Socüstisk Fotkeparti (break-away)
FR PCF 1920 Parti Communiste Français (SFIO majority)
GE USPD
KPD
DKP
1917
1918 
1969
Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD break-away) 
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (1920: rest-USPD joined)
Deutsche Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (newly formed, after suppression)
IR CPI 1921 Communist Party of Ireland (1923,1948 merger with IWL, 1933,1970 reformed)
ri PCI 1921 Partito Communista Italiano (PS11919-21 pro-Comintern; PSI break-away)
NE SDP
CPN
1909
1918
Sozialdemokratische Parti) (SdAP break-away) 
Communistische Partij Nederland (change of SDP)
NO NKP 1923 Norges Kommunistiske Parti (DNA1918-23 pro-Comintern; DNA break-away)
SW VPK 1917 Vänsterpaiütet Kommunisten» (1921 Comintern, schism 1924,1931,1967,1977)
SZ KPS
PTS
1921
1944
Kommunistische Partei der Schweiz (1940 suppressed) 
Parti du Travail Suisse/Partei der Arbeit
UK CP 1920 Communist Party of Great Britain (merger of left BSP and SLP)
So u r c e : Collected from Jacobs 1989, M c Innes  1975, Tannahill 1978, W aller & Fennema  1988, 
WENDE 1981.
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Table A.6
Foundation and Name of Communist (and Syndicalist) Union Movements in Western Europe
Country Abbrev. Founded Name (Changes)
AU FGE 1945 Fraktion Gewerkschaftliche Einheit (fraction within ÖGB)
BE OSR
CBSU
1920s
1940s
Opposition Syndicate Rövolutionaire (within CGTB) 
Syndicats Uniques (merged to form FGTB)
DE FS 1918 Fagoppositionens Sammenslutning (within DSF)
FR CGT-U
CGT
1921
1944
CGT-Unitaire (CGT break-away, 1936 merged again)
CGT (Communist-led by 1947, break-away of Socialist CGT-FO)
GE FAUD
BRI
1897
1924
Freie-Arbeiter Union Deutschlands (syndicalist)
Bund revolutionärer Industrieverbände (1927 change in name)
IT USI
CGIL
1912
1944
Unione Sindacale Italiana (syndicalist, supressed 1926) 
Confederazione Generate Italiana del Lavoro (Communist-led by 1947)
NE NAS
EVC
1892
1944
Nationaal Arbeids Secretariat (syndicalist since 1905 schism) 
Eenheids Vak Centrale (Communist, schism 1958, end 1960-4)
NO NFO 1913 Norsk Fagopposition (within NALF/LO, pro-Comintem majority)
SW SAC 1910 Sveriges Arbetares Centralorganisation (Syndicalist, later Communist)
UK NUM 1924 National Minority Movement (1921 British RILU-bureau)
Source: Collected from Galenson 1953a: Kendall 1975; Linden & Thorpe 1990, Waller 1990.
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Table A.7
Foundation and Name of White-Collar Union Centres (mainly private sector), Western Europe
AU 1917 Ständige Delegation der freigew. Angestelltenveitände (predecessor: 1907,1919 BFG)
DE 1952 FTF Fslesrädet tor danske Tjenestemands- og FunkionaBrorganisationener
1953 FR Hovedorganisationen tor Arbejdsleder- og Tekniske FunktionsBrforeninger i Danmark
1972 AC Akademikemes Centralorganisation (predecessor: AS 1962)
FR 1944 CGC Confédération Générale des Cadres (1980: CGC-CFE)
GE 1919 AfA Allgemeiner freier Angestelltenveitände (predecessor: 1913, -1933)
1919 Gedag Gesamtverband Deutscher Ange stell ten verbände (-1933, refounded 1950s)
1921 GDA Gewerkschaft der Angestellten (-1933)
1949 DAG Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft (1945 in British zone)
1951 ULA Union der Leitenden Angestellten
NE 1923 W H Verbond van Vakorganisabes van Hoofdarbeiders (1929: joined fiberal NVC)
1966 NCHP Nedertands Centrale voor Hoger Personeel
1974 MHP Vakcentrale voor Middelbare en Hogere Personeel
NO 1974 AF Akademikemes Fellesorganisasjon
1951 FSO FunksjonaBrenes Sentralorgansisasjon (-1965: tomi new YH)
1965 YH Yrkesorgansisasjonennes Hovedsammenslutning (1977: merged to form YS)
1977 YS Yrkesorganisasjonnenes Sentralforbund
SW 1917 SR Statsjänstemännenes Riksförbund (1973: joined SACO)
1931 DACO De Anställdas Centralorganisationen (1943: merged with TCO)
1937 TCO Tjänstemännens Centralorgnisation (1943: merger with DACO)
1947 SACO Sveriges Akademikers Centalorganisalion (1974: merged with SR)
SZ 1918 VSA Vereinigung Schweizerischer Angestelltenverbände
Source: Ebsinghaus 1988; Visser 1989; Bain & Price 1980;
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Table A.8 
Foundation and Name of Public Sector Union Centres, Western Europe
Nation Founded Abbrev. Name
DE 1952 FTF Fællesrâdet for danske Tjenestemands- og Funktionsrorganisationener
1953 CO-1 Statsjenestemændenes Centralorganisation 1
1972 AC Akademikemes Centralorganisation (predecessor: AS 1962)
FR 1948 FEN Fédération de l'éducation Nationale
GE 1918 DBB Deutscher Beamtenbund (1928: joins Christian-National union centre)
1922 ADBB Allgemeiner Deutscher Beamtenbund (DBB break-away, cooperation with ADGB and AfA)
1949 DBB Deutscher Beamtenbund (newly founded)
DRB Deutscher Richterbund
IT
NE 1916 CRP Centrale van Rijkspersoneel (1920-22: with Liberal ANC, 1946-: with AC)
1917 CMHA Centrale van Middelbare en Hogere Ambtenaren (1974: merged to form MHP)
1946 AC Ambtenaren-Centrale
1966 NCHP Nederiands Centrale voor Hoger Personeel
NO 1918 EL Emberstsmenneses Landsforbundet (1975: merged to form AF)
1923 ST Statstjenestemanns Sentralorganisasjon (1977: merged to form YS)
1951 FSO Funksjonarenes Sentralorganisasjon (-1965: form new YH)
1965 YH Yrkesorgnsisasjonennes Hovedsammenslutning (1977: merged to form YS)
1974 AF Akademikemes Fellesorganisasjon
1977 YS Yerkesorganisasjormenes Sentralforbund
SW 1917 SR Statsjänstemdnnenes Riksförbund (1973: joined SACO)
1937 TCO Tjänstemämens Centralorgnisation (1943: merger with DACO)
1947 SACO Sveriges Akademikers Centaiorganisation (1974: merged with SR)
SZ 1903 FöV Föderativverband des Personals öffentlicher Verwaltungen und Betriebe (SGB cartel)
So u r c e : V isser 1989; Bain & Price 1980;
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Tabla Votas of Socialist and Labour Parties, U n ttm  Europe 1890-1944
AU BE DE FR 6E IR IT NE NO SU SZ UK
SPÜ BWP SO SFIO SPD IIP PSI SOAP ONA SAP SPS Lab.
1890 0.1 7 .0 19.7
1892 0.2 9 .0 . •
1893 . 8.4 23.3 .
1894 13.2 . . 0.2 0.3 •
1895 11.0 . 6.8 •
1896 . . . 6 .8
1897 . . 8.9 3 .0 0.6 •
1898 14.8 U .O 11.2 27.2 .
1899 . • . 9 .6
1900 22.5 . . 13.0 3.0 . 1.8
1901 17.1 • 9.5 .
1902 . 10.4 . 3.5 12.6
1903 20.4 31.7 9.7 .
1904 20.6 . . 21.3 .
1905 . . 11.2 9.5 14.7
1906 25.4 10.0 * 16.0 . 5 .7
1907 21.0 . 29.0 .
1908 14.5 . . 14.6 17.6
1909 28.7 . 19.0 13.9 21.6 .
1910 28.3 13.1 . • 7.1
1911 25.4 . . 28.5 20.0
1912 9.3 » 34.8 26.3 .
1913 29.5 . 17.6 18.5 .
1914 . 16.8 . 36.4 10.1
1915 , . 32.1 .
1917 31.1 30.8
1918 28.7 . 22.0 31.6 . 21.9
1919 40.8 36.6 . 21.2 37.9 32.3 NSO • 23.5
1920 36.0 32.2 21.6 ----- 29.7
1921 34.8 . 24.7 9.2 36.2
1922 . . 21.3 19.4 . . 23.3 29.4
1923 39.6 . . 10.6 . . 30.5
1924 36.6 20.1 26.0 . 8.8 41.1 33.0
1925 39.4 . . . 22.9 ONA • 25.8
1926 37.2 . . ---- .
1927 42.3 . . 9.1 36.8 .
1928 . 18.0 29.8 . 37.0 27.4
1929 36.0 41.8 . . 23.8 . 37.0
1930 41.1 24.5 . 31.4 .
1931 . . . 28.7 29.2
1932 37.1 42 .7 20.5 20.4 7.7 41.7
1933 18.3 5.7 21.5 40.1 .
1935 46.1 . 28.0 37.8
1936 32.1 . 27.5 . . 42.5 45.9
1937 , . 10.3 21.9 .
1938 10.0 .
1939 30.2 42.9 . . . 25.7
1940 . . . 53.8
1943 44.5 . 15.7 . 28.6
1944 8.8 46.5
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1954
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Table B.1. 2: Votes of Social is t  andI Labour Part:ies. Western Europe 1945-1989
ALI BE DE FR CE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
S Pô both PS S P SD SFIO SPD ILP PSI PvdA DNA SAP SPS Lab.
44.6 32.8 23.8 . 41.0 47.7
31.6 . 17.9 . 20.7 28.3 .
« 40.0 . 26.2 .
. 8.7 8 .7 25.6 46.1 .
38.7 29.7 . 29.2 . 45.7 «
34.5 39.6 . 46.1
. . 14.5 11.4 26.0 48.8
. . . 29.0 46.0
42.1 . 41.3 28.8 . 12.7 46.7
37.3 . 12.1
. . . 27.0 46.4
43.0 . . 15.2 . 32.7 44.6
. 39.4 31.8 9.1 48.3
35.8 . 15.5 . 14.2 46.2
44.8 . . . 30.4 26.4 43.8
. 42.1 . 47.8
36 .7 . 36.2 11.6 46.8
44.0 . 12.4 .
. . 13.8 28.0 26.6
. 41.9 . 47.3 44.1
28.3 . 39.3 15.4 43.1
42.6 . 38.3 . 48.0
. . 18.9 . 23.6 23.5
28.0 34.1 16.5 • 14.5 50.1
. . 42.7 17.0 46.5
48.4 . . . 45.3 43.1
50.0 27.2 37.3 • 24.6 22.9
. . 45.8 . 9.6 27.3
25.6 19.1 13.7 . 35.3 43.6
26.7 . . 39.3
50.4 . 29.9 . . 24.9
42.6 . 9.6 . 42.7
27.0 37.0 11.6 33.8 42.3
(25 .4 ) 13.0 12.4 . 22.8 .
51.0 . 38.3 . 9.8 . 43.2 24.4 36.9
. 42.9 . .
(25 .1 ) 12.7 12.4 32.9 36.6 9.9 28.3 37.2
. 9.4 30.4 45.6
47.6 . . 42.7 . 11.4 . 22.9 27.6
31.6 . .
(28 .3 ) 13.8 14.5 . . 40.8 44.7
43.1 31.3 . 33.3
(30 .6 ) 15.7 14.9 29.3 37.0 6.4 14.3 . 18.4 30.8
. 29.8 36.6 . . 43.2
. 9.5 31.9 34.3 .
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1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1943
1944
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Table B.2.1: Scats of Socialist and Labour Parties, Western Europe 1890-1944
AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SW SZ UK
SP0 BUP SO SFIO SP0 ILP PS I SOAP DNA SAP SPS Lab.
0 .0 2 .9 . 8.8 . . .
0 .0 2 .0 .
. • 5.5 11.1 . *
18.4 . # 0.0 0.0
• 7.0 . . . 3.0 . .
. . . . . 0.4 0 .7
. . . . . 3.1 2.0 0.0 .
18.4 10.5 10.0 14.1 .
. . « . . . 0.4 2 .7
21.1 . . . . 6.5 0.0 . 0.3
. 12.3 . . . 6.0 • .
. . 7.8 . • . 1.7 4 .2
. 14.0 . 20.4 . 3.4 .
17.5 . . . . 5 .7 .
. . . . . 6.0 a 5.7 1.2
. 21.1 9.1 . . 8.1 • 4.3
17.3 . . . 10.8 . .
20.5 . # . . 14.8 4 .2
. 21.1 . . 8.1 7.0 8 .9 .
« 21.1 12.8 . . . 6.3
20.4 . . . . . 27.8 7.9
21.0 . . 27.7 . 18.7 .
. 28.1 . . . 10.2 15.0 . .
. . 17.4 . . . 37.8 10.1
. . . . . 15.4 .
« . # . 37.4 10.6
. 28.1 . . . 22.0 14.3 . 8 .8
42.4 37.6 . 10.9 38.7 . 30.7 NSD . 21.7
37.7 . 32.4 22.2 . 32.6
36.6 . . . . 23.0 5.3 40.4
. . . . 13.3 20.0 . . 21.7 23.1
41.2 . . 9.2 . . 31.1
. 37.2 18.1 26.6 5.3 45.2 24.6
41.7 . . 24.0 ONA , 24.7
. 35.8 . . ----- .
43.0 . . . . 8.5 39.3 .
. . 16.4 31.2 . . 39.1 25.3
37.4 41.2 . . 24.0 . . 46.7
43.6 « . . 25.2 « 31.3 .
. . . . . . . 26.2 7.5
39.0 41 .9 21.3 20.7 4 .6 . 45.2
. . 18.5 5.2 22.0 46.0 .
# 45.9 . . . . 26.7 25.0
34.7 33.7 . . 46.7 48.7
« . . . 9.4 23.0 . .
. . 6.5 . .
31.7 43.2 . . . . 24.1
. . . . 58.3
. 44.6 . 12.3 . . 28.9
# 5.8 50.0
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Table B.2.2: Seats of Socialist and Labour Parties, Western Europe 1945*1989
AU BE DE FR GE IR IT HE NO sw SZ UK
SPG both PS SP SO SFIO SPD ILP PSI PvdA ONA SAP SPS Lab.
46.1 32.4 25.7 50.7 61.4
34.2 16.5 20.7 29.0 .
. 38.5 24.7 .
. . 9.5 9.1 27.0 48.7 .
40.6 31.1 « 32.6 56.7 .
36.3 39.6 50.4
. 17.3 10.9 25.0 47.2
. 30.0 47.8
44.2 42.3 31.0 12.7 51.3
40.8 12.9
27.0 44.0
44.8 16.2 33.3 45.9
40.0 34.0 8.2 52.0
39.6 9.5 14.1 48.1
47.3 32.0 26.0 41.0
43.4 49.1
39.6 . 38.1 11.1 49.3
46.1 . 13.8
# 13.8 28.7 26.5
43.4 48.5 50.3
30.2 40.7 15.3 45.3
44.8 39.4 57.8
. 25.1 24.7 25.5
27.8 35.4 12.1 14.4 53.6
. 45.2 12.5 49.3
49.1 46.6 45.7
50.8 28.8 40.0 26.0 23.0
. 46.4 9 .7 28.7
26.3 18.8 13.2 40.0 44.6
27.8 . . 50.2
50.8 30.3 . 27.5
43.1 9.0 . 43.6
29.2 37.1 11.5 35.3 49.0
(27 .4 ) 15.1 12.3 . 21.5 .
51.9 . 38.9 9.8 . 44.1 25.5 42.4
* 43.9 .
(28 .8 ) 16.5 12.3 33.7 56.5 9.0 29.3 41.9
# 9.6 31.3 47.6
49.2 38.8 . 11.6 . 23.5 32.2
. 32.0 • .
(3 1 .6 ) 16.5 15.1 • . 45.2 45.6
43 .7 . 35.6 . 34.7
(34 .0 ) 18.9 15.1 30.9 37.4 7.2 14.9 • 20.5 35.2
31.4 46.8 . . 44.7
9.0 32.7 38.2 .
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Table 8 .3 .1 : Votes of Christian-D«aocratic and Religious P arties , Western Europe 1890-1944
Year
AU BE FR GE IR IT 
Cath. Cath. 
FG PPI
NE NO SZ
Cath. Cath. Cath.
POP
Cath. Chr. Cath. Prot. Prot.
KrF
Cath. Prot.
EVPCP KP/PC other both BVP 0ZP big 3 RKSP other ARP CHU other KK
1890 . 52.9 18.6 .
1891 « . (49 .7 ) 20.2 29.5
1892 . 53.7 . . .
1893 19.1 •
1894 . 51.1 1.2 . (44 .2 ) 20.3 17.1 6 .7
1896 # . # . . 23.0
1897 . . (57 .2 ) 20.3 26.2 10.7
1898 . 48.5 2.0 18.8 . .
1899 . . . • 20.8
1900 48.5 3.0 « .
1901 (49 .9 ) 15.7 27.4 6 .7
1902 . • . • 23.1
1903 , 19.8 • .
1904 . 49.8 2.2 . 0.5 « « .
1905 . . (48 .6 ) 13.1 24.7 10.8 22.5
1907 52.3 19.4 • .
1908 . 48.6 1.1 « . . . 20.5
1909 . • . 4 .0 (51 .3 ) 12.8 27.9 10.6
1911 45.4 . m m • 19.1
1912 51.0 1.9 16.4 . •
1913 . . 6 .0 (46 .4 ) 21.5 14.5 10.5
1914 • . • . 21.1
1917 . . 16.5
1918 . (49 .9 ) 30.0 2.0 13.4 6.5 0.4
1919 35.9 36.6 2.1 19.0 . 20.5 . • 21.0 0.8
1920 41.8 (1 7 .8 ) 4 .2 13.6 • .
1921 37.0 4 .3 . 20.4 . • .
1922 . (54 .5 ) 29.9 1.4 13.7 10.9 1.6 20.9 0 .9
1923 44.0 . . .
1924 • (17 .3 ) 3 .7 13.6 . •
1925 . 36.1 2.5 . (50 .8 ) 28.6 1.6 12.2 9.9 3 .0 20.9 0.9
1927 41.4 . . •
1928 , (1 5 .1 ) 3.1 12.1 . . 21.4 0 .7
1929 . 35.4 3.1 . (51 .7 ) 29.6 1.1 11.6 10.5 3.3
1930 35.7 (1 4 .8 ) 3 .0 11.8 • m .
1931 • . . 21.4 1.0
1932 • 38.5 0.2 3 .2 (1 5 .0 ) 3.1 11.9 • • •
1933 (1 4 .0 ) 2 .7 11.2 (50 .4 ) 27.9 2.1 13.4 9.1 3.4 0 .8
1935 . . . . 20.3 0.7
1936 . 27.7 1.1 . . . 1.3
1937 « . 34.8 (52 .7 ) 28.8 2.8 16.4 7.5 2.5
1938 33.3 . .
1939 32.7 . . . 16.8 0.9
1943 . 23.1 . . • 20.8 0.4
1944 # 20.5 . , . . .
272
A p p e n d i x
Table 8 .3 .2 : Votes of Christian-Dcancratic and Religious P arties, Western Europe 1945-1989
AU BE 0E FR GE IR IT NE NO SU SZ
Cath. Cath. Prot. C Cath Cath. Prot. Cath. Chr. Cath . Cath . Chr. Cath. Prot
OVP Both CVP PS C KRF CD(S) Both CDU CSU FG DC CDA KVP ARP CHU other KrF KdS CVP EVP
1945 49.8 . 24.9 7.9
1946 42.5 26.3 35.2 (51 .5 ) 30.8 12.9 7.8 2.1
1947 . 21.2 0.9
1948 . 19.8 48.5 (53.4)^32.3 13.2 9.2 2.4
1949 44.0 ♦43.6 (34 .1 ) 28.3 5.8 8.4
1950 47.7
1951 12.5 25.8 22.5 1.0
1952 (4 8 .9 M 0 .4 11.3 8.9 3.1
1953 41.3 (46 .0 ) 37.1 8.8 40.1 10.5
1954 ♦42.0 32.0
1955 23.2 1.1
1956 46.0 11.1 (50 .0 ) 31.7 9 .9 8.4 2.9
1957 (50 .2 ) 39.7 10.5 26.6 10.2
1958 46.5 11.1 42.4
1959 44.2 (49 .1 ) 31.6 9.4 8.1 2.8 23.3 1.4
1961 ♦42.3 (45 .3 ) 35.8 9.6 32.0 9.3
1962 45.4 7.9
1963 38.2 (49 .2 ) 31.9 8 .7 8.6 3.0 23.4 1.6
1964 1.8
1965 ♦34.8 (47 .6 ) 38.0 9.6 34.1 7.8
1966 48.3
1967 14.1 (44 .5 ) 26.5 9.9 8.1 2.9 22.1 1.6
1968 (31 .7 ) 20.0 11.7 10.5 39.0 1.5
1969 (46 .1 ) 36.7 9.5 34.1 7.8
1970 44.7 1.8
1971 43.1 (30 .1 ) 19.7 10.4 2.0 (36 .7 ) 21.8 8 .6 6.3 4 .0 20.7 2.1
1972 (44 .9 ) 35.2 9.7 38.7 (31 .3 ) 17.7 8.8 4.8 4.0
1973 4.0 3.8 35.1 . . . . 11.9 1.8
1974 (32 .3 ) 23.3 9.1 . . . .
1975 42.9 5.3 . . . . 21.1 2.0
1976 (48 .6 ) 38.0 10.6 38.7 - 1.4
1977 (35 .9 ) 26.2 9 .8 3.4 30.5 31.9 CDA CDA CDA 3 .7 9 .7
1978 (3 6 .3 ) 26.2 10.1 . . .
1979 41.9 . 2.6 38.3 . . . 1.4 21.5 2.2
1980 . . (44 .5 ) 34.2 10.3 . . .
1981 (26 .5 ) 19.3 7.1 2.3 36.5 30.8 . 4.6 8.9
1982 . 39.2 29.4 - 4 .9 1.9
1983 43.2 . . (42 .7 ) 30.8 11.9 . 32.9 • • - 20.4 2.1
1984 . . 2.7 . • - •
1985 (29 .2 ) 21.3 8 .0 . . . . 8.3
1986 41.3 . . 34.6 . 3 .9
1987 (27 .5 ) 19.5 8.0 2.4 (44 .3 ) 34.4 9.8 27.1 34.3 . • 20.0 2.1
1988 2.0 . . . - 2.9
1989 . 29.3 35.3 . 4.1 8.5 -
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Table B .4 .1 : Seats of Christian-Oaaocratic and Religious P arties , Western Europe 1690-19M
AU BE FR GE 1R IT NE NO SZ
Cath. Cath. Cath. Cath. Cath. Cath. Chr. Cath. Prot. Prot. Cath. Prot.
Year CP KP/PC other POP both BVP OZP FC PPI big 3 RKSP other ARP CHU other KrF JCK EVP
1890 68.8 26.7
1891 (46 .0 ) 25.0 21.0 .
1892 60.5 . .
1893 24.2 .
1894 67.8 0 .7 . (40 .0 ) 25.0 15.0 0.0 .
1896 . 21.1
1897 . (45 .0 ) 22.0 17.0 6.0 .
1898 71.7 1.3 25.7 .
1899 . 21.8
1900 56.6 0 .7 . .
1901 . (57 .0 ) 25.0 22.0 10.0 .
1902 . 21.6
1903 25.2 .
1904 55.4 1.8 . . 0 .6 .
1905 . (48 .0 ) 25.0 15.0 8.0 21.6
1907 58.0 26.4 .
1908 52.4 0.6 . 21.0
1909 . . 3.1 (60 .0 ) 25.0 25.0 10.0 .
1911 43.2 . 20.1
1912 54.3 1.1 22.9 .
1913 . . 5 .7 (46 .0 ) 25.0 11.0 10.0 .
1914 . 19.6
1917 22.2
1918 (50 .0 ) 30.0 3.0 13.0 7.0 0.0 .
1919 40.6 39.2 0.0 21.6 . 19.7 21.7 0.5
1920 46.4 18.5 4 .6 13.9 .
1921 41.9 1.1 . 20.2 .
1922 . (59 .0 ) 32.0 0.0 16.0 11.0 1.0 22.2 0.5
1923 48.5 . .
1924 17.8 3.9 14.0 .
1925 40.1 1.6 . (54 .0 ) 30.0 1.0 13.0 11.0 3.0 21.2 0.5
1927 44.2 . .
1928 15.9 3.3 12.6 23.2 0.5
1929 38.0 3.2 (53 .0 ) 30.0 0.0 12.0 11.0 4.0 .
1930 40.0 15.3 3.4 12.0 •
1931 . 23.5 0.5
1932 42.2 0.0 2 .6 15.4 3.4 12.0 .
1933 14.2 2.8 11.4 (52 .0 ) 28.0 2.0 14.0 10.0 4 .0 0 .7 .
1935 . 22.5 0.5
1936 30.2 1.0 . 1.3 .
1937 . 34.8 (56 .0 ) 31.0 2.0 17.0 8.0 2.0 .
1938 . 32.6 .
1939 36.1 . . . 23.0 0.0
1943 23.2 22.2 0.5
1944 . 21.7 . .
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Tabic B .4 .2 : Stats of Christian-Dewoeratie and Religious P arties, Western Europe
AU BE DE FR GE IR
Cath.
FG
IT
Cath.
DC
NE NO
Prot.
KrF
SU
Prot.
KdS
SZ
Cath. Cath. Prot.
KRF
Cath.
CD(S)
Chr. Chr. Cath. 
CDA KVP
Prot. Cath.
CVP
Prot.
EVPÖVP Both CVP PSC Both CDU CSU ARP CHU other
1945 51.5 27.0 5.3
1946 45.5 29.0 37.2 (53 .0 ) 32.0 13.0 8.0 2.0
1947 . 22.7 0.5
1948 . 21.1 53.1 (54.0)+33.0 13.0 9.0 2.0
1949 46.7 49.5 (37 .1 ) 31.1 6.0 6.0
1950 50.9
1951 . 15.1 27.2 24.5 0.5
1952 . (51 .0 )*32.0 12.0 9.0 2.0
1953 44.8 . (50 .5 ) 39.8 10.7 44.6 9.3
1954 ♦45.5 34.0
1955 24.0 0.5
1956 49.7 . 13.1 (51 .3 ) 32.7 10.0 8.7 2.0
1957 . (54 .3 ) 43.7 10.7 27.2 8.0
1958 49.1 12.3 45.8
1959 47.9 . (50 .0 ) 32.7 9.3 8.0 2.0 24.0 1.0
1961 ♦45.8 (48 .5 ) 38.5 10.0 32.6 10.0
1962 49.1 . 8.0
1963 41.3 (50 .7 ) 33.3 8.7 8.7 2.7 24.0 1.0
1964 . 0.0
1965 36.3 (49 .4 ) 39.5 9.9 32.6 8 .7
1966 51.5
1967 8.1 (46 .0 ) 28.0 10.0 8.0 2 .7 22.5 1.5
1968 (32 .5 ) 23.6 9.0 5.5 42.2 0.0
1969 (48 .8 ) 38.9 9.9 34.7 9.3
1970 47.9 0.0
1971 43.7 (31 .6 ) 22.2 9.4 0.0 (38 .7 ) 23.3 8.7 6 .7 3.3 22.0 1.5
1972 . (45 .4 ) 35.7 9.7 42.4 (32 .0 ) 18.0 9.3 4 .7 3.3
1973 4.0 4.4 37.5 . . . . 12.9 0.0
1974 (34 .0 ) 23.6 10.4 . . . .
1975 43.7 . 5.1 . . . 23.0 1.5
1976 (49 .0 ) 38.3 10.7 41.7 ------- . 0.0
1977 (37 .7 ) 26.4 11.3 3.4 29.1 32.7 CDA CDA CDA 2.7 14.2
1978 (38 .7 ) 26.9 11.8 . .
1979 42.1 . . 2.9 41.4 . . 0.0 22.0 1.5
1980 . (45 .5 ) 35.0 10.5 . .
1981 (2 8 .8 ) 20.3 8.5 2.3 39.2 32.0 4.0 9 .7
1982 42.2 30.0 4 .7 0.0
1983 44.3 . . (49 .0 ) 38.4 10.6 35.7 . 20.5 1.5
1984 . . 2.9 . -
1985 (32 .5 ) 23.1 9.4 . . 10.2
1986 42.1 . . 36.0 3.3
1987 (29 .2 ) 20.3 9.0 2.3 (44 .9 ) 35.0 9.9 30.7 37.1 . . 21.0 1.5
1988 . 2.3 . • . 0.0
1989 . . 33.1 36.0 4.0 8.5 .
(♦ ) in c l. »inor other parties  or independent candidates
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Table B.5.1: Votes of Co«ariist and Leftis t Parties, Western Europe 1890-1944
AU
rpd
BE
PCB
DE
OK?
FR GE IR IT NE NO SU sz
PST
UJC
PCF le f t KPD le f t CPI le f t  PCI le f t CPN le f t NKP le f t VPK le f t CP
1891 . 1.0
1895
1897
1901
1905
1906 2.3
1910 16.1
1913 . 5.3
19K 13.6
1917 8.0
1918 2.3 0 .7
1919 16.2 7.6 2.0 DMA
1920 0.9 0.4 2.1 17.9 -------- 6.4
1921 0.0 4.6 0.6 21.3 4 .6 3.2
1922 1.8 0.4 NICP 1.8 0.2
1923 0.7 0.3
1924 0.5 9 .8 11.7 8 .9 0.3 6.1 18.4 3 .6 1.5 0.3
1925 1.6 1.2 0.4 2.0
1926 0.4
1927 0.4 1.1 4 .0
1928 11.3 18.8 10.6 0.1 6.4 1.8
1929 1.9 0.3 2.0 0.6 0.2
1930 0.6 13.1 0 .0 1.7
1931 1.5 0.3
1932 2.8 1.1 8.3 19.8 16.9 0.1 3 .0 5.3
1933 12.3 3.2 1.3 1.8
1935 1.6 1.4 0.1
1936 6.1 15.3 0.3 3.3 4 .4
1937 3.4
1939 5.4 2.4 2.6
1940 3.5 0.6
1944 2.7 10.3 0.2
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Table B .5 .2 : Votes of Conwnist and L e ftis t P arties , Western Europe 1945-1989
AU BE 0E FR GE 1R IT HE NO SW SZ UK
kpo PCB DKP le f t PCF le f t ICPO CPI le f t PCI KPO PCB DKP le f t PCF le f t KPO CPI le ft
1944 . 2.7 . 10.3 0.2 . .
1945 5.4 12.5 26.1 11.9 0.4 0.2
1946 12.7 . 28.6 18.9 1.5 10.6 .
1947 6.8 . 5.1 .
1948 . . 2.6 22.3 7.1 7 .7 6.3 .
1949 5.1 7.5 . , 5.7 5.8 .
1950 4 .7 4.6 . 0.3
1951 . 26.7 0.0 2.7 0.1
1952 . . 6.2 4 .3
1953 5.3 4.3 . 2.2 22.6 4.5 5.1
1954 3.6 . . 0.0
1955 . . 2.6 0.1
1956 4.4 . 25.9 4.7 5.0
1957 3.1 0.2 3.4
1958 1.9 . 18.9 22.7 4.6 3 .4
1959 3.3 . 2.4 1.8 2 .7 0.1
1960 1.1 6.1 . 4.5
1961 3.1 . . 0.0 2.9 2.4
1962 3.0 « 21.9 2.0
1963 . • 25.3 6.1 2.8 3.0 2.2
1964 1.2 5 .8 5.2 0.2
1965 4.6 . . 0.0 1.4 6.0
1966 0.4 0.8 10.9 . 0.2
1967 . 22.5 2.1 3.6 2.9 2.9
1968 3.3 1.0 8.1 20.0 3 .9 26.9 4.4 3.0
1969 0.0 1.0 3.5
1970 1.0 . . 4.8 0.1
1971 1.4 3.1 1.4 10.7 . 3.9 8.6 2.6
1972 . . 0.3 27.2 7.8 4.5 10.4
1973 3.6 7.5 21.4 4.9 0.0 1.1 . . 11.2 5.3
1974 3.2 . . . . 0.1 0.5
1975 1.2 4.2 7.0 . . . 2.4
1976 . 0.3 34.4 4 .9 . • 4 .8
1977 2.7 3 .7 6 .6 0.0 1.7 1.7 3.3 0.4 4 .2
1978 3.3 20.6 6.3 . .
1979 1.0 1.9 9 .6 . 30.4 5.2 . . 5.6 4.2 0.1 0.4
1980 . . 0.2 . •
1981 2.3 1.1 14.0 16.1 2.8 0.0 4.6 2.1 4.6 0.3 4 .9
1982 . 0.0 3 .7 1.8 3.9 5 .6
1983 0.7 . . . 29.0 6.5 . . 3.6 0.0 12.1
1984 0.7 14.2 . . . .
1985 1.2 . . . . . . 0.2 5.5 5.4
1986 0.7 . 9 .7 2.1 . . 0.6 2.5
1987 0.8 0.9 18.1 . 0.0 6.1 26.6 4.6 • . 2.6 0.0 10.2
1988 0.8 15.5 11.2 1.2 . . • . 5 .8
1989 . . 0.0 6.8 . . 10.4 •
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Table B .6 .1 : Seats of Comunist and le f t i s t  P arties , Western Europe 1890-1944
AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO SU sz me
KPÔ PCB DKP PCF le f t KPO le f t  CPI le f t PCI le f t CPN le f t NKP le f t VPK le f t PST CP l -
1891 0.0
1895 . ■
1897 1.0
1901 1.0
1905 1.0
1906 3.1
1910 16.2
1913 . 5.3
1914 14.2
1917 4 .8
1918 2.0 1.0 m
1919 16.4 5.2 1.4 DNA
1920 0.0 0.0 0.9 18.3 3 .0
1921 0.0 2.8 0.2 19.3 3.0 2 .6
1922 2.0 0.0 NKP 1.0 0.2
1923 0.0 ------ 0.0
1924 0.0 4 .5 9.2 9.1 0.0 4 .0 16.0 1.7 0.4 0.2
1925 1.1 1.0 0.0 1.5
1926 0.0
1927 0.0 . 0 .7 2.0
1928 2.3 17.8 11.0 0.0 3.5 1.0
1929 0.5 0 .0 2.0 0.0 0.0
1930 0.0 13.6 0.0 0.0
1931 1.1 0.0 3
1932 1.6 1.4 2.0 19.8 17.1 0 .9 2.6
1933 12.5 4.0 1.0 0.0
1935 1.4 1.1 0.2 2
1936 4.5 11.8 0.0 2 .2 2.6
1937 . 3.0
1939 4.5 2.0 2.1
1940 1.3 0.0
1944 2.9 6.5 0.0
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Table B .6 .2 : Seats of C o n utis t and le f t is t  P arties, Western Europe 1945*1989
AU
ICPO
BE
PCB
OE FR GE I* IT NE NO sw SZ UK
DKP Left PCF le f t ICPO CPI le f t PCI le f t CPN le f t NICP le f t VPK le f t  le f t CP le f t
1945 2.4 12.2 m 28.4 7.3 0.3 0.5
1946 11.4 . . 30.5 18.7 1.3 10.0 •
1947 6.1 . . 3 .6 •
1948 . . 3.4 22.8 5.7 8.0 3.5 •
1949 3.0 5.7 . . 3 .7 0.0 .
1950 3.3 4.7 . 0.0
1951 . . 17.8 2.6 0.0
1952 . . 6 .0 2.2
1953 2.4 4 .6 . 0.0 24.2 3.2 2.0
1954 1.9 . .
1955 . . . 2.0 0.0
1956 1.8 . . 27.0 4 .7 2.6
1957 3.4 . 0 .7 0.7
1958 0.9 . . 2 .2 23.5 3.7 2.2
1959 0.0 . . 2.0 1.3 . 1.5 0.0
1960 0.0 6.3 2.2
1961 2.4 . . 0.0 1.3
1962 0.0 . . 8 .8 0.4
1963 . . 26.3 5.1 2.7 2.7 . 2 .0
1964 0.0 5 .7 3 .4 0.0
1965 2.8 . . 0.0 1.3
1966 0.0 0.0 11.4 0.0
1967 . . 15.3 0.6 3.3 2.7 . 2.5
1968 2.4 0.0 8 .6 7 .0 0.0 28.1 3 .7 1.3
1969 . . 0.0 0.0
1970 0.0 . . 4 .9 0.0
1971 0.0 2.4 0.0 9 .7 4.0 8.0 . 2.5
1972 . . o.o 28.4 4.6 4 .7 10.0
1973 3.4 6.3 15.4 2.7 . • 10.3 5.4
1974 1.9 . . . . 0.0 0.2
1975 0.0 4.0 7.4 • . . 2.0
1976 . . 0.0 36.0 3.3 . • 4 .9
1977 0.9 4.0 6 .9 1.3 3.3 0.0 1.3
1978 1.9 . 18.1 2.1 . .
1979 0.0 0.0 9 .7 31.9 4.3 . . 5 .7 . 3.5 0.0 0.2
1980 . . 0.0 - .
1981 0.9 0.0 14.3 9.1 3.0 2.4 2.0 4.0 0.0 2.6
1982 0.0 1.2 2.0 3.3 5 .7
1983 0.0 . . 30.5 5 .7 . . . 2.5 0.0 1.1
1984 0.0 14.9 . • .
1985 0.0 . . . . • 0.0 3 .8 5.4
1986 0.0 . 5.8 2.3 . 0.0 2.0
1987 0.0 0.0 17.7 3.0 28.1 4.0 . - . 2.5 0.0 1.2
1988 0.0 13.7 4.3 1.6 . . • 6.0
1989 • • 4.8 • • 10.9 -
SOURCES: own datacollection  based on HACKIE I ROSE 1990; FLORA 1981: Ch. 1, 2; and own updates.
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1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
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Table C . l . 1: S o cia lis t (Labour) Union Membership, Western Europe 1890* 1944
AU BE DE GE IT NE NO SU S2 UK
BFG CGSB LO(DSF) ADGB CGL NW LO(NALF) LO SGB TUC
. 259,000 . 3,460 1,593,000
. 555,318 . . 1,094,000
46,606 . 237,100 NAS . 1,155,000
. 223,500 . 9,495 721,000
. 246,500 15,728 . 1,100,000
. 259,200 18,700 . 1,000,000
98 r 669 . 328,200 25,400 . 9,203 1,076,000
. 412,400 15,000 . 1,093,191
. 61,000 493,700 12,950 . 1,184,241
119,334 14,000 75,000 580,500 26,100 1,600 75,046 1,200,000
98,898 31,311 77,000 680,427 12,444 4,800 87,150 1,250,000
119,050 21,125 73,000 677,500 8,881 7,600 84,658 1,200,000
135,178 8,826 64,621 733,200 10,526 7,500 79,090 1,400,000
154,665 14,378 63,000 887,698 7,934 7,900 95,640 25,047 1,500,000
189,121 20,000 65,000 1,052.108 NW 9,000 163,472 30,736 1,423,000
323,099 34,184 69,000 1,344,803 15,600 173,270 38,892 1,541,000
488,270 42,491 78,000 1,689,785 18,960 25,300 288,790 62,387 1,555,000
501,094 55,840 91,000 1.865,506 190,422 26,200 39,000 372,452 72,464 1,700,000
482,279 67,412 96,697 1,831,731 258,515 32,334 47,200 324,782 66,865 1,777,000
415,256 73,366 98,643 1,892,568 292,905 36,685 43,200 216,158 66,180 1,705,000
400,565 68,844 101,563 2,128,021 302,400 40,660 45,900 170,352 74,654 1,647,715
421,905 77,104 105,000 2,421,465 383,770 44,378 53,100 159,852 78,119 .
428,363 129,126 107,067 2,583,492 309,671 52,195 60,800 171,044 86,313 1,662,133
415,195 126,745 115,000 2,525,042 327,312 61,447 63,800 194,504 89,392 2,001,633
240,700 129.177 121,529 1,502,811 320,858 84,261 67,600 101,207 65,177 2,232,446
177,100 . 133,776 994,853 233,863 87,598 78,000 110,708 64,972 2,682,357
166,900 150,522 944,575 201,291 99,511 78,900 140,802 88,628 2,850,347
311,100 179,284 1,277,709 237,560 128,918 93,900 186,146 148,946 3,082,352
412,910 255,134 2,866.012 249,039 159,449 107,500 222,185 177,173 4,532,085
772,146 576,890 277,392 7,337,477 1,150,062 190,942 143,900 258,996 223,588 5,283,676
900,800 687,610 279,300 7,890,100 2,200,000 247,748 142,600 280,029 223,600 6,505,482
1,079,800 689,236 244,400 7,568,000 1,128,915 216,617 96,000 252,361 179,400 6,417,910
1,049,900 580,545 232,100 7,895,100 401,054 196,806 83,600 292,917 154,700 5,128,648
896,800 568,715 233,100 7,138,400 211,016 180,340 85,700 313,022 151,400 4,369,268
828,100 545,715 237,000 4,618,400 201,049 184,493 92,800 360,337 151,500 4,328,325
807,500 525,039 237,000 4,156,500 . 190,179 95,900 384,617 150,000 4,350,982
756,400 526,221 155,600 3,977,300 . 196,959 93,100 414,859 153,800 4,365,619
772,800 530,575 156,000 4,150,200 . 203,042 94,200 437,974 165,500 4,163,994
766,200 518,658 156,000 4,653,600 , 217,390 106,200 469,409 176,400 3,874,842
737,300 504,605 250,200 4,906,200 . 251,487 127,000 508,107 186,700 3,673,144
655,200 502,781 259,100 4,821,800 . 271,009 279,200 553,456 194,000 3,744,320
582,700 522.476 269,500 4,417,900 . 315,023 144,600 589,176 206,900 3,719,401
520,200 572,171 300,000 . 336,158 153,400 638,593 224,200 3,613,273
500,000 591,976 301,800 . 321,806 157,500 633,351 229,800 3,367,911
580,074 354,700 . 298,555 172,500 653,331 223,400 3,294,581
545,119 381,300 . 285,649 214,600 701,186 221,400 3,388,810
573,839 423,400 283,382 268,300 757,376 218,400 3,614,551
546,469 451,600 293,654 316,000 840,234 222,400 4,008,647
581,951 473,100 . 306,226 340,000 897,947 225,500 4,460,617
546,224 509,200 319,099 352,500 961,216 223,100 4,669,186
515,800 . 331,278 306,300 971,103 212,600 4,866,711
529,500 , . 293,800 991,285 217,300 5,079,094
m 547,200 299,700 1,023,139 231,300 6,024,411
m 563,800 280,500 1,038,808 250,200 6,642,317
• 579,400 . • . 1,069,287 267,600 6,575,654
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1945
1946
1947
1946
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
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A P P E N D I X
Table C.1.2: Socialist (Labour) Union Membership, Western Europe 1945*1989
AU BE OE FR GE IR IT NE NO SU S2 UK
ÓGB FGTB LO FO 0 FGTB L0 FO 0GB ICTU
m 307,247 604,300 76,366 237,745 339,900 1 106,900 312,900 6,671,100
924,274 381,239 604,600 . 83,014 301,346 407,000 1 147,000 367,100 7,540,400
1 238,088 370,772 613,900 350,000 94,601 331,480 442,400 1 194,200 381,600 7,791,500
1 278,686 385,779 623,100 350,000 . 101,950 368,191 456,300 1 238,600 393,500 7,937,100
1 279,520 400,783 635,800 350,000 105,476 381,643 473,600 1 255,900 380,900 7,883,400
1 290,581 415,787 656,400 350,000 5,451,343 113,789 405,919 488,400 1 278,400 377,300 7,827,900
1 310,200 446,388 662,400 350,000 5,912,125 117,698 418,776 503,400 1 313,200 382,800 8,020,100
1 318,327 541,228 671,100 350,000 6,004,476 119,635 433,683 515,600 1 338,800 389,200 8,088,500
1 320,343 540,128 687,700 350,000 6,051,221 118,045 454,088 526,000 1 350,900 393,100 8,093,800
1 347,639 535,543 686,600 350,000 6,103,343 120,516 463,458 538,600 1 354,600 400,900 8,107,000
1 398,446 545,366 687,400 350,000 6,104,872 122,424 467,338 542,100 1 384,500 404,000 8,263,700
1 427,301 543,710 705,500 360,000 6,124,547 122,682 500,332 545,400 1 404,300 414,300 8,304,700
1 438,755 565,790 714,900 370,000 6,244,386 118,474 486,249 540,900 1 422,500 426,500 8,337,300
1 458,310 580,101 719,100 380,000 6,331,735 116,467 476,892 543,500 1 447,200 430,200 8,176,300
1 474,929 588,126 753,100 390,000 6,273,741 292,661 486,739 541,400 1 467,100 431,400 8,128,300
1 501,047 573,884 776,500 400,000 6,378,820 299,122 506,963 541,600 1 485,700 437,000 8,299,400
1 518,004 562,357 789,500 415,000 6,382,036 308,581 507,202 562,000 1 501,200 445,400 8,312,900
1 518,096 546,289 802,400 430,000 6,430,428 319,732 512,209 565,100 1 522,700 451,000 8,315,300
1 531,695 570,117 817,200 445,000 6,430,978 317,428 528,609 568,600 1 547,300 451,100 8,325,800
1 539,600 579,280 834,000 460,000 6,485,471 333,452 527,211 571,000 1 563,300 450,700 8,771,000
1 542,813 600,411 829,200 475,000 6,574,491 340,007 535,746 574,300 1 564,600 449,600 8,867,500
1 542,979 609,308 835,100 490,000 6,537,160 341,145 556,269 574,000 1 587,600 444,200 8,787,300
1 512,405 616,651 849,400 500,000 6,407,733 345,642 563,219 570,200 1 607,100 441,200 8,725,600
1 514,016 641,301 865,300 560,000 6,375,972 355,366 648,400 560,562 574,100 1 625,100 436,500 8,875,400
1 517,100 659,225 894,400 600,000 6,482,390 375,579 714,200 564,835 582,300 1 659,700 434,800 9,402,200
1 520,300 669,998 896,000 617,000 6,712,547 389,883 780,000 611,401 594,400 1 680,100 436,700 10,002,200
1 526,400 718,158 909,500 627,000 6,868,662 391,364 825,000 623,765 601,900 1 733,100 437,900 9,894,900
1 542,000 765,825 924,200 616,000 6,985,548 396,183 842,900 633,142 603,700 1 771,500 441,400 10,001,400
1 559,500 799,089 930,100 629,000 7,167,523 402,380 901,900 664,083 613,800 1 807,600 446,400 —4 o o o rv> o o
1 580,400 827,864 947,800 630,000 7,405,760 418,485 965,100 677,133 635,800 1 863,500 455,200 10,363,700
1 587,500 881,960 1,011,700 640,000 7,364,912 423,874 1,032,600 702,143 655,000 1 918,100 471,600 11,036,300
1 604,700 916,994 1,087,200 639,000 7,400,021 428,919 1,104,900 706,574 673,700 1 961,200 474,700 11,515,900
1 619,100 929,220 1,141,600 649,000 7,470,967 446,547 1,160,089 730,428 692,200 2 017,800 468,500 11,865,400
1 628,100 903,610 1,212,000 649,000 7,751,523 468,855 1,285,004 745,306 712,700 2 057,300 463,100 12,128,100
1 641,500 945,844 1,249,600 661,000 7,843,565 484,233 1,326,918 749,932 721,000 2 089,400 459,000 12,172,500
1 661,000 957,792 1,279,800 665,000 7,882,527 495,285 1,346,900 744,079 748,000 2 126,800 459,900 11,601,400
1 677,300 957,714 1,325,300 683,000 7,957,512 492,213 1,357,290 1,026,723 755,000 2 140,800 459,200 11,006,000
1 672,500 955,461 1,364,700 686,000 7,849,003 486,987 1,358,004 998,821 751,400 2 161,800 458,900 10,510,200
1 660,500 940,074 1,380,000 705,000 7,745,913 483,458 1,351,514 946,248 745,100 2 195,800 456,200 10,082,100
1 672,800 947,997 1,399,100 712,000 7,660,346 485,670 1,344,460 918,535 759,300 2 238,600 451,200 9,855,204
1 671,381 932,954 1,411,800 720,000 7,719,468 470,810 1,306,250 903,334 769,600 2 226,900 443,600 9,585,729
1 671,217 880,624 1,444,300 652,000 7,764,687 . 1,305,682 900,825 785,600 2 217,508 441,196 9,243,297
1 652,839 874,712 1,435,500 585,000 7,757,039 . 1,343,716 911,733 787,400 2 221,998 442,637 8,797,192
1 643,586 874,712 1,412,800 517,000 7,797,077 1,397,982 931,406 783,900 2 212,392 442,020 8,652,318
1 644,408 874,712 1,423,000 450,000 7,861,120 . 1,439,216 967,088 782,200 2 197,024 441,449 8,405,000
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Table C .2 .1 : S o c ia lis t (Labour) Union Density (Gross X ), Western Europe 1890*1944
AU BE DE GE IT NE NO SU S2 UK
BFG CGSB 10 AOGB CGL NW L0 LO SGB TUC
1890 m . . . . 0.5 11.3
1891 . . . 4.4 . . 7.8
1892 « . . 1.9 . 8.2
1893 . . 1.7 1.1 4 .7
1894 . . • 1.9 . s 7.2
1895 • « . 1.8 . . • . 6.5
1896 . . . 2.4 2.3 « . 1.0 7.0
1897 . . . 2.9 . . . 7.0
1898 . 7 .9 3.4 . . . 7.6
1899 . . 9 .6 3 .7 1.8 0.3 5.4 0.0 7.6
1900 1.6 1.4 9 .9 4 .0 . 0.8 6.4 • 7.8
1901 1.9 0.9 9.3 4 .5 . 1.3 6.1 7.5
1902 2.1 0 .4 8 .2 4.5 0.8 1.3 5 .6 . 8.6
1903 2.4 0 .6 8 .0 5 .7 0.6 1.3 6 .8 2.1 9.1
1904 2 .9 0 .9 8 .2 6 .6 . 1.5 11.6 2 .6 8 .6
1905 4 .9 1.5 8 .7 8 .3 . 2 .6 12.3 3.3 9.2
1906 7.4 1.8 9 .8 10.2 1.4 4.1 20.4 5.2 9.2
1907 7.5 2 .4 11.4 10.3 2.0 1.8 6.3 26.3 5.9 9 .9
1908 7.1 2 .8 12.1 10.7 2 .7 2.2 7.6 23.1 5.4 10.3
1909 6 .0 3.1 12.3 10.9 3.0 2.2 6 .9 15.4 5.3 9 .8
1910 5.8 2 .9 12.7 12.1 3.1 2 .7 7.3 10.4 5 .9 9.4
1911 6 .0 3 .2 13.1 13.5 3 .8 2.9 8.2 10.4 6.1 .
1912 6.1 5 .3 16.6 14.2 3.1 3.3 9.2 11.0 6 .2 9.3
1913 5 .9 5 .2 17.5 13.7 3.2 3.9 9.4 12.2 6.4 11.2
1914 3 .4 5.2 18.1 8.0 3.1 5.2 9 .8 6.3 4 .7 12.4
1915 . . 19.6 5.2 2.3 5.3 11.0 6 .8 . 14.8
1916 . 18.1 4 .9 2.0 5.9 10.9 8.4 • 15.7
1917 . . 25.3 6.5 2.4 7.5 12.6 11.1 . 16.9
1918 . 35.3 14.5 2.5 9.0 14.1 13.1 24.7
1919 41.0 25.8 37 .7 36.5 11.3 10.4 18.5 14.9 18.6 28.7
1920 45 .7 30.3 37.3 38.8 21.2 11.4 18.0 13.5 18.6 35.2
1921 52.7 29.9 25.0 36.7 10.6 11.2 12.0 14.7 15.0 34.6
1922 48.9 24.8 28.2 37.8 3.8 9.9 10.3 16.8 12.8 28.8
1923 40 .7 23.9 27.9 33.7 2.0 9.2 10.6 17.7 12.5 24.3
1924 37.0 22.6 27.8 21.5 2.0 9.3 11.4 20.1 12.4 23.9
1925 36.3 21.5 27.4 19.5 9.4 11.7 21.1 12.2 23.8
1926 34.1 21.2 17.7 18.3 9.6 11.3 22.5 12.3 23.7
1927 34.9 21.1 17.5 19.1 9 .7 11.4 22.2 13.0 22.4
1928 34 .7 20.3 17.2 21.3 10.0 12.7 24.7 13.7 20.6
1929 33.8 19.5 27.3 22.5 11.2 15.1 26.4 14.0 19.4
1930 30.2 19.2 22.2 22.1 10.8 33.1 28.1 13.5 19.6
1931 26.9 20.1 28.4 20.2 13.6 17.0 30.0 15.2 19.3
1932 24.1 22.0 30.5 14.8 17.9 32.3 16.3 18.7
1933 23.3 22.8 30.1 • 14.0 18.2 31.7 16.7 17.3
1934 22.3 34.4 12.8 19.8 32.5 16.1 16.9
1935 . 21.0 36.2 . 12.1 24.4 34.6 15.9 17.3
1936 . 22.1 39.2 . 11.6 30.2 37.1 15.7 18.4
1937 » 21.0 40.8 # 11.9 35.2 40.8 15.9 20.3
1938 , 22.4 41.8 12.2 37.5 43.3 16.1 22.5
1939 . 21.0 43.8 . 12.8 38.4 46.0 15.9 23.5
1940 38.2 . 13.3 33.0 46.1 15.1 24.3
1941 , 44.0 . . 31.3 46.5 15.3 25.3
1942 . 44.9 , 31.5 47.3 16.1 29.9
1943 45.5 . 29.1 47.5 17.3 32.8
19U 46.1 . 48.2 18.3 32.4
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Table C .2 .2 : S o c ia lis t (Labour) Union Density (Gross and Met X ), Western Europe 1945-1989
AU BE DE FR GE IR IT NE NO su S2 UK
OGB FGTB LO FO DGB ICTU UIL FNV(NW) LO LO SGB TUC
gross gross net gross gross gross net gross gross net gross net gross net gross gross net gross
1945 12.3 47.3 . . 10.4 34.3 49.5 21.0 32.7
1946 52.7 15.2 . 46.7 . . . 11.2 12.9 12.7 40.3 . 50.5 24.3 . 36.8
1947 64.5 14.8 • 47.2 2 .9 . . 12.7 12.1 11.9 43.4 . 51.9 24.8 . 37.9
1948 64.6 15.3 . 47.3 2.9 . . 13.6 13.5 13.2 44.3 . 53.2 25.2 24.1 38.3
1949 62.9 15.8 • 47.9 2 .9 . . 14.0 13.7 13.4 45.7 . 53.3 24.0 22.5 37.9
1950 62.2 16.3 . 45.0 2.8 32.9 31.0 15.0 14.4 14.0 46.7 . 53.6 23.3 22.0 37.2
1951 62.4 17.5 . 48.8 2.8 34.7 32.6 15.4 14.6 14.3 47.8 . 54.4 23.2 21.8 37.9
1952 62.9 21.1 . 48.8 2.8 34.4 32.1 15.7 14.9 14.5 48.5 . 54.2 23.0 21.7 38.1
1953 62.8 21.0 . 49.3 2 .8 33.8 31.4 15.7 15.4 14.9 49.0 . 53.4 22.6 21.3 37.9
1954 63.1 20.7 . 48.6 2.8 33.0 30.5 16.1 15.2 14.7 49.7 . 52.4 22.6 21.2 37.4
1955 63.8 21.0 . 47.8 2 .7 32.1 29.5 16.5 15.1 14.5 49.6 . 52.3 22.3 20.9 37.7
1956 63.3 20.8 . 48.7 2 .8 31.5 28.8 16.7 15.8 15.2 49.5 . 51.9 22.3 21.0 37.4
1957 62.7 21.6 . 48.9 2.8 31.5 28.8 16.3 15.1 14.5 48.4 . 51.5 22.4 21.1 37.3
1958 62.7 22.0 . 48.5 2 .9 31.5 28.7 16.1 14.7 14.0 48.5 51.3 22.4 21.1 36.7
1959 62.8 22.2 . 50.0 2 .9 31.2 28.4 40.8 14.9 14.1 47.9 . 50.9 21.6 20.2 37.2
1960 63.4 21.6 17.9 48.8 3 .0 31.4 28.5 42.1 15.2 14.4 47.8 . 50.5 21.5 20.1 37.3
1961 63.5 21.0 17.3 50.2 3 .0 31.0 28.0 43.8 14.9 14.0 48.7 . 49.7 20.9 19.5 36.9
1962 63.1 20.0 16.5 49.8 3.1 30.9 27.7 45.2 14.6 13.7 48.2 . 49.1 20.3 19.0 35.5
1963 63.5 20.6 16.9 49.6 3.2 30.6 27.2 44.3 14.8 13.8 47.7 . 49.3 19.7 18.5 36.2
1964 63.4 20.4 16.7 49.5 3.2 30.6 26.9 45.9 14.5 13.5 47.2 . 49.3 19.3 18.1 37.9
1965 63.0 20.9 17.0 48.4 3 .2 30.7 26.9 46.2 14.4 13.4 46.7 . 48.6 19.0 17.8 37.9
1966 63.0 21.0 17.1 48.0 3.3 30.5 26.5 45.7 14.8 13.6 45.8 . 48.1 18.6 17.4 37.3
1967 62.4 21.2 17.1 48.0 3.3 30.5 26.2 45.9 14.8 13.6 44.8 . 48.8 17.9 16.7 37.4
1968 62.8 21.9 17.6 48.2 3 .6 30.3 26.1 46.3 4 .8 4 .7 14.5 13.3 44.9 . 48.8 17.4 16.3 38.3
1969 62.6 22.1 17.7 49.1 3 .8 30.2 25.9 48.5 5.2 5.1 14.4 13.1 44.2 . 49.1 17.1 16.0 40.6
1970 62.1 22.4 17.9 48.3 3 .7 30.7 26.4 49.9 5.6 5.5 15.4 14.0 48.8 . 48.1 17.2 16.0 43.4
1971 60.9 23.6 19.0 48.1 3 .7 30.8 26.5 50.0 5.9 5.7 15.4 13.8 44.8 . 48.6 16.7 15.6 43.3
1972 60.2 25.0 20.2 47.5 3 .6 31.3 26.9 49.6 5.9 5.8 15.4 13.7 43.7 . 49.2 16.4 15.3 43.6
1973 58.9 25.6 20.9 47.3 3 .6 31.6 27.1 49.6 6.2 6.0 15.6 13.8 44.1 . 49.9 16.2 15.2 43.0
1974 58.6 25.9 21.3 47.1 3.5 32.6 28.0 50.6 6.6 6.4 15.6 13.8 44.9 . 50.5 16.4 15.4 44.4
1975 58.5 27.4 22.6 50.1 3 .6 32.6 28.0 50.3 6 .9 6 .7 16.0 14.1 44.2 . 50.7 17.8 16.7 46.8
1976 58.5 28.1 23.3 52.3 3.5 32.9 28.3 50.0 7.2 7.0 15.8 13.9 43.5 . 51.4 18.3 17.2 48.3
1977 58.1 28.3 23.5 53.3 3.5 33.2 28.6 50.8 7.4 7.1 16.2 14.2 43.7 . 52.5 17.9 16.8 49.5
1978 57.8 27.3 22.8 55.9 3.5 34.1 29.5 52.1 8.2 7.8 16.3 14.3 44.0 37.6 53.1 17.6 16.4 50.3
1979 58.0 28.2 23.5 56.4 3.5 34.1 29.5 52.4 8.3 7.9 15.9 13.9 43.8 37.5 53.2 17.2 16.0 49.9
1980 58.4 28.4 23.6 56.7 3.5 32.5 28.2 52.1 8.3 7.8 15.3 13.3 45.6 38.5 53.4 16.9 15.7 47.3
1981 58.5 28.2 23.4 57.6 3.5 33.7 29.1 49.8 8.3 7.8 20.5 17.5 44.9 37.5 53.5 16.5 15.4 45.3
1982 58.2 28.0 23.1 58.7 3.5 31.5 27.1 48.3 8.3 7.7 19.4 16.4 44.2 . 53.9 16.5 15.3 43.5
1983 58.0 27.5 22.5 58.7 3 .6 31.0 26.5 47.5 8.2 7.5 18.2 15.2 43.1 . 54.3 16.4 15.3 41.9
1984 58.2 27.8 22.7 59.1 3 .6 30.5 25.9 47.5 8.1 7.3 17.4 14.3 43.5 . 55.0 16.1 15.0 40.6
1985 57.7 27.5 22.4 . 3.8 30.5 25.8 45.8 7.8 6.9 16.8 13.7 42.9 • 55.1 15.7 14.5 39.0
1986 57.0 26.1 21.2 . 3.2 30.3 25.6 . 7.6 6 .7 17.4 14.2 . • 55.6 15.5 13.0 37.5
1987 56.4 25.9 21.1 2.9 30.0 25.3 . 7.8 6 .7 16.0 13.0 . . 56.5 15.4 12.9 35.9
1988 56.1 25.9 21.1 2.5 29.9 25.1 . 8.0 6.8 15.9 12.9 . . 55.8 14.9 12.4 35.1
1989 56.1 25.8 21.0 . 2.2 29.9 25.0 . 8.2 6.8 16.3 13.3 . . 54.8 14.7 12.3 34.3
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Table C.3.1: Christian Union Membership, Western Europe 1890-1944
AU BE FR GE IT ME S 2
ZCG CSC CFTC GCGD GEDA CIL NKV CNV CNG SVEA
1890 230
1891 320 .
1892 413 . • .
1893 667 76
1894 858 . 160 .
1895 1,001 5,500 572
1896 1,130 8,055 2,352 .
1897 1,467 21,000 7,737
1898 1,719 34,270 18,277 .
1899 1,966 56,391 32,014 . 25
1900 7,913 2,042 76,744 40,205 687 40
1901 2,258 84,497 45,744 918 88
1902 12,060 2,452 84,667 46,112 1.386 88
1903 14,787 2,802 91,440 50,216 3,002 158
1904 14,759 3,210 107,556 56,126 1,756 742
1905 17,860 3,673 188,106 75,695 2,307 2,870
1906 18,164 20,055 3,974 247,116 90,413 2,500 3,828
1907 27,018 30,231 4,516 284,649 107,668 1,112 3,610
1908 35,610 39,517 4,941 260,767 120,133 786 3,809
1909 30,072 40,537 5,400 280,061 120,275 11,650 6,587 3,278
1910 46,533 49,478 5,465 316,115 121,012 15,541 7,480 3,200
1911 45,523 71,235 5,982 350,574 122,126 104,614 16,403 7,792 3,198
1912 44,603 82,761 6,545 350,930 131,195 111,000 21,096 7,944 3,293
1913 37,237 102,177 7,254 341,735 148,079 113,000 29,048 11,023 1,592
1914 22,693 123,000 7.818 218,197 111,988 103,326 35,257 12,327 1,568
1915 13,666 • 8,148 162,425 80,500 99,000 40.338 15,013 2,705
1916 13,785 . 8,259 178,907 27,836 89,000 54,855 20,506 4,620
1917 18,607 • 8,475 293,187 20,783 . 69,139 28,008 8,158
1918 20,556 . 8,832 538,559 147.698 # 91,804 46,338 16,069
1919 30,725 65,000 70,000 1,000,770 356,170 500,000 141,002 66,997 16,677
1920 64,478 156,631 65,000 1,105,894 463,199 1,190,000 146,030 73,819 14,827
1921 78,737 200,102 90.000 1,028,900 422,845 989,000 142,035 71,332 12,475 2,883
1922 78,105 186,668 73,000 1,033,506 460,086 117,115 61,365 11,030 3,433
1923 79,377 65,000 806,992 408,773 98,054 53,265 10,211 3.746
1924 80,128 172,841 63,000 612,952 393,559 91,905 50,042 9,755 4,018
1925 77,220 133,056 62,000 582.319 411,113 90,475 48,327 14,037 4,120
1926 76,122 145,634 65,000 643.508 418,700 96,403 51,217 18,093 5,327
1927 78,906 155,079 72.000 720,059 456.980 102,076 52,704 18,842 6,233
1928 100,987 168.853 79.000 763,843 501,635 110,384 57,518 21,339 6,290
1929 107,657 181,407 86,000 792,872 557,420 130,894 71,300 33,577 6,266
1930 111,939 203,788 85,000 778.863 591,520 145,815 80,288 38,592 6,510
1931 108,420 239,299 84,000 698.472 593,800 176,646 101,454 40,471 8,836
1932 100,606 300,800 88,000 . 192,655 115,006 41,305 10,664
1933 301,010 92,000 . 190,396 115,606 40,570 11,635
1934 97,000 . 179,717 112,196 39,539 11,982
1935 297,183 106,000 . 173,535 108,514 38,435 12,729
1936 280,796 275,000 # . 168,661 108,235 39,910 12,996
1937 304,999 320,000 , 170,623 110,395 39,712 12,583
1938 325,711 305,000 . 177,909 113,885 40,300 12,750
1939 339,869 270,000 186,943 121,179 39,700 12,525
1940 . 174,027 114,858 36,800 11,500
1941 # . 36,118 11,557
1942 . # . « 38,188 12,025
1943 # 42,348 10,634
1944 . . • 42,500 10,500
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1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
A P P E N D I X
Table C.3.2: Christian Union Membership, Western Europe 1945*1969
BE FR GE IT NE SZ
CSC CFDT CFTC CGB CISL NKV CNV CK6
204,959 300,000
307,611 365,000
336,553 380,000
401,432 320,000
453,140 330,000
471,532 335,000 2,840
505,479 350,000 6,301
520,844 350,000 13,206
535,252 340,000 21,282
537,661 323,000 26,953
544,698 333,000 33,121
557,738 366,000 46,142
570,438 403,000 49,364
596,304 415,000 51,935
614,406 408,000 147,623
634,754 422,000 148,138
642,980 433,000 186,193
643,510 455,000 179,872
676,878 500,000 177,924
695,164 420,000 75,000 175,464
708,407 471,000 70,000 162,417
732,802 480,000 70,000 153,524
759,987 492,000 70,000 144,556
774,960 565,000 80,000 136,284
799,447 594,000 80,000 139,830
811,905 611,000 80,000 190,282
846,497 635,000 83,000 190,670
897,590 669,000 84,000 195,067
925,134 699,000 87,000 201,185
975,563 703,000 87,000 211,491
1,042,234 738,000 90,000 224,196
1,078,968 746,000 94,000 231,841
1,100,675 745,000 96,000 244,753
1,113,505 726,000 99,000 248,946
1,129,571 698,000 102,000 266,321
1,151,817 667,000 105,000 288,420
1,169,317 657,000 109,000 294,916
1,176,428 664,000 111,000 297,234
1,169,392 613,000 114,000 299,771
1,166,460 623,000 117,000 306,329
1,190,543 588,000 120,000 307,075
1,205,568 562,000 116,000 307,472
1,212,107 536,000 113,000 307,529
1,207,144 510,000 109,000 306,847
1,241,154 485,000 106,000 304,963
. 182,821 93,994 46,700
224,885 119,051 44,700
. 251,510 131,560 47,200
• 269,552 147,551 48,200
. 296,431 155,987 48,100
1,189,882 311,434 166,188 49,600
1,337,848 321,480 174,750 50,100
1,322,038 334,714 181,995 64,300
1,305,361 347,268 191,138 64,200
1,326,542 360,986 199,693 70,500
1,342,204 381,733 206,283 73,200
1,706,818 411,991 215,956 75,200
1,261,839 395,047 218.473 78,000
1,654,242 395,869 218,449 79,700
1,283,892 400,396 219,019 78,000
1,324,398 411,785 223,788 79,700
1,398,864 417,764 224,869 84,000
1,435,626 418,526 227,481 89,900
1,503,555 418,845 229,803 93,400
1,515,154 407,652 229,270 92,600
1,467,990 411,981 234,524 92,500
1,490,807 425,299 240,734 92,700
1,522,864 428,447 240,684 91,600
1,626,786 409,414 240,013 90,500
1,641,289 400,239 238,207 92,900
1,807,586 401,804 238,200 93,700
1,973,333 399,732 238,867 94,800
2,184,279 395,360 235,762 97,800
2,214,099 397,919 229,973 98,900
2,472,701 355,170 224,511 99,800
2,593,545 356,466 225,976 106,100
2,823,780 345,344 258,342 107,000
2,809,802 341,897 295,343 101,300
2,868,737 335,542 300,958 101,300
2,883,097 326,875 303,775 101,400
3,059,845 310,046 302,321 103,300
2,988,813 346,036 105,400
2,976,880 335,226 111,400
2,953,411 316,920 109,600
3,097,231 302,802 107,600
2,953,095 298,276 106,900
2,975,482 294,115 102,397
3,080,019 291,938 104,054
3,288,279 291,118 107,857
3,379,028 298,834 108,054
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Table C .4 .1 : C hristian  Union Density ( in  X ), Uestem Europe 1900*1944
AU
ZCG
BE
CSC
FR
CFTC
GE
GCGD GEDAG
IT
C Il
NE
NKV CNV
SZ
CNG SVEA
1900 0.1 0 .0 0.5 0.2 . . 0.0
1901 . • 0 .0 0.6 0.3 . 0.0
1902 . 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.3 • 0.1 0.0
1903 . 0.6 0.0 0 .6 0.3 . 0.2 0.0
1904 • 0 .6 0 .0 0 .7 0.4 . 0.1 0.1
1905 « 0 .8 0 .0 1.2 0.5 . 0.2 0.2
1906 0.3 0 .9 0.0 1.5 0.5 . 0.2 0.3
1907 0.4 1.3 0.0 1.6 0.6 . 0.1 0.3
1908 0.5 1 .7 0.0 1.5 0 .7 . 0.1 0.3
1909 0.4 1 .7 0.0 1.6 0 .7 0 .7 0.4 0.3
1910 0 .7 2.1 0.0 1.8 0 .7 1.0 0.5 0.3
1911 0 .7 2 .9 0.0 2.0 0 .7 1.0 1.1 0.5 0.3
1912 0.6 3.4 0.1 1.9 0 .7 1.1 1.3 0.5 0.2
1913 0.5 4 .2 0.1 1.9 0.8 1.1 1.8 0.7 0.1
1914 0.3 5.0 0.1 1.2 0.6 1.0 2.2 0.8 0.1
1915 . . 0.1 0.9 0.4 1.0 2.4 0 .9 .
1916 . . 0.1 0 .9 0.1 0.9 3.2 1.2 .
1917 . . 0.1 1.5 0.1 • 4.0 1.6 .
1918 . . 0.1 2 .7 0 .7 . 5.2 2.6 .
1919 1.6 2 .9 0.6 5.0 1.8 4 .9 7.7 3 .6 1.4
1920 3.3 6 .9 0.5 5.4 2.3 11.4 6.7 3.4 1.2
1921 3 .8 8 .7 0 .7 5.0 2.0 9.3 7.3 3 .7 1.0 0.2
1922 3 .6 8 .0 0 .6 4.9 2.2 5.9 3.1 0.9 0.3
1923 3 .6 . 0.5 3.8 1.9 5.0 2 .7 0.8 0.3
1924 3 .6 7.2 0.5 2.9 1.8 4 .6 2.5 0.8 0.3
1925 3.5 5.4 0.5 2.7 1.9 4.5 2.4 1.1 0.3
1926 3.4 5 .9 0.5 3.0 1.9 4 .7 2.5 1.4 0.4
1927 3 .6 6 .2 0.6 3.3 2.1 4 .9 2.5 1.5 0.5
1928 4 .6 6 .6 0.6 3.5 2.3 5.1 2.7 1.7 0.5
1929 4 .9 7 .0 0 .7 3 .6 2.6 5.8 3.2 2.5 0.5
1930 5.2 7 .8 0 .6 3.6 2 .7 5.8 3.2 2.7 0.5
1931 5.0 9.2 0 .6 3.2 2 .7 7.6 4.4 3.0 0.6
1932 4 .7 11.6 0 .7 . . 8.5 5.1 3.0 0.8
1933 11.6 0 .7 . 8.3 5.0 2.9 0.8
1934 . 0.8 « . 7.7 4.8 2.9 0 .9
1935 11.4 0 .9 . 7.3 4 .6 2.8 0.9
1936 . 10.8 2.3 . . 6.9 4.4 2.9 0.9
1937 11.7 2 .6 . 6 .9 4.5 2.8 0.9
1938 . 12.5 2.5 . 7.1 4.6 2.9 0.9
1939 . 13.1 2 .2 • , 7.5 4.9 2.8 0 .9
1940 « . 7.0 4 .6 2.6 0.8
1941 . . . . 2.5 0.8
1942 . . . 2.7 0.8
1943 . . . . . . 2.9 0 .7
1944 . . 2.9 0 .7
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Table C .4 .2 : C hristian  Union Density (Gross and Met Density in X ), Western Europe 1945*1989
BE FR GE IT ME SZ
CSC CFDT CFTC CGB C1SL NCV CMV CNG SVEA
gross net gross net gross net gross net gross net gross net gross net gross net gross net
1945 8.2 2 .6 . . . 3.1 0 .8
1946 12.3 3.1 . . . . 9.6 9.4 5.1 5.0 3 .0 0 .9
1947 13.4 3.2 . . 9.2 9.0 4.8 4 .7 3.1 0.9
1948 15.9 2 .7 . . . . 9.9 9.6 5.4 5.3 3.1 1.0
1949 17.9 2 .7 . . 10.7 10.4 5.6 5.5 3 .0 1.0
1950 18.5 2 .7 0.0 0.0 10.0 9.2 11.0 10.7 5.9 5.8 3.1 1.0
1951 19.8 2.8 0.0 0.0 10.6 9.5 11.2 10.9 6.1 6.0 3.0 1.0
1952 20.3 2.8 0.1 0.1 10.7 9.6 11.5 11.1 6.3 6.1 3 .8 1.0
1953 20.8 2 .7 0.1 0.1 10.3 9.4 11.7 11.3 6.5 6.3 3 .7 0.9
1954 20.8 2.5 0.1 0.1 10.3 9.2 11.9 11.4 6.6 6.3 4.0 0.9
1955 21.0 2 .6 0.2 0.2 10.4 9.0 12.3 11.8 6.6 6.4 4 .0 0.9
1956 21.4 2.8 0.2 0.2 13.1 11.2 13.0 12.5 6.8 6.6 4.1 0.8
1957 21.7 3.1 0.2 0.2 9.6 8.6 12.3 11.7 6.8 6.5 4.1 0.8
1958 22.6 3.1 0.3 0.2 12.5 10.9 12.2 11.5 6 .7 6.4 4.1 0.8
1959 23.2 3.0 0 .7 0.7 9.8 8.5 12.2 11.5 6.7 6.4 3 .9 0 .7
1960 23.8 19.8 3.1 0.7 0.7 10.0 8.8 12.4 11.6 6 .7 6.4 3 .9 0 .7
1961 24.0 19.8 3.2 0.9 0.8 10.1 9.0 12.3 11.5 6 .6 6.2 3 .9 0.7
1962 23.6 19.4 3 .3 0.9 0.8 11.1 10.0 12.0 11.1 6.5 6.1 4.1 0.7
1963 24.5 20.1 3 .6 0.8 0.8 11.2 10.2 11.7 10.9 6.4 6.0 4.1 0.6
1964 24.5 20.1 2.9 0.5 0.8 0.8 11.3 10.3 11.2 10.4 6.3 5.9 4 .0 0 .6
1965 24.6 20.1 3.2 0.5 0.8 0 .7 11.1 9.9 11.1 10.2 6.3 5.9 3 .9 0 .6
1966 25.2 20.5 3.2 0.5 0.7 0.7 11.3 10.1 11.3 10.4 6.4 5.9 3 .9 0.6
1967 26.1 21.1 3 .2 0.5 0 .7 0.6 11.4 10.3 11.3 10.3 6.3 5.9 3 .7 0 .6
1968 26.4 21.3 3 .6 0.5 0.6 0.6 12.0 11.0 10.6 9.8 6.2 5.7 3 .6 0 .6
1969 26.8 21.5 3 .7 0.5 0.7 0.6 12.0 10.9 10.2 9.2 6.1 5.6 3 .6 0.5
1970 27.1 21.7 3 .7 0.5 0.9 0.8 13.0 12.0 10.1 9.1 6.0 5.5 3 .7 0.5
1971 27.8 22.4 3 .8 0.5 0.9 0.8 14.0 13.0 9.9 8.8 5.9 5.4 3 .6 0.5
1972 29.2 23.7 3 .9 0.5 0.9 0.8 15.3 14.2 9.6 8.5 5 .7 5.2 3 .6 0.5
1973 29.7 24.2 4 .0 0.5 0.9 0.8 15.3 14.3 9.3 8.2 5.4 4 .9 3 .6 0.5
1974 30.6 25.1 3 .9 0.5 0.9 0.8 16.9 15.4 8.2 7.2 5.2 4 .7 3 .6 0.5
1975 32.3 26.7 4.1 0.5 1.0 0.9 17.3 15.6 8.1 7.1 5.1 4.6 4.0 0.5
1976 33.0 27.4 4.1 0.5 1.0 0.9 18.4 16.6 7.7 6.6 5.8 5.1 4.1 0.6
1977 33.5 27.9 4 .0 0.5 1.1 1.0 17.9 15.9 7.6 6.4 6.5 5.8 3 .9 0.6
1978 33.6 28.2 3 .9 0.5 1.1 1.0 18.3 15.9 7.3 6.2 6 .6 5.8 3.8 0.6
1979 33.7 28.0 3 .7 0.5 1.2 1.0 18.0 15.6 6 .9 5.9 6.4 5.7 3 .8 0.6
1980 34.1 28.4 3.5 0.5 1.2 1.0 18.9 16.1 6.4 5.4 6.2 5.4 3.8 0.5
1981 34.5 28.6 3 .4 0.6 1.2 1.1 18.4 15.2 6.9 6.0 3 .8 0.4
1982 34.5 28.4 3 .4 0.6 1.2 1.0 18.2 14.7 6.5 5.5 4 .0
1983 34.2 28.0 3.1 0 .6 1.2 1.0 17.9 14.3 6.1 5.1 3 .9
1984 34.2 27.9 3.1 0.6 1.2 1.1 18.7 14.6 5.7 4 .7 3 .8
1985 35.1 28.6 3.1 0.6 1.2 1.0 17.6 13.1 5.5 4.5 3 .8
1986 35.7 29.0 2 .8 0 .6 1.2 1.0 17.4 12.5 5.7 4.7 3 .6 3.3
1987 35.9 29.2 2.6 0.6 1.2 1.0 17.8 12.3 5.1 4.3 3 .6 3 .3
1988 35.7 29.1 2.5 0.5 1.2 1.0 18.7 12.7 5.0 4.1 3 .6 3 .3
1989 36.6 29.8 2.4 0.5 1.2 1.0 19.2 12.4 5.0 4.2 3 .6 3 .3
287
L a b o u r  U n i t y  i n  U n i o n  D i v e r s i t y
Table C.5.1: Comnunist (and Syndicalist) Union Membership and Density (X ), Western Europe 1900-1944
FR GE IT NE SU
CGT CGTU BRI FAUD US I NAS SAC
members gross members gross members gross members gross members gross members gross members gross
1900 . . 8,881
1901 • . 10,526 . .
1902 100,000 0.9 7,934 0.6
1903 . . 6,000 0.5
1904 158,000 1.4 5,000 0.4 .
1905 . • 3,250 0.2 .
1906 203,273 1.8 3,718 0.3 .
1907 . . 3,414 0.2 .
1908 . . 3,674 0.3
1909 . . 3,454 0.2 .
1910 . . 5,247 0.3 .
1911 . . 6,180 0.4 .
1912 400,000 3 .3 8,097 0.5 , .
1913 276,000 2.2 9,697 0.6 3,700 0.2
1914 206,000 1.7 9,242 0.6 4,500 0.3
1915 40,000 0.3 10,510 0.6 4,900 0.3
1916 77,000 0.6 14,309 0.8 9,300 0.6
1917 238,000 1.9 23,068 1.3 15,200 0.9
1918 490,000 3.9 33,626 1.9 20,300 1.2
1919 995,000 7.B 111,675 0.6 500,000 4 .9 51,570 2.8 24,100 1.4
1920 1,193,000 9.2 100,000 0.5 37,125 1.7 32,300 1.6
1921 489,000 3 .8 349,000 2 .7 71,747 0.3 31,391 1.6 28,800 1.7
1922 490,000 3 .8 365,000 2.8 62,231 0.3 23,280 1.2 30,800 1.8
1923 491,000 3 .8 380,000 2.9 . 13,759 0.7 32,800 1.9
1924 491,000 3 .8 396,000 3.0 . 13,753 0.7 37,400 2.1
1925 505,000 3 .9 413,000 3.2 27,000 0.1 21,000 0.1 13,615 0.7 37,200 2.0
1926 525,000 4 .0 431,000 3.3 31,650 0.1 18,000 0.1 13,698 0 .7 36,200 2.0
1927 535,000 4.1 405,000 3.1 30,000 0.1 20,000 0.1 14,250 0 .7 32,000 1.6
1928 555,000 4.2 370,000 2.8 49,350 0.2 17,000 0.1 16,079 0 .7 28,000 1.5
1929 566,000 4 .3 411,000 3.1 48,000 0.2 . 17,361 0.8 26,300 1.4
1930 577,000 4.4 323,000 2.4 49,000 0.2 9,584 0.0 16,929 0.7 28,200 1.4
1931 560,000 4 .2 294,000 2.2 4,000 0.0 20,199 0.9 30,900 1.6
1932 533,000 4.1 259,000 2.0 22,512 1.0 34,000 1.7
1933 510,000 4 .0 260,000 2.0 19,562 0.9 36,600 1.8
1934 491,000 3 .9 264,000 2.1 12,956 0.6 36,100 1.8
1935 786,000 6.3 12,018 0.5 35,500 1.8
1936 2,584,000 21.2 11,356 0.5 33,200 1.6
1937 3,959,000 32.5 11,207 0.5 31,200 1.5
1938 3,469,000 28.2 10,652 0.4 30,600 1.5
1939 2,500,000 20.2 10,330 0.4 27,900 1.3
1940 . . . 23,300 1.1
1941 . . . 23,400 1.1
1942 . . . 22,600 1.0
1943 . . 22,100 1.0
1944 . . . . 21,900 1.0
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Table C.5.2: Connunist (and Syndicalist) Union Meafeership and Density (X ),
Western Europe 1945-89
FR IT NE SU
CCT CGIL E VC SAC
members gross members gross net nenbers gross nenbers gross
1945 4,473,000 38.9 162,323 22,100 1.0
1946 4,979,000 42.4 . 124,365 5.3 22,200 1.0
1947 4,549,000 38.2 . 176,873 6.4 21,400 0.9
1948 2,856,000 23.8 . 133,153 4.9 20,500 0.9
1949 2,823,000 23.5 . 135,242 4.9 20,000 0.8
1950 2,915,000 23.3 4,640,528 39.0 36.3 139,499 4.9 19,900 0.8
1951 2,746,000 21.9 4,490,776 35.5 32.7 19,500 0.8
1952 2,337,000 18.5 4,342,206 35.2 32.6 19,600 0.8
1953 1,979,000 15.7 4,074,648 32.2 29.6 19,000 0.8
1954 1,657,000 13.1 4,134,417 32.2 29.1 17,200 0.7
1955 1,579,000 12.3 4,194,235 32.5 29.0 17,000 0.6
1956 1,500,000 11.6 3,665,989 28.1 25.1 16,600 0 .6
1957 1,239,000 9.5 3,137,800 23.9 21.5 16,200 0.6
1958 1,350,000 10.2 2,595,490 19.6 17.0 16,700 0.6
1959 1,398,000 10.4 2,600,656 19.8 17.2 17,000 0.6
1960 1,410,000 10.4 2,583,170 19.6 16.8 17,600 0.6
1961 1,411,000 10.3 2,531,254 18.3 15.7 18,000 0.6
1962 1,415,000 10.1 2,610,843 20.2 17.3 18,700 0.6
1963 1,405,000 10.0 2,625,580 19.5 16.9 19,800 0.6
1964 1,422,000 9 .8 2,711,842 20.2 17.4 20,500 0.6
1965 1,432,000 9 .7 2,542,933 19.2 16.3 21,700 0 .7
1966 1,433,000 9.5 2,457,945 18.6 15.4 22,800 0.7
1967 1,434,000 9.4 2,423,480 18.2 15.2 23,000 0.7
1968 1,600,000 10.3 2,460,961 18.2 15.2 23,900 0 .7
1969 1,685,000 10.5 2,626,388 19.1 16.0 23,800 0.7
1970 1,693,000 10.3 2,942,517 21.1 18.1 23,500 0.7
1971 1,679,000 10.0 3,138,396 22.3 19.2 22,600 0.6
1972 1,669,000 9.8 3,214,965 22.6 19.5 21,700 0.6
1973 1,682,000 9 .6 3,435,576 23.7 20.5 21,100 0.6
1974 1,685,000 9.5 3,826,622 26.1 22.1 20,000 0.5
1975 1,708,000 9.5 4,081,399 27.3 22.8 19,000 0.5
1976 1,665,000 9.1 4,313,131 28.2 23.2 18,500 0.5
1977 1,607,000 8.6 4,490,065 28.7 23.1 18,100 0.5
1978 1,475,000 7.8 4,527,962 28.9 22.6 17,900 0.5
1979 1,359,000 7.1 4,583,474 28.6 22.0 18,000 0.5
1980 1,249,000 6.5 4,599,050 28.4 21.6 18,200 0.5
1981 1,257,000 6.5 4,595,011 28.3 21.0 17,600 0.4
1982 1,117,000 5 .7 4,576,020 27.9 20.1 17,100 0.4
1983 1,046,000 5.3 4,556,052 27.6 19.1 18,000 0.4
1984 998,000 5.0 4,546,335 27.5 18.4 16,100 0.4
1985 871,000 4.6 4,592,014 27.3 17.7 15,500 0.4
1986 772,000 3.8 4,647,038 27.2 16.8 .
1987 701,000 3.5 4,743,036 27.4 16.3 .
1988 651,000 3.2 4,867,406 27.7 16.0 .
1989 600,000 2.9 5,026,851 28.5 15.9 ■
SOURCES: own data co llec tio n ; DUES database (HZES, University of Mannheim); Visser 1989, '992. 
NOTE: BE 194S- and FR: net membership figures (excluding estimated non-active).
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